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SUMMARY 
This study explores the processes unleashed when state identity securltý is threatened 
through the endangerment of primary norms (including practices of democracy, as N\ell 
as power). In particular, it examines how these issues are played out in the context of 
6special relationships'. The responses do not always appear easily explicable in rational 
terms of state interest or codes of practice. Instead, what emerges is the state's need to 
protect the hegemony of norms against perceived subversion by the 'other'. This leads to 
an exploration of whether there is a 'politics of passion' that makes thinkable subjecti, ýe 
responses that are externalized as 'rational" policy, and if so, hoN'ý it plays out in 
discourses and practices in close state relationships over the short- and long-term. 
Using the case of American and British relations with Iran from the time of the 
Shah to the Rushdie Affair, I ask, 'What does the Anglo-American discourse. in its 
encounter with Islamic Iran, reveal about the dynamics of passion in special 
relationships? ' First, I propose a method for analyzing the contribution of emotions in 
discourse and its effect on policy-making, using identity theory and practices of 
constructivism as a framework. I narrow the focus to the reflexive emotions of pride and 
shame, and their discursive impact on establishing social bonds between states. Second, I 
argue that discourses of political passion inform the power politics of special 
relationships in two guises: through political love (in close relationships of solidarity and 
pride) and political strife (in *bad' relationships of shame and isolation). The analysis 
demonstrates that special relationships are not purely felicitous, but fall along a spectrum 
from those in which the social bonds are positive, to those in which false claims to 
solidarity and trust make them 'engulfing' (as was the case with the Shah), to those in 
which they are negative, being perpetually at risk and under attack (as has been the case 
with the Islamic Republic ever since). Third, by tracking discourses of political love and 
political strife across time, I demonstrate that emotionalized decision-making at moments 
of crisis can become reified into long-term policy orientations. 
In analyzing passionate constructions in Anglo-American discourses toward Iran, 
the 'special relationship' with the Shah can be seen as based on false pride, which vested 
British and American identity security in sentimentalized presumptions and practices of' 
'Iran-as-Shah', rendering opposition to him as dangerous and anti -de m ocratic. With the 
Shah's fall, 'the loss of Iran' was constructed as a betrayal of Western universalist ideals 
of democracy and their subversion by Islamic radicalism. Political love devolved into 
political strife as shame and anger on both sides maintained the social bonds, but 
transformed them into ones of pain and vulnerability. Iran's perceived humiliation at 
Washington's acceptance of the Shah into the US, and America's humiliation at Iran's 
seizure and holding of hostages, served to reify emotionalized responses in US policy as 
appropriate. Suspicion and blame. characteristic of a politics of strife, made possible the 
labeling of Iran as a rogue, and the launch of President Reagan's First War on Terrorism. 
In Britain, the Rushdie Affair and the accompanying fatwa issued from Iran were 
interpreted as endangering core values of freedom and democracy. inspiring 
emotionalized responses that mirrored those of the US, and strengthened a mutualized 
,, \noIo-,, 
Xmerican politics of passion toward radical Islam at home and abroad. 
'Fear of Persia was our chief motive: though afterwards we thought, too, of our own 
honour and our own interest. ' 
--Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. p. 80 
'Qualitatively, the emotional intensity of the identification of the individual with his own 
nation stands in inverse proportion to the stability of the particular society as reflected in 
the sense of security of its members. ' 
--Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 125 
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Introduction 
Page I 
'We have it in our power to begin the world over again. ' -Thomas Paine. Common 
Sense 1 
In response to the events of II September 2001, President G. W. Bush invoked 
democracy and liberty as the primary sources of American strength and leadership NN hen 
he said, 'Today our fellow citizens, our way of life. our very freedom came under 
attack .... Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world' 
(Bush 2001 ). Earlier that day, Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed to the strength of the 
community committed to those sentiments, declaring: We. the democracies, must come 
together, ' (Blair 2001 ). Bush and Blair, by invoking values their publics would inherently 
understand and identify with, were drawing on a heritage of meanings that would serve 
not only to unify their nations in crisis, but place Americans, Britons and other 'freedom- 
loving' peoples in opposition to those who were supposedly not (Silberstein 2002: 7). 
Bush's and Blair's responses were swift and emotional, and underscored the basic 
normative building blocks of their nations' identity: democracy, freedom. justice. and the 
defense of 'good' in the world. For both, 9/11 was not just a terrorist attack on a pair of 
buildings that cost many lives, but an attack on the primary norms that defined their 
nations, and a clear warning that the world had changed as a result (Larsen 1997: 17)-. 
These were not moderate responses to soothe popular suffering, but incitements to anger 
and outrage. Theirs was a passionate call to arms to protect the honour, credibiljtý', 
legitimacy and power of Britain and the United States - an act of what I call political 
passion (Kelman and Fisher 2003: 322-3). 
Democracy as exemplified in Britain and the US, is generally understood in the 
discourse of their elected leaders, themselves the models of its application, as a 
benevolent and inclusive political system, and hence, the cornerstone of peace and 
I, Fhomas Paine, in Isaac Kramnick, ed. (1987) Common Sense (Harmondsworth. Penguin), p. 41. 
1 - Larsen uses the term 'go, - erning statements' for what I call here 'primary norms'. see Henrik Larsen 
(1997) Foreign PolicY anti Disco urse .4 nalysis (London: Routledge). 
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stability (Doyle 2005: 463, Kissinger 1957: 1). When. for example, President Jimmý 
Carter stated in his inaugural, 'The United States will meet its obligation to help create a 
stable, just and peaceful world order, ' (January 20,1977). Cold War differences among 
democracies were recognized as being relatively peripheral. and democracy of aný, kind 
was considered preferable to communism, though perhaps not to all manifestations of 
dictatorship (Oren 2004: 17; Shaw 2001: 187). At the time, the prevailing, or dominant 
discourse presupposed democracy to be a 'brute fact* and therefore conceptuallý 
unproblematic (despite wide variations in practice and purpose) (Searle 1995: 2). This 
constitutive view of democracy, based as much on domestic political norms as on the 
abi I Ity of those norms to be distributed, was understood to embody not 'ust American and 
British identities but universal human identity based on incontrovertible, and thus, shared 
common human values and aspirations. The representation that American and British 
democracies epitomized models of these values informed their relations and encounters 
with non-democracies, producing an inclusive discourse constructed on the presumption 
that all nations and peoples could become democratic. Difference, in this discourse ýýas 
constructed as acquired rather than inherent and therefore as temporary, and bounded 
only on 'the basis of a past/present dichotomy , in which the 'present' of others was akin 
to the West's 'past' (Barkawi and Laffey 2001: 4; quote in Rumelili 2004: 32). 
Promoting democracy as an enabler for others to become more like Western 
I iberal states, instantiated the production of a set of 'guardian/chi ld, relations with those 
non-Western states, outside the grip of the Soviet Union. that expressed a desire to 
democratize, including Bhutto's Pakistan, Perez's Venezuela, and Pahlavi Iran (Doty 
1996: 89; Millikin 1999: 94). This set of relationships, 'ostensibly nurturing' but 
obscuring 'and justifying practices of domination', had the advantage of including these 
states within the West's security framework. and thereby performativelN, producing (and 
reproducing) the US role as the leader of the free world, and the West as the bulwark of a 
liberal political paradigm (Doty: ibid). This was seen to systemically reduce the 
likelihood of interstate war through ýýhat were perceived as the shared norms that 
inspired peace among those v, ithin the community (Diamond 1992; Doý le 1986, among 
others, for contrary ., ie\\. Barkawi and Laffey 200 1 ). 
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Yet, events unfolding in Iran two years after Carter's assumption of the 
presidency revealed the application of democracy to be a project of plural interpretations. 
re-problematizing the presumption that the Westem model held unk,, ersal appeal. 
American and British reactions to the revolution, the fall of the Shah and the rise of an 
Islamic government in Iran further showed that their own interpretations of democrac,,, - 
and even freedom were not inclusive when the *child* does not proceed down the 
'guardian's' chosen path (Rumelili 2004: 38). Rather than being uni'ý ersalist. their 
interpretations were contingent on notions of secularity, and capitalist modernity. as ý\ell 
as their own Western-centric historical and religious traditions (Petito and Hatzopoulos 
2003: 6-9; Rupert 2001: 158). In fact, these were the very components ýNihich represented 
how they articulated themselves, and the points of difference that defined their identities 
in respect to 'others' (a point made by the proponents of democratic peace. see for 
example, Brown, Lynne-Jones, and Miller, eds., 1996: ix-xxxiii). 
Iran's blurring of the boundaries of what constituted the hegemonic discourse of 
liberal democracy, combined with its rejection of important Western norms and practices, 
was shaming for Britain and the US, which represented themselves as avatars of its 
practice and morally chosen for its dissemination. The special relationship ý'kith the Shah, 
discursively expressed in what I label political love, and which was constructed around 
social bonds of we-ness, shared security concerns, development commitments, trust, and 
other elements of mutuality, was transformed as the discourse eroded into ., 'Vhat I call 
political strife, in which the social bonds remained vibrant, but became constantly 
threatened. As the political ideology and form of government adopted by Iranians fell 
outside the Anglo-American discursive geography of comfort, Islamic Iran ., ýas 
understood to be inherently 'Other' (that is, as non-Self, rather than less Self), and 
therefore, having a 'present' that was unlike the Western 'past' and hence, un-moldable. 
This view was based not on objective fact - that Iranians did not ýkant and could not 
achieve democracy - but on subjective perceptions of ýý, hat democracy entailed, and 
hoýý 
Iranian practices failed to conform to those entailments. In an externalization of these 
sentiments, the Islamic Republic was labeled an illiberal democracy, theocracy or as 
simpl\ 'barbaric and beyond the imagination' (Senator Abraham Ribicoff, 'Proceedings 
and Debates of 96 th Congress'. May 17,1979, quote in Bill 1988: 284). Anglo-American 
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political discomfort with the religio-political content of the neýý Islamic Iran figured it as 
a danger to Western security, and Shia radicalism as a threat to the universalist creed of 
democracy and Western hegemony over the *modern' (Zakaria 2003. Geldenhu\ s 2004). 
Labeling it a rogue and terrorist ensured it remained a focus of discursi,. e strife. 
indicating that a 'special relationship' was being perpetuated, but as one of isolation. in 
which the bonds were perpetually being put at risk (Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 18) 
Yet, the danger Iran represented was not an objective threat to Western territory, 
economic practices, or security establishments (except for its ý,, Jthdra%val of US rights to 
the observation posts along the Soviet border). It did not strike up alliances ýý ith the 
West's enemies, and did not fall into the Soviet camp (Cottam 1990: Hermann 1990). 
The threat Iran represented was subjective and more fundamental. By adopting its oýý n 
universalist creed based on the laws of an established and wide-ranging religion, it 
rejected the special relationship it had enjoyed with the United States and the Western 
alliance, and by so doing, endangered the hegemony of the universalist idealism of 
American, and more broadly, Western liberal democracy; though a regional poýýer, it 
suggested an alternative to global ordering, particularly regarding the unsettled claims 
that the only way to be humane and modern was according to American-led Westernized 
norms. Iran's threat was normative and inspired strong political emotions: it endangered 
the security of Western identity. 
In this study, I explore the processes that are unleashed when identity security is 
endangered and primary norms defining the self (including practices of democracy as 
ýkell as power) are threatened. In particular, I look at how these issues are played out in 
the context of 'special relationships'. The responses do not always appear easily 
explicable in rational terms of state interest. Instead, what emerges is the state's need to 
protect against the perceived subversion by the 'other'. This leads me to explore hoýý a 
'politics of passion' plays out in the discourses and practices of states in close 
relationships with other states over the short- and long-term. 
The Questions Posed 
Fhis studN addresses the issue of identity security as it relates to that of a hegemon and its 
normative community, which together empo\\er a specific intemational order and define 
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who can be party to it. From a theoretical standpoint. the central question is: "Hoýý does 
hegemonic identity, conceived by the United States and Britain as bein-(-' erripmýered bN a 
universalist normative vision of democracy. confront the threat of a competim"; 
universalist vision? In unraveling the answer, a second theoretical question arises in 
regards to the emotionalized, apparently 'irrational' approaches to policy-making that 
appear to privilege primary norms over 'interests': Is there a politics of passion that 'is 
activated when primary norms are threatened? This leads to se--, eral spec ic questions. In 
the context of the case study adopted here, the first is: How did 'the loss of Iran' and the 
special friendship it offered, govern Anglo-American identity politics to produce radical 
Islam as a threat to democracy and the next global enemy? The second is: What does the 
Anglo-American discourse, in its encounter with revolutionary Islamic Iran, reveal about 
the dynamics of special relationships? Rather than conceiving them as simpl" felicitous. 
can they instead be analyzed across a continuum, from positive to negative? 
I attempt to address these issues in the context of relations between Iran and the 
two leading proponents of the Western democratic project, the US and Britain. I do so in 
a period that begins with the last Years of the Shah's reign and ends with the Salman 
Rushdie Affair. In the course of this enquiry, the norms and moral equivalencies 
associated with liberal democracy appear to shift in response to the perception of threat 
and the need to learn new ways to confront it, implicating not only short-term cognitive 
engagement in decision-making, but a reifying of sentiment in long-term outlooks. The 
third specific question therefore is: How did Anglo-American responses to the politics of 
Islamic threat result in an increasingly exclusive interpretation of the conditions possible 
for Western-defined democracy? 
The context for the study of Iran's relations with Britain and the United States is 
therefore the shared Anglo-American discourse. This is not to claim that Washington and 
London had parallel relations ýýJth Iran during this period. The,. ý did not. The relationship 
bet%\een Iran and the US was openly referred to as 'special'. certainly from 1972. when 
Kissinger and Nixon gave Iran unfettered access to US militarN products, until the Shah's 
fall (Zonis 1991). Though Britain's relations N\ere 'special' with Iran until the 
nationalization of Iranian oil under Prime Minister Mossadeq. thereafter it ý\as less so. 
althouoh the tN\o countries remained close diplomatically. militarik. and commercialk 
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until the advent of the Islamic Republic, and it was Britain's Ambassador Anthoný 
Parsons, as much as the United States' Ambassador William Sullivan upon ý, Oom the 
Shah relied for advice and support in the last days of his reign (Parsons 1984: Sullik an 
1981). Thereafter, the hostage crisis had a special effect on LýS- Iran re I at ions. ýkhich did 
not characterize Iran-British relations until ten ý, ears later when the Rushdie Affair 
erupted. 
The claim being made is that American and British conceptions of self. and the 
historical continuity of the role identities they have assumed in global affairs constitute a 
shared field of Anglo-American discursivity (Bell 2006; Bially Mattem -1005, Dumbrell 
200 1; Laffey and Weldes 2004: 355). Further, their own 'special relationship' of close 
alliance, bolstered by intelligence and security exchanges, is constitutive of 'ýýe-ness'. a 
discourse of mutuality that is sufficiently thick that 'there is a conscious project to merge 
identities by making domestic structures more alike' (Bially-Mattem 2001, quote in 
Buzan 2004: 30). At times, their differences (or disagreements) ý01 trump that ý%hich is 
shared, and the discourse is interrupted (Bially-Mattem 2001 ). Yet, the linkages that 
inform their actions as well as the meanings associated ý% ith them, form a complex mesh 
of discursive practices that often confounds critics for how easily it re-connects into a 
mutual discourse in times of insecurity and fear (Dumbrell 2004: 237). The 'ý've-ness' of' 
shared norms surrounding democracy. which is constitutive of both nations' sense of 
mutualized identity and common perceptions of threat, provides the foil for the 
subsequent analysis of how Anglo-American constructions of Iran became passionate. 
brief review of the shared aspects of British and American identity as constitutk, e of this 
discourse therefore follows. 
The 'thick' Anglo-American discourse of democracy 
The term exceptional ism' is most commonly associated -vith the American creed of 
Nlanifest Destiny, what Weinberg defines as 'in essence, the doctrine that one nation has 
a pre-eminent social worth, a distinctiveIN lofty mission. and consequently. unique rights 
in the application of moral principles' (Weinberg 1963: 62). Yet, it is equally applicable 
to the political self-image of Britain, x0ich, though contributing to the precariousness of 
British identitN, hangs on despite the stripping aN\ w, of its empire (Gamble 2200-33: 5 1.63). 
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The concept of bearing trusteeship over other nations less developed than their 
own is deeply ingrained in the identities of both nations, what Kipling described in 'The 
Recessional' as 'the White Man's burden'. or in American terms. 'the burden of 
leadership in the fight for world peace' (Truman 1952. State of the Union speech )3 - For 
both states, this is instantiated by their conception of themselves as standard -bearers of 
Westem democratic civilization (Colls and Dodd, eds. 1986. Shama 2002: 262-_l 14). Each 3 
takes credit for pioneering fundamental cultural, political and economic aspects of liberal 
democratic modernity that evolved originally as domestic expressions of go'. crnance 
before being projected outward (Habermas 1996: 2 1; Laffey and Barka%ý 1 1999: 408). 
Importantly, the interfacing of this process through the politics and institutions of 
Christian ethics-that 'covenant between God and man' in John 'Ninthrop's ýýords, or 
civitas in Hobbes'-served to ground its legitimacy on moral grounds (Gutman 
1996: 342; Hobbes 1969: 11.10.8; Roper 1989: quote on 4; Tuck 1989: 57-58). 
Although the 'universalist' claim has more often been seen as a t,. picall,, 
American form of idealism (Kennedy 1961), the deep British conviction that their system 
of freedom is not only 'universalist' but the original altruistic inspiration for the 
internationalist project can be seen in this speech by Queen Elizabeth II on the 17 th of 
October 1953 marking the anniversary of the Magna Carta: 
'it was in these fields of Runnymede, seven centuries ago, that our forefathers 
first planted a seed of liberty. which helped to spread across the earth the 
conviction that man should be free and not enslaved! ' (Engraved plaque, Lincoln 
Castle). 
Me use of concepts such as 'destiny', 'leadership', *sowing seeds of liberty', 'moralit,, '. 
and 'civilization' as narrative staples to illustrate British and American perceptions of 
their particular democratic vision, privilege the benevolence (and .,, eil any ulterior 
purposes) with which they understand their project of dissemination to be motivated 
(Dunne 20033). By its very nature. then, it is a 'natural' goal for humanity, which admires 
and aspires to emulate it. Hence, its 'goodness' has been naturalized (and thus. can be 
3 rhis is not to saN that other empires have not arrogated to themsek es the unique capacltý to rule oý er 
less 
Cýi\ourecl peoples and lands than their oNýn, beginning wth the Romans, and including the French, NNho 
described their purpose as a 'mission ci\ ilizatnce'. In all of these, the impnmatur of the di,. Me is an 
,a role similar to that used 
b\ monarchs and so, ereigris to justiýN their rule o\ er important factor, pla-N Inv 
their domestic population in pre-democratic times. 
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continuously defended). Not only do the ends offer a rationale for justifl, ing means, but 
the means are perceived as to be naturally above reproach. since they are being 
undertaken by those already espousing (and benefiting from) universal values of freedom 
(Bisely 2004: 50; Doty 1986; Thatcher 1986: 41-2). 
The use of such rhetoric, and the passionate belief in relational hierarchý. 
remained (and remains) little sullied by contradiction or adverse circumstance-an 
important aspect of the nature of exceptionalism. and an important interest of this study 
(Ikenberry 2004: 613-, Oren 2004: 21). Yet both states have consistently encountered the 
dilemma that bequeathing freedom on others constrains their own (Burke 1912: 26: Doty 
1996; Mayall 1998; Tidrick 1992: 4). This has meant that the continuencý of British and 
American identity as the paragons of 'good' (in British parlance, chi,,, alrý and altruism) is 
continuously at risk, since, in the words of Kermit Roosevelt, it is necessary at times to 
'do the dirty work of democracy' (Doty 1986: chapter 3, quote in Kinzer 2003: 4). 
Leadership has required independence to choosevhich 'good' should predominate. Yet. 
for the US, even more than the UK, the need to be seen as acting \ý ith rectitude so as to 
ensure it was loved and admired as a moral force, continuously has undercut that 
independence (Doty 1986, Ignatieff 2005). Because it was the image that was important, 
the 'pleasing illusion' (Michael 2000: 159), the unassailable position of the 1ý, S as leader. 
therefore, perpetually has depended on its being the arbiter of meanings and practices it 
could define as 'democracy' and 'freedom'. To maintain its image, the discourse of 
6ends' has had to trump any tarnishing aspect of 'means'. These 'means' (and hence, 
meanings) must be positioned so they can be viewed and adopted as acceptable, 'natural*. 
and honourable, a risky and yet crucial component of the Anglo-American discourse, and 
one that has made it continuously dependent on the approbation of others, not least their 
allies in the third world (Doty 1996). 
The points of similarity-and familiarity-between Britain and the US in their 
interpretation of power and its discursi,, e projection in role identities of world democratic 
leadership can be seen to have roots in a broad field of Anglo-Saxon heredltarý claims, as 
\\ell as specifics of territory. the sequential linkage of global po\ýer. and as mentioned 
earlier, the institutionalization of -\ýe-ness' in a special relationship -persistently 
v 1998: quote on 2: 1 laseler 2007: sentimentalized and rnýthologized' bý both (Danche 
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65). For Britain, the building not just of empire but of Pax Britannia, as well as her 
special role as the dowager of all other English-speaking nations, 'pro,, -ed' and ýkas 
productive of the view that international order was best preserved through the leadership 
and diligence of the Anglo-Saxon model (Bell 2007; Churchill speech to American 
Congress 1946). To Churchill, as to Seeley. Truman, and many of their successors on 
both sides of the Atlantic, an Anglo-American discourse v, as a natural deý elopment. 
sharing not only kinship but common values, aspirations and capacities (Gamble 
2003: 34; Haseler 2007: 73; Mayall 1998; Michael 2000). With the devolution of the 
British empire and the passing of Western (or non-communist) leadership to the United 
States, a former colony, power, in a unique twist of history continued to be expressed in 
the same language and according to similar socio-politico-economic models (Gamble 
2003: 90-91; Halliday 1994: 112-113: Harvey 2003; for contrary view, see O'Brien 
2003). The perceived right to steward mankind sat easily upon their respective 
6 exceptional ist' shoulders, despite moments of extreme friction between the two, 
particularly in the I 9th century and over Suez (Haseler 2007: 72). As the US took on the 
role of hegemon, it enabled their shared claim to universalist values to inform not only 
the global project of democracy, but to become the core of Western discourse. 
Complementing the similarity of their cultural approaches was the fact that the 
US, like Britain, was territorially separated and self-contained, a maritime power 
protected by its oceans and therefore able to choose the level of insularity or openness 
with other stateS4 . Territorial self-containment contributed to 
both states' perception that 
notions of public and private are only thinly divided, individual threat quickly being 
interpreted as national insecurity, and vice versa (McAlister 2005: 209). Arrighi 
interprets this similarity in concrete terms when speaking of the changeover from the 
British empire to the US: 
'In both instances, the hegemonic role fell on a state-the United Kingdom in the 
eighteenth century. the United States in the tý\entjeth centurý--that had come to 
enjoy a substantial 'protection rent', that is, exclusive cost advantages associated 
ý\ ith absolute or relative geostrategic insularity. ' ( 1994: 62). 
4 This argument is made persuasIN el, bN %lead, Russel (2007) God and Gold: Britain, America and the 
MakingqftheModei-n Woi-ld(Ncýý York: Knopf). 
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This ability to be insular or engaged at will can be seen in their approaches to the Middle 
East, where the US and UK have filled complementary roles, the former almost 
seamlessly replacing the latter as geopolitical heavy-weight, and filling its shoes as the 
main trade partner. military strategist and supplier, and protector of the Gulf and its 
surrounding states (Beeman 2005: 65). In no instance was this partnership of engagement 
and withdrawal clearer than in the coup that overthrew Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq 
in 1953, a project conceived by the British government in response to his nationalization 
of Anglo-Iranian Oil, but which was conducted by the CIA under President Eisenhower. 
though still bearing the imprint of British design (Farmanfarmaian et al. 1997, Kinzer 
2003; Roosevelt 1979). In fact, as Beeman dryly notes, 'the United States repeated all 
the old political patterns that the British had employed: strong-arm tactics in the oil 
market, demands for diplomatic immunity, undue influence on the throne, monopolistic 
trade concessions and an imperious attitude' (Beeman 2005: 65). Significantly, though 
the US dominated Iranian military and commercial trade, and exercised the greater 
political influence on the Shah at the time, it was Britain's BBC which was credited by 
supporters and detractors alike of being a key media player during the revolution 
(Sullivan 1981: 191,210). 
Media dominance by both the US and the UK, is a key emblem of their 
conceptions of self, liberal democracy, and mutual esteem, and fulfills an important role 
in projecting this image abroad (Larson 1986). At the same time, their respective media 
serve as the rhetorical loudspeakers through NNhich political players in different parts of 
the world are figured as pro- or anti-democracy, freedom loving or anti-Western, and, as 
Such, provide imagery and signification to events and agents that come to be understood 
as such not only throughout those parts of the world less able to provide themsek, es their 
own media voice, but within the larger Western community in which allies are vested 
xý, -ith an interest in maintaining a community of broadly shared values for shared gains 
(Barnett 1994: 411). Information dominance, with its implied success in the marketing of 
neýýs, as ýýell as in its collection and analysis, plays a key role in positioning Anglo- 
American narratives at the core of Western discourses on democracý (Hippler 2000: 68). 
In short, though British and American social and political identities spring from 
different histories, tile shared normati, ýe underpinning of the liberal doctrine that informs 
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their view of the international order and their own roles, ýkithin it, and ý%hlch has 
constructed their powerful relationship of , %% e-ness. constitutes a surprlsinglý resilient 
Anglo-American discourse (Bially Mattem 2005). Both are strong proponents of the idea 
that security is best maintained by a system of like states ýklth similar political sý stems. 
and social and cultural structures. Cultural and religious pluralism must thus be priýatized 
if peace among states is to be maintained (Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003: 6). The idea that 
domestic political similarities are determinants of collaborati\e relations underpins. of 
course, the theory of democratic peace, as well as Oren's critique of that thesis in %0ich 
he sees 'democracy' as 'America-like' and hence. that there should be no surprise in 'the 
proposition that "America-like" countries do not fight each other' (see L',, 'nn-Jones et al 
1996: preface; Doyle 1986; Mearsheimer 1990, Oren 2004: 179). Thatcher summed up 
the we-ness behind the shared identity security in her 1983 speech at the Winston 
Churchill Foundation awards dinner, 
'Differences between us? Yes, we have few, but they are as nothing compared 
with the things we share - our resolve to defend our ý, ý'ay of life, to deter all 
threats and to ensure in the end that triumph of freedom which American and 
Britain work for, long for, and believe will one day come' (1986: 95). 
In the next section, I offer a general overview of the literature on identity security 
and its effect on East/West relations, pointing out gaps particularly as related to the 
questions posed in this study. As my intent is not an exhaustive reviek"', but to illuminate 
the existing discursive figuration of Anglo-American identity security in relation to 
democracy and Islam, I will focus here on themes that reflect the logic of the literature 
that does exist (Sayyid 1997: 18). A more detailed literature discussion accompanies each 
chapter. The reviexý, below is followed by a description of the five keý periods proposed 
for study, and more generally, xO,, a re-assessment of the Anglo-American relationship 
ith Iran is an apposite subject, not only for the theoretical insights it offers. but because 
it remains misunderstood, and Net. is so critical for pollcý formation going 161-Nýard. 
Evaluating the Literature 
There is a -vast literatUre dedicated to American and more generall% 
Western security 
ISSLICS. such as orand strategy. security communItles. and response to threats (Adler 
1 Q97. 
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Adler and Barnett 1998; Barnett 1996: Doyle 1995: Frederking 2003. GeldenhuN s 2,003. 
Ikenberry 200 1: Walt 1987, among many others). 
In contrast, there are few examples of literature on American and European 
identity security, although it is a growing topic. Particularly apt are Buzan (2004) The 
United Stute. ý and the Great Powerv, which examines identit", - in terms of polaritN and 
power-, Campbell (1998) Writing Security, in which American concepts of self and other 
form a narrative of identity discipline that evolves from re-creations of historical 
discursive practices; Chilton (1996)SecurityMetaphors which investigates American 
security through foreign policy paradigms, Doty (1996) Imperial Encounters ýOich 
unpacks the North South relationship as constitutive of northern - and especially 
American and British - concepts of security and power, Kubdikovd (2001) Foreign 
Policy in a Consiructed World, which addresses identity security in the context of several 
different regional conflicts; Ger6id 6 Tuathail (1996) Critical Geopolitics (particularly 
chapter 6), in which American strategy toward internal conflict in Bosnia is viewed 
through the lens of ego idealism and metaphor-, and Weldes' (1999) analysis of the 
production of US credibility, toughness and masculinity in a politics of identity played 
out in the Cuban missile crisis. All of these have been extremely useful in the 
development of this study. 
There is also important literature on special relationships, although it tends to 
tocus on specific relationships between the US and other states: Britain (Bartlett 1992: 
Danchev 1998; Dumbrell 1997,2004, Gamble 2003; Walsh 2003, among others), 
Thailand (Fineman 1997), and Israel (Stephens 2006: among others). There is little 
theoretical analysis of a structure which bears a name coined by Churchill, but Xýhich 
Stephens notes is 'under-theorized and under-conceptualized' (p. 1). Instead, she 
observes, 'We are left with little more than assertions by politicians that the relevant 
relationship is -special" (ibid). Although she defines specialness, as necessitating 
specific attributes, such as 'pervasiveness. durabilit\ and legitimacy', as \\ell as 
transparency and multi-level em-lagement, she does not offer a rounded theorN of special 
relationships. nor does she address variations on the theme (chapter 1. quote on 4: 
Danchev 1998). 
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In terms of Anglo-American relations with Iran, there is no lack on engagement 
with the Shah and thereafter the Islamic Republic (Cottam 1988; Ehteshami and 
Vareshteh, eds. 1991; Ganji 2006; Gasiorowski 1990,1991, Halliday 1979,1998, 
Keddie 198 1; Kinzer 2003, Ramazani 1982,1990: among others): on political Islam. 
particularly Iranian inspired (Fuller 2002; Hippler and Lueg 1995: Pipes 1983,1993. ed., 
Roy 1994; Wright 1985), or Islamic terrorism (Celmer 1987; Hoffman 1998; Kepel 1994. 
Lacquer 1999; O'Ballance 1997; Piscatori 1983-, Post 1984; Taheri 1987: Turner 1991). 
However, there is little that addresses these questions in the context of Western identity 
security, as analyses tend to be realist and instrumentalist (see for example, Hunter 1992. ). 
It can be argued that Zonis' (199 1) Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah, which 
explains the Pahlavi era through political-psychology. addresses in passing the identity 
security of the US in relation to the 'grandiosity syndrome' he contends ýý as the Shah's 
dominating flaw. 
Perhaps most useful is Pollack's (2004) The Persian Puz--le: Conflict between 
Iran andAmerica. Pollack's encyclopedic history of modem Iran sums up the 'might 
makes right' celebration of the tension between American power based on legitimacy and 
American power based on force - that is, in Thucydides' terms, between hegemonia and 
arche (Lebow 2001: 548-9). As the most significant American academic practitioner to 
compose a serious treatment on Iran in the wake of 9/11, his discourse can be understood 
to represent mainstream American practice and outlook over time, and indeed, his 
knowledge of Iranian social and religious trends. particularly the sources of the Islamic 
political doctrines that Khomeini espoused as the basis of his ideology, reflects that of 
many other US analysts (see Kemp 1994; Rubin 1981, Wright 1985, among others). In 
this regard, specific information on the Islamic opposition to the Shah, and its theoretical 
bases, is either absent from these accounts, or dismissed as irrelevant (for discussion of 
this in general Middle East context, see Ayoob 1991; Niva 1999). This persistent gap 
helps to illuminate the self-referential nature of American power. In this sense. Pollack's 
can be construed as a primary source as it is both revisionary and a discursl,,. e marker. 
There Is considerable analysis of identitN security leading up to the end of the 
Cold ýVar oriented toýý ard Iran and its internal responses to eN ents both ideological and 
militarv (Arjornand 1988. Ehteshami 1995. Fischer and Abedi 1990. Rahnerna and 
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Behdad 1991, Scio Ii no 1999), or the impact on Iran and the NI iddle East of ýarious 
actions and ideologies emanating from the West (see for example Afary and Anderson 
2005, Esposito 1990; Keddie and Gasiorowski. eds. 1990: %lenashri, ed. 1990: Ramazani 
1986; Tehranian, ed. 2003). Works by Iranians tend to fall into three camps: pro-Shah 
apologists, who see little but barbarianism in their successor regime (Ho""eýda 1998: 
Nahavandi 2005; Taheri 1987), Marxist-liberals attempting to unpick ýNhý the revolution 
never developed into a leftist or secular movement and seeing the hostage crisis as a 
means for the clerical leadership to claim the radical high ground (Abrahamian 99) 1 3. 
Ganji 2006; Irfani 1983, Milani 1994); and members of the disenfranchised intelligentsia 
both horrified and deeply disappointed by the revolution's actions (Arjornand 1988: 
Bakhash 1985; Bani-Sadr 1982; Zabih 1982 ). 5 For a Iýrical and scholarlý exploration of 
identity without these resistances, see Mottahedeh 1985. 
Interestingly, although there are various analyses dedicated to the changing 
security challenges of the Gulf, particularly as a result of Iran's revolutionary export 
programme (Adib-Moghaddam 2006, a]-Saud 2003: Potter and Sick, eds. 1997). and the 
implications on foreign capabilities and interests (Adib-Moghaddam 2007, - Chubin 1994, - 
Chubin and Tripp 1988; Cordesman 1987; Ehteshami and Vareshteh. eds. 1991 : Joffe 
199 1; Halliday 1996; Mojtahed-Zadeh 2003), there is little that addresses their impact on 
the identity of Western powers as perceptions of danger and the role of Islamic 
resurgence shifted (Ansari 2000: 49-5 1, Esposito 1992, Hiro 1985: 164-185; Murphý 
2003). Zunes (2003a) is unusual in his willingness to identi(y both American and British 
approaches to the Gulf in terms of their investment in a specific post-Cold War order. and 
their impetus 'to defend their hostility towards these countries in the name of collecti"e 
security and other I iberal ideals' (p. 100; see also Keddie 1987). 
A claim made particularly in American. -conservati,, e' scholarship on political 
Islam and its historical engagement vvith domestic as vell as Western societies, is that tý 
*in ferioritý ', 'co I lective paranoia', 'conspiracy theories", I nab, I itý to keep up mth 
5 13N the time these works were publ I shed, most of these %ýrjters %ý ere al read NI mm I grants, whose %ie%%s, 
lio%%e%er neatlý put, re%ea I the pain and bittemess of their o%%n I oss in the face of Khomeini's gain. 
The 
hostage crisis in particular serves as the crucible of their own misreading of Iranian 
identit, - and the modem 
political po%%er of Islam. For those scholars that ha\e continued to analyze Iranian policý, their 
books do not reflect the political emotion that emanates so clearl,, in this set, SUgue, ýting that as catharsis 
\% as achie\ ed. the passion subsided, if not the pain. 
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modem technological advancement' and other -typical' Nliddle Eastern *characteristics' 
contributed to an outpouring of militant Islam directed at the West (Leýý Is -'002-. 
Netenyahu, ed. 1986; Pipes 1983,19912002; for contrary view, Ajami 1992, Bill 
1988). Yet, analysis is sparse regarding how Western society became articulated as the 
object of Islamic ire and how its own responses to this development are social 1,. deri-ý, ed. 
The exceptions, which address Western identity and conceptions of self in relation 
to security and democracy as formulated through the lenses of the Middle East, are 
impressive for their acuity, and their care in avoiding passionate constructions. See 
particularly, William Beeman (2005), who couches his study of the demonization that 
characterizes relations between the US and Iran in anthropological terms that addresses 
both cultural and discursive resistances: Melani McAlister (2005) %Oose Epic 
Encounters. - Culture, Media and US interests in the Middle East since 1945 examines the 
ýpolitics of representation... as well as the development of an often uneven and contested 
public understanding of history and its significance' in relation to American 
entanglements in the Middle East., and Bobby S. Sayyid (1997). 4 Fundumental Fear: 
Eurocentrism and the emergence of Islamism, who adopts a construct] vist approach to 
analyze Western concepts and fears of fundamentalist Islam. Other works worth 
mentioning are A. Salvatore's (1997) analysis in Islam and the political discourse ol 
modernity, A. Mirseppasi's (2002) study of Iran in terms of development theorý - Naveed 
Sheikh's (2002) The New Politics qf Islam, which situates analysis in terms of 
international relations, Ofira Seliktar (2000) who utilizes discourse analý'sis to 
problematize American policy conflicts within the Carter administration-, and Yllmaz and 
Bilgin's (2005/6) discourse analysis on Turkey's identity production. 
The Structure of the Study 
Chapter 2 laý s out the critical constructivist theory that provides the framework for this 
study's anaiNsis of identity endangerment and responses to It. In this section, I advance an 
approach for expanding theoretical ly on emotional ltý ýý ithin identltý politics, placing it in 
the larger paradigm of normative theorý. As the emotional motiN ators upon N, h ich I focus 
are those released by perceived threats to NNell-being. and prompt defensiNe moNes and 
discourses of 'lo, ýe' or 'strife', I ha,. e called them a 'politics of passion'. -1-o test rný 
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initial hypothesis that political passion not onlý affects decision-makin_ý!. but becomes 
reified in long-term policy profiles, I confine my theoretical analýsis to the specific case 
of dyadic security communities, that is. special relationships. and suggest that these in 
turn can be viewed across a continuum of felicitous special relationships. special 
relationships of false pride, and negative special relationships. Using aspects of political 
psychology as it applies to shame and pride in state decision-making. I utilize discourse 
analysis to develop an understanding of the role of normative self-defense in both short 
and long-term processes of international relations. 
In focusing on Anglo-American relations ýý, Ith Iran, I propose five periods for 
analysis in which policy is most clearly informed by passionate political constructions of 
democracy and Islam as contingencies of identity security: I) the N car leading up to the 
fall of the Shah, 2) the revolution, 3) the hostage crisis, 4) the first War on Terrorism, and 
5) the Rushdie Affair. These constitute important resource points in US and British 
articulations of their own universalist ideals and how they engaged ýý ith and confronted 
Iran's; likewise, these were critical moments in establishing the conditions of possibilit% 
for enabling policies later adopted in response to the (second) War on Terror. 
The third chapter addresses the period just before the Shah's fall in which 
American and British discursive relations with Iran were sufficientlý close as to be 
definable as political love, but in fact, one that was over engulfing, and which thereby 
established what became thinkable and possible in policN terms during the re-ý, olution and 
after. The passionate construction that 'Iran \ýas the Shah' had implications for the close 
I guardian/child' duality that compromised Western preparedness for change inside Iran, 
and led to the passionate discursive patterns concerning democracy and secularism that 
\\ould structure ensuing Anglo-American perceptions. 
The fourth chapter investigates how processes of American and British identitý - 
creation (and their conceptions of democracy and security) were elaborated in their 
responses to the revolution proper. The main focus is on UIS responses to Iran. as this was 
the dominant relationship and is the source of the richer body of textual material for the 
period. Nevertheless. it \ýas the Anglo-American ideological 111, ýestment in Iran, inscribed 
in the promotion of democracy and modemltý, and Western universalist \ alues that 
oo\erned their pcrceptions of events. This influenced ý6ether Iran's experience . ýas 
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understood as a nascent popular democracy attempting to reformulate goals of modemaN 
and articulated sovereignty within a legitimating Irano/Islamic context. or as a clerical 
coup, a medieval throwback that rejected modernity and výas a danger to regional. and 
eventually, global, security. 
The focus on US discourse continues in Chapter 5, which takes up the hostage 
crisis. This was a specifically American experience, a point of *no return' '. vhich 
solidified the construction of Iran as a rogue and the US as innocent 'Victim, elaborating 
the discourse around radical Islam in emotionalized terms as a more generalized site of 
threat. The revival of historical memory enshrined in the captivity narratiN e provides a 
useful paradigm by which to understand US perceptions of private and public. as Nýcll as 
the appropriateness of passion in policy development. 
In Chapter 6, the analysis remains almost exclusively on American discourses 
toward Iran during Ronald Reagan's War on Terrorism, not only because the US (in 
conjunction with Israel) was the primary power articulating the threat of international 
terrorism as emerging from the rise of militant Shia Iran, but because Iran did not 
significantly figure in Britain's identity construction during this period. This chapter 
explores how the US constructed terrorism along similar discursive patterns as 
totalitarianism, enabling the two dangers to merge as primary threats to Western notions 
of democracy, and eventually, making it possible for Islamic terror to replace Soviet 
communism as the West's greatest enemy. 
In Chapter 7, the focus shifts to Britain and the discursive crisis that emerged ký ith 
the Rushdie Affair. This event had important domestic and international implications for 
Britain's identity security, as it exposed the contingency of deeplý, embedded notions of Z_- I 
tolerance and inclusivitN,, in the face of alternative interpretations by the Muslim 
community. Khomeini'sfiatwu further served to polarize emotional responses around 
'freedom of expression' versus 'freedom from blasphemý, '. contributing to a discourse of 
Islamophobia that linked the threat of Shia and Sunni militancy both inside and outside 
Britain. The Affair served not only to narrow liberal constructions of acceptable 
democratic practice in Britain. but acted as a landmark in the affirmation of a shared 
narratl,., e field N\ ith the US. re,, ital izing- an Anglo-, -\merican discourse toý, ý ard Iran and 
radical Islam as dangers to international order. 
CANI, ' ' LAE 
LiNivEiý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In conclusion. the discourses by which the [Aited States and Britain represented 
themselves, their articulation of democratic norms and their construction of Islamic 
danger as a product of identity threat will be analyzed over time. In the process. the 
politics of passion will be examined for its ability to signal how the social bonds linking 
states together are maintained and transformed. Emotionalized behaviours expressing 
alienation or solidarity will be examined for their ability to motivate learning and 
promote change. Although policy is always a construction of choices and preferences, 
this study attempts to locate how certain preferences and choices become privileged. and 
makes the claim that threats to identity evolve upon defense of fundamental, constituti,,, e 
norms, rather than material self-interest, engaging the play of emotion in their protection 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 912). Although this does not disclaim that other forces 
are at work as well, the intent of this study is to identify the causal impact of sentiment on 
international relations in the short and long term. The purpose of unveiling these 
discursive patterns is not just to understand American and British policy in the Iranian 
case, but to understand 'the historical conditions of possibility of meaning and action' 
(Torfing 2003), that is, how the politics of passion refigures the range of policy options, 
and how dependent identity is on the precarious imaginary of self and conceptions of 
security. 
This research, confined as it is to one case study, thus suggests possibilities for a 
further research agenda that utilizes political passion to enquire into special relations in 
other situations and with other states, such as US relations ý% ith Batista's Cuba and 
Chang-Kai Chek's China, its close alliance vith Israel, and the fraught relationship 
between Greece and Turkey. The Rushdie chapter likexkise suggests the possibility for 
research on relations between host states and internal ethnic communities, such as The 
Netherlands and its Moroccan immigrant groUPS. 
6 
Iran as a case study for political passion 
Iran's revolution and democratic experiment offers an important case for re-theorizing 
US and British policy responses not only for its immediate and ongoing relevance to the 
Anolo-Arnerican grand strategy in the Gulf rc(-, ion. but for what it can reveal about the 
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construction of Britain and America's own passionately held positions in relation to 
radical Islam and Islam ic-terrori sm (a term first used in the Shia Iranian context). 
Importantly, the change that the relationship underwent - from passionate embrace to 
bellicose dislike - offers an ideal discursive structure to study the politics of passion. and 
map out the factors that affected the transition from political love to political strife. 
Additionally, it offers a significant case where the exchange of rhetorical salvoes bemeen 
the two sides - the 'representational force' used in the attempt to compel the other to 
behave differently - involved similar discursive charges of irrationality, barbarity and 
terrorism, a power politics of identity that in effect failed to affect the 'other' in the ýý ay 
intended, leading to long-term implications for their figuration not only of the 'other' but 
of the dangers embedded in the current international order (Bially-Mattern 2001: 35 1). 
Approaching the issue in this manner may likewise offer a theoretically based answer to 
the question, why have they narrated the same identities vis-A-vis each other for so long'? 
(Bially Mattern 2005: 23). 
Prevailing rationalist theories, both realist and liberal, for the breakdown in 
British and American relations with Iran explain it in terms of strai ght- forward power 
politics reflecting the fact that when principle (such as support of human rights) and 
interest conflict, the latter will triumph (Ganji 2006; Ikenberry 2001; Moravcsik 1997; 
Wait 1987; Waltz 1979). Such approaches take for granted that the anti-Westem 
political-religious movement in Iran was anathema to the ideological framework of 
American and British democratic universalism, and thus hostile to their securit-V, and 
national interests. This realpolitik argument explains American and British responses in 
terms of Soviet-American regions of influence (Kuniholm 1990). the drying up of Iran as 
a significant arms market (Pollack 2004); the 'loss' of Iran as an important regional ally 
tor the West and for Israel (Hoogland 1990); the growth in Iran's rapport ýýith the PLO 
and adoption of its terrorist methods (Ledeen and Lewis 1996. O'Ballance 1997. Taherl 
1987). the impact on OPEC and specifically the stabilitý of the Gulf monarchies (Murphý 
'003, Potter and Sick 1997), and the axN kward non-aligned character of the revolution 
outside common proxy-war boundaries (AdibAloghaddam 2006: Rubin 198 1 ). The 
difficulty is that the explanatory power of this argument is insufficient: it fails to address 
" Appreciation goes to Dr. Jerrold Post for this observation. 
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the roots of the breakdown, why the new Iranian sý stem ký as viewed ýý ith such fear and 
suspicion by the US and the UK, and why, in all the years since. no dialogue has been 
able to be cobbled together by states that share many material and geo-strategic interests. 
Because the hostage crisis followed so soon after the changeover from the Shah to 
the Islamic leadership Oust nine months later), and was itself such an extraordinary eý. ent. 
the significance of the initial stage of the revolution-labeled by contemporaneous 
studies, and the media as a 'debacle' (Ledeen and Lewis 198 1) and 'tragedy, (Bill 1988, 
Sick 1984)-has largely been eclipsed. Yet, it was the broader implications of the 
revolution, not specifically the hostage crisis, that first drew Samuel Huntington's 
attention as sparking 'an intercivilisational quasi war ... between Islam and the West 
(1996: 2 16). And although many analysts have taken subsequent catastrophes in the 
Middle East as the genesis for the negative Anglo-American discourse toward 
fundamentalist Islamism, such as the Beirut bombing, Iran-Contra, the first Gulf War, 
the first World Trade Centre bombing (Bennett 1994, Fuller 2002, McCrisken -1003, 
O'Ballance 1997), it was Iran's revolution that constituted the first case in ýý, hich Islam 
was politically incorporated into the structure of government, and served as the 
introduction of politico-Islamic imagery as a staple in TV newscasts beamed into 
American and British living-rooms (McAlister 2005). So interchangeable ýýere Iran and 
Islam in fact, that, Richard Cottarn observed, 'by Iran, everyone understood, was meant 
the forces of Islamic political militancy' (1990: 285). 
In an attempt to further understanding, rather than just explanation. a re- 
examination of Anglo-American discourses from the inception of the Iranian revolution 
through to the Salman Rushdie Affair a long decade later, appears overdue. Rather than 
presupposing democracy, the nexus of secularization with modernization, or securitý'. to 
be objective facts, this study conceives of them as cultural constructions formed in the 
ongoing production of identity. For this purpose, the Iranian case offers an ideal 
magni(ying (glass, for it was perceived from the outset as threatening three fundamental 
and inter-related aspects of American and British identities. In rejecting the Anglo- 
., \i-nerican model of democracý. Iran ýNas seen to threaten 
its universalist appeal: bý 
incorporating Islam Into nationalist politics, Iran \ýas understood to he obscurantist, 
Putting at risk secular liberal modernity as an internationalist creed, bN aggressiýCIN 
Chapter I Page 21 
adopting a *neither East nor West' policy and instead promoting Islamic communit. y as an 
active alternative to Westernization (or world communism). it was construed as hostile to 
American and British policies for a world order based on economic liberalism and 
democratic peace (Huntington 1999; Ikenberry 2001: 22). It is not the purpose of this 
study to ascertain the 'truth' or 'falsity' of these representations, but rather, to reveal how 
they enabled certain practices and policies that can throw light on Anglo-American 
behaviour. 
The Iranian revolutionary period brings together several elements that critically 
affected discourses of democracy, modernity and security. First, it serves as an 
emblematic beginning point in the relationship of the United States and Britain towards 
political Islam as the Cold War wound down and a landscape of Islamic terror began to 
take shape. Not only is it a critical juncture in light of Halliday's description that, in 
combination with the hostage crisis, 'no single event in modern history since the outbreak 
of the Korean war in June 1950 has so concentrated US attention on a Third World crisis' 
( 1990: 250), but it prompted the first War on Terror(ism) under President Ronald Reagan, 
an initiative that, though itself unspectacular, codified policies that would ballast and 
inform the second War on Terror under George W. Bush (C. Simpson 1995). Though 
both these developments are normally framed as security issues, they can be seen to 
reflect a shift in Western perceptions of the global order as no longer divided between the 
1ree world' and the 'communist' world. 
This is not to suggest that Iran constituted the first or only case of democracy 
alternatively interpreted. Revolutionary Iran's importance stems from how it served to 
reconfigure the concept of Western democracy as an international project. Within the US 
and England themselves, democracy has undergone a history of interpretations often 
informed by significant events that have reflected issues of domestic as well as foreign 
concern. For the UK, the loss of the Suez Canal connoted in effect the Final demise of the 
British Empire, an event that fundamentally changed British identity and self-lmagerý, 
and made possible the impulses that led to the important period marked b,,, social 
democracy (Colls and Dodd 1986). For the United States, it ýNas the ýNar in Vietnam, 
N\hich focused public doubt on the internal functioning ofAmerica's democratic model, 
\\ ith political and academic reformist repercussions that for a time painted American 
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exceptionalism as having reached its final demise (McCrisken 2003: Chapter I Oren 
7 2004). In both these cases, outside phenomena ýý here seen as sites of contestation for 
what Oren has termed a 'nationalist' drive in both the [ýS and UK to perfect their own 
democracies. 
The case of Iran, by contrast, resulted in contestation over the discourses of 
British and American 'international' democratic identity, positioning it squarely in the 
realm of international relations. Iran's metamorphosis. and Anglo-American responses to 
it, therefore raises the question of what exactly was being secured. What is clear is that 
Iran became notjust another little Third World 'other', it represented its own, confusing, 
uncharted danger to Western democracy, complete v, -ith its own expansionist capability. 
On a macro level, it can be argued that what was being secured was the 
hegemonic discourse of democracY-the North's versus the South's as a determinant of 
world order. The power of the former to ensure exposure for its discursive construction 
across a wide spectrum (through scholarly exchange, commercial relations, media reach 
and government clout) would generally be assumed to ensure that the discourse of the 
stronger and more powerful American and British entities would trump Iran's on the 
world stage (Doty 1996; Karim 1997; Weldes, Laffey, et al 1999). Yet, Khomeini's 
designs to export Islamic revolution succeeded in exposing to those in the Islamic ummah 
an image of the West as imperialist, exploitative, debauched, and godless, ýkhile at the 
same time inspiring new visions of aAari'a-based alternative. This, combined ýýith the 
support President Carter gave to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, contributed to a neýk and 
resurgent politico-theocratic discourse and sense of identity in the Middle and South East. 
Though vvilling to partner N, ýIth the US against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the success of 
that venture Ný, as imputed by the mu. jahedeen to a radicalized Islam - much like it had 
been in Iran. The genesis of the competition between the 'the West's' and the 'Islamic' 
hegemonic discourses, therefore. can be seen to have its roots in the Iranian experience. 
7 See, I ikemse. Caparoso 1978 on the NkaNe of democratization in Affica and Latin America Nkhich I ed to 
discussions that questioned British and American (and other Western) representations oftheir oýýn motke'ý 
as ben evo I ent. At issue, hoxke\er %%ere not the bas Ic tenets of the un I ýersalist ideal but ho%% cap I ta II st greed 
\ýas being allo\ýcd to o\er-ride this ideal. Finallý. more moderate communist states. particularlý 
Yugoslavia, otTered at times the promise of'socialist-capitalist structures worthy of emulation, scc Oren 
2004: 17. 
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At the same time, norms of modernization needed securin, -j. The parlay of Islam 
within new conceptual i zat ions of democracy, in an atmosphere of freedom not onlý from 
the Shah's oppression but from interference by great powers, sparked a significant 
reformulation of the modern, which had until then preconditioned de\ elopment and 
liberal governance on Western secular models. Iran's Islamic government represented an 
independent reading. As one example, the Islamic Republic's success in carrying out one 
of Ernst Gellner's two revolutions linked to *the tidal wave of modernization . that is, the 
conversion of subjects into citizens (1992: 11 ), remained (and remains) ýN idel) 
unrecognized by Anglo-American policy makers (see also Cottam 1986). Iran 
represented the first example-and an enduring one-of the return of religion into the 
formal structure of government, and a strong model of its legitimating power in modern 
nationalist politics and social organization. As Petito and Hatzopoulos (2003) point out. 
the reappearance of religion has re-introduced the 'clash of civilizations' debate. not as 
Huntington conceived it, but as a dissonance between the Anglo-American code and the 
needs of those nations whose own codes fail to mesh with it. This is reflected in the 
growing emphasis on 'authenticity' in third world development, where ,,, alues associated 
with liberal democracy, seen to be the products of Western tradition, fit uncomfortablý' 
and are ill-suited to the cultures and needs of emerging states (Mirsepassi 2000). 
Finally, representations of political Islam as 'dangerous' necessitated securing, a 
project that for over a decade entailed its close association with the 'subversions, of Iran. 
For example, symbols and concepts associated with such terms as 'fundamentalism', 
Jihad' and Islamic terrorism, among others, derive their modem interpretive meanings 
from the experience of the US and the UK with Iran. Further, as other events unfolded 
which have enmeshed the Islamic world with the West. the process of constructing and 
reconstructing Islam has simultaneously and continuously impacted on representations of 
Iran. This study conceives the representation of Iran, therefore, as not only the first, but 
an ongoing incidence of Nkhat has become ýN ithin the Anglo-American discourse. a 
conceptual izi ngy of states and political movements characterized or influenced by radical 
Islam. The reification of this discursive pattern has produced tension and fear, an 
outcome that \\as not incý, itable, as privileging different narrati-ves in both British and 
American traditions could have evoked different grammars and different outcomes. 
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'The possibility of constructing, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics is worth 
exploring'. --Hans Morgenthaul 
Over the past decade and a half, a growing body of scholarship has been drawn to anaIN'sis of 
state relations within close communities, and the discourses they use to secure solidarity. 
normative confluence, belonging, and shared views of international ordering (Adler and 
Barnett 1998; Bell 2006; Bially Mattern 2005, Buzan 2007, Campbell 1992; Dietz 200 1-, 
Frederking 2003; Levy 2003; Rumelilli 2004; Wendt 1992, among others). This reflects a 
departure from the theoretical dominance of power politics and material interests, and a 
growing acceptance that identity can act as a determinant of security communities (Biallý' 
Mattern 2005; Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1989). Using security relationships as a 
locus of examination, therefore, avoids difficulties that other state relationships might incur. 
In this study, special relationships, which inculcate the security dimension, are my focus: the 
Anglo-American special relationship, and the special relationship enjoyed by lran, ýý'Ith both 
the US and the UK at the time of the Shah. However, in exploring the rupture of the latter 
security community, patterns that marked closeness reveal themselves in chiaroscuro and 
mirrored in a relationship of hostility. Thus, I argue, a positive special relationship has its 
opposite in a negative one, characteristics of which escape definitions of pure power politics. 
and, inasmuch as they reflect aspects of felicitous security communities, can be studied using 
similar theoretical markers of identity. 
Adler and Barnett (1998) argue, as do Janice Bially Mattern (2001: 350), Buzan 
(2007), Ickenberry (2004: 616-17). Lincoln (1989: 9) and Rumellili (2004) that securitv 
communities are characterized by a compelling identity of '-vve-ness', in vvhich practices of 
violence and power politics appear to become secondary to the application of trust and a 
discourse for resolving differences. This ',,, N, e-ness' evolves not just from the shared interests 
and mutually advantageous gains that elicit the choice to join together. It is reflecti% e of the 
act of communion itself. and the discourse that elaborates what it means to be a member of a 
II lans Mor-enthau (1985) Politics ainongNations. - The strmZQle. l()I-poWer and pe(We, 6 th ed., reý. Kenneth W. ýl 
Fhompson (Ne\% York: Knopf), p. 7. 
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specific -in' society. Learning to be a member of the community is part of the shared process 
of establishing 'transnational... "cognitive regions'", with different members acting as 
-teachers' at different times (Adler 1997: Adler and Barnett 1998: 33). The shared discourse 
adopted by those on the inside therefore itself constructs and shapes the membership. since. 
as observed in social theory, discourse *is not only an instrument of persuasion. operating 
along rational (or pseudo -rational) and moral (or pseudo-moral) lines, but it is also an 
instrument of sentiment evocation' (Lincoln 1989: 8). The discourses of identity that secure 
those inside, work to empower the group's members against mutually perceived threats on 
the outside - dangers that are socially constructed in opposition to their shared norms (Doty 
1996). Friendship, therefore, can only be truly established with a state (or states) that shares 
fundamental similarities of identity, or which chooses to so define its interests that they 
mirror those of the other state in critical respects (Kemberg 1976. - Post 1986). In 
psychological terms, this type of relationship has been labeled narcissistic (Freud 1971: 526). 
In a hostile relationship, shared discourses likewise construct a 'cognitive region' and often in 
narcissistic forms, though in an atmosphere of continual suspicion and alienation. These 
negative special relationships are oriented toward rhetorical conflict maintenance rather than 
peace-building.. 
Yet gaps remain in our comprehension of how group composition (and interaction) 
affects long-term policy-making, or reflects processes and heuristics outlined in political 
psychology (Levy 2003; cf Dietz 200 1; Lebow 198 I: chapter 5; Neumann 2004; Weber 
1995). Important investigation has gone some way in analyzing the effect of external crisis 
on inter-community behaviours and its impact on re-assigning meanings to signifiers of self 
and other in the discourses of foreign policies that ensue (Ross 2006: Tuathail 1996: Weldes 
1999). There is less analysis on the effect of internal crisis on state friendship. Bially Mattern 
has investigated the rejection of the discourse of community by both members. and the re- 
fastening of the discourse of we-ness through representational force with effects at the 
leadership, bureaucratic and public levels (2001,2005). She does not address the intended 
rupture of a security community by one of its members, the inadequacý- of representational 
force to refasten norms and preferences to the special relationship. or the illipact this has on 
the need and ability to secure the identity of the one (or ones) that remain. 
By looking at the simplest form of international community. that of a special 
relationship between two states. I investigate first. how the breakdown in the shared 
perception of mutualized identity. that *extension bet, ýý,, een self and other' (Wendt 1992: 'iM). 
becomes an issue of identity security as one party adopts an alternatiN e discourse of norms 
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and international ordering; second, how this impacts the ensuing representational politics of 
re-signifying friend as foe. The process of re-securing identity can be deconstructed to reveal 
both *rational' and irrational' responses to new contingencies. In the realm of the *rational'. 
the responses by the 'jilted' state, for example. might include redrawing the boundary 
defining self from other, re-signifying the danger represented by the other. and disciplining 
the discourses of self so that the new practices and meanings that constitute identity are 
produced as an apparently natural consequence of, and consistent with. prior preferences and 
perceptions (Walsh 2003). However, observation suggests that often responses are highly 
emotionalized as the 'jilted' state - finding itself rejected, along kvith the norms and other 
shared values of 'we-ness' that contributed to its self-definition - perceives the need for 
immediate and mobilizing self-defense. Protection of primary norms, such as honour. 
legitimacy and credibility will trump material interests until the danger has been discursively 
overcome. These responses, drawing on primary norm protection rather than 'objective' or 
ýmaterial' self interest, may not, according to the lexicon of power politics, be *rational' 
(even though they may be rationalized as such), though in the language of identity politics, 
they constitute a (subjective) claim to survival. 
Closer examination reveals this is only half the picture; actions by states within what 
appears to be a felicitous normative community (such as a security community or special 
relationship) likewise may reveal subjectivities in policy. Extreme commitment to 'we-ness' 
will at times promote tolerance by one state for internal inconsistencies or threatening 
behaviours in the other which, if practiced by other states, would not be overlooked 
(Ikenberry 2004: 617); the 'blind' trust shared by 'in' states may also lead to a relaxing of 
foreign policy practices in regards to the other that can open vulnerabilities in intelligence 
gathering and security measures (Marcus 2003). The question arises therefore. are such 
special relationships in fact 'good'? Scheff and Retzinger. in their study of emotions and 
violence, suggest that 'engulfing' relationships that demand conformity and identivy, 
on the part of one or both parties, might appear outwardly strong but are in fact suffocating, 
and therefore, contain the seeds of strife (1991: 15). Similarly, a relationship of enmitý- in 
vý-Iiich tx, ý-o states are involved in a spiral of negative rhetoric and rejection. is in fact still an 
enmeshing liaison kvith ongoing social bonds, but it is one of isolation. constantIN, \-ulncrable 
and threatened by the other. 
Although post-structural explanations offer a partial picture, the,, - do not fullN- explain 
policies in wliich states apparently ignore their own best material interests or codes of 
practice for the sake of'promoting the sentiments ofsununum honuin or sunimion inahon. 
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Political psychology goes some way in explaining this conundrum in that motivated bias (that 
is, emotionality) at the decision-making level has been observed to be common at times 
*involving high stakes and consequential actions that might affect important values, (Levy 
2003: 264). The result is judgments that 'are often rationalizations for political interests or 
unacknowledged psychological needs' such as fear, guilt and desire (Jervis 1985: 25). The 
study of motivational bias, however, has been confined to the agent level at particular 
decision-making points, and has not been tracked as an aggregate affecting and becoming 
embedded in long-term policy orientations (Ross 2006). 
I therefore suggest a broader theory to include the emotional. The ability of the 
constructivist method to 'defamiliarize' the familiar by throwing new light on meanings and 
practices, offers a useful approach for the analysis of emotions' impact on those same 
processes (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Ross 2006: 198). However, tracking emotions cannot 
mirror norm analysis, since as Ross argues, emotions are 'fugitive' and hence difficult to pin 
down in regards to how much control they exert and to what unexpected objects (memories, 
social habits) they may become attached. It is my contention that constructivism contains the 
tools to address such ambiguity, since, although norms and emotions are different, norms can 
likewise function in unpredictable ways and perpetuate perplexing combinations - 
particularly in relation to identity and normative change, challenges that constructivism has 
met (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Ross 2006; Seliktar 2000: 3,6). 
It is my intent to investigate the social construction of meaning through discourse 
analysis not only to focus on specific moments within the decision-making process, but to 
situate them in a broader decision-making framework over time - thereby illustrating how the 
parts sequentially fit into the whole, and vice versa. My purpose is to unpick the role of 
sentiment from that of norms within the discourses of amity/enmity and to illustrate how it 
contributes to the construction of estrangement and the policy formations that follow. in this 
case specifically in a binary relationship. A useful framework upon which I draw is the 
concept of political narcissism, which reflects the self orientation of the state. and enables 
emotionality to be contrasted with cognitive processes. In so doing, I argue that political 
passion as expressed through special relationships infon-ris the power politics of identity in 
2 
two guises: as political love and political strýlý. These opposite discursive formations are 
I have adopted 'love' and 'strife' from the fifth century BCE Greek philosopher Empedocles, who described 
all social processes as emanating from tN%o opposing forces. Love (philotis), which unites, and Strife (eris), 
which di% ides. See Bruce Lincoln ( 1989) Discourse w7d the Construction qJ'Socieo-, Comparative studles ol 
mi-th, ritual and, -lassificatioll (Oxford: Oxford Uniý ersjtN Press). p. 176 ft. 9. 
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not confined to moments of crisis, but are instead, long-term continuities that function as 
rhetorical strategies of inclusion or exclusion. 
I develop these points in three sections. The first discusses state identity and state 
relations using both the theory and method of constructivism and discourse. The second 
proposes a theory of political passion, specifically in the context of a special relationship. 
highlighting the political impact of two families of relational emotions: shame and pride: and 
draws on cognition in political psychology as well as the study of narcissism. The third 
suggests a methodology for studying the role and effect of political passion in response to 
identity (in)security in special relationships. 
Discourse, Agency and Part-Whole Analysis 
In problematizing the role of passion in interstate relations for the purpose of understanding 
Anglo-American constructions of Iran (and vice versa) over time, I go beyond the 
'hermeneutics of recovery' in which hidden meanings are made intelligible. to focus on social 
structures in which meaning is constructed through discursive practices such as negotiation 
and decision-making (Howarth et al 2002: 129). To this end, I locate analysis on an anti- 
foundationalist epistemology. I recognize that events or the existence of objects as real-world 
phenomena exist 'external ... to thought', but that truth is contingent (Campbell 
1997: 7, 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 8,10). To discover processes of truth creation involves 
denaturalizing the practices and meanings that have become fixed in representations of self 
and other by recognizing them to be reified and socially constructed. At the same time, as 
Kowert notes, constructivism 'insists on the importance of agents as "-ell as structures', how 
they see themselves and how their world views shape national behaviour (Kowert 1998/9: 2). 
This last point is critical, since it is an agentic contribution (emotionality) to the normative 
structures that is of interest here 3 (Fierke 2004: 484). 
Further, to discover how certain meanings and practices come to inform specific state 
relationships requires investigation into how presumptions and habits of thinking become 
embedded in state identity - and how resistant to rational decision-making that might make 
them. In other words, if state identit-v becomes defined through reified practices. identity 
Security, by implication. would appear to become increasingly important. A moratorium on 
questioning and challenging accepted truths -, ývould suggest the need for a discourse that 
I -a, -, ent-dri 
' utilitarian and instrumental approaches, This stands in stark contrast to the beha, ý, iour outlined in i 
iN en 
see J. G. March and Johan P. Olsen 1989 'The Institutional Dynamics of 
Intemational Political Orders'. 
: pp. 943-969 Intemationtil Otýqani: wiwi . Vol. 52) (4) 
Xutumn . .1 
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justifies marginalizing alternative voices and interests, while increasingly disciplining 
domestic perceptions of the danger of the inter- subjective space. In this critical theoretical 
approach, the 'egoistic' state that proceeds toward self-protection through cold rationalitv. as 
understood in realism and liberalism, instead reveals itself to be a -passionate" state. risking 
its self interests and inter-relational position for the sake of defending subjectivelý, - embedded 
truths, even if - or particularly when - still justifying its moves as rational. The 
emotionalized construction of truth, therefore, would appear under certain circumstances to 
be contributory to a politics of passion. What interests me here is to determine when and how 
a politics of passion over-rides balanced politics to become critical to the conduct of foreign 
affairs. If and when those circumstances prevail, how does a politics of passion then affect 
the construction of such concepts as democracy, freedom, and danger? 
The state of the scholarship 
Theorizing the politics of representation, that is, the social rules that give meaning to 
material facts and structures through the constitutive power of language and text. has drawn 
from an array of methods and approaches developed in various fields including psychology. 
sociology, anthropology, history and linguistics. Interpretation of what constitutes the 
ontology of power politics is as variable as the labels used and the methods adopted, despite 
there being claims of universalist intent (Doty 1996: 168; Guillaume 2002: 12). Indeed, a 
plethora of nomenclatures have been adopted, depending on the disciplinary roots of the 
practitioner, or the influences adopted (Ashley 1989; Bakhtin 198 1, Bially Mattern 200 1, 
2005; Checkel 2004; 1998; Der Derian 1997; Dietz 2001; Doty 1996, Frederking 2005; 
Guillaume 2002; Howarth et al. 2002; Laclau and Mouffe 1985. Seliktar 2000, Weldes 1999: 
Wendt 1992, among many others)4. 
' Criticism has been rife conceming the lack of focus on research and method in this endeavour at re-evaluating 
international relations scholarship. One criticism derives from discomfort with what is seen as relaw, ism in 
post-positivist, a-causal approaches to international relations , see John A 
Vasques ( 1995) 'The Post-Posltjý Ist 
Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory after Enlightenment's Fall' in 
Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theon. Today (Pittsburgh: Pennsý lvania State 
University Press), 17-240, for ripostes to this view see W. Connolly ( 199 1) ldentitvýDiýl('_, rence. - Democratic 
Ncgotiations oj'Political Paradox (Ithica, NY: Cornell Univ. Press). p. 174, James Der Derian (1997) 'Post 
I'heory: Ethics in International Relations', in Doyle, Michael W. and G. John Ickenberry, eds.. Veit Thinking in 
International Relations (Oxford: Westview Press), p. 58. ). Another criticism, stems from the perception that it is 
'fuzzy', %k ithout rigorous empirical methods or testable criteria, see Friedrich V. KratochN% il and John 
G. Kuggie 
(1986), 'Intemational Organization: A state of the art or an art of the state, ' International Organi: ation. Vol. 40 
(4) Autumn , pp. 753-76.. 
For discussion see J. Milliken (1999) 'The Study of Discourse in International 
Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods'. European Journal oj'International Relations, 5 (2). pp. 22 5- 
'54, and Ma - (Cambridge: ja Zehfuss (200 1) ('onstructivism in International Rclations: The Politics qj'Reulhý 
Cambridge Unkersitý Press). 
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My theoretical approach runs close to N111likin's (1999) three 'commitments' of a 
generalized (and in some sense hierarchically ordered) discourse analysis: 1. "Discourses as 
systems of signification' in which *people construct the meaning of things' in a relational 
structure of signs; 2. *discourse productivity', in which *discourses define knowledge' and 
authorize certain truth regimes and their spokespersons while silencing others, and 3. "the 
play of practice', in which discourses are seen to be constantly re-articulated, and hence, are 
-historically contingent', (which suggests that the 'constructivist turn' offers a useful 
dimension to international relations study through engagement with subjugated discourses. 
not just dominant ones ). 
What emerges is the need to problematize that which others have taken for granted. 
assumed, or reified as exogenous to what are subjective contributors to relations betxeen 
states (Ashley 1989; Campbell 1992; Connolly 1991, Foucault 1980; among many others). 
Looking at structures and practices as endogenous variables enables analysis of how 
identities inform interests and behaviours, which Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein point out 
is 'a characteristic blind spot in the rationalist vision' 0 989: 66). 
Developing theories that include those subjectivities in international relations is 
gaining traction, its current hurdle being to re-introduce emotionality back into a scholarship 
that has, since the behaviouralist and realist turns, been dominated by positivist approaches 
(and biases) (Marcus 2003: 183,185). Yet, as Crawford (2000) observed in her ground- 
breaking 'The Passion of World Politics' in International Security. 'Theories of international 
politics and security depend on assumptions about emotion that are rarelv articulated and 
ýOich may not be correct' (116). Emotions, she contends. are *ubiquitous' and *irnplicit'. a 
ý, Iew backed up by Hill, who states 'Feeling and intuition are just as vital attributes of 
decision-i-nakers as thinking and sense-based observation' (2003: 116). Nonetheless. as a 
recent reprise of the subject by Bleiker and Hutchison point out, scholarship on emotions in 
\k, orld politics is still thin, there being little discussion of methodology or systematic inquiry 
into critical issues. despite general acknovOedgyement in the academe after the appearance of' 
Crawford's paper (and one by Jonathan Mercer delivered to the ISA in 1996). that it %ý as a 
subJect of significance (2008: 116. see also Fierke -1004-, Linklater 1004. Mercer '00 ). 
6 
Emotions in International Relations 
For an alteirriatke paradigm of commitments, namek, 'Sernioloov. Genealow, and 
Dromolop'. ce James Der 
Derian 1997, 'Post-Theory: Fthics in International Relations'. op cit.. pp. 63-14. 
6 Bleiker and HLAChison's citations, howeN er. indicate that there has 
been significantl,, greater interest hoýý 
emotions impact IR in the interN ening eight ý ears (see parlicularlý foomotes 39 and 
40 2oO8 op c It.: 1 
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Why study political passion as a separate or 'subset' process in the relations of states? After 
all. non-native theory has until now generally defined perceptions as incorporating emotional 
propensities as much as values and historical experience in the construction of identity. The 
best reason for adopting such an approach is that it offers the ability to explain puzzling 
actions of states that don't fit within either a realist/liberal paradigm or a straightforward 
normative one, and therefore, remain unsatisfactorily explained. Critically, understanding 
emotional positioning can throw light on why certain identity roles or norrns are privileged 
over others, that is, why states make certain choices and not others at any given point. By 
examining the role of passion in politics, states can be understood to act for reasons that 
reflect other continuities within their makeup - and which are there ý, vhether we as scholars 
choose to recognize them or not. Just as the normative relationship to the ontology of 
international relations analysis was obscured in the period predating the post-positivist debate 
by the proposition that reason could be separated from perception, so too with the emotional 
content of both international relations practice and theory (Smith 1992: 490). It is not just that 
emotional influences should be focused on more thoroughly, but, to paraphrase Smith. the 
more problematic is the premise that the subject is unavoidably emotionalized. The bearers of 
agency (however the debate on agency evolves and however agency is configured in any 
II Nvill given state) have bodies and minds with capacities *that interact, and 'A'hich in politics 
always exceed the agency exercised by rational subjects' (Coole 2005: 125). 
One important observation must be made here: emotional motivation is a frequent 
attribution in international relations, but tends to be attributed to 'others', particularly Middle 
Eastern, and other Third World or 'southern' 'others', in contrast to the 'selr (Doty 1996; 
Kabbani 1986; Karim 1997). Atkin observes this of the perceptions that informed US-So,, ýiet 
relations: JI]rrationality is credited too often with too much influence in tsarist and Soviet 
foreign policy... because beliefs in certain irrational motives is viewed as a criterion for 
disapproval of the policies themselves' (1990: 10 1). This itself is a an emotional response. as 
Said makes clear in his landmark Nvorks investigating normative and emotionalized 
constructions in history and international relations (1979; 1997). What remains under-studied 
is the emotional content of political representation and power relations as a (generalized 
lactor, and not just as the expressions of certain cultures and peoples that *cannot 
discern 
betvveen reality and fantasy' (Peretz 1984. quote in Said 1997: xxiii). 
Classical political philosophers including Hobbes. Hume and more recently. 
Nlorgenthau. orappled Nvith the way reason and the passions interacted; yet. the view that the 
emotions Nvere not only ephemeral and hard to track. but detrimental to reason and 
in need of 
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control, has dominated modem approaches in international relations (Bleiker and Hutchison 
2008: 118; Finnemore and Sikkink 1989: 911; Freud 1971: 635, Marcus 2003: 184-5: Mercer 
1995: 1; Tuck 1989). Emotions, as Bleiker and Hutchison point out, ha,,,, e traditionally been 
perceived as temperamental and 'feminine', and an expression of the more primitive politics 
of underdeveloped societies (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008: 116-, Doty 1996: NIarcus 
2003: 189) What is more, *Emotions can be politically dangerous and undesirable in 
politics... [b]ut to pretend that affect and empathy do not exist is to miss fundamental 
dynamics of political life' (Finnemore and Sikkink 1989: 916). Mercer condemns realism and 
constructivism, as, for the most part, eliminating emotion on grounds that it is -irrational'. 
and in particular, accuses constructivists as interpreting cognitiý, -e beliefs (norrns) as -free of 
7 
affect' (2005: 97) . 
Like both Crawford and Fierke, I see a link between norms and emotions. in that theN 
share aspects of being socially derived, are variable across cultures and time. and are able to 
be studied primarily through their articulation in discourse (Crawford 2000: 130-1 '13, Fierke 
2004: 480). Yet emotions and norms, though reflexive and entwined, are different. Norms, 
according to Finnemore and Sikkink, who draw on a rich heritage of norm-based scholarship, 
are rules of appropriate or 'proper' behaviour according to the judgments of a given 
community. They are derived from experience, affected by learning, are constitutive of the 
society in which they are a part, come in various strengths depending on how fully they are 
acknowledged, the strongest being internalized to the point that they are taken for granted. 
Norms are seen as 'good' - there being no 'bad' norrns from the vantage point of those 
promoting them (1989: 891-892). Norms, therefore, are purely socially derived phenomena-, 
they are cognitively 'created' products and productive of inter-subjective interaction. 
Emotions, on the other hand, are biological and cognitive. as well as socially derived. 
Instinctual and physical attributes attend the expression of emotion - quickened heartbeat. 
perspiration, sudden laughter - ývhich do not accompany the expression of norrns, although 
the process of protecting threatened norms can inspire strong emotions (Cra, ý-ford 2000: 1 26- 
7). What is more, emotions are understood to provide the force and vitality to motiX ate action 
and make choices - providing the impetus to enact normative 
behaviours. for example, or 
choose between competing requirements of power politics. What is more, Marcus cites 
neuroscientific studies that establish 'the central role of emotions in the resolution of moral 
I ha-, e not explored the Izendered contributions to the examination of emotionality. 
Nkhich undoubtedly ha,, e 
brought a rich perspecti%v e to the study of perception and response, but hich 
ha., e done so N% ithout offering 
,, tit cient explanator,, power to the decision-making, processes ofstates in crisis 
to be included here, nor ha"e , It I 
theN offered a method to track emotionality in decision-making . see Bleiker and 
Hutchison 2008. op cit: 8.. 
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dilemmas' (2003: 187). Finally, Fierke states: 'A socially constructed vieov of emotions places 
meaning at the core of experience, and language as the place where boundaries are drawn. 
whether between individuals or between collective entities. such as states' (2004: 489. 
emphasis in original). The difficulty in assessing and theorizing emotions, therefore. lies not 
in arguing their importance, but in their seeming inability to be easily analý'zed. their multi- 
level inspiration and reflexivity, and their elusiveness in fulfilling the positivist requirement 
of showing how they contribute to obtaining outcomes through falsifiable means (, NIercer 
2005: 98). As Marcus admits, 'the terms "emotion" and "'reason" remain notoriously 
confused, even in contemporary psychology' (2003: 187). Nevertheless. there seems a 
growing consensus that emotion and reason operate as collective capacities, rather than bein(-, 
opposed forces, and that 'to reason requires emotion, not only to recruit its abilities but to 
execute its conclusions' (Marcus 2003: 206; McDermott 2004). 
To recognize that emotion is endemic in rational thinking and decision-making 
enables a further claim: rational and irrational thought are themselves constituted as such and 
therefore, it makes no sense to distinguish between rational and irrational, except as 
reflections of social rules. The behavioural revolution, and its emphasis on measurement 
privileged preferences over process, lending credence to the argument that rational 
preferences were those that privileged self-interested outcomes (with little regard to how they 
were obtained) over preferences for strategy (for example, acting with empathy) (Mercer 
2005 : 98). 8 The return to norms and the growing interest in what role emotions play in policy 
formation and motivation, suggests that 'process' - how decisions are reached, what values 
and motivations are in play, how the argument is framed, and whether the process is fair and 
marked with respect or disregard - now appears to matter (ibid). As both rational and 
irrational are contingent terms, reason in decision-making must viewed as composed of both. 
IdentitY, hegetnony and emotion 
In shifting the focus away from the positivist study of power politics as an expression of 
rational self help (or the maximization of preferences). and by association, awaý- from the 
view of all actors as being alike, an understanding of relations among states can be t'ramed in 
terms of identity. the carivas upon which norms and emotions assume meaning (Jepperson et 
al. 1999. Moravcsik 1997. Waltz 1979). Approaching the interaction between states as 
liabernias' -communicative action' vhich emphasises empath\. and moral discourse, ýýas a significant 
departure from this v lew, for discussion see 'Forum on Habermas especiallý 
Thomas Diez and Jill Steans 
(2005) 'A useful dialo, -nie: 
Habermas and International Relations'. Review 01 International Siudics 31 ( I), 
January. pp. 1-17-140. 
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processes of constituting collective meanings does not deny the concept of states as 
privileging the security of the self, or of states as egoistic entities. as in fact. it enables 
introduction of concepts such as narcissism and emotion into the discussion. Rather it denies 
the reification of the state as an entity defined b-,., self-help. *In the sense of treating it as 
something separate from the practices by which it is produced and sustained' (Wendt 
1992: 147). 
Additionally, it orients the focus toward apprehending states as complex entities in a 
relational system, which enables a view of interstate relations as governed by endogenously 
constituted structures that vary with every relationship (Ibld: 135). Relationships are 
transformative based on the meanings associated with the practices of the 'other' as much as 
on the meanings that figure the self. Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein label this the 
'cultural environment' and observe: 'When states engage in egoistic foreign policies ... more 
is going on than simply attempting to realize selfish goals. They are also instantiating and 
reproducing a particular conception of who they are'-and one might add, what theý, want. 
and who they interpret the other as being and wanting (1999: 340-34 1). Thus relations of 
friendship or enmity are constituted through 'systems of meaningful practice that form the 
identities of subjects and objects', that is, through systems of discourse that express 
perception (Howarth et al. 2002: 3-4, Wendt 1992). 
Identity, rooted in the Latin, idem, meaning 'the same', but which in fact draws 
equally from identidum, meaning 'repeatedly', involves 'a repeated pointing at a thing or 
person to confirm that it remains the same through space and time. It is reassurance, but also, 
a constraint' (Mount 2007: 21). Identity construction is a continuous productive process that is 
cognitive, though in drawing meanings from the actions of others and one's own responses to 
2: 13 7). those actions, it is also behavioural (Wendt 199. 
SI een in this light, representational practices reveal themselves to be political acts that 
construct identity (in this case, the collective self. its motivations, aspirations, morals. in sum. 
its 'personal ity'), as well as empowering certain actors to articulate and manage that 'realitý' 
(Fierke 2004: 484, Weldes et al. 1999: 17-19). Within that *reallty'. that ýOich is not the self 
is foreign. The boundary around the self is the beginning of the other. and operates as a 
discLirsive field (Campbell 1991: 8, ConnollNý 1991: 201). How the self is percei%-ed and the 
boundary represented, is as much ooN erned by the selt7s subýjugated meanings as by anN 
actual moves by the other, thus 'national security depends on national identity' (Campbell 
iI ive. as 1992: 2 5 3), quote in KoNvert 1999: 1. Wendt 1992: 13 7). The process. ho\N ex Cr. is refle\ i 
the language of identity is that of both perception and self-perception (Coole 2006: 416). This 
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inter-subjectivity enables states to expect patterns of behaviour from others. Ný-hether in ten-ns 
of friendship or strife (Bially Mattern 2005: 5 1). 
The attempt to maintain 'sameness'. however. is a precarious undertaking. 
socialization requires internalizing new circumstances, adjusting interests and re-assessing 
the motivations and actions of 'others' as well as the *self'. Identity becomes ent-vvined with 
processing change as well as the language employed to represent it. Power resides in the 
ability to dominate discursive representations of 'sameness' in the context of change. This 
suggests a multi-level process of negating the external other as a threat to the contingent 
identity of the self (the state), while ignoring and/or disciplining internal differences which 
are perceived to constitute a risk to the collective ideation of legitimacy (Connolly 1991: 201). 
Establishing hegemony requires instantiating widely accepted meanings associated 
with the self (and other) that act 'persuasively', so the discourse can be adopted as 'true" 
(Lincoln 1989: 8; Howarth et al. 2002: 3-4). The tautology that characterizes the process of 
naturalization perpetuates the power of the discourse. 'The ordinary grammar employed in 
contemporary discourses, whether of national leader, journalists or social scientists. 
constitutes a forgetting of struggles, which, if they had ended in other ways, might have 
engendered other grammars and categories' (Shapiro 1988: 92). Discourses of dominance 
thrive best on fixed meanings and presumptions that perpetuate the hegemonic narrative with 
a minimum of negotiation, emotion or alternative memory. Dominant discourses are not, 
therefore, easily responsive to change, and when faced with circumstances that de-couple 
accepted signifiers (and their associated truths) from previously 'fixed' meanings, will 
cxperience turbulence and agitation (Jervis 1976). Crises are moments of discomfort inv, -hich 
social bonds are threatened. These are moments of revelation: hegemonized signifiers are 
contested and denaturalized, and habits of meaning and practice are shed as emotion focuses 
cognition on learning new meanings and practices (Marcus 2003: 218). Shifts in the discourse 
take place until new, collectively acceptable meanings emerge, forgetting takes place. and a 
new hegemonic discourse pre--, -ails. 
Investigating these 'nodal points', when in effect the veil has been lifted from the 
tightly controlled visages of states, offers the international relations scholar a glimpse into the 
inany alternative faces and expressions - the competing meanings and practices - at play in 
state behaviour. These then offer the opportunity to distill out the components of action and 
reaction, xN hich arc perpetuated during the periods in-bet,. veen. 
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Passion and repre. ventation 
As states are both actors on the international stage, and collectivities of individuals, the 
language of international relations frequently anthropornorphizes them as having individual- 
like characteristics. This has enabled scholars to represent imagined communities and 
national entities as responding in ways analogous to human actors in that they are seen to 
manifest identity and various of its characteristics, such as intentionality, agency, fear, and 
the ability to engage in 'special relationships' (Robin 2004, Wendt 1992: 167, ff 2 1). For the 
purpose of this investigation, the agent/structure duality is less important than the fact that 
together they constitute the field in which discourses are articulated, beliefs are embedded. 
sentiment is felt and projected, habits of mind are established and institutionalized, and policy 
emerges (Selikar 2000: 2-3). 9 It is immaterial to this investigation whether the state operates 
as a person; what is critical is that both agents and structures operate as conduits of political 
decisions and the processors of their outcomes (Coole 2005: 136; Weldes 1999: 17-19). A 
second debate regards how much policy at any given time is dependent on one person, or a 
small group of persons projecting and imposing norms and subjective motivations on the 
state, group of states or international order, and therefore, how individual action and its 
ideational and emotional components impact intersubjective analysis. Fierke contends: 'The 
emotions may remain disguised in individuals, but to be translated into political agency and 
identity, they must be put into words by leaders, who give meaning to the individual 
experience by situating it in a larger context of group identity' (2004: 484); this debate is 
closer to the questions raised in this investigation (Bisely 2004: 63; Kissinger 1957: chapter 3). 
What appears to be less a subject of debate is the nature of state agency as 
disembodied and rational regardless of the delimitations or allowances understood within its 
definition. Because discourse as a reflection and expression of agency is a relatively recent 
waV to engage analysis of power politics, the nature of agentic representation, particularly 
oN-er the long term, has been largely excluded from enquiry (Levy 2003: 273, - Mercer 2005). 
Tliis stems partially from the need to situate the argument for a discursive approach in the 
same terms as used in positivist reasoning so as to ensure an even playing field - particularlý 
in the North American academy where 'conventional' constructivism prevails (Frederking 
2003: 262). \Vendt"s caution in premising his case for constructivism. in 'Anarchy is What 
9 For discussion, see Forum on the state as a person' in Review qf International Studies, Vol. 30 (2), April 
2004, pp 255-316, specifically Iver Neumann (2004) 'Beware of Organicism: The narrative self of the state', 
op. cit., pp. 259-268, and Alexander Wendt (2004) 'The State as Person in International Theorý, '. op. cit., pp. 
"89-3) 16: and D. Coole (2005) 'Rethinking Agenc,,: A phenomenological approach to embodiment and agentic 
capacities', 11olitical Stu&es. ýol- -53, (1 ), March, p. 13-5. 
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States Make of It' is such an attempt. His compellingly and painstakingly laid out argument 
that identities and meanings are produced and productive of ongoing relations between states 
- what he terms *inter-subjective social relations'. with -subjective' used in its thinnest 
meaning as the self distinguished for rational reasons from others - is designed to staunch 
any doubt that identities are constructed through reasoned processes, and in fact. the entire 
edifice he builds is a 'positivist' argument for an alternative way of understanding state action 
and choice (Wendt 1992). 
In fact, throughout the variations of constr-uctivism, what is 'assume[d] 
are ... communicatively rational agents constructing ... social rules through the performance 
of speech acts' (Checkel 2004: 230; quote in Frederking 2003: 363, emphasis mine). Within 
the modem tradition of privileging the 'rational actor' paradigm, the lexicon of international 
relations analysis, both rationalist and constructivist, has been largely sanitized of emotional 
contributors such as greed, cruelty, envy, revenge or affection to decision-making or norm- 
creation, due to the perception that they lack legitimacy within a rational dialectic, or worse, 
undermine it (Mercer 2005: 92; cF Fierke 2004). 'The result is a politics without passions or 
principles, which is hardly the politics of the world in which we live, ' (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1989: 916). 
The general exception is fear, 'a symptom of pervasive conflict and political 
unhappiness', which is perceived as a 'rational' emotion in realism in that it is attributable to 
and productive of threat (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008: 199; Crawford 2000: 122-22; quote in 
Robin 2004: 3; Ross 2006: 3)1 0. Yet compared to its fiery philosophical antecedents expressed 
through the vim and vigour of Hobbes, Clausewitz, Hume, and others, fear has become 
mundane as an idea in the hands of rationalist literature. Having been denaturalized of its 
passion, fear represents the political fiction of emotional un-engagement by 'respectable 
society' (Arendt 1963: 153, Robin 2004: 3) Balzacq probes this dilemma in an interview with 
Robert Jervis in October 2004: 
B: "Fear can transform a gesture into a cheap signal and thereby elicits unexpected 
answers. However, many students of security dilemmas often overlook the emotional 
ý'ariable. In contrast, you have recognized that dynamics of misperception are also 
driven by emotions, yet devoted little time to the scrutiny of such pervasive factors. 
Why" 
Cf Corey Robin (2004), Fear: The histon, of apolitical idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Judith Shklar, 
(1989) 'The Liberalism of Fear' in Nanc\ L. Rosenblum (ed. ). Liberalism and theAforal Life (Cambridge: 
Harvard Univ. Press). 
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J: *You are quite right. Perception andMisperception completely put aside emotions: 
indeed one chapter denies the importance of wishful thinking. This %ý as a major 
blunder. 
... Over a number of years I came to see the importance of emotions and what 
psychologists call 'motivated bias ...... I would very much like to produce a study that 
shows how emotions and cognitions interact in politics. but at this point the challenge 
is simply too great. ' (Balzacq 2004: 564-565). 
Love and hate in relations between states 
Harold Lasswell argued compellingly that world politics were imbued with 'emotional 
insecurities' (1965: 57), and indeed, history is littered with cases where 'Interests' 
'rationalized' emotionally driven actions - often promoting practices and meanings un- 
ballasted by objective gains or even consistent practice. Passionate constructions are 
inextricably enmeshed in discourses that made possible emotionalized decisions and action; 
one needs but name Suez, Watergate, Iran-Contra. The still largely unexamined 
presupposition in modem international relations study is the insistence on a Cartesian dualism 
that presupposes a separation of mind from body, 'rational' from subjective, anchoring the 
ontology of state decision-making to reason (Alford 1997: 13; Coole 2005). 
Diana Coole, in her work on the role of corporeality in political agency, argues that 
simultaneous with any rational register, a somatic, pre-cognitive dimension operates and 
informs intersubjective relationships (ibid: 128). Campbell, reflecting this outlook, though 
shirking the term 'emotion', constructs a 'mythology of evil' in which difference is 
apprehended in a variety of interpretations that are employed to *discipline' the self in 
relation to the other and which can be understood to be emotional (Campbell 1998). 
Campbell amply illustrates that reason is contingent on the replay of historicist fears re- 
iný-thologized in discursive economies - that is, as passionate constructions. 
Political emotion can be understood then as the shared, somatic, pre-cognitive 
response of the collective in socially constructing a national imaginary. Emotions, which 
impact the collectix, e well-being of society, whatever their rationale, can be analyzed as 
i-notix! ators of intent and action, and thereby as having a politics of their own in that they 
iril'orm the . N, Ielding of power. leadership encounters, the valuation of norms, and so forth. 
They can set-N-e as both an instrument and an effect of social rule making. On the margins of 
the literature one notes that just as fear is an emotion that has been institutionalized within the 
frarnework of international relations analysis. *trust% its opposite, has too. And if fear and 
trust are ackno\\ ledged. then why not kindliness. guilt. anger, maliciousness - as these and 
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countless other emotions impact on representation and the discursive profiles of self and 
other. To apprehend an emotion such as fear as an institution of politics enables the 
naturalization of political 'fear' (evil) - and *political goodliness' (, virtue) - with concepts of 
morality and reason. In effect, if reason (as objective fact) is linked to goodliness (virtue). it 
is purportedly fastened to morality (Kennan, *Long Telegram', 1946, in Buhite 1997: 31). 
However, morality, a constitutive norm perceived as so much more "fixed' than an emotion 
(such as fear or love), is itself relative, as to some, *morality and loyalty are one', to others 
morality is 'reduced to power' (Alford 1997: 13,15). MacIntyre has argued 'there is no 
rationality independent of tradition, "no view from nowhere", and no set of rules or principles 
that will commend themselves to all, independent of their conception of the good' (Thomas 
2003: 31). 
Political passion as the expression of a politics of morality can be seen, therefore, 
like morality, to have its 'good' and 'evil' sides - political love (a solidary relationship) and 
political alterity (a relationship of strife) as its Janus faces, and like Janus faces, they are 
linked. Political love, as much as political strife ( hate, anger, fear), is instantiated around the 
perception of threat to the social bonds linking self to other. How the threat is defined, its 
nature and attributes, feeds into the moral design of its antidote (Robin 2004: 16). Acting 
'lovingly' becomes a tool to create political friends and influence their governments - an 
expression of morality if virtue be understood to fulfill the Puritan text that God helps those 
who help themselves - in Waltz's terms, the exercise of self-help. Thus Robin argues there is 
always a layer under the moral dimension, that of politics, since recognizing that which is 
moral is a product of historical perspective, presumption, reaction and practice, that is, of 
discourse. 
As passion and reason are symbiotic, both are agentic resources in the 
instrumentalization of power. If in the discursive construction of self, the emotional content 
ot'identity prevails, the representation of truth that ensues is a politics of passion. Yet, how to 
distill out the passion from the reason? First, state behaviour cannot be clinically tracked like 
that of individuals, and group behaviour has its own characteristics; but it has been argued 
that *by conducting, an intensive analysis of individual cases that rest on clinical evidence 
rather than on common-sense impressions, psychoanalysis tells us something about the inner 
\ý-orkings of society itself, in the verý' act of turning its back on society and immersing itself 
in the indiý, idual unconscious. E\-ery society reproduces its culture-its norms, its underlying 
assumptions. its modes of organizing experiences-in the individual. in terms of personality' 
(Lasch 1968: 34). Lakeoff. working off this approach through analysis of language, sees the 
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state as having personality, its identity, its self-image being reproductions of its collecti-ve self 
(Lakeoff 2004). Second, Fierke argues that by using a levels of analysis approach. 'it is 
possible to go beyond ... treating groups as if they were individuals' because the social 
construction of the political, expressed through language, is larger than the sum of its parts - 
it is not just -the sum of individual experience in a context' but the impact and intermingling 
of the 'physical, psychological and political' in the language of politics (2004: 483). This idea 
is picked up by Adorno, who, in analysing the German relationship with democracNý wrote: 
-The individual's narcissistic drives, for which a callous world promises less and less 
satisfaction, which nonetheless persist undiminished as long as civilization refuses them so 
much, find a substitute gratification in their "identification with the "vhole"" (quote in 
Hartmann, ed. 1987: 121-122). This has two implications for the study of emotionalized 
policy within special relationships. It suggests, firstly, that the part-whole analysis of 
discourse enables examination of contextualized individual articulations as contributors, as 
well as responders, to political language creation in the construction of short and long-term 
policy; and secondly, it enables an understanding to emerge of the political context of special 
relationships, and the political personality special relationships have as articulations of the 
states that compose them. 
The conscious creation of (or entering into) special relationships constructs the 
blurring of the self/other boundary as felicitous, as the security of each 'self is identified as 
good for the security of both. This is a reflexive act, since as Lasch explains, 'the narcissist 
cannot identify with someone else without seeing the other as an extension of himself (Lasch 
1978: 86). This shared approach to threat which in terms of policy is understood to be 
balanced through a closeness of other mutual 'goods', including trust, transparency, 
communication and goodwill, constitutes what I label 'political love' (Stephens 2006). 
Willing to overlook and rationalize indiscretions and inconsistencies for the sake of 'the 
larger summum bonum toward which all political agents should strive', political love can be 
understood as standing in opposition to political fear, in that they both contribute to the 
production of identity and vision of order (Dunn 1996: 46). In Judith Shklar's 'Liberalism of 
Fear". it is fear, rather than love. that begins the process. It is 'a summum malum, which all of 
us know and would avoid if only we could. That evil is cruelty and the fear it inspires. and 
the very fear of fear itself, above all the fear of "a society of fearful people"' (ibid: 47). II 
'' See also Arendt's discussion ot fear, which takes its cue from the experiences of World War 11 (Hannah 
-\rendt (195 1,1971) Origins (? I'Tolalitarian ism (Ne\% York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich). p. 442. 
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If salutory fear, as argued by de Toqueville, 'makes men keep , vatch and ward for 
freedom', political love is equally a combatant against the manipulation of "others'. as the 
partnering with and securing those close to the 'self' protects against outside intervention. 
Political love is not to be confused with the temporal pursuit of pleasure or even desire. but 
like those pursuits, embodies the energy to take action in an anarchic world. Political love 
braces those states in need of protection and direction, while justifying their own commitment 
on moral grounds, as well as resting it on the broader shoulders of mutual interests and the 
exchange of gains. The authority of this love is productive of a relationship in which loyalty 
for the sake of the longer process celebrates the successes and rationalizes av"ay the 
dysfunctions of the relationship. These special relationships become *sticky" in that the 
ideological, as well as material, are intricately narcissistic, moulding reality to bolster their 
political love, narrowing the boundary between the selves into a faceted self, while staving 
off the normal fear and threat of the other. 
The social bonds of comfort and security established in these special relationships 
manifests itself in decision-making that relies on successful behavioural habits and heuristics. 
and hence, requires less attention to detail and less maintenance, in the name of trust, than 
would a normal relationship. A sense of well-being therefore can lull states into a lower 
performance of their strategic tasks, enabling logical inconsistencies to go un-addressed 
(Crawford 2000: 138, Marcus 2003: 203). In contradiction to how it appears on the surface, 
therefore, taken to extremes, such relationships are not all good. Such social bonds require 
conformity of ideation and action, and a degree of trust in the other that negates the self. If 
the demands of loyalty make negotiation of each state's individual needs difficult, the bonds 
of mutual security are constantly threatened. Political love, therefore, can imply a damaging 
relationship, despite efforts by both states to paint it as positive and deny its risks - as much 
to themselves as to others. Scheff and Retzinger call such relationships 'engulfing'. as they 
require a degree of de-selving to be maintained, and a constant denial that the social bonds 
are in fact, at risk of being out of attunement (1991: 15). 
Political love can be turned on its head when one or both states find the object of 
desire and friendship painful and alienating for reasons that, not unlike personal relationships, 
involve a perceived transgression of trust and respect and therefore, a ý, videning gulf in shared 
norms. The fallout is often sex-ere as expectations of conformity and loyalty persist, and it is 
in *the narcissism of minor differences' that a mirroring hurt and rage evolves (Freud 1971). 
In place of overlapping imaginaries that prv., -ilege inclusivity, threat is represented as 
liaLlilting, all exchange. and the other is demonized in what becomes a hard-to-stop 
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relationship of isolation and politics of strife (Beeman 2003). Despite the presumption that no 
relationship exists, in fact it does, through the constant communication of anger focused on 
the other, the 'defensive myth' acting to closely link the two in a spiral of mutually 
constituted pain (Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 15). Externalized sentiment is imposed on 
objective reality, which becomes a reflection of subjective impulse. which is translated into 
policy. This can be understood as irrationality, as it applies not reason to a problem. but 
conviction. 
Narcisissism and cognitive psychology: lenses on what drives political passion 
Love in the American therapy age of the late 20th century, according to Lasch, had devolved. 
selfishly, from being a form of self-sacrifice or 'submission to a higher loyalty'. to *simply 
the fulfillment of the patient's emotional requirements' (1978: 12). German psychologist Otto 
Kernberg describes the willing dependency characteristic of non-nal love relationships as 
replaced in the narcissistic case 'by self-righteous demandingness' (1984: 145). It was this 
aspect of self orientation and outward demandingness across the American social and 
political landscape that led Lasch to argue a cultural shift toward narcissism was well begun 
in the US by the mid- I 960s. This affected not only the domestic but the international: The 
inability to process a passion that is but intense need-fulfillment, means that the environment 
of the narcissist is constantly endangering. In Kernberg's observation: 'His devaluation of 
others, together with his lack of curiosity about them, impoverishes his personal life' and 
contributes to a lack of 'any real engagement with the world' (Kernberg 145; quote in Lasch 
1978: 41). Only by divesting that world of its threatening characteristics can the narcissist 
survive and continue interacting (Johnson 1977: 3 1). 
It is not coincidental, perhaps, that the analysis of political and strategic decision- 
making in terms of cognitive psychology, and conducted primarily in the United States, 
attained significant influence in the understanding of foreign relations at about the same time 
as the appearance of Lasch's research - and that of others such as Johnson (1977), Kernberg 
(1974) and Stein (1977). Both sets of enquiry highlight disconcertingly similar 
characteristics, patterns and pathologies (Jervis 1976; Jervis 1970, Lebow 198 1; LeN, y 2003). 
What Jervis terms 'motivational bias' can be seen to operationalize decision-making in 
patterns that echo those of narcissism. 'Whereas unmotivated biases generate perceptions 
based on expectations. motivated biases generate perceptions based on needs, desires and 
interests' (Levy 2003: 268). Motivated bias, according to this argument, can lead to -ýN-ishful 
thinking', which promotes stratevies that contribute to an 'illusion of control'. discounts tý _ý I 
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information that questions existing perceptions, and exaggerates the likely success of 
preferred strategies. 'in this case, perceptions of threats serve to rationalize existing policy. 
rather than inform and shape policy' (ibid). 
This mirrors Lasch's assessment of how narcissism affects decision-makingy: *The 
remarkable absence of internal freedom to become interested in the personality of the other'. 
means that internally generated images must replace knowledge about who the other is, and 
why and how he or she acts and reacts; adding to this process is the discomfort of acquiring 
self-knowledge that comes from curiosity. Devoid of context, *narcissistic preoccupation 
specifically defends against surprise with a sense of forced (and forceful) certitude. ' (Stein 
1977: 181). 
In the psychological analysis of political decision-making, Lebow draws attention to 
the tendencies by leaders to reduce internal conflicts over policy adoption, particularly at 
times of stress, through practices of over-confidence in the favourable consequences that are 
expected, and in avoiding through misrepresentation, rationalization or denial. warnings, that 
it might fail (Lebow 1981: 114). Cottam suggests that this is not confined just to decision- 
makers at the top, but informs bureaucratic structures as well. 'Indeed, a central ingredient of 
bureaucratic inertia, ' he states, 'is the rigidification of perceptual assumptions' (Cottarn 1977: 
In effect, extreme discomfort with change, which elicits the fear of being out of 
control, requires change to be reconceived as a scenario of continuity. For the constantly 
,,, 1gilant narcissist, this means unconsciously storyboarding the narrative in which he or she 
can function, so as to be able to construct a self-image of impervious hero. Constructivists, 
such as Doty and Campbell, write this as disciplining the discourse to protect the precarious 
self (Campbell 1998: esp. chapter 2; Doty 1996: chapter 1). In regards to close personal 
relationships, Kernberg argues, 'narcissistic patients evince an unconscious fear of the love 
object', that person (or thing) which can evoke vulnerability and hence, the possibility for 
pain. All special relationships carry this risk - the risk of allowing the interests of self and 
other to be confused, until that point when the other's independent actions take place in an 
environment of extreme vulnerability on the part of the self. Rational decision-making is 
designed to protect against this eventuality. But when a special relationship shifts, new 
information is left unprocessed, a situation of crisis arises. and defensive behaviour makes 
emotionalized decision-making more likely. In fact, 'defence mechanisms are most likely to 
break do,, N-n when the pol icN -maker[s] are inescapably confronted Nvith the real ity [they] ha% e 
repressed' (Lebow 1981: 119) To overcome the agony this implies. motivational bias comes 
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to dominate the construction of policy, for it is the defense of the self. the precarious identity 
that must be secured against the threat of the other. 
In this way, it becomes possible to tie in, systematically. the psychological into the 
study of thesocial construction of political identities. The discussion of motivated decision- 
making undertaken by Cottarn, Hermann; Jervis, Lebow, and others, has primarily limited 
itself to the cognitive processes at play and how they relate to policy creation and policy 
change (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008: 125, Crawford 2000: 118). Yet, as Levy suggests. 'the 
incorporation of psychological variables and their interaction effects into social and cultural 
explanations of identity [can] create a better balance between social structures and individual 
agency in constructivist research' (2003: 274). Likewise, Marcus. drawing on evidence from 
neuroscience, and Finnemore and Sikkink in discussing norm creation, suggest that research 
on the relationship between emotion (affect) and reason (cognition) in determining 
behaviours of change is long overdue. It is important to note that although Lasch "N'rote his 
treatise, The ('ulture q Narcissism in the late 1960s, narcissism became incorporated into a 
general discourse of American politics, and appropriated by the US press to describe 
American popular engagement with everything from materialism to immigration (Ignatieff 
1997). The consistency in decision-making patterns and the conduct of narcissism, can 
therefore be used to understand American practices. and images of identity. That said, the 
parallelism in the practices and meanings of language use, dyadic labeling and the social 
constructions of threat by both the UK and Iran in this case study, and within the production 
of their special relationship, enables narcissistic practices to be traced as contributory to the 
conditioning of their identity creation as much as that of the US. 
In sum, the complex relationship the narcissist has with emotional demands can be 
understood to have its parallel in state decision-making within special relationships of 
security, particularly at times of crisis; this is revealed in the following ways: a choice of love 
object that mirrors or represents an ideal of the self, a fear of the love object for its ability not 
only to exert pain but to see through the veneer of innocence; a horror of surprise as an 
affront to the self's credibility, a need to decontaminate the environment of threatening 
qualities (Post 1986: 677-9). Unconsciously, in order to relate to the confusion of the 
enx-ironment, the process amounts to a winnoNving away of the facts, contexts and k-nowledge 
that are most threatenint.,. The narcissist's storyboard of ex, ents, and his/its own role and 
image within it, contains an inner coherence that is connected only at certain points with the 
actual facts. the perceptions and narrative framing constituting instead the reality (Johnson 
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1977: 13 1 ). Bakhtin describes this as monologism, a key concept for this study. in that he 
frames it in terms of language and discourse: 
'With a monologic approach (in its extreme or pure form). another person remains 
wholly and merely an object of consciousness, and not another consciousness. 
Monologue is finalized and deaf to the other's response, does not expect it. and does 
not acknowledge in it any decisive force' (1984: 293). 
Here Bakhtin achieves the critical link between the theory of narcissism and the theory of 
emotionalized dec i sion- making, in that he observes that even in the perceived absence of the 
other, the dialogue with the other continues. The other is there even if only as a recipient of 
the monologue, and thus the decision-making, which varies according to the nature of the 
other, and depends on that other. This, as Guillaume points out, is essential for anchoring the 
monologic discourse into the theory of identity (Guillaume 2002: 7). This takes place outside 
of narcissism as well. It is the degree, and the self-referentiality of the knowledge that relates 
narcissistic impulse to motivated decision-making. 
Emotion, Method and Text 
A comprehensive examination of political emotionality and its impact on representational 
practices in international behaviour is beyond the scope of this study. Here I narrow my focus 
to those emotions that underpin conflict or solidarity in regards to special relationships. For 
this, I expand on the extraordinary path begun by Scheff and Retzinger, which bridges the 
sociological, historical, psychological and political in a synthetic (part-whole) approach 
focusing on the effect of emotions on social structure (see also Fierke 2004). First, they 
identify two families of social emotions that stand out as relational, those of shame and pride. 
Shame and pride arise only when another's view is engaged, when self-worth is perceived 
through the eyes of another (Sartre 1956: 347 ff). They are likewise emotions of reflexivity. 
since 'self-monitoring from the viewpoint of others gives rise to self-regarding sentiments' 
(Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 8). Shame and pride are regarded as primary or 'coarse' emotions 
of attachment, in that they incorporate physiological, psychological and cultural components 
(ibid: 27). Genetically inherited (thus, biological), they both only have meaning as self- 
conscious responses to the perceptions of others, and they are variously interpreted from one 
society to another (ibid: 5). Shame and pride are core emotions that are expressed. particularl, N 
in modern societies which no longer commonlv use the words 'shame' and ý, pride% in 
lingtuistically rich variants. Shame, therefore is often articulated as embarrassment. 
humiliation. indignity. dishonour. disrespect, insecurity, anger. arrogance. superiority. self- 
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righteousness. guilt and smugness: pride is articulated as trust, solidarity. commonality. 
security. friendship and alliance. In studying how modem states build and break bridges. 
therefore, these 'code' words are more frequently apparent in the discourses used b-,, 
statesmen and other elites. This is particularly important to recognize in the studY of modem 
societies, in which the language itself conspires to deny the existence of pride and shame. 
Second, Scheff and Retzinger suggest that repressed shame that is neither 
acknowledged nor resolved (on the part of either the self or the other). leads to violence. 
Thus, 'shame causes and is caused by alienation, pride causes and reflects solidarity' (p. 3). 
Shame and pride therefore constitute key elements in the process of attunement. providing the 
emotional security (or insecurity) of a relationship's bonds. This does not mean that parties 
within a well-attuned relationship do not have disagreements or fights, but that they fight 
fairly, their communication of respect toward the other reflecting the secure bond of pride in 
the other, and by reflection, in themselves. Acknowledged, shame passes quickly, ha-ving 
acted as a signal that a bond was at risk and in need of repair. Thus, a conflict o,,,., er interests 
does not per se lead to violence, for parties in attunement can acknowledge the other's needs 
sufficiently to find compromise -a disagreement in this situation often leads to a 
strengthening of the bridge binding states, and encourages further cooperation. 
It is in those relationships where the other's legitimate needs are insulted, devalued, or 
ignored, that shame occurs. The denial of shame (repressing it through silence and guilt, or 
though the overt expression of anger) leads to further shaming of the other in the form of 
disrespect (to overcome pain or embarrassment, for example), begetting a perpetuated spiral 
that eventually leads to discourses of strife or outright violence. Bonds are maintained, but in 
a relationship of isolation in which the insecure linkages are perpetually chafed through 
suspicion, pain and anger. Shaming can only take place between states that are already 
linked, since if the other's perception is not important, their actions and responses are not 
interpreted as reflecting on the self Thus, for example, relations between two states with little 
contact or commonality would not be characterized by social bonds that could be easily 
affected by either shame or pride. Establishing relations of pride, for example, "'N-ould 
characterize the practices of states contemplating bridge-building for increased solidarity, 
shame xNould characterize states experiencing separation of close social bonds within an 
existing alliance. Scheff and Retzinger argue that shame occurs as a signal that bonds are 
already at risk and experiencing damage. a claim that suggests that shaming can be an 
, process in a continuint., relationship. ongoing 
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As shame and pride are communicated through discourse - the practices and 
meanings of language and action - tracking their expression in processes of attunement. or 
alienation offers a useful method to analyze relationships between states. This does not 
suggest that other factors are not at play, that leaders are not using sophisticated cognit'Ve 
decision-making tools or that material interests or events are not exerting influence. Instead. 
it is my purpose here to distill out the reflexive and self-referential emotions of shame and 
pride to reveal how they contribute to the matrix of policy making and its perpetuation in the 
production of political love and political strife. 
A proposed method 
Political passion can be traced as a five-step sequence: 1) The initial cause (motivator) 
identity insecurity through the endangerment of fundamental norrns (the shame percei"'ed). 
This can come from a third party threatening both states within a relationship, or through the 
actions of one state within the relationship. The perceived threat can be interpreted as 
endangering universalist ideals, concepts of nationalism, sensitivities in collective memorý', 
or sovereign integrity (including territorial). 2) The passionate response (motil, ation to 
action) to protect primary norrns that constitute the nation, expressed as shame or pride, and 
often in a paralleling emotionalized framework as that perceived to have constituted the 
initial threat - that is, through acknowledgement or disrespect of the other. The primary 
norms can include honour, legitimacy, sovereignty and historical memory, norms which 
constitute identity and without which, survival (security) is deemed at risk and the passionate 
response can include trust/distrust, tolerance/intolerance. solidarity/ alienation. 3) Behaviours 
inspired bY shame or pride (the motivational bias), which emerge during crisis and can 
reflect impairments as well as refinements in decision-making processes (Crawford 
-1000: 140; McDermott 2004; Ross 2006: 4; Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 29). The former may 
include a reduction in evaluative processing due to stress; reliance on overly simple heuristics 
and imagery of the other, the use of inadequate analogies and the avoidance of 
counterfactuals (Houghton 200 1 ). The latter may contribute to the ability of leaders to 
decisively mobilize the public through national unity and information dominance, and to 
benet-it from heightened attention, and learning. 4) The emotionalized discourse that 
privileges practices and meanings necessary for bridge-building or bridge- destruction. such 
ýis the kindlin!,; of existing emotional associations to promote certain policy choices and enlist 
public support. or implanting ne-w emotional practices and meanings to address the changed 
environment. 5) The policies that constitute political love or politicalsirýlý (Chart I). In the 
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tI ormer, this involves re-confirming the emotionalized contingencies of the special 
relationship - elements of we-ness which include self-esteem, trust. comfort. and other 
emotions of genuine mutuality embraced in the term pride. If the relationship is engulfing. it 
includes a furtherance of policies that tolerate the other's "bad' qualities or propensities (such 
as dictatorship, human rights abuses), and shield the other from outside criticism. If it is a 
relationship of isolation, that is, political strife, policies will project shame (anger, distrust. 
guilt, suspicion, vengeance). 
Thereafter, political love or political strife (in the production of policies and their 
justifications) can be examined as longer-term processes of positive or negaw-e bridge- 
maintenance (Chart 2). Political love involves over-coming conflicts of interest. maintaining 
good-will and transparency, and promoting exchange. Under circumstances of serious stress 
to the relationship, the bridges that have been built and maintained enable the effective use of- 
representational force, as the normative and emotional commitments to the other implicate a 
willingness to re-assert a mutually beneficial relationship (Bially Mattem 2005). In political 
strifle, the rhetorical continuity of an emotionalized special relationship infuses all actions on 
the part of the other with negative connotations and a willingness to see in the other 
aggressive or deceptive behaviour. In this political formation, the bridges are too frail for 
representational force to work as it is interpreted as simply one more signal of bad faith in a 
relationship of muscular alterity. 
In the short term, emotionalized politics are justified in both cases on the bases ot 
analogy, rational response, and the necessity of avoiding further risk. Over the long term, 
policy orientations become habits and predispositions that reflect emotional expectations. 
learning and experience gleaned from crisis. The emotional commitments serve as catalysts 
ofnorm adjustment and contribute to defining appropriate behaviours and policies, that is, 
their institutionalization. This contributes to the 'mood" of the goverriment whenever 
interaction with the other is required; strategies are re-activated that were operationalized and 
t1ound successful in the past, and a calming familiarity accompanies the use of heuristics, 
irnavery and rhetorical style that were previously relied upon (Crawford 2000, Marcus 2003). 
Even in the production of political strife, the disposition to repeat patterris in policy is 
calmins, and a confirmation of appropriate behaviour, even if it simply reflects false pride. 
I'liese policy approaches are stored in collective memory as necessary for the perpetuation of 
identity securivy. The mood, however, works against receptivity to change or arguments for 
ad N-here new justi-rient. Change. therefore, is most likely to occur only under circumstances , 
threats reveal the environment as no longer responding well to existing strate(-, ies. In that 
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situation, emotions come into play, refocusing the attention to develop alternatively 
appropriate responses, leaming is energized. and dispositions ill-suited to the present. can 
adapt. 
The texts 
To track these five steps in short-term policy construction. dislocations of hegemonic 
discourse (nodal points) are an important focus. It is at these moments that meanings are 
decanted, their lack of applicability and appropriateness within new contexts revealed. 
emotional confusion motivates the shedding of old habits. and new meaning creation is 
impelled to begin. Pride and shame will be highlighted in discourse as conceptual 
inducements to social connection or alienation, and followed from nodal point to policy 
reification over time. The texts used for this study are examined conceptually using a 
methodology consistent with Roxane Doty's (1996) representational practices, and David 
Campbell's (1998) constitutive differences. Tracking the actual as well as indirect usage of 
the words (shame and pride) and their euphemisms within text, the linkage between 
individual statements and long-term policy orientations will be instantiated. revealing the 
connection between the 'interpersonal and institutional' in micro-macro sequential 
investigation (Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 36). 
While not constrained to a specific order, this will include: a) examination of social 
antagonisms, that is, the limits to objective constitution, which give rise to emotions ot s ame 
and pride and the spirals of alienation or solidarity that impute meaning to shifting relations. 
b) subject position, what Barthes wams as the text endeavouring to 'make the reader no 
longer a consumer but a producer of the text', and which can be counterbalanced by 
encouraging the text to be understood as apolitical act intended to engage the reader's (or 
listener's) loyalty (Barthes 1974: 4), c) the 'systematic play' between signifier and actual 
presence as articulated by Derrida, since the contradictory quality of democracy as policýý and 
democracy as idealistic ideology is of particular significance in this study. In considering the 
inconsistencies between the proclaimed self-image within the Anglo-American discourse, and 
the behaviour of both states toward Iran. it is the combination of difference and deferral that 
plays a key role. and is a reflection of the power of emotion to move experience into mis- 
rcmembrance (Doty 1996: 6). 
Written text dominates the material being analyzed. yet also included are non- 
linguistic, that is, material practices, traditions and social rules. which are stronu, cultural 
components of diSCOUrse (Laclau and Nfouffe 1985: 82-83). Original texts constitute the 
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archival sources of this study. Secondary texts are used when they themselves can be 
understood as primary within the historical context of a discursi-,. 'e paradigm. and in the 
framework of this study, this is often the case. as it is in secondary texts that shame and pride 
often can be seen to perpetuate and reflect the mood and production of a politics of passion. 
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EMOTION AND POLICY-MAKING 
Chart 1 
PASSIONATE RESPONSE BALANCED RESPONSE 
Perceptions of threat to identity 0 Cognitive processing 
security: 0 Useful analogies 
" Nationalism 0 Information acquisition 
" Sovereign integrity 0 Diverse opinions 
" Universalist ideology 0 Utility maximalisation 
" Collective memory 
NORM PROTECTION 
(Motivation to action) 
Protection of primary norms: 
9 Honour 
" Legitimacy 
" Credibility 
" Historical memory 
EMOTIONALIZED BEHAVIOURS 
(Motivational bias) 
, xpressions of shame/ pride: 
" Stress (impulsive moves, 
dysfunctional communication) 
" Exaggerated expression 
(imagery, heuristics) 
" Intensity of emotional response 
(symbols of shame or status) 
" Impaired information 
processing (false analogies, 
reduced memory) 
Mobilisation for action 
PASSIONATE DISCOURSE 
Denial of emotion 
Kindling new emotional 
practices/ meanings 
Recontextualizing existing 
emotional associations 
DISCOURSES AND POLICIES 
OF SOLIDARITY 
Balance of interests and 
norms 
Acknowledgement of the 
other, strong social bonds 
POLITICAL LOVE 
Perpetuating attunement: 
" Comfort, self-esteem, trust, 
hope, pride, status 
" Transparency, mutuality, 
we-ness, shared discourse 
POLICIES OF ALIENATION 
Heightened emotional component 
" Rational justifications 
" Anticipation of frustration and 
aggression 
" Perpetuating shame/ status 
spirals 
POLITICAL LOVE 
(Engulfment) 
Expressions of: 
" False pride 
" De-Selving, 
conformity 
" Pseudo-trust 
" Shame denial 
(guilt, anger) 
POLITICAL STRIFE 
(Isolation) 
Expressions of: 
" Pain 
" Fear 
" Distrust 
" Superiority 
" Anger 
" Revenge 
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THE POLITICS OF PASSION 
Chart 2 
POLITICAL LOVE 
Comfort 
Self-esteem 
Trust 
Hope 
POLITICAL STRIFE 
" Fear 
" Anger 
" Distrust 
" Pain 
SHORTTERM 
Justification through: 
" Analogy 
" "Rationality' 
" Risk avoidance 
" Shared interests 
Shared preferences 
LONG TERM 
" Institutionalisation of policy in 
bureaucracy; 
" Continuance of government "'mood" 
" Perpetuation of passionate 
communication 
" Collective memory 
" Emotionality in receptivity to change 
Chapter 3 
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Lead-up to Revolution: The Play of Love 
There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and B, ill, 
to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves. ' Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan' 
The intensity of the Anglo-American special relationship with Iran under the Shah played 
a significant role in the nature of the schism that ensued once the Shah fell. The rapport, 
in material terms, was based on Iran's role as military bulwark against communism and 
as an economic and political ally of the West. But the bond was more complex than that. 
The Shah was the ideal son. He was viewed as someone the West could trust, not on1v to 
resolve differences with his allies in a non-violent manner, but as a believer in, and 
promoter of Western norms within the process of modernizing and eventually 
democratizing his nation. In outlook, therefore, he represented the ideal third ýý, orld 
leader, while the opportunities he offered to those in the West to manage and take 
advantage of the assets he controlled rendered him a seductive ally. Not only did he 
command extensive reserves of oil (and gas), but geostrategic position, and very 
importantly, a market - for arms, large-scale development in accordance with Westem 
l'ormulae, and regional influence. In the '60s but more so in the *70s, Iran was a countr\ 
the West loved to love, and nowhere more so than in the Anglo-American discourse. 
For the United States, in which good and evil are representations frequently used 
to distinguish friends from foes, the malignant from the pure, those ývho are good are 
constructed in both the domestic and international discourse as paralleling or emulating 
the values and aspirations of the US (Sheikh 2002). Good, in US, and larger Western 
terms, is constructed as rational, as Kennan pointed out in his Long Telegram right after 
the close of WWII. In this key document, he contrasted the American sý stem to that 
prevail ino in the 'con spi racy within a conspiracN' \\hich \ý as the ne\ý SoNiet 
L': n ion. sI nce 
'for it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as \ýith us, the measure 
a0ainst \ý hich outlook is constantl\ being tested and re-formed' (Kennan 
1946 in Buhi 
L_ I 
ite 
1 Richard Tuck, ed. ( 199 1) Leviathan ( Cambridge: Cambridge 
UniN ersitN Press), p. 19 
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1997: 3 1, emphasis mine). 
For the leaders of the Anglo-Saxon worlds. the fund of objective fact was the 
basis of reasonable governance, which ensured individual libertý and the maximizing of 
whatever it took to encourage humanity to be most human. 'Objective fact'. defined bý 
Searle as established 'by human agreement' (in contrast to *brute facts' \ýhich *required 
no human institutions for their existence'), was nonetheless understood to be 
foundational, a synonym for truth, as well as morality (Searle 1995: 1-2). This ýýas the 
basis of Anglo-American 'universalism', both as doctrine and as mission. 'Good'. in 
practices of democracy, was perceived to be absolute - unlike that claimed by Marxism 
or Islamism thereafter - since it was viewed as outside contextual isation or interpretation. 
In effect, democracy was perceived by great statesmen from Kennan to Carter and 
Churchill to Thatcher, as saved from the dogmatism that plagued all other political 
systems, its rationality based on truth, not just belief (Thatcher 1986: 42). 
The political good which the United States saw in its allies, and ýOich ýýas 
perceived as returned in kind, was not therefore, just a search for glory. but a moral 
commitment to a process-implicit in many cases to be a long one. For those allies being 
brought into the fold from beyond the trans-Atlantic alliance, liberal market 
democratisation was an expectation, but not a requirement. Their faults were seen as less 
important and more transient than their attributes if the latter were understood to relate 
directly to US interests and the strength of the free world (Harvey 2004: 39). For those 
states failing within these constraints, commitment and affection figured strongl\ in the 
discursive economies that defined the relationship. For those special relationships in 
which shared security was deeply entrenched, as vith the UK, Israel, South Korea, Japan, 
and in its day, Iran, the nature of the loyalty, and practices of mutuality can be described 
as political love. 
That embrace, however, required each party to cede elements of their oýýn needs 
and points of viexý in a precarious balance that continuously pushed against the egoism 
and sovereignty of each state, a compromise seen as necessar,, for the good of the 
universalism and securitý that inspired it. The aspiration ýý as perfect 'attunement'. \\hIch 
\\ould ensure adequate negotiation betx\een the parties \\ithin a framework of reciprocal 
respect and feedback promoting pride. The risk. hovvever. was *engulfment', in \\hich the I 
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member states' needs would be too 'fused' for effective negotiation, and instead. their 
interests and identities would be subsumed in -pseudo-bonds' that demanded conformit. 'ý 
to certain roles (Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 17). In place of genuine we-ness, the bonds 
would provide only the semblance of community, being constantly threatened through 
repressed shame on the part of both parties. This shame could arise from both their o\ýn 
compromises, and from the lack of ratification as to the cost of those compromises bý the 
other. Political love therefore perpetually contained the seeds of political strife, in that the 
shame of engulfment could not be acknowledged if the special relationship ýýas to 
continue. 
In the case of the West's relationship with Iran prior to the revolution. engulfment 
characterized the political love, which led to fundamental discontinuities between ýOat 
the West understood to be the identity of Iran based on the discourse projected by the 
Shah, and the identity of the nation as projected in the unheeded discourses of various 
opposition groups. As this was not an alliance of expediency, unalloyed by the 
investment of morality and political love, but a relationship that entwined the identities 
and expectations of the US and the UK with those of the Shah, the fallout. ýN-hen it came, 
was tumultuous. Not only were the hopes and resources committed to this model child to 
be written off, but more disturbingly, the child rejected the universalist ideals of the 
parent(s). Adding insult to injury, the child's reasoning remained oblique and 
misunderstood, leading to discursive figurations of Iran as first a 'lost' child (justifying 
practices of anger and discipline); then as a 'bad' child (toward which responses of fear 
and hate became thinkable and actionable). and finally as a 'terrorist' and *rogue' 
(warranting practices of revenge). 
In this chapter, I illustrate how a politics of passion regarding pre-revolutionar,, 
Iran was operationalized in the Anglo-American discourse to protect against the identity 
insecurity inspired first by the Soviet threat and second. by the need to control the oil 
spigot (and hence, modernization) then in the hands of the Shah and other Middle East 
rulers. This took the lorm of. a) the mobilization of a coup to replace the 'Communist' 
, %, Iossadeq, b) reduced historical memory 
in imbuing the oil-rich Shah NNith the attributes 
of a democratizim-1. Westernized security partner, c) exaggerated expressions of support 
in response to his demand for Nveapons to protect against the So% iets. d) impaired 
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information processing as a result of accepting unchallenued the Shah's discourse on Iran 
and the region. e) compulsive loyalty to the Shah as he fell. Their passionate responses. I 
argue, show how the Shah was vested with Westem identity. how his representations of 
self and difference became those adopted within the Anglo-American discourse as part of 
the leaming process of we-ness, and how the friendship fed into the West's self-esteem 
(albeit false pride, or hubris) in regards to the efficacy of its 'universalist' norms in 
exportable inscriptions of democracy, modemization and global security. I also address 
how the Anglo-American discourse was constructed to deny the shame of supporting a 
dictator who did not promote democracy and was frequently criticized for his abuse of 
human rights. 
In the second section, I suggest that when circumstances revealed the shared 
dependency to be based on false assumptions about both themselves and the other. 
political love prompted efforts to refix the relationship. However, having shut out 
alternative discourses, the commitments of political love served to blind Britain and the 
US to actual circumstances in Iran. This led to anxiety and emotional vithdrmkal as 
discursive practices supporting the Shah lacked the grammar to perceive non-Shah 
leadership in Iran as anything but catastrophic. What is interesting is hoNý quickly this 
took place, a reflection of the 'emotional' intensity at play. 
The boundaries of the literature 
The revolution caught most scholars by surprise, with the result that revisionism 
characterizes much of the literature (Kramer 2001). Among the few to have anticipated 
'fairs 
("The Crisis of '78'. the cataclysm were James Bill, in his 1978 article in Foreign. ýl 
Winter), Homa Katouzian (1981) and Fred Hallidaý (1980). Bill's subsequent The Eagle 
and the Lion: The tragedy ofA merican- Iranian relations is a tour de force (for contrar" 
view, see Ganj 1 2006: 3). An extended diplomatic history, it pro,, ides ,, aluable insights on 
US and Iranian polic,, mistakes. Jim Hoagland, in a 1988 revle%% in The Guardian. offers 
a strikino example of how the discursive construction of identity bears upon the literature. 
ho\%ever. I loagland's critique exemplifies the mainstream in'. estment in the *tough 
conservative', pro-Shah discourse that remained \\ell-entrenched ten ýears after the 
institution of the Islarnic Republic. Hoagland takes the \ iew that Bill 
lets Iran otTtoo 
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lightly: -Iran's own specific characteristics and shortcomings contributed mightilý to this 
disaster and deserve much more attention in this account, ýý hich accepts ýý 1th too much 
equanimity the Iranian genius for blame-shifting', Hoagland writes. Although Bill's 
work has since come to be regarded as among the most even handed. Hoagland 
denounces his views of US policy, which at the time were still quite shocking, 
attempting instead to fend off the shame they implied: jBill] cites only Khomeini's 
explanation, which is consistent with the general sense that pervades this book. that 
unending American arrogance, chicanery, and clumsiness bear the responsibility for the 
destruction of US-Iranian relations and the implacable hostility that Iranians show toward 
Americans and other foreigners today' (May 29,1988: 20). 
Two excellent primary sources are John Stempel's ( 198 1) Inside the Iraniun 
Revolution, and Gary Sick's (1985) All Fall Down: A merica's tragic encounter with Iran. 
Stempel, a first secretary in the US Embassy in Tehran, offers incisive eye-ýkitness 
accounts of events, which he combines with an insider's view on the tenor and thinking 
taking place in the US government. Sick worked closely with Brzezinski on the National 
Security Advisory desk as an area expert, bringing invaluable insight on the nature of the 
information available, and the attitudes that prevailed in Washington during the last ý eýlr 
of the Shah's reign through to the end of the hostage crisis. His surprisingly doctrinaire 
account provides mordant examples of the passionate politics being practiced at the time. 
Two other useful primary sources are the diaries of British Ambassador Anthony Parsons 
(1984), and American Ambassador William Sullivan (1981), ýNhich offer impassioned 
descriptions of Iran's upheavals, and their own often painful roles in transmitting the 
news to their respective capitals. 
One critical primary source that offers a unique resource for the scholar 
is the 
American embassy documents found by the Students Following the Imam's 
Line (SFIL). 
Spanning a 15-\ear period from the latter part of the Shah's reign to the 
last day before 
the hostage crisis, it is an unparalleled archive even noý\,, 27 years later. - 
In the secondarv literature, the lead-up to re,. olution has 
been analysed as 
, Sources for these documents ýary. For this research, tý%o editions \N ere used: 
1) Asnati. published h% the 
Students Follo\ý Ing the Imam's Line (SFIL) and 2) Iran, - 
The Afaking qf U-ý Policy. 19--- 1980. on 
microfiche, from the National SecuritN Archi\ e. George 
Wash I ngton Unkersjtý; \Oich forth Is ýtud\, %k as 
accessed at the I, Iddel Hari Military Centre for Archkes 
Librar\ at Kings College, and refer-red to as US 
Enibassý Documents, or USED. 
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culturally overbearing and uncritical on the part of the US (Altheide 198 1. Bakhash 1985. 
Fischer 1981 -, Heikal 198 1), unrestrained as an expression of US military policy in 
response to the Soviet threat (Cottam 1977,1989, Ledeen and Lewis 1981 ), politicall\ 
blind on the part of all parties (Halliday 1979, Rubin 1980). clientelist and uneven 
(Gasiorowski 199 1, Keddie 1981 -, Hoogland 1989), and colonialist (, "Vlilani 1994: 1 
Several of these, including Katouzian 198 1, take as their primary focus Iran's Internal 
discourses and upheavals, particularly as they related to the political rise in Islamic 
activism as a tool against the Shah. Zonis in Majestic Failure (1991 ) approaches the 
subject through a psychological analysis of the Shah, and the US ability to play on his 
dependency and need for 'self-objects'. However. Zonis does not adequately interrogate 
how American psychology or emotion played into the policies that bolstered and secured 
the partnership, and blames the fall of the Shah on Iranian xenophobia. 13ý ignoring 
American motivations, and the claustrophobia of both states in the engulfing discourse of 
false expectations, his otherwise fascinating treatment is seriously impoverished. 
In the course of several publications examining the Iranian upheaval and its 
effect on Western relations with Islam, Halliday ( 1979,1996,1998,2002) moves from a 
leftist view of the Shah's Iran as plagued by conspiracy and confusion. to one in ýýhich he 
balances Western rigidity and Iranian dogma as equally contributory to the 
misinterpretations in the mutual disenchantment of each others' system. Foucault ( 1979), 
interviewed in Tehran, where he travelled to personally \ýitness the forces of revolution, 
adopts a critical view of the West's outrage and incomprehension, stating the Iranians 
ýýkere swimming in ambiguity' through 'various layers of language, expression and 
engagement' (p. 229). Nonetheless, his position has been passionately criticized as being 
pro-Khomeini and anti-Shah. and then later ignored (and forgotten) so as not to tarnish 
his reputation (Afary and Anderson 2005, Mirsepassi 2000: 1 ). In the securitý arena. there 
is useful discussion on what the fall of the Shah meant to US perceptions of the regional 
geostrategic situation (Moller 2003, Rubin 1980: Ramazani 1990, Tehranian, ed. 2003: 
arnong, others), although the actual strength of the Shah's military capabilities (and hence. 
role) Is often over-stated (Cooley 1991, Hu\ser 1986. for an exception see Shah's 
obituary bN Liz Thurgood. The Guardian 12/3,, 1980). 
What remains inadequatelý addressed is \\ h\ the LIS and Britain \vere so ca\ alier 
Chapter 3 Page 59 
in adopting, largely unadulterated, the Shah's discourse of Iran, and ýOy theý remained 
so wedded to it for so long. Beyond observing the catastrophic impact of the practice 
adopted by both states to restrict their own intelligence gathering in Iran and instead 
accept the Shah's, there is little discussion as to why they would have left themselves 
open to such vulnerability or so trusted another state (Parsons 1984: 34-38. - Sick 1985: 32. 
42; Brzezinski 1983: 367). Further, once the die had been cast. analysis is thin on the 
normative reasons why the US and Britain were unable to re-establish engagement ýý ith 
the revolution's leadership in an expression of their own democratic discourse of freedom 
promotion. National security needs combined with state propensity toýýard self-help, 
following the realist paradigm, would suggest that to ensure a stable flow of oil, and to 
re-establish anti-Soviet security measures, both the US and Great Britain would have 
acted vigorously to activate a working relationship with the new government, regardless 
of its Islamic character or human-rights profile (Stempel 198 1: Waltz 1979: 118). 
From a liberal, even English School perspective, ký, ith its theoretical emphasis on 
opportunities and capabilities, although the religious leadership that acceded to power in 
Iran adopted strong 'Neither East nor West' rhetoric (explainable as an outgrowth of the 
country's historical experience of invasion and foreign-imposed crisis [Adib-'Vloghaddam 
2005: 270]), the rapid moves towards elections for a constitutional congress, the drafting 
and adoption of a constitution, and the holding of general parliamentarx" elections could 
be argued to have offered compelling reasons to become more activelý committed to 
Iran's tentative steps toward democracy-however illiberal and vulnerable they might 
initially have seemed-not only to shore up US and British influence in the country. but 
to legitimize their image as supporters sin qua non of popular democracy (Halliday 1990, 
Kmý ert 1989-9: passim, for contrary perspective see Harvey 2003). Instead. the US 
insisted on a policy of loyalty to a fallen, and in many xýay,, s already tarnished monarch. 
Why? ThouOi a phenomenon able to be partially analyzed in normative terms. 
explanation for the tenacity of this IoN alty remains unsatisfactorv. as it reflects behm, -iour 
that is inconsistent with other US or British practices. Under circumstances of sudden 
change, 'national' interests and norms themsek es become sites of passionate 
contestation, as do the agentic relationships to those interests. In such a period. ýOen 
sit, mifiers pegt. 2ed to the pre\ lous regime are set afloat and \et. in response to emotionall\ 
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inspired figurations, remain privileged, policies are ill-explained b--, rational 'interests' or 
by cognitive or normative approaches, since none explain why the choices made ýýere 
preferred over others. 
Understanding emerges when viewing the discourse in terms of emotional 
linkages between memory, habit and experiences (Ross 2006: 3). By unpicking the highlý 
personalized liaison between the Shah and his Anglo-American partners, it becomes 
possible to clarify the coincidence of motives, yearnings, benefits and compromises that 
enabled relaxation of the normal conduct of foreign affairs during his reign (Schoenbaum 
1979: 16), and the passionate embrace that fulfilled the promise that Iove is blind'. 
Following this discourse through part-whole analysis reveals an interrelationship that 
went through an arc of mutual dependency and then disillusion, ýýhile highlighting the 
vulnerabilities that were at stake throughout, and which made the passionate 
constructions possible. 
The passion of the special relationship 
'Only a few weeks ago the Shah was crowned - he had postponed the e, ýent until 
his aspirations and politics and programs for his people had produced substantial 
results. The verdict throughout the free world was that he had thoroughly eamed 
his crown. Indeed. the story of modem Iran is one of the great success stories of 
our time. And the realization that in some small measure, we have been able to 
help Iran accomplish this success should give all of us in the United States 
satisfaction and joy. ' US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Tehran 29/11/1967 (in 
Alexander and Nanes 1980: 370) 
Rusk, making sure to spotlight his ability to speak for the 'free world'. expresses here his 
verdict on the Shah's sterling performance and character. The substantial achievements 
Rusk refers to \Nere the result of the White Revolution. ýkhich \\as undertaken four ýears 
earlier, and by the time of this speech, was alread,,, - being regarded as seriousl" flawed. 
having inspired violent demonstrations. severe population dislocation (urban migration) 
and agricultural falls in production, all of N\hich the embassy in Tehran had reported on 
23 2-17). For Rusk. and ýOiich Rusk knexý (Ansari 2006: 47-49, Katouzian 1981: 2 )--- 
however, the Shah's choices symbolized Western progress in action. ýýhile the content of 
that effort x\ as remote and therefore less important than the strong emotional and 
ideological associations' it could muster (Edelman 1967: 5). At the same time. Rusk%, 
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discourse aligns US help with Iran's achievements, signifying success as contingent on 
them both, and therefore, a source of mutual self-esteem. What is denied in the discourse 
is the incongruity of the enthusiasm of a state (the US) promoting universalist values. for 
a figure crowning himself king whose personal *aspirations. politics and programs (sic)' 
are produced as appropriate and sufficient for an entire nation. The abstraction of the 
Shah as good for his country is revealed as adequate, while the shame of betraying the 
American moral commitment to individual rights and responsibilities was repressed. The 
sense of inadequacy this implied translated seamlessly into another emotion. namely 
superiority over the backward Iranians, who required the authority of strong, leadership to 
bring them modernization, as well as American help and guidance. 
In American 'society, power likes to present itself in the guise of benevolence' 
(Lasch 1978: 8 1), or in the case of Britain, altruism (Coils and Dodd 1986). Yet, in both 
cases, relationships tend to reflect a less benign bent, such that 'even the most intimate 
encounters become a form of mutual exploitation' (Lasch 1978: 63). From this 
perspective, the moral underpinning of 'help' in the Anglo-American foreign-policy 
discourse reflects as much, if not more, the motivation to secure the *seir than interest in 
bolstering the 'other'. In Michael Ignatieff s view, this is not onl-y an American. but a 
Western impetus, and an ongoing one: 
'When policy was driven by moral motives, it was often driven by narcissism. We 
intervened not only to save others, but to save ourselves, or rather an image of 
ourselves as defenders of universal decencies. We \ýanted to show that the West 
-meant" something. ' (1997: 95). 
Mutual exploitation includes security considerations, exchange of gains and ideological 
compatibility. In addition, within the Anglo-American construct, if a state is perceived as 
an exemplar of its own manifest destiny on a free-world course, especially a *pioneer' in 
an unfriendly neighbourhood, such a state (Iran, Israel, Japan. South Korea, Taiwan) 
becomes 'special' (Stephens 2006: 4). Driven bý the American imaginary of the frontier, 
such states are produced as prodigies, the 'opening' of their lands to liberal market 
forces 
being implicated, in the struggle between the barbaric and the ci,. ilized. as *good' and 
-natural'. and further. as mirroring the West's mNn modem political history, even though 
the representation ot I that past (le 'referent') is itself contingent (Dot\ 
1996: 7). As such. 
the United States. acting the charismatic leader of the free world. attracts and 
is attracted 
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to states it can construct as mirroring entities, a process that bolsters its oýýn self-image. 
as well asjustifying and formalizing its close impress upon theirs (Post 1986). For 
Britain, those to whom she chose to bequeath power while patroness of her empire %ý ere 
I ikewise those she recognized most closely - the monarchs. the elite tribes, and those %ý ho 
appropriated to themselves the Anglo-Saxon model (Bell 2007: 256; Dodge 2003. chapter 
1; 'Fidrick 1992: 231-2). Approaching politics as a combination of romantic and parental 
love engaged in the flowering (and protection) of model wards can be understood 
therefore as a characteristic of Anglo-American leadership (Doty 1996). 
The Shah's Iran fit with this profile perfectly. It was represented as fearlessly 
striding toward, in the Shah's phrase, the 'Great Civilization', and in Nixon's, as acting 
the 'bridge between East and West' ('Remarks'. Washington 23/10/1969, in Alexander 
and Nanes 1980: 372; Keddie 1981: 18 1). Likewise, Iran's domestic and historical position 
as a regional power distinct from the Arab Sunni Middle East, contributed to the 
possibility for 'mutual exploitation' on a psychological level - as illustrated by the 
Shah's continued oil shipments to Israel during the 1973 Arab Oil embargo, on the one 
hand, while on the other, he collected unfettered both British and American military 
hardware (News Conference, Secretary Kissinger and the Shah', Zurich, 18/21975, in 
Alexander and Nanes 1980: 423; Gasiorowski 1991; Zonis 1991: 261). And although 
structurally, Iran was little different from many other growing third world states, by the 
1970s the Shah considered Iran had a *rightful place on the world scene' (F. Pahlavi 
1978: 98). This fed and confirmed the West's ability to perceive him as a unique regional 
expert without whom policy construction would be the poorer ('White House Statement'. 
Carter and the Shah, 15/11/1977 in Alexander and Nanes 1980: 448), as ýý eII as a steady 
monarch fully in control of his own country. The mutual exchange and adoption of 
discourses did important psychological and emotional work in underscoring the three 
nations' inter-textuality and constituted a deepb, sentimentalised m,, tholog,, of 
interdependency - asummum bonum - of pol itical contentment. 
HoNý eý, er. it h id as much 
as it revealed, beino binding. but also blinding. 
The Good Child 
The close association bemeen the Shah and the US dated 
from 1953 NOen the CIA 
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helped regain the Shah his throne and a 10-ýear clientelist relationship ensued 
(Gasiorowski 1990,1991 ). As the price of oil rose, the friendship gyre\ý from a peripheral 
to a central one for the US, enabling the Shah to assume an increasingh, 'ý Ital role as a 
key regional supplier, and as a pillar of the US-managed securitv communItN of Westem 
democratic states that grew out of the Nixon Doctrine (Bill 1988: 197-201. Milani 
1994: 13). 
The special relationship was elaborated as a response to the threat b,. the So-,. iet 
Union against Western identity security, that is. the hegemony of its liberal ideals. The 
political love evolved from the Shah's ability to convincinglý promote himself as more 
reliable than the populist Prime Minister Mossadeq in maintaining the strategic buffer 
zone between the USSR and the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. His argument for 
stockpiling arms played on American fears, and were seen as crucial for deterring, the 
spread of communism ('Staff Report', Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. US Senate: 
US Military Sales to Iran, July 1976, in Alexander and Nanes 1980: 406). This situation 
continued under President Carter, who as late as October 3 1,1978, at a birthdaý party for 
the Shah's son at the White House, stated, 'Our friendship and alliance with Iran is one of 
the important bases on which our entire foreign policy depends' (quote in Sick 198-5: 62). 
The perception in Washington, London and other key Western capitals, ýý as that Iran 
shared crucial security concems, as ýkell as common interests, aspirations and %, -alues. 
This implied not only shared strengths, but also shared dependencies, that is, a 
relationship sufficiently close to reveal the inner 'other' - vulnerabilities against ýOich 
mutual friendship could protect. Iran was understood to be part of the \Vestern collective 
identity which gave meaning to its motivations and goals (Bially-Mattern 2001: 353)). 
That same evening, Carter summed up the \\, ell-being felt to reside in the relationship, 
TFhe Shah's] progressive administration is very valuable. I think, to the entire Western 
world' (Sick ibid, emphasis mine). 
Gushing enthusiasms for the Shah and the images of friendship that shored up 
each regime had produced for several years a discursive fiction of normative similaritv at 
the state level, and a sense of mutual dependencý at the elite le-% el. As stated bý the Shah 
eI during a visit to the Nixon White House in October 1967: 'We are det' ndinv, the same 
principles, upholding the same moral \alues' (PahlaN 1. 'Remarks'. Washington. in 
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Alexander and Nanes 1980: 372). 
The nature of this collegial we-ness, however, was based on several 
misunderstandings and subjectivities that nonetheless were regularly supported bý 
reasoned argument. These in turn coloured not only the events that rapidly severed Iran 
from the West two months after Carter's warmly worded toast. but contributed to the 
conditions of possibility for the vitriol and suspicion that has produced Iran ever since as 
a rogue state. The umbrella for these subjectivities, and the passions that contributed to 
them, was the discursive equivalency of the *Shah-as-Iran. This equivalency ý\ as 
promoted through the instrumental ization of development theories and North-South 
inscriptions in which the universalist applicability of the Western model of progress and 
modernity were privileged by the Shah and marketed as applicable in Iran. The pride this 
engendered in the public narrative conducted at the elite level in Tehran, London and 
Washington was not matched by broad popular well-being in Iran. Because occasional 
whiffs of this reality reached all three capitals, false pride was mutually shared, a glue 
that recursively held them together, but which chained to associative feelings of anxietý, 
frustration, embarrassment and distrust in the face of unfulfilled aspirations and 
expectations (Milani 1994: 10; Mirsepassi 2000: 11-13 and passim, Rouleau 1980). Of 
primary importance was maintaining the fictive image of the self-confidant, supporti,,, e 
-self in the eyes of the other -a relational necessity that put enormous strain on both the 
US and UK in regards to Iran, and visa versa. 
Because the Shah represented himself and his rule as ideologically encompassing 
and promoting the West's 'universalist' values, the-v feature as constant contingencies in 
the production of political love within the Anglo-American discourse toward Iran. As 
such, they contributed to fixing the Shah's legitimac,,,, to Western reason, enabling the 
relationship to be figured as a source of trust and comfort - even when it ýý as not. The 
maintenance of Anglo-American identity security NNithin the special relationship reveal a 
tolerance for failings such as corruption, authoritarianism, and human-rights abuse that 
seriously compromised the rationalitý of perceiving the 
Shah's performance in Western 
normative terms. The passionate commitment to do so. meam\hile. stood in stark contrast 
to the Aniflo-American discourse toward other Third World states. such as the 
Ph iI ippines, Kenya. or Grenada, \, ý Ii ich cou Id offer none of the , spec Ial' assets such as 
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security positioning, oil. or weapons markets, that the Shah could provide (Beeson 2007, 
Doty 1996: 53,80. chapter 3 passim-, Said 1979: 154). Critically, figuring the Shah in 
terms that enframed Western reason enabled the Anglo-American discourse to reflect to a 
large - and eventually, damaging - degree the Shah's own representations, not only of 
Iran, but of Islam. 
The 'Shah-as-1ran' 
The discourse of endearment surrounding the Shah emanated from the sense of comfort 
and safety that he evoked in Washington and London over a number of years and on a 
number of fronts. 'For almost a decade, ' noted Sick, 'the United States ... viewed its 
relations with Iran almost exclusively as relations with the person of the Shah' ( 1985: 32). 
The monarch in many respects was a creation of the US and British intelligence 
services who in repositioning him on the throne, overthrew Mossadeq and Iran's first 
democratically elected government (Ansari 2006: 36-37). Mossadeq, who had 
nationalized Iran's oil, was figured in both the US and Britain as pro-communist and thus 
likely to allow Iran to drop into the Soviet sphere (Farmanfarmaian et al. 1997: 243, 
Keddie 1981: 135; Kinzer 2003: 203, Roosevelt 1979). The rapid take-over by the US of 
what had been a primarily British operation responding to disruptions in long-standing 
Anglo-Iranian Oil relations, and the shift in emphasis from oil security to protection 
against communism, reflected the perception in Washington that US identity security ýýas 
being threatened, necessitating a passionate response to protect its credibility as 
tI reedom's leader. In this way, the hasty takeover by the CIA ý, ýith Britain's approval, was 
one of the first cases to reveal that the nature of acceptable democracy (particularly in the 
Third World) within the Anglo-American discourse was contingent (Armstrong 1992: 
Harvey 2003: 9; Kinzer ibid: 202; Roosevelt 1979: passim). 
In place of the dramatic Mossadeq, the Shah was timid, yet he represented the 
image of a Westernised leader who enthusiastically espoused Nýhat in the Anolo- 
., \merican discourse was perceived to 
be enlightened ideals of progress and de'. elopment. 
lie spoke fluent English and French, dressed as a Westerner. and seemed 
habituated to 
the modern ways he promised to bring to his nation. Equally 
important. he \\as a keen 
supporter of British and American foreign policies (such as 
Lý ndon Johnson's exploits in 
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Vietnam, and Britain's containment of Nasser), and reassuringly secular in his own 
policy proclivities, unflinchingly providing oil supplies to Israel and South Africa (Bill 
1988: 177; Joint Statement by Pres. Johnson and the Shah. Washington 23/8/1967 in 
Alexander and Nanes 1980: 367; Ledeen and Lewis 1981: 54). While building a personal 
relationship with each American president and British prime minister over the course of 
37 years on the throne, he fostered an adept foreign media personality of a ruler dedicated 
to improving the lot of his people in accordance with a clear modernisation agenda 
(Brzezinski 1983: 357). The personal communication he maintained constantly ratified the 
relationship and confirmed the emotional connection, offering an important balance 
against its normative inadequacies. 
Over time, the Shah's personality cult was carefully nurtured, and his ability to 
clear the political field of opponents so shrewdly handled that by 1969, U, ýYelvs and 
World Report quoted him as saying, 'In this country, the word -king- is almost magic. 
The people accept almost anything from the "king" (quote in Bill 1988: 197). 
Importantly, it was not just the Shah who came to believe this, but increasingly. so did 
the US and Britain and their allies (Carter 1982; Kissinger 1976-, Rusk 1967). The Anglo- 
American discourse toward 'Iran-as-Shah' grew increasingly enthusiastic: it became 
laden with assertions of common identity, goals, and commitments. It also came to reflect 
very closely the Shah's reading of history, his assessment of the political, religious. 
social, economic and security situations, and his perspective on the region. In an 
example of the emotional ized denial of official memory for the promotion of political 
love, US government communications (both public and secret) summarizing the Shah's 
decades-long reign, mirrored his 'relentless ... erasing of 
Mossadeq from the official 
record of events', rarely if ever mentioning the period. or the level of popular 
democratic 
development achieved in the election of Mossadeq's several govemments (quote in 
Ansari 2006: 38, USED 1965-1977 passim). For the US, this emotional commitment to 
o, verlook its own values for mutual 'interests' infuses the 'Shah-as-iran' 
discourse, the 
secret shame of omission submerging the impulses not only of those authoringr 
official 
The British archives on this period remain unaN ailable. The American archiN es 
on the Mossadeq 
o\ erthrow were made available in 1992 through the National 
Security Archn. e. see also. C. %I. Woodhouse 
(I 982), 5otnething Ventured: 4n Autobiogi-apki, (Ne\\ York: Harper 
Collins): and James Risen (2000) 'The 
Secret Histor\ of the 1961 Coup', \v%v\%. n\-tIn1c, -ý.,: oi1i 
hhrarN %\orld mideaý, t 0416001 ran-ci q- i ndev lital 1. 
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writing on Iran, but the readers' as well. As Scheff and Retzinger observe, 'Under these 
conditions, shame becomes recursive and self-perpetuating. Unacknowledged shame 
builds a wall between persons and between groups. A chain reaction occurs, shame 
building on shame' (p. 30). Conformity to the myth of mutuality ensured that attunement 
between the two states was never complete, but instead, that a constant, often 
subconscious sense of alienation within the engulfment of the relationship prevailed. 
In similar vein, rarely was the Shah's weak character touched upon in official 
documents, though it frequently figured in reports written prior to the 19-53 coup. BN' 
contrast, these documents, as well as speeches made by various US statesmen from 
Kissinger to Carter, were prone to emotional exaggeration and discursive imitation, 
citing, for example, the advantages of 25 centuries of kingship in Iran. a construct of the 
Shah's first enunciated during the Persepolis festivities of 1972 (Zonis 1991 ). An 
embassy report to the State Department penned February 1977, stated, 'His almost 
unchallenged domination of the political scene rests on 2,500 years of monarchical 
tradition and his own extraordinary skill in exercising his powers for the benefit of his 
nation' (USED 1149,1977/02/28, v. 7: 88). Constructing the Shah in these terms enabled a 
politics of passion in which was embedded an ahistoricist narrative of tradition and 
legitimacy. Yet, this elided alternative perspectives on how the Shah's powers were 
viewed by his own populace, and the methods by which he was maintaining his 
monarchical hold. 
Even subjugated views, such as those heard during Congressional debates in the 
later '70s, particularly on military sales to Iran, all stopped short of denying the mutually 
beneficial aspects of a relationship that, besides guaranteeing shared securitý, and which 
now also included the protection of Gulf oil resources, involved a cosy alliance with a 
very 'Western', Eastern monarch. In fact, the intensity of the emotional commitment 
rneant that to criticize the Shah became politically hazardous for much of the *70s in both 
Britain and the US. The domestication of meanings associated ýNith him and his regime 
had become institutional ised and bureaucratised as normative - that is, they constituted 
appropriate' behaviour toward Iran (Sick 1985: 18.2 1). To question him or his 
pro(grammes implied a lack of confidence in the NNay the,, were conducting their moral 
agenda (Parsons 1984: xi. 19: Sick 1985: 41-21). Even to those who regarded the situation 
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in Iran with concern, the Shah was no longer a subject to be problematized, the 
dominating themes of the Anglo-American discourse serving to objectitý Iran as an 
object of desire, a prize to be protected and show-cased: an object. in short, of political 
love. 
The passionate construction of the Shah-as-Iran was elaborated in three sub- 
discourses: his key position inside the Western security community. his promotion of 
Western-style modernity and human rights through economic well-being, and his steady 
grip on power with implications not only for regional stability but world order. Each of 
these contributed to Anglo-American identity security, in that they perpetuated (falselý or 
otherwise) emotions of comfort, and enabled figurations of self as promoters of 
democracy and stability. 
The Shared Security Discourse: From pride to hubris 
The Nixon Doctrine of 1969, which codified the US decision to reduce its costly role of 
global gendarme by arming and supporting surrogate friends, identified Iran as its first, 
and as it turned out, its most spectacular proxy (Schoenbaum 1979-, Taheri 1988: 57). In 
so doing, the two states (with Britain as usher and witness) established an international 
regime of cooperation to combat the threat of communism. This confirmed that they 
trusted each other to resolve disputes among themselves peacefully, and, would provide a 
concerted front of shared ideals and capabilities against a common enemy - fulfilling the 
requirements of a security community (Barnett 1996, Bially-Mattern '1001: 353-, 
Frederking 2003: 368). 
This was a win-win scenario -a commanding position for Iran. and low-cost way 
tor the US to tI ultil its national security interests. As a September 1976 Report of the 
Inspector General of the US Foreign Service stated: TS policy toward Iran has been 
effective in advancing US interests. Most policy objectives have been attained. and at a 
i-ninimum cost in terms of US official resources' (USED 01089: 6). B,, 1976, the Shah's 
role had come to include shoring up US identity security in the oil sector. a keN aspect of 
kVash in oton's ability to maintain is role identitN as moderniser and manager of global 
x\ ealth (Harvev 2003, chapter 2, passim. O'Brien 2003: 11). Premised on the commitment 
that 'So long as Middle Fast petroleum remains ý, ital to the "'est. Iranian 
friendship \ý III 
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be of critical importance to the United States'; it was constructed as a 'special 
relationship' (USED ibid 1, quote on 6), in which the US could play a shl ieldin-o. as Xýell 
as a modelling and nurturing role on several fronts including military. strategic, and 
econom iC4 . The gilded phrase 'special relationship* appears regularly in diplomatic and 
policy texts, being one the US 'considered unusually close. and a special relationship 
comparable in some respects and for much the same reasons to the US relationship ýý ith 
NATO and Israel' ('Annual Policy Resource Assessment for Iran: Part 1'. secret cable, 
US Embassy Teheran, USED 1977/04/05,01159). 
Parsons suggests that Britain apprehended the relationship similarlN. 'For nearl,, a 
decade' he writes, 'the Shah had enjoyed an exceptional relationship ýý Ith the 
administration in Washington, ' He goes on: 
'This enhanced status for the Shah in American eyes created an unique nexus of 
interdependence. The Shah adopted foreign and strategic policies which suited the 
United States (and Britain for that matter); in return, the cornucopia of American 
arms supplies and political support was opened wide. ' (1984: 46). 
What Parsons fails to note is that the cornucopia of Britain's arms supplies ýkas opened 
equally wide, with more Chieftain tanks sold to the Shah than to its own Ministry of 
Defence (Keddie 1981: 176). 
The role of parental guardians of a 'good' child enabled the US and Britain to 
imagine Iran an extension of self. On the one hand, the Shah's Iran was the West's 
bulwark against communism and Gendarme of the Gulf., on the other. the US and the 
Western Alliance were Iran's protectors against Soviet aggression, an identitý merging 
that implicated the contingency of narcissism. and its subtle inscription of meanings of 
dominance and dependence (Kissinger 1979; and House of Representatives 'Hearings on 
the sale of Advanced Warning Aircraft Control Systems to Iran', July 29,1977 in 
., \ lexander and Nanes 1980: 370). This 
identity merging was starkly revealed when Nixon 
and Kissinger signed an unprecedented strategic security agreement Ný ith the Shah in 
Tehran on May 31", 1972, beginning the extraordinary arrangement of trust and support 
4'%s Washington October 2 Nixon used the phrase 'special relationship' at the time of the Shah si it to 
3. 
1967 and it was used frequently after Nixon's election to the Presidency. Johnson used the phrase: 
*our 
most xalued and trusted friend' but stopped short of calling It a *special relationship'. 
Thereafter it 
remained in the lexicon used hN both parties until the Shah's fall, see Alexander and 
\anes, eds. ( 1980) 
Ilic, I 'nI't,,, 1,5fates einti Ii-ein A Documentarv Histon, (Frederick. VD: 
Aletheia Books). pp. 348-434 pas., dm. 
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that blurred sovereign military lines between the two states. Significantlý. Nixon. then 
vice president of the US, ended the meeting with the Shah sa)Ying humbly. 'Protect me' 
(quote in Sick 1985: 14). 
Just five weeks later, on July 5, in an impressive act of mobilization. Kissinger 
penned a directive to the Departments of State and Defense to provide kkhatever militar\ 
equipment the Shah asked for short of nuclear weaponry. The Secret Memorandum 
states, 'in general, decisions on the acquisition of military equipment should be left 
primarily to the goverriment of Iran. If the Government of Iran has decided to bu,,. certain 
equipment, the purchase of US equipment should be encouraged tactfull" ýOere 
appropriate, and technical advice on the capabilities of the equipment in question should 
be provided' (Kissinger 'Memo', Department of State, 1972, National Securit" Archi"e). 
Nixon's and Kissinger's arrangement with the Shah was a response to the final 
withdrawal of British forces from the Gulf as well as a result of their close personal 
relationship with him, and there was an emotional sense of comfort that both depended 
and were dependent on the other - the Shah's provision of security against the Soviet 
I Jnion, as well as importantly, his economic reliance on the US, making it a relationship 
in which attunement was possible, dependency being perceived as in some measure 
balanced. 
This all changed with the oil windfalls of the *70s, which made it possible for the 
Shah to buy whatever he wished free of any US economic constraints. This catapulted 
Iran into becoming the Pentagon's biggest client, its billions enabling the US military to 
amortize the heavy research and development costs of such systems as the F- 14s. IBEX 
surveillance network and Phoenix missiles (Alexander and Nanes 1980: 376; Keddie 
1981: 176; Schoenbaum 1979: 19). A similar situation prevailed in Britain. \\here the 
Shah's purchases offset the heavy outlays for oil, as ý\ell as for military research (Keddie 
ibid: Shulz 1989). 
Faith in the Shah's support of the US and the West perpetuated an emotionalised 
discourse of such trust and goodwill that despite his ne\\ financial independence elicited 
no change in the arrangement. At the time, Iran's free hand in the US arsenal -a position 
no other country, not even Great Britain. enjoyed - \\as constructed not as a risk 
but as a 
boon. As Parsons notes: 'The relatke tranquillity and pro-Westem orientation of 
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I ran ... was of cardinal importance' (p. 140). The picture of the Shah as a dependable and 
admirable ally runs throughout the Anglo-American discourse. a heuristic that drc%\ from 
the memory of distrust and discomfort associated with the independence of Mossadeq 
and the contrasting feeling of pride the US took in his replacement. That this 
extraordinary decision was emotionally driven can be attested to bý, the fact that it fit 
neither a normative nor rational paradigm, in the former case there being no rule of 
appropriateness toward other 'most favoured nations' with which it coincided. \\ hile in 
the latter, the exposure and vulnerability it created were incongruous ýýith 'self-help'. 
Four years later, Kissinger confirmed the we-ness at a meeting of the United States-Iran 
Joint Commission: 'On all major international issues, ' he declared, ' the policies of the 
United States and the policies of Iran have been parallel and therefore mutuallý 
reinforcing' (Kissinger, 'Statement upon the Conclusion of the US-Iran Joint 
Commission, 6/8/1976, in Alexander and Nanes 1980: 403). 
This discourse of affection, in Kissinger's view, was unique, in that the Shah 'ýý, as 
for us the rarest of leaders, an unconditional ally' (Kissinger 1979: 1261 ). By then, 
however, incongruities and discrepancies in the human rights and development aspects of 
the Shah's rule were already rife; yet, the commitment by the US and Britain to the Shah 
was too great, and the habit of the relationship too engrained to allov, for a fundamental 
reassessment of the alliance. Instead, attunement among the parties eroded as unspoken 
shame came to invest every aspect of the relationship: Anglo-American embarrassment at 
the Shah's iniquities and the growing need to discursively dismiss orjustl(,, them, the 
Shah's self-doubt at being perceived as not delivering his vaunted Great Civilization and 
being under-appreciated by his greatest allies. Guilt on the part of all three festered as all 
adopted the hubris of false pride in the other. 
Democrucv, fluman Rights, and the Discourse qf Denied Shame 
In his memoirs. British Ambassador Parsons remembers the enthusiasm ýý ith ýý hich 
he 
prepared for his mission to Iran: 
'I had a keen intellectual interest in observ, ng at first hand the prospects ot one of 
the teýk Third World countries NOich \\as generall,, ý belleNed to be close to 
breakini-, throui,, h the barrier of underde,, elopment'. ( 1984: 4) 
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This view pervades official British and American documents and much of the media 
during the late *60s and most of the '70s, mythologizing Iran as not only an economic but 
a political miracle. The general acceptance, even in secret reports to Congress and the 
NSC, of the Shah's commitment to democratization suggests an erasure of resistances to 
even the most inconsistent of the Shah's claims regardingr political liberalization. 
Presumptions that economic expansion would create political opening's were tempered 
primarily by the concern that the Shah's modernization plans were too ambitious to be 
absorbed by a diffident population. Discussions in State Department and embass,, reports 
of the Shah's intentions and ability to incorporate more representative government into 
society, or loosen media censorship, usually contained only one sentence justil'ý ing, the 
lack of progress by noting that he considered Western forms of democracy inappropriate 
for Iran, a view that is rarely contested (Parsons 1984: 18, USED 1975-6: passim). The 
imposition of a one-party system in 1975, for example, \ý hich the Shah touted as 
politically liberalizing, was reported with little comment, the lack of surrounding 
discussion, and hence, relational context, implying comfort ýý ith the idea - or at best, 
unexamined acquiescence. 
'Although the abolition of Iran's multi-party system has unnecessar[IN, 
strengthened his foreign critics, we doubt that the Shah cares. He seems to see his 
own position and that of his nation made so strong by virtue of oil and by his o\ýn 
successful record of leadership that criticism of his internal policies \\, III either be 
muffled or be of no consequence. In this he may be right" (USED. Confidential 
Report, US embassy Tehran to Dept of State 10/7/75: 3). 
rhis document evokes the tone of an indulgent parent putting a posltiý e spin on a rather 
unimportant incident - thus acting as a ratification of a reciprocated bond. Equally 
tellin,,,, it demarcates the difference between American identity and that of the Shah's 
'foreign critics' in a confirmation of the boundarý between *them' (the critics) and 'us' 
(the US and the Shah) through a logic of equivalence (HoNNarth et al: 2002). This N%as a 
response to perceived endangerment to the Shah's identity as a democratizing leader. 
\\ hich by association, reflected on the US as parental guide. There is no comment on the 
Shah's actual act of having abolished the multi-parv, s\ stem. The use of the \ýord 
'unnecessary' not onlý SitUates the American perception of the Shah's action as 
ýicceptable, but denies that an\- support for a multi-part\ system in Iran has ý,, alidity. 1-he 
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cable is silent regarding internal dissent, save to note it ýkill be *muffled' or dismissed: bN, 
not eliciting further discussion, these are revealed as tactics the US has not onlý come to 
expect, but to ignore. The last sentence, by giving the Shah the benefit of the doubt. in 
fact puts the US imprimatur on his choice to stifle political plurality. The failure to note 
in any way how contrary this is to US democratic norms, even in a confidential report. 
suggests meanings and practices in which shame has been subconsciously repressed. This 
implicates the US as emotionally entrenched in the Shah's discourse, and engulfed in a 
relationship in which its own ideals and discourses of liberal democracy are being 
transgressed through the embedded denial of responses (both emotionally, normatively 
and in policy). (For similar, though marginally more critical approaches in the British 
discourse, see Parsons 1984: 16-17). 
The discursive discipline of political love, in which the Shah's successes are 
endearingly figured as outshining any drawbacks, had serious implications for the United 
States' own universalist discourse of human rights. The following exchange at a Hearing 
of the House Subcommittee on International Organisations in August 1976 offers one 
example. The hearing took place in response to a 1976 Amnesty International report, also 
presented as evidence that day, which had found the abuses of the Shah's security and 
intelligence services, SAVAK, so serious, and the Iranian laws protecting civil rights so 
inadequate, that it had prompted the UN Commission on Human Rights to list Iran as a 
top violator requiring immediate action (Butler and Lavasseur White Paper 1976). This 
constituted a threat to both Iran's and it's allies' identity security as practitioners of 
universalist values, especially under Carter's promotion of human rights. The normative 
rule of appropriateness would have necessitated signalling acknowledgement and 
pressing for changes, political emotionality. on the other hand. apprehended the need for 
immediate defence, and thus, unequivocal denial. In his statement, Assistant Secretary of 
Near Lastern and South Asian Affairs, Alfred Atherton testified: 
'I believe that the advantages which have been made in improving the 
human rights of the broad ma-ioritN of Iran's population under considerable 
adversity far outweigh such abuses as have occurred in an attempt to 
control the violent challenges to the government' (L'SED Doc. 01092, 
'Human Rights in Iran', US Congress, House Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 9/8/1976: 27). 
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Here Atherton reveals the US adoption of the Shah's claims that the general human rights 
situation was improving in Iran and that political repression was confined to the control 
ot'violence against the government. In the same hearing, William J. Butler of the 
International Commission of Jurists corroborated the Amnesty findings, offering 
evidence based on his own official investigations conducted in the Iranian prisons. 
Atherton, however, rejected this evidence with the extraordinary statement. , We do not 
have what I should call primary evidence of torture' (Ibid: 28). ' Atherton's denial of 
Butler's findings, and his figuration of human rights abuse as a necessary sacrifice 1e\ ied 
only at the violent few in the face of the larger good of the majority, implicates a 
subjective projection of a rosy, fictive image of Iran thatJibed with the hegemonic regime 
of truth surrounding it in Washington, and which Atherton elected to believe in the face 
of the discomfiting facts produced by Butler. This 'belief' is instantiated ýýJthout settling 
the meaning of 'improvement' in the area of human rights, save through the exclusionary 
practice of denying the importance of the abuses enunciated during the hearing. His false 
pride in the 'improvements' attained by the Shah's regime reflects unacknoýý'ledged, and 
hence, repressed shame at the UN Human Rights Commission's condemnation of Iran's 
6gross violations'. As Scheff and Retzinger observe, denial of such feelings is often 
projected outward in a denial of the situation, a state of affairs that makes it difficult to 
acknowledge one's own responsibility or contribution. and therefore, the morality of 
one's actions. 'To the extent that shame becomes a part of one's character, it would seem 
to interfere with the functioning of conscience', a process breakdown clearby, observable 
during these hearings (Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 186, USED ibid ). 6 
Such constructions within the Anglo-American discourse enabled the Shah's 
autocratic methods to be projected as commensurate \\ ith Western democratic \ alues. 
5 During the hearing, Butler felt it necessary, in light of Atherton's reference to broadened human rights, to 
remind the Congressmen that 'recently the Shah has eradicated the \Nhole concept of the týýo partý political 
-svstern when 
he decreed in 1975 as follows, and I quote him: -. A person ý% ho does not enter the ne\ý 
political party and does not believe in the three cardinal principles %ýhich I referred to, ýýill onlý 
haýe two 
choices: He is either an indiiý idual \ýho belongs to an illegal organization or is related to an outla\ý of 
the 
party, or in other words, is a traitor... (USED Doc. 0 1092 US Congress. 
House Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 9,8/1976: p. 6). Atherton rejoined b\ stating: 'the so-called sin-gle part-N within itself is a 
forurn 
for expressing different points of \ lew' (ibid: 28) 
"'This file contains Butler's report as \%ell as the House testimon\, and a report on an earlier 
meeting 
between the [IS representati\e and other members of the LN commission on 
Human Rights. The 
documents make clear that US pressure e\entuallý, led to a revision of theJudgement. 
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Parsons reviews Whitehall's perceptions of Iran in a similar fashion of denial. noting. 
'the human rights record of the Shah's regime was bad. But ýý hen had they not been so in 
Iran? ' (Parsons 1984: 3) In figuring present practices in terms of historical continuit". 
Parsons uses false analogy to implicate Iran as inferior - failures in the pastjustiýN ing 
failures in the present - and therefore not necessitating similar human rights practices to 
those of the West. He then claims that ongoing contact with the West \ýould prove 
1'elicitous in this regard, though only because, 'There was no doubt the continuation of the 
Shah's regime, and the achievement of his goals, were in our interest' (ibid: 3.18). This 
discourse, characterised by cognitive constraint, wrapped the Shah's goals in a regime of 
truth which only partially mirrored and permanently deferred the meanings and claims of 
the Anglo-American discourse. In this way, Britain and the US both instantiated the lo,, e 
object as well as their own selves in figurations of 'good' (even when the Shah's methods 
were 'necessarily' authoritarian or abusive), and that of any nay-sayers, whether UN 
inspectors or opponents to the Iranian government, as endangering. 
Atherton testified several times over the years, as did Undersecretary of Political 
Affairs Philip Habib, Charles Naas of the State Department Iran Desk, Leslie Gelb of the 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Henry Precht of the State Department and many 
others, their statements contributing to the fund of hegemonic language in ýý hich ýý ords 
such as 'friendship', 'stability', 'Iynchpin', 'progress' and 'mutual protection' appear as 
regular and consistent signifiers (USED 1975-77: passim). Meanvhile, references to 
human rights abuses, political liberties, freedom of expression. corruption and 
mismanagement are glossed over, or when addressed ýkith candour. overshadowed b,, a 
subsequent flurry of positive rhetoric - both tactics revealing the embarrassment 
associated with overt mention, and the importance of submerging any hint of shame 
for 
I 
the sake of continuity and solidarity (USED ibid, including especially Richard 
Helms, 
'Decision-making in Iran' to USDOS. 0 1066.1976/07/22: v. 7: 1021- 107, Alexander atid 
Nanes 1980: 405-475). 
This is not to say that certain aspects of the relationship, including 
Iran's human 
rights practices. Nýere not at times hotly debated. Counter-arguments and protestations 
\\ere loud in the Senate at the Shah's autocratic rule. human riLyhts abuses. and self- 
aggrandizement. Secretarý of the Freasury William Simon called 
him 'a nut*. \ýhilc Paul 
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Erdman's The C'rash o '79 was a thinly disguised critique of the risks implicated in the )f 
Shah's megalomania (Bill 1986: 15-21; Erdman 1976; quote in %Milani 1994: 95). 
-Sometimes I think it is a lot easier not to look at these problems squarely. but an aýýful 
lot of things can happen under this kind of non-recognition of harsh realities as they exist 
in society, ' noted Donald Fraser, Chairman of the House of Representati", es Hearing on 
H uman Ri ghts inI ran (U S ED Doc. 0 1092 9/8/1976: 31). Fraser' s rare sound in L-1 of 
concern at the fragility of the boundary between protection and self-delusion, ýýas as 
close as it could be to an acknowledgement of American practices to%ýard the Shah's 
regime, in which shame was elided and hubris privileged. His observations, hoýýe,. er. 
were interpreted as a call for greater American guardianship around the positi" e 
mythologies surrounding the Shah, and the status it incorporated (Campbell 1992: 235). 
The power instantiated in the passionate evocation of American pride in the Shah, and 
fondness for him personally, was thereby strengthened, rather than lessened, by doubt. 
This was the case even though many individuals in government did not hold views that 
were all similarly pro-Shah, as Zbigniew Brzezinski realized during the Shah's last daýs 
on the throne .6 As the crisis unfolded, ' he grumbled, 'it 
became evident to me that lovýer 
echelons at State, notably the head of the Iran Desk, Henry Precht, Nkere motivated bý 
doctrinal dislike of the Shah, and simply wanted him out of power altogether' (Brzezinski 
1983: 355). This revelation, however. only strengthened Brzezinski's own commitment to 
the Shah. 
,I li, thologies of invincibility and stability: 
Writing off the opposition 
In 1975, departing US Ambassador Richard Helms alloxýed himself to pen a small 
expression of alarm concerning, the political situation in Iran, but then thought better of it. 
Writing in his end-of-mission summary that the educated elite vas 'unable or un%\ illing 
to provide the conservative leadership from ýNhich peaceful chanL-, e ideallý \ýould corne. ' 
lie added, 'one cannot but fear that they are abdicating in fa-, or of the radicals'. Though 
lie ackno%ý, ledged that 'radicals' existed - but not who they \\ere, Helms. 
I Ike his 
predecessors, and his British counterparts. chose to ek-ade the issue, and 
figured the threat 
of opposition as too minimal to \\arrant further thought. Almost In relief 
he adds. 'On the 
other hand, the country's very successful economic performance probably 
lessens the 
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dangers of social upheaval (USED, Diplomatic Airgram, August 1975: 40). In this ýýaý. 
the economic discursively disciplined the political, such that the social stresses Of 
modernization were seen as politically defrayable as the economic rewards cemented the 
Shah's position. Yet, the engulfing discourse of political love in fact failed Helms and 
Washington here too, for already there were clear indications that the Shah's 
Westernizing projects and methods were disastrously structured, and within a year of 
I lelms' departure, the economic situation deteriorated dramatically. 
The Anglo-American discourse of solidarity remained unassailable. however. 
because the Shah's stability, as Schoenbaurn observes, was inherently 'taken to be a good 
thing', the fact being, that 'for most of official Washington, it was seductively easy to 
identify the Shah with Iran' (1979: 18) The discourse played simultaneously on the 
Anglo-American fears of what political instability in Iran might mean (Gulf oil shortages. 
Soviet military adventurism), and on strong positive associations with the Shah's 
steadfast leadership. Activating (albeit obliquely) the historical memory of discomfort 
elicited during the Mossadeq era, Kissinger in August 1976, stated 'The stability of Iran, 
the commitment of Iran to its security, is a major factor for global peace and a major 
factor in the stability of the Middle East. There are at least some Americans who do not 
take it for granted because they remember that even in Iran things were not always that 
way, and that they do not always have to be that way, and that we owe something to the 
farsighted leadership of His Imperial Majesty, which has brought matters to this point' 
('Statement on the Conclusion of the US-Iran Joint Commission'. in Alexander and 
Nanes 1980: 403). The constancy that was accorded the relationship was thus intimately 
bound up not only with the need to maintain the Shah's personal commitment to stability, 
but because the past was used to conjure up fears of a future without him. 
Balancing this, the self-constructed image of the Shah as a monarch beloved bý 
Iiis people who were reaping the benefits of his reforms, was generally accepted in the 
discourses abroad. Not only was the policy of the State Department and Whitehall to look 
tile other xvay when their embassies in Tehran were discouraged by SAVAK from 
i-naking too many opposition contacts (Stempel 198 1: Cooley 1991: 18, Sick 1985. 
Sullivan 198 1: chapter 3. passim). but they s,, stematically reduced their political 
-esources in favour of boosting their commercial and consular sections. 
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'There would be no 'spying on Iran' in my embassyý declared British 
Ambassador Parsons, equating the normal diplomatic practice of reporting on opposition 
voices as 'spying', and justifying his decision on the 'rational' argument of not Xýanting 
to insult the Shah through any hint of continuing Britain's historical practices of 
intervention in Iranian affairs (1984: 5). The same view pertained in Washington. 
'Opposition to the regime is more a state of mind than a readiness to act. ' noted a Dept of 
State Bureau of Intelligence and Research Secret Report in which the primary area of 
concern was enlargement of the Embassy commercial premises in Tehran (USED 0 1144. 
'The Future of Iran, Implications for the US'. January 1977). A State Department 
Briefing Paper drafted that same month stated, 'The Shah, who has 35 years of 
experience on the throne, has the loyalty of the broad mass of the populace, particularly 
in the rural areas, and the full cooperation of the armed forces and the 
intelligence/security apparatus, as well as the support of an extremely able group of 
civilian technocrats' (USED 01138,3 March 1977: 124-125). Although acknowledging 
that there were Iranian technocrats and intellectuals who were 'passively resistant to the 
Shah's authoritarian rule' and various clergy who 'do not accept the present monarchy or 
its reform projects', these sectors of society are not analysed further, most probably - to 
judge from embassy documents and other archival sources - because no in-depth 
information was being collected. 
This willingness to abrogate their own intelligence gathering responsibilities, and 
their blind comfort in the we-ness of the relationship, acts as a vivid example of how they 
had given up important aspects of themselves in order to maintain the bond. Although it 
appeared outwardly to be one of intense attachment, in fact, it signalled a relationship in 
ýý hich independence was interpreted as disloyalty, or even betrayal (Scheff and Retzinger 
1991: 25). 
Signifying the opposition as simply 'passive resistance' enabled what was 
argUably the most serious misconstruction within the 'Shah-as-iran' discourse: the Shah's 
invincibility. Western academics and politicians. as Nýell as the Shah, discurskel", 
figured Marxism as the problem child, and therefore, that opposition would spring from :: 1 
the intelligentsia and middle classes (Cottam 1989. Hermann 1989. Pahla" 1 198 1). 
DraN\ ing on the shared US-Iran memory of %lossadeq's -communist' proclk ities. the 
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Shah represented the Soviet-linked Tudeh party as Moscow's Trojan horse. and the small 
Marxist-inspired Mojaheddin and Fedayeen fringe groups as major terrorist threats - 
ensuring they were figured as serious enough that the government was justified in 
causing their violent suppression (Irfani 1982; Keddie 1981: 236-239). ' 
Additionally, the moderate intellectual and middle classes, known to support 
political liberalisation and civil rights, were constituted as closet leftists, even though 
their discourses paralleled the Anglo-American narrative of democracy (Milani 1988: 74). 
Represented by the Shah as threatening his vision of progress. they were s,,., stematically 
discredited (until, ironically, the Shah was overthrown and they became the 'moderates' 
that in the Anglo-American response to Khomeini, were represented as Iran's primary 
hope). In the meantime, the Shah's ability to deliver stability and business I lkeýý ise 
enabled this group to be repressed through state violence, and for London and 
Washington to be lulled into acquiescence. 'I blame myself for not speaking to the Shah 
about this crass reaction' Parsons, in retrospect, notes. 'My staff pressed me hard to have 
this out with the Shah ... They were right. 
But I did not. ' (Parsons 1984: 53). 
The clerical opposition was understood purely in terms of the Court's discourse. 
Fhe ulama were represented as having been effectively co-opted by the Shah, and 
unlikely to play any significant political role in a society already experiencing the 
benefits of secularized modernization (Sullivan 1981. Hoogland 1989-, Vilanilam 
1989: 97). As Prime Minister Jamshid Amouzegar, declared in August 1977, *the 
reactionary mullahs are finished. Iran has moved beyond them' (quote in Stempel 
198 1: 84). Sullivan reports that in his discussions with the Shah *he often spoke of them 
as -ragheads" and told how corrupt and venal they were' (1981: 90) Those clerics that did 
iiot succumb to royal constraint were jailed and/or banished, and. along with many 
hazaaris, painted as reactionary and anti-reform, in contrast to the Shah, who ýNas painted 
as modernizing and bringing progress (Keddie 1981: 157, Vilanilam 1989: 131-2) In 
fact, 
the Shah's regime often equated the 'red' (communist) threat, and the Nack' 
(reactionary mullahs) in a false analogy in Nvhich all opposition ýýas traitorous, and 
bý 
necessity therefore, working in *an unhoh, - alliance' (Pahlavi 1980: 1533-6). 
This 
I The assassination by guerri I las oftwo Americans in the mid-'70s (as ýý el 
I as several members of 
S.. \\',. \K) made this argument niore readily adoptable in the American 
discourse, see Keddie 1981: 239). 
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symbolized all opposition forces as evil and faceless. such that the Islamic political 
philosophers whose thinking grounded much of the revolution's rhetoric (such as 
Mottahari, Taleghani, and Shariati), and who all spent time in SAVAK's jails, never 
warranted mention in any of the documents from this era, nor any main US or British 
newspapers vetted for the period (USED passim; National Security Archive Iran 
documents, passim; see also Ionnides 1984; Vilanilarn 1989). Likewise, their lectures 
and writings on the nexus between Islam and modernity, if noticed at all, ý\/'ere dismissed 
as irrelevant -a critical oversight brought about by the Anglo-American buy-in of the 
Shah's discourse. 
The British view of the clerics mirrored both the Americans' and the Shah's. 'We 
knew that the religious classes were implacably opposed to the Shah's vision of an Iran 
transformed into a modern, industrialized Western state, ' Parson observed without further 
comment a year prior to the upheavals. Instead, he evoked the old Iran in Orientalist 
terms of Eastern lassitude, 'The slow, traditional courtesies of the Muslim world were 
being swamped by the onrush of the Great Civilization, but were not being replaced by 
the vitality and enthusiasm which might have been expected in a society in the process of 
rapid and fundamental change' (pp. 3,6). Parsons does not consider how an Eastern 
people would feel about becoming a Westernized state, the latter's virtues having become 
so naturalized as a good thing that he is disconcerted by the lack of enthusiasm in Iran, 
seeing in it an expression of the 'slow' torpor (as opposed to 'vitality') of the traditional 
Muslim world. Because the political love invested in Iran was constructed on Western 
norms and motives, and on Anglo-American practices and imaginaries, the Iranian 
interpretation of modernity designed the Shah's way was construed as rejection and 
backwardness. Parsons is correct in saying the clerical classes and traditional Muslim 
society were 'against the Shah's vision of modernity' - but failed to conclude that they 
might wish to develop their own vision of modernity in Iran. 
The urban and rural lower classes. and the bazaar, though at times courted to 
balance what was perceived as a middle class duped by the attractions of Marxism. \\ere 
constructed as politically malleable and not a significant factor (Milani 1988: 65). 
'Orientalist' labels such as uncivilized, back\Nard. and benighted. fenced them off 
rhetorically as effectn, -ely as the slums in ýNhich they dwelled fenced them aNýa,, 
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geographically (Parsons 1984: 14). A position of superiority in constructions of and bv 
the Shah vis-a-vis the Iranian populace was absorbed with little variation in the Anolo- 
American discourse, paralleling and fuelling the feeling of benevolence. upon %ýhlch their 
own status rested in relation to Iran. Yet, as Parsons discovered, but only after bein(2 in 
Iran for two years, 'the propaganda machine went to Orwellian lengths to sustain the 
myth of the Shah's mystical union with his people and to disguise the reality of his 
remoteness' (p. 23). Parsons fails to consider this important, writing it off as a quirký 
aspect of the Shah's rule, subsuming subconsciously the shame it inspired, which 
nonetheless is hinted at in his use of the word 'Orwellian'. This cognitive and affiliative 
constraint was operationalized equally strongly in the emotionalized American discourse, 
which ignored the Shah's intolerance for diversity of opinion, and looked the other ýNay 
(in shame) when he made such statements as: 'The place of those who opposed the 
Constitution, the monarchical system and the People-Shah-Revolution is either in jail or 
outside Iran' (quote in Kayhan International 3/3/1975). It was never asked, therefore, 
what beyond 'The compulsion of total terror' was there in the Shah's reign to engage his 
population? (Milani 1988: 70, quote in Robin 2004: 100) The Shah is credited with 
propounding no ideology beyond massive modernization and monarchical grandiosity 
(Stempel 198 1, USED 1973-77 passim). Besides a rising I iving standard, that was itself 
Lineven and tended to favour the rich (this, too, is largely unexamined), there was little 
space given over to why the Shah would have been beloved by his people (Keddie 
1981: 180; Milani 1988: 70). 
The media adoption of the Shah's discourse was equally passionate and it was 
strikingly uninformative concerning the outlook of the urban or rural poor. the political 
activism taking place within the bazaar and mosque networks, or even the tenor of those 
in the oil fields (Vilanilam 1989: 19). 'Newsmen were just repeating what the architects 
of I IS foreign policy ... had stated about 
Iran and the Shah'. and what original coverage 
there was focused on the capital, considering Iran's importance to Westem security and 
oil needs, it was extremely sparse (Adams 1981: 12; quote in Vilanilam]989: 91). 
Seasoned reporters \\ere careful what they investigated. and what theý published (Cooleý 
1991: 2-4). subsuming the shaming requirement to self-censor \\ ithin the rational 
argument that to function at all in Tehran. they had to folio\\ the rules. In this the media 
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contributed to the Anglo-American discourse of engulfment as good (rational) and proper 
(normatively appropriate), for the sake of Iran's stability. and the Anglo-American 
relationship with it. The fiction that a country moving toward progress could do so 
without a free press was elaborated in a discourse that only rarely referred to the Shah's 
tight control over the media; yet, even the 'freer' English language version of the Iranian 
papers offered little insight on the Shah's opposition (Kayhan International 1973-77: 
passim; Tehran Journal 1974-78: passim). 
The construction of stability in the narrative surrounding the Shah was, in sum, a 
field filled only by the subjective truths emplaced by power and fear. and was 
passionately preserved as a primary plank in US and British foreign policy. The 
emotional claim on this 'knowledge' made possible meanings that immunised the 
'stability' of the Shah from the effect of adverse developments for much longer than 
otherwise would have been possible. As Carter famously said on his visit to Iran exactly 
a year prior to the Shah's departure and one week before the first major demonstration of 
the revolution: 'Iran under the leadership of the Shah is an island of stability in one of the 
more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your 
leadership, and to the respect, admiration and love which your people give you' (Carter 
1982: 437; Pahlavi 1980: 152-153 ). 8 
Distortions - the hidden danger of political love 
Political love, which had flowered initially out of the security- and oil-based 
arrangements of mutual gain in the *60s, began, in the late '70s to exhibit strain in 
response to embedded and unacknowledged distortions. First, countervailing voices were 
ignored or reduced to quietism (Bill 1988; Milani 1988: 95). Red flags that v'ere being 
raised were squashed. One, by an American Embassy political officer in 1978, pointed to 
disturbing signs that Iran was not what the US was making it out to be. But, as the officer 
8 Interestingly, Carter's speech replicated almost word for word a dispatch sent to London in 1961 
by the 
British Resident in the Gulf, Sir William Luce, after 6,500 British troops and 45 warships ýý ere sent to 
Kuwait to dissuade Iraq from fulfilling a threat to nýade. The operation %%as successful' and as 
Sir Luce 
wrote to the Foreign Office, 'The Persian Gulf. thanks to our presence, is an island of comparati,. e stabilitN 
surrounded bv a sea of uncertainty. ' See Faisal bin Salman al-Saud (2004) Iran, 
SaudiArabia, ind the Guýf- 
Poiver Politics iti Transition (London: IB Taurus). p. 7. 
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wrote in a telegram found by the hostage takers, 'we [Americans], ýk ith increasing 
stubbornness, insisted on ignoring them' (Asnad, 14 (5), March 1979: 24). 
Second, the importance of Tehran as the CIA's regional centre for gathering 
intelligence on the Soviet Union enabled perceptions of developing difference ýý ith the 
Shah to be damped down for the sake of privileging the discourse of communist 
containment and identity security. 
Nonetheless, anxiety increased in response to a heightening degree of alienation 
in the relationship, suggesting that old strategies and habits were inadequatehy, serving the 
current situation (Marcus 2003: 203). The unalloyed warmth with which the Shah's Iran 
had been constructed in the Anglo-American discourse began to cool. The Shah's self- 
aggrandizement, which Zonis attributes to his compensating for the perpetual 
diminishment he felt as a result of Washington's and London's role in obtaining him his 
throne, led him to adopt an uncomfortably brash stance on oil pricing in OPEC (Zonis 
1991: 227). This was an indignity to its own status that grated on Western nerves (USED 
0 1144: 127), and contributed to rising US public outrage at his unrelenting expenditure on 
large-scale weapons and his failure to improve his human rights record. In response to 
Carter's human rights platform and commitment to arms control. public protest rejected 
the discipline of enframing these latter concerris as occasional corollaries to the process 
of modernizing a backward country. A particularly loud and recriminatory debate in the 
Senate at the time of the Shah's order for AWACS served to introduce serious strains into 
the relationship (Sullivan 1981: 116). More veiled, but equally irritating, to judge from 
secret State Department texts, were activities by SAVAK, which had begun tracking the 
Shah's opposition in the United States and Europe, and in so doing, ýýas flouting the 
sovereignty of those states as well as intemational law (USED, 01138: 130). 
At the same time, a plaintive fear began to creep into official documents that the 
US had become too dependent on Iran, which offered the US unique strategic 
surveillance options for monitoring the USSR. This translated into expressions of 
paranoia that the United States had become unnervingly vulnerable to pressure b,, a 
po\ker-hungory Shah, an acknowledgement that normative rifts ýkere present in the 
relationship, though there is no suggestion that the US perceived itself as having in allý 
ý\ay contributed to the situation. Embarrassment at the extreme beha\ iour ot'such a close 
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ally was transformed into anxiety for America's own identity security. This drove a 
wedge of overt distrust into the relationship. 'A significant change to this policy of 
forthcomingness would ... entail definite risk that the Shah would counter ýk ith actions 
against our military and intelligence assets in Iran, and very probably on our economic 
and commercial interests as well', noted a secret State Department Briefing paper 
(USED, 01138,1977/01/03, v. 8: 122). The apprehension that the bond ýkith the Shah ýýas 
not secure, but instead, a source of fear in that it constituted a 'definite risk'. reflected 
Washington's own unacknowledged intolerance for precocious behaviour on the part of 
the 'child', leading to suspected violence in relation to the precarious boundary between 
Iranian and American identity. 
In weighing tactics to get the relationship back on track. however, no strategic 
change was contemplated. Instead, a variety of ways were considered to contain the 
situation and re-assert American control, revealing the US commitment not to alienate or 
put pressure on the object of its endearment for the sake of its own status in the 
arrangement. The bedrock of political love helped to mitigate the sense of incipient 
danger, despite the general sense that the relationship was in a 'precarious equilibrium" 
(ibid). Emotional imbrications in the political at multiple levels (fear and anxiety at the 
prospect of reduced status as a benevolent parent, of military pressure. of economic 
consequences) perpetuated the environment of we-ness (Katouzian 1981: 323). Yet, in a 
relational configuration no longer as comfortable as the initial permutation of identity 
construction, security came to be seen more in terms of putting in place wa. ". 's to maintain 
stasis rather than promoting expansion (Campbell 1992: 232, f. 34). This reduced the well- 
being in the relationship-leading to a narrowing in the range of possible courses of 
mutual action, and opening up a new range of possible misunderstandings. 
The Shah, exceptionally sensitive about his foreign image, and always cognisant 
that his empowerment stemmed quite considerably from his special position with the 
US. 
responded to the unease by making several liberalisation moves. thereby acknowledging 
American calls for democracy. As a paean to detractors, the Shah allowed criticism 
to be 
published in the Iranian media concerning allied states (Milani 1988: 
109). Yet, this small 
opening exposed those states as objects of popular derision. and 
helped to make them 
magnets of an increasingly ýý idening Iranian discontent. *B,,, " the summer of 
1977. it %ýas 
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clear to most Iranians, but not to Washington,... ' wrote Stempel. 'that the LýS had 
become chained to the Shah in negative ways' (1981: 80). 
The close rapport between the United States and the Shah was therefore itself 
going through an awkward nodal point just before the revolution, in which signifiers \ý ere 
beginning to float free from their moorings, and a sense of disarray to cloud ýkhat had 
been a very clear regime of truth. This in part helps to explain why the revolution seemed 
to appear so suddenly, since a primary focus at the time was on the growing irritation in 
the American relationship with the Shah (while the Shah's relationship with the rest of 
Iran was understood as secondary and under control). Despite upheaval in the streets 
throughout Iran, and the rising death toll throughout 1978, by as late as October none of 
the tension that a crisis normally evokes had begun to seep into the discourse (Bill 1988). 
Instead, both sides stepped back from substantive engagement over military bargaining 
and oil pricing to a more social agenda as a means to re-knit and ratify the trust and 
camaraderie in the relationship. Two rapid-fire state visits in one year (the Pahlavis to 
Washington, November 1977, the Carters to Tehran, New Year's eve 1977-'78). helped 
to hide the withdrawal, even neglect, that characterised the political, as opposed to the 
booming economic exchanges at that time (Sick 1985: 28). It was only once the crisis on 
the ground was apprehended in Washington as being serious, that the relationship 
bounded back to life, with a sense of ire and self-blame at having abandoned the Shah at 
a critical hour propelling the relationship once again forward (Carter 1977: 435). 
By then, a mass, but to the West, invisible, popular movement was beginning to 
take shape in Iran in response to a strongly articulated Islamic-based ideology. The 
fateful Rose Garden meeting between the Shah and President Carter and their ýý ives in 
the fall of 1977, however, in which tear-gas was used to control the anti-Shah 
demonstrators beyond White House gates, made it suddenly obvious to anyone watching 
television news that day that a large opposition did in fact exist, at least 
in the US. The 
dismissal of any discourse that recognised this opposition, and the perpetuation of a 
narrative emphasis on unmitigated pride in the Shah. meant that when the opposition 
proved to be a reality, it registered as a shock to both the elites that 
had belittled it, as 
ýýell as to Westcrn publics una\\. ire of the alternatives to the 
hegemony of the Shah 
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Iranian Ambassador to London, Parviz Radji makes no secret in his diaries that 
habits of thinking, and sentimental attachments to symbols and desires are not easily 
altered (McDermott 2004: chapter 10). Seven months after the Rose Garden incident. he 
writes of his amazement at what was happening in Iran, being conditioned to deny what 
was unfolding - and, more critically, unable to provide insight to Whitehall. On Julý 14. 
1978, two days after dining with Mrs. Thatcher, in which 'no potentially contentious 
issues are mentioned', Radji notes, 'Good heavens! What's happening in Iran" Hoýv can 
the Shah have changed so much, so fast? I suspect that the recent power cuts may haN C 
acted as a catalyst for greater pol itical tolerance' (Radj i 1983: 9 1 ). And as S ick wrote in a 
briefing paper on the occasion of a Policy Review Committee at the White House on 
November 6,1978, 'the most fundamental problem at the moment is the astonishing lack 
of hard information we are getting about developments in Iran ... This has been an 
intelligence disaster of the first order. Our information has been extremely meagre, our 
resources were not positioned to report accurately on the activities of the opposition 
forces' (Sick 1985: 90). Both statements reflect an ongoing inability to acknowledge the 
incongruity of their own judgements toward the Shah, scripting further alienation in the 
relationship with Iran. The surprise at the degree to which a widespread opposition had 
developed, therefore, and the inability to conceive of what an opposition against the Shah 
could consist of and meant, left both Washington and London (and, Sick points out, many 
other Western and allied states, including Israel) ill-equipped to understand ensuing 
events. 
Yet, the work of political love did not stop there. False pride in the Shah, the 
conviction that he, and only. he, could guarantee a pro-Westem stance and pre- 
conceptions perpetuated in his discourse that the religious leadership would 
be a disaster, 
continued to symbolize him as the only viable leader within the Anglo-American 
discourse. This meant that the Khomeini leadership came to represent the submerged 
shame. embarrassment and self-deception that had never been ackno\ý 
ledged on the part 
of the US and Britain toward the person of the Shah and the nature of 
his regime. 
Q It was a shock that \\ould be strangely paralleled two 
decades later when the collapse of the So, iet 
, 
hanistan came to be understood in terms of Sunni jihad. occupation of Afg 
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Bypassed shame not only deflected any conscious recognition of the Anglo-A merican 
contribution to the Shah's fall, but served. particularly in Washington, to focus anger on 
those toppling him. This enabled policies that proscribed any bonding, ýý ith the new 
religious leadership so as to ensure the security of their own identities. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 
Page 88 
From Political Love to the Politics of Strife: The making of a 'Bad' relationship 
'Our problem in Iran is not intemal developments there. Our problem In Iran is us. ' 
-Pentagon official' 
'There is a Persian poem going like this: "Love has been created in the heart b. y time. It 
cannot be eliminated from the heart except by time. " And this holds true for our present 
hostilities and misunderstandings with the United States. ' --Ibrahim Yazdi, Foreign 
Minister, Islamic Republic 2 
'Why, ' asked Ayatollah Khomeini of some Americans visiting his headquarters in 
Nauphle-le-Chateau a few days before he returned to Iran at the head of the revolution, 
'[does Carter back] a regime to which the Iranian people are unanimously opposed"' 
(quote in Rubin 1980: 233). To Khomeini, whose understanding of American interests in 
Iran was at the time not constrained by the assumption that US identity was discursively 
wedded to the Shah, the US reputation as a power encouraging emancipatory 
movements, made it inconceivable that it would ignore a populist uprising. For the 
United States and Britain, however, the answer was obvious: an enlightened. 
Westernizing friend was at risk of being toppled by anti-modern forces bent on reversing 
what they understood as positive universalist trends, and hence, this could not be a 
popular revolution, but a civil war (Dorman and Farhang 1987: 163). 
3 With the Shah in 
trouble, the precariousness of their own identities in relation to him emerged, as did the 
imperative of demarcating the boundary between the 'Shah-as-us'. and 'Iran-as-them' in 
a production of meanings to protect the self. Within the tight nexus of political love. the 
threat ýNas represented as endangering both the Shah and the West. Having promoted the tý 
1 Quote in David Schoenbaum (1979) 'Passing the Buck(s)', Foreign Polic - V, 
N. 0- 3,4. Spring, p. 20. 
Quote in Christos laonnides (1984), America's Iran. - Inpii-vaml catharsis (I. anham. MD: Universit), Press 
ofArnerica), p. 61 
1, -k revieN% of the IS press by Dorman and Farhang sho\ýed that the term *revolution' \%as not used 
tor 
almost a \ear after the turmoil began, see William Dorman and Mansur 
Farhang (1987) Tile LS Press and 
Irtin: Foreignpolici- andthejozirnalism o6iclerence (Berkelev: Universit\ of 
California Press). 
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Shah's vision as heroic in relation to his benighted people. and linked to the promulgation 
of democracy and security, the self-worth of the US and the UK was tied to maintaining 
that picture of reality (Cottarn 1977; Hermann 2003: 293: Lasch 1978: 84, Lebo%ý: 
1981: 115). 
The following section describes the revolution from both the Iranian and Anglo- 
American perspectives. This is then reprised to track the emotional contribution to the 
meanings associated with the rise of revolutionary fervor and the fall of the Shah. In the 
final sections, I analyze the role of political passion in the two discourses that split the 
Carter cabinet as Khomeini replaced the Shah in Iran, and their constructions of self and 
other in formulating policy toward the new moderates in government, the constitutional 
process, and the Shah's plea to enter the US. 
Dispassionate Constructions of Revolution 
For Iranians, the events culminating in the fall of the Shah were incontrovertibly a 
revolution. The time frame was long; for Khomeini and his followers, over fifteen years. 
In 1963, and again in 1964, during the White Revolution, Khomeini gained prominence 
by speaking out against the Capitulations Agreement, which granted US citizens 
immunity from Iranian law. His public scom of the Shah and the mailes (parliament) for 
signing away what he considered Iran's sovereignty led to his arrest, imprisonment and 
expulsion (Bakhash 1985: 34; Milani 1994: 48-52. Farmanfarmaian et. al 1997: 368). For 
Khomeini, the Shah's legitimacy was always tied to US imperialism and other forms of 
'Westoxication' (Keddie 1981: 203). Khomeini used his exile in Najaf to preach political 
sermons that were widely distributed through the Iranian mosque system on cassette. His 
ideology ýkas politically current. reflecting ideas of Al-Ahmad and Shariati (Ansari 
2006: 76; Keddie 1981: 205-208), and itself x, ý, ent through several evolutions, though it 
ýk as his uncompromising criticism of the government and the Shah that made 
his x o1ce. 
both figuratively and in practice, so ý\ idely recognized throughout the urban and rural 
backwaters of Iran (Bakhash 1985: 38). 
The causes of the revolution. from the Iranian vieýý. included unequal 
distribution 
of financial and social goods. -cultural colonization'. wasted expenditure on arms. and 
xý idespread fear of the Shah's intelligence service. SAVAK. 
Together. these coalesccd 
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into a single, driving cause: hatred of the 'puppet' Shah and his US. and to some extent. 
British masters (Milani 1988). The identity the revolution had to secure ýý as that of Iran 
and Islam. which to many among Iran's population, had dissipated into crisis through 
what was perceived as the Shah's shameful sell-out of Iran's sovereignt" to US interests 
and his humiliating secularization of society (Ajami 1992; Keddie 1981: 203.207). In 
1978, the poor, the clergy, the middle class, the students. the intelligentsia, and all the 
others that marched against the heavily equipped national army. no longer recognized 
themselves in the Shah's discourse: meanings had been severed from their historical 
associations-living modes, male-female relations, codes of dress, business and 
community relationships, even the calendar-all were being contextually and relationall" 
reformulated in ways that lacked adequate social grounding or acceptance. The revolution 
offered the promise of recouping Iranian identity through the only avenue still open to it, 
its Islamic dimension (Irfani 1983: 160-161). 
Many parties, including the National Front (underground since Mossadeq's 
overthrow), and fringe movements at opposite ends of the political spectrum, took active 
part (ibid: 170-173; The Iranian, passim). From the beginning, the clerics maintained 
control and momentum through a disciplined politico-religious programme of marches on 
holy days, and demonstrations of mourning in forty-day sequences according to Islamic 
ritual (Fischer 198 1; Taleqani et al: 1993). Khomeini, having moved from Najaf to Paris, 
and in command of the media's spotlight, unrelentingly demanded the Shah's departure. 
On January 16,1979, the Shah quietly left, first for Egypt, then Morocco. To most 
Iranians, it was a miracle. Khomeini returned to Iran two weeks later to masslýe popular 
celebration. On February 11. the Shah's military barracks x\ ere over-run and his feared 
'Immortals' routed. The revolution was proclaimed a success. The Shah's Prime Minister 
Shapour Bakhtiar fled, to be replaced with Khomeini's moderate cabinet-in-ýýaiting 
headed by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. At the same time. clerical heav\ ýý eights 
instrumental in planning and managing the revolution, such as . ý\ýatollahs 
Beheshti, 
Mottahari, and Montazeri. formed a shadov, - instrument called the ReNolutionar\ Council 
\\hich assumed significant po\\crs. including the conduct of draconian trials against 
SAVAK and other Pahlax i officials. In April. a nation\\ide 
Referendum pa\ed the ý\aý 
f'or elections of a constitutional council. tasked to draft a new constitution 
for an Islamic 
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Republic over the course of the summer. This enabled Iran to affirm its identitN as an 
Islamic nation carrying out steps toward the creation of consensual uoý ernment (the 
notional equivalent of divinely inspired democracy). 
Within the Anglo-American discourse, the events of 1978/79 vv-ere constructed as 
a civil war, until the overthrow of the regime (Carter 1982: quote 442: Vilanilam 
1989: 118). To allow that the turmoil was anything but social discontent rather than a 
fundamental rejection of the status quo and therefore a revolution. ýýas unthinkable in a 
discourse that represented the Shah as Iran. The timeframe ýýas short: 13 months (Parsons 
1984: 60; Sullivan 1981: 142), beginning in January 1978 kkhen riots in Qom erupted in 
response to an officially planted article in the Persian press that condemned Khomeini as 
a British agent and of immoral character (Ansari 2006: 78, Parsons ibid). For London and 
Washington, the issue was how to continue economic and securitN- arrangements in Iran. 
These were understood as best protected by a pro-Western goverriment. preferablý- the 
Shah's, but otherwise, of his designated heirs, including the armN (Carter 1982: 44 3). 
The identity that had to be secured ýý as that of the US and Britain, guarantors of 
regional security, as well as of the universal norms that defined the free world. Within the 
Anglo-American discourse, the cause of the crisis ýýas chocked up to the liberalization 
programme the Shah rushed into at the beginning of 1978, just as economic recession 
triggered social tension (Cottam 1989). This ýýas seen to confirm de Toqueville's 
warning that 'the most serious moment for a bad government is when it seeks to mend its 
ways', a quote widely used, and appearing in among others, Parsons' memoirs (p. 60), and 
Sullivan's (p. 4). After the Shah's departure. the Anglo-American focus shifted to the 
. moderates', the reform-minded intellectuals and laý branch of Khomeini insiders. Britain 
flormally recognized the new government and the Islamic Republic. and made tentative 
steps toward direct communication NýJth Khomeini: the L. 'S did not. As the summer of 
1979 progressed, much of the free press that had flo,. vered in the brief spring folloký in(-, 
the revolution was shut down, while there NNas gro\\ ing repression of the ethnic 
peripheries - the clampdown on the Kurds turning 
into a low-lex. el civil \ýar that 
\ýitnessed the establishment of a new military bodý. the Revolutionary Guards. 
That summer \\as significant in mo other \ýaNs. In the US. the presidential 
campaiOn began to heat up. sifting all international relations through a domestic narratk C 
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of partisan politics. Meanwhile, the Shah discovered it increasingly difficult to ind a fi 
permanent haven, even as his cancer became critical, and his requests for entry into the 
US gained urgency. For the US, identity security was achieved with his acceptance into 
America. Sacrificed in this process were important Anglo-American national interests. 
including influence over energy supplies, Soviet containment, and market exchanges. 
The Bad (Evil) Child 
Early on, the Anglo-American media, as well as many policy-makers, viewed the 
undercurrent of Islamic revivalism - illustrated by the huge turnout at Friday prayers, and 
by women wearing chadors, as dangerous. This 'disturbing trend' indicated rejection not 
just of the monarchy, but of the reforms the Shah had brought to Iran (Parsons 1984: 55). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the first upheavals were discursively constructed as an 
anti -modem ization blow-back by medievalist clerics, a mirroring of the Shah's discourse 
which made them the easiest targets to write off and the most obvious for delimiting the 
boundary between self and difference, modem and pass6. 'The Shah has alienated a lot 
of powerful groups, ' Carter noted in his diary on October 25,1978, 'particularly the 
right-wing religious leaders who don't want any changes made in the old ways of doing 
things' (Carter 1982: 438). That Carter would have called any group outside the Court as 
'powerful' indicated the first break with the signifiers of invincibility previously 
associated exclusively with the Shah. Yet, because shame in Washington's association 
with the Shah had been ignored, there was no real sense of how Anglo-American policies 
liad contributed to the situation. At this critical period, US support for the Shah was 
lukewarm and contested, however, as the uprisings rose in temper. and the Shah appeared 
increasingly vulnerable, concern at a loss of control in Iran infused policy construction 
\\ ith a discourse of American honour, which privileged backing him as a long-time 
friend. This produced a series of unclear polic,,,, choices, some strongly supportive, others 
less so, depending on how important 'honour among friends' or shame at having such an 
ally, was in the discourse of the official N\hose policy orientation prevailed at any given 
moment. 
Carter's description above of the Shah's conundrum likewise reveals an 
emotionalized misreading of the clerical message for Iran, \\hich did not reject *changes 
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to the old ways', but specifically, modernization the Shah's way. Apprehending the 
religious leaders as 'backward looking', enabled Carter to secure the West and its friend 
the Shah as 'forward- I ookin g' while simultaneously clearing the field of altematives, an 
interpretation that domesticated the concept of change. What is more, it did the further 
work of separating (and thus protecting) the Shah from Iran's apparent madness, as well 
as his own failures. 
In contrast to the Gucci-suited Shah who skied and snorkeled, the opposition was 
'dark-robed', 'turbaned', or veiled in black,, the use of Islamic garb as a political 
statement being completely foreign and scary to Western eyes. The opposition's religious 
rhetoric and imagery evoked discomfort and distress in Washington and London, where 
-no secularism, no democracy" was something of a sacred equation', their own inter- 
weavings of faith and state construed as being significantly different (Hurd 1994; quote 
in Keane 2000: 5). As the University of Virginia's Ramazani explains, 'Even those 
observers who do allow for the influence of factors other than 'fanaticism' on political 
behavior find the Iranian behavior incomprehensible-not to mention the purists of the 
"power politics" school of thought. If they fail to acknowledge, for example, the religious 
influence of the Calvinist cast of mind on Woodrow Wilson's concept of world order, 
how can they possibly understand Khomeini's concept of an Islamic world order? ' 
(1986: 19). 
The Iranian revolution pitted the universalist values of Western progress against 
the Islamic ideal of religious-based community. From Khomeini Is perspective, the 
Anglo-American world view was 'still backward ... in creating a psychological and 
spiritual progress similar to the material progress. They are', he declared, 'still unable to 
solve their social problems because solving these problems and eliminating hardship 
requires an ideological and moral spirit' (Ishmael and Ishmael 1980: 616). Turning the 
discursive tables on the Anglo-American rhetoric of democracy and justice, he claimed, 
'the Shah and his government are in a state of armed rebellion against the justice-seeking 
peoples of Iran, against the constitution, and against the liberating decrees of Islam' (Bill 
1988: 19). This narrative reflects Khomeini's personal shame at Iran under the Shah, and "3 
the behaviours that ensue from such feelingl,: deep anger and the need to show disrespect 
toward the other in a rhetoric of hyper-excitability, and mobilization for action. 
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The Khomeini camp's rejection of Western. and particularly American. 
ideologies, shored up positive feelings in Washington toward the Shah (Milani 1988: 82). 
. We knew little about the forces contending against him, ' noted Carter, 'but their anti- 
American slogans and statements were enough to strengthen our resolve to support the 
Shah' 0 982: 440). To him, the anti-Americanism was dangerous, because it reflected bias 
against the US for what is was (its values), rather than distrust for what it did (its 
policies), since in Carter's construction, the US was carrying out ethical policies, so the 
attitude against it could only be normative and existential (Katzenstein and Keohane 
2007: 10). 4 For the deeply religious Jimmy Carter, and many of his entourage (and all of 
his successors), Khomeini's rejection of the West's paradigm therefore was presented to 
the public as a rebuff by those who hated freedom and therefore hated America - and 
hence, was perceived as threatening US identity. This located Khomeini and his followers 
as evil, a subversion of the 'American way' that threatened the spiritual mythology of the 
US and questioned the basis of its very existence (Campbell 1998: 153). Embedded in this 
'apocalyptic mode' lay a visceral distrust and horror of the religiosity and cultural 
6oddities' of an old man whose world view was incomprehensible, and therefore 
perceived in emotionalized terms as dangerously out-of-step with modem thinking. In 
declining to speak a Western language, in evoking Persian and Qoranic tradition, and in 
choosing to live with an asceticism distinctly foreign to Western ambition, his 
interpretation of such concepts as modernity and Western partnership was so unorthodox 
that his categorization as a 'bad child' within the parental construction of inter-state 
relations was rapid and easy. The modernity of the revolution's politics was only dimly 
understood and generally ignored as incongruous with other imagery of third world, 
dependent nations (Hermann 2003; Khomeini in Algar 1982: 8; Ramazani 1986). His re- 
interpretation of non-alignment as a 'new system of values, independent of East and 
West' and truly outside either the US or Soviet blocs was construed as naive and a danger 
to existim, international order (Brzezinski 1988: 694) 
4 Katzenstein and Keohane define anti -Americanism as *a psychological tendency to hold negative views of 
the United States and of American society in general' (p. 12), and suggest it can have cognitive, emotional 
and normati%, e components, although they confine the assessment of the emotional to 'intensity" only, see 
. 4nti-Amei-icanisnis (Ithica, 
NIY: Cornell Unkersity Press; p. 13). It is of interest that they, like majority of 
scholarship on anti-, ý\nicricanism, analyze it in terms of attitudes abroad, rather than in terms of reflexi,. e 
responses to it in the US. 
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With Khomeini's first salvos associating US and Western actions with bad faith. 
and two-faced behaviour. self-righteous outrage at such disrespect entered the US 
discourse toward what was perceived as a militant cleric tempting Iran to shift from being 
a good to a bad child. This prompted responses of hyper-excitability in which 
Washington's own actions and commitments within the Iranian context drew on a 
historical memory from which the Mossadeq era had been whitewashed, and therefore, 
rendered meaningless Khomeini's references to criminal intervention and support of an 
illegitimate shah. Instead, the relationship was viewed as having been one of generosity 
toward Iran, and figured as 'innocent', in opposition to Khomeini's stance, ýN,, hich ýýas 
I extremist', 'vengeful', and very quickly, 'terrorist'. In this way, the barbs he inflicted on 
US identity were contained, and a framework elaborated for policies that could ignore 
and reject the Iranian voices accusing it of being a 'hypocritical' accomplice in the 
'crimes' committed by a 'puppet' Shah that it had propped up (interview with Dr. 
Bohonar in loannides 1984: 33-34). 
A good example of Khomeini's 'evil' (as it was produced in this early 
emotionalized US discourse), was his strident condemnation of Washington and London 
as having systematically looted Iran through their support of the 'American' Shah. 
Responding to what he conceived as Anglo-American disrespect and insult, he continued 
the spiral of shame, provoking in them similar feelings of anger by branding their actions 
toward the Iranian people as a travesty of human rights: 
'For the children who lost their fathers and the parents who lost their children I 
feel very sad. The Shah destroyed everything, and built big and beautiful 
cemeteries for us. Is it human rights--oh American President, who kept talking 
about human rights and issuing statements of unconditional support for the 
Shah-to say that when we want to name a government, we get a cemetery full of 
people? ' (Quote in loannides 1982: 35). 
Such insults were received in the US with shock and passionately rejected, not only 
because they were felt to be unfair. but equally importantly, in order to deny the stain 
they placed on British and American honour. In this way, the cycle of shame was 
perpetuated. Indeed, Washington, attempting in turn to shame Khomeini, accused him of 
betraN ing, British and American benevolence. Revealing its own shame through false 
pride, it protested that the Shah xNas a leader who had brought honour to Iran and its allies 
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by having brought economic prosperity to its people (Bill 1988: 239, Hiro 1985: 85). 
'Rarely would contemporary history', wrote Jonathan Randal in The Washington Post, 
4appear to provide such an example of people's ingratitude towards a leader who brought 
about an economic miracle of similar proportions [to Iran's]' (2/4/1978). 
In choosing to see Iran's fate as held in the hands of two men - Khomeini or the 
Shah - and in favouring the Shah as the visionary modernizer, the media fed a deep- 
seated popular confusion in Britain and the US over why the Iranian people would reject 
such a leader, or the Western-inspired 'miracle' he'd engineered. Further, there was little 
within the discourse of political love associated with the Shah's Iran to cast light on why 
the Shah, not to mention the British or Americans, would be considered criminal or guilty 
of anything but good intentions and generosity. 
Carter, writing in January 1979, reflects the egocentric constraint and a-historicity 
under which he, too, laboured: 'The Ayatollah's tape-recorded speeches sent into Iran 
were condemning the United States equally with the Shah for alleged crimes' he states 
with wonderment (1982: 483). The idea that the US had committed any crimes in Iran was 
preposterous to Carter. The perception that Khomeini's condemnations were not only 
groundless but heartless, and therefore shameful, meant that a narrative of the US - and 
the West generally - as the 'wronged' party, insufficiently respected or acknowledged, 
and thus offended, became normalized well before the Shah's departure or hostage crisis. 
This contributed to a play of difference charged with anger and derision in response to 
Khomeini's, and which was 'largely impervious to the characteristics and qualities of the 
other' on both sides (Campbell 1998: 156). The welding of the Shah to the image of Iran 
meant that once he was removed, or his plans over-ridden, those exercising the agency of 
overthrow became culprits, while US culpability could be deferred, and thus dismissed. 
In the process, the emotional work of fending off Khomeini's accusations deflected the 
focus away from the content of earlier British and American actions in Iran, making any 
expos6 or alternative interpretation of those actions unlikely. 
The fictive image of Khomeini as evil and bloodthirsty was not a response 
consistent with existing subjective practices toward traditionalist Islamic leaders (as 
relations with the religiously flanked and be-robed Saudis and Gulf Emirs illustrated) nor 
ith realist postures that accommodated unsavoury regimes such as in Pakistan or 
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Ethiopia for the sake of containing the primary threat which was perceived as Soviet 
expansionism (Cottam 1990: 276). The emotional dimension must be sought elsewhere: 
in the degree of shock and disappointment by the Anglo-American decision-making elite 
at the realization that the Shah faced a substantive opposition; in the self-blame at having 
allowed themselves to arrive at this point knowing so little about that opposition; in their 
growing awareness that affection for the Shah had coloured their judgment concerning 
his performance; and in the discomfort felt by many whose significant and often personal 
business dealings depended on his power (Bill 1988: 335-338). 
The re-inscription of British and American identity security through a sanitized 
imagery of their own 'love' in contrast to the incoming Iranians' propensity to 'hate'. 
situated Khomeini in a 'chain of difference' in which the meanings associated with him 
were relational, and understood in terrns of each other (Campbell 1998: 68, fn 69; Doty 
1996: 46; Lebow 1984: 103). Thus, Sick's view of Khomeini 'as the most dangerous of all 
ideologues,... a man riven with hate - hatred for the Shah, hatred for Carter and America, 
hatred for those who dared oppose his vision ... and that 
hatred translated itself into the 
frenzied curses of the mobs' (Sick 1985: 219-220), reveals the chaining, as ýNell as Sick's 
own already formed hatred for Khomeini as a manifestation of reflexivity. The behaviour 
bespeaks the insecure bonds of alienation and pain, and an exaggeration clearly 
indicating that the words and actions of the other are being interpreted as an attack 
(Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 69). The bonds of political love can be seen, therefore, to 
have been going through a dual process - compulsively damaging behaviour 
in relation 
to the social bonding with Khomeini and his followers as they assumed prominence, and 
a reaffirmation of the bonds with the Shah as he lost power. 
The Lost Child 
Carter acknowledges in Keeping Faith that along with Khomeini's calls 
for 'bloodshed'. 
he was also 'calling for ... the establishment of an 
Iranian republic'. a political ambition 
that \ýas never acknowledged as more in keeping with Anglo-American 
democratic ideals 
than the Shah's authoritarian regime. Why would this be? For Carter. the emotionality 
embedded in the loss of the Shah focused the need to securitize American 
honour as a 
primary norm. This ý%as because effective leadership depended 
first on being seen as an 
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honourable nation, a fundamental aspect of identity security. What was secondary was 
the US identity role as a supporter of freedom movements, particularly if that movement 
was contested. As American honour was intimately bonded to the welfare of the Shah. 
the US president, in an expression of mobilization to protect the status quo, 'insisted and 
instructed Cy [Secratry of State Cyrus Vance] to retain our relationships with the Shah 
and with the military - our only two ties to future sound relationships (sic) with Iran' 
(Carter 1982: 445; Lebow 1984: 110). 
This view was echoed in the British and American media. Giving scant, but 
usually unfavourable coverage to Khomeini, and little background information on Islam. 
they dedicated large amounts of generally laudatory coverage to the Shah. This ensured 
pride of place for the hegemonic discourse supporting him, and by association, the 
reasons for Britain's and America's loyalties, and their own behaviour as staunch allies 
(Altheide 1981: 140, Dorman and Omeed 1979: 28). On the day of his departure from 
Iran ( 16/1/1979), the New York Times carried 31 items on the Shah, with several photos 
(Vilanilam 1989: 128-9). Khomeini's arrival in Tehran two weeks later to the largest mass 
demonstration ever recorded elicited only two articles in the Times, the one on the front 
page featured not his triumphal return to Iran, but his threat to arrest the Shah's caretaker 
Prime Minister (ibid: 12 1). Although occasional letters were published by such authorities 
as Richard Falk and Mary Catherine Bateson, in which the Iranian upheaval was 
described as an emancipatory movement against a harsh dictator, much of the media 
presented the situation as a political and economic disaster for the West O'elt, York Times 
18/1/1979, Vilanilam 1989: 123-4). The articles on the Shah still represented a man with a 
grand plan for his country. They avoided words such as 'tyrannical', 'brutal' and 
despotic', which had crept in during the pre-revolution tensions in relations with the 
Shah, and instead, symbolized him as a 'good' and 'moral' ally. He was described 
\\ ithout reservation as a leader dedicated to modernizing despite the obstructionism 
encountered at every step, and as being a religious man (this was implied by a picture 
featuring him prayino at a mosque 18 years earlier in 1953! ), and a victim of fanatics and 
communists (New York Times 17/l/1979). These images and reports pictured the forces 
against the Shah as mad, since other-, vise, ý\hy would the mullahs expel a religious man, 
or the poor condemn someone bringing them prosperity, sanitation and education'! 
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The Shah thus evolved into a tragic hero, a figure toward whom many in 
Washington sought to showjust what solid American loyalty towards its friends could be. 
something viewed as key to American honour. and hence, to its interests (Weldes 1999). 
As tragic hero, the Shah came to represent the 'lost child', the chimera of hope and 
affection that remained discursively attached to a fictive Iran. In the hyper-excitabilit",, 
that surrounded his last days, the Shah came to represent what Iran could have been. His 
loss was the West's loss. 
Thus, on November 2,1978, when Ambassador Sullivan sent a telegram entitled 
'Thinking the Unthinkable', in which he suggested that the Shah might abdicate, leaving 
Washington an Iran without him, he was first ignored, and then castigated for his 
presumption (Sullivan 1981: 203-4). However, only within the Anglo-American 
discourse was this 'unthinkable, ' since by then it had been a call shouted nightly from the 
rooftops in Iran for over six months. Carter's distrust for Sullivan led him to send an 
alternative officer, General Huyser, to Tehran to provide a second line of reports (Carter 
1982: 443, Huyser 1986). Sullivan then expressed the belief after the Shah's departure in 
January 1979 that Bakhtiar 'was a "quixotic" character, and that, as the tide bringing in 
Khomeini was rising, 'arranging some sort of accommodation ... with the leaders of the 
impending revolution' might be wise. This sounded the death knell on his career. as 
Carter reacted by angrily accusing Sullivan of having 'lost control of himself", and 
sidelined him (Carter 1982: 446; Sullivan 1981: 236). The perceived heresy of Sullivan"s 
suggestion proved to be anathema to 'the brooding fear' that had already gripped the 
White House (Vance 1983: 329). 
Carter's rejection of a straight-forward diplomatic communication of fact 
reflected the unacknowledged pain of separation that he and his Cabinet were 
experiencing in regards to the Shah-as-Iran. This loss of an emotionalized attachment ýNas 
denied through anger at the messenger, as much as at the 'new Iran'. Even after the 
Shah's departure, and the well-documented outpouring, of celebrating Iranians, an Iran 
outside the personal ambit of the Shah was not yet an acceptable topic of discussion in 
the White House (Keddie 1981: 257). This attempt to maintain a fixed hegemonic 
discourse at the very moment when the social bonds between the two states were being 
redefined, put a moratorium on alternatiý e discourses concerningy not only the *neýN' Iran. 
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but the role of the Shah. As Iran was already being constructed around s,,,, mbols of fear 
and pain, identifying areas of attunement was rendered difficult (Scheff and Retzinger 
1991: 65). 
In fact, Brzezinski and Carter interpreted Sullivan's recommendation for 
accommodation with Khomeini as betrayal - of the Shah and of American honour. This 
points to the production of motivated bias, in that sentimentalized meanings impaired 
information processing, as only 'comfortable facts' were found acceptable (Lebow 
1984: 111-113. ). Though Sullivan had urged Carter to establish contact ýý ith Khomeini in 
Paris, the president had rejected this outright 'because our forming any relationship ýN ith 
Khomeini would indicate a lack of support for the struggling [Bakhtiar] government in 
Iran, which the Ayatollah has sworn to destroy' (Carter 1982: 446). Carter's passionate 
insistence on continuing constructions of, Iran-as-Shah' therefore, suggests a desperate 
attempt to deny change; with the past appearing rosy, and the present seen as imposed in 
an involuntary encounter with anti-American ism, disappointment served to repress new 
ideas and cognitive variants (Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 67). Additionally, the grain of 
truth in Khomeini's scornful diatribes stimulated the need to negate him as a defense 
against further attack. At the time, important scholars, such as Richard Falk, Richard 
Cottam and John Cockroft, suggested the Shah's opposition was acting with cause, and 
thus acknowledged Iranian motivations (Falk 1980; Ledeen and Lewis 198 1). The 
response to the Sullivan telegram at the highest reaches of government discredited this 
discourse as misguided (Vance 1983: 325) This enabled a figuring of Khomeini as a 
disaster, and impossible to work with despite the already recognized moderation of his 
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan (Carter 1982: 449). 
Brzezinski, denying his own contempt and growing fear of the revolution. which 
he frames as something to be 'remedied'. and unable to ackrimN ledge any motivation in 
its leaders beyond murderous rage, commented, 
,I simply had no faith in the quaint notion - favoured by American laýý ý. ers of 
liberal bent - that the remedy to a revolutionary situation is to paste together a 
coalition of the contending parties, who - unlike domestic American politicians - 
are not motivated by a spirit of compromise but (demonstrabl", in the Iranian case) 
by homicidal hatred' (1983: 355). 
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Here Brzezinski lays bare his sense of US superiority, and by association, the Shah's. and 
his aversion for the goings on in Iran. The statement. no means unique in the annals. 
reveals that in Washington's discourse, Iran's new leaders had alreadý been denied 
legitimacy even as they stepped to power with broad popular support. They were instead. 
discursive products of an emotionalized Shah-as-Iran discourse that made it thinkable to 
reject them, and reflect that in policy. 
It was in this context, and well before the hostage crisis, that the term 'terror' was 
linked to Khomeini's entourage, and the Islamic nature of his politics. *When the history 
of this period is written, you will see that Teheran was probably the first street battle 
fought by international terrorism', wrote Ledeen and Lewis in 1980 in Debacle, a book 
based on a series of articles published in the Washington Quarterlv when Ledeen ýýas one 
of its editors (along with terrorist expert, Walter Lacquer) .5 'At the center. ' the passage 
goes on, 'sat the ayatollah himself, with a vision of an entire Islamic world liberated from 
unbelievers of all sorts, totally under the theocratic control of Shi'ite visionaries' 
(1981: 105 ). 6 
As the Shah's army, until the revolution, had been portrayed both in Iran and the 
West as 'invincible', terror was the only mechanism that seemed conceivably able to 
threaten it. The Shah himself had adopted the word to describe most expressions of 
opposition to his regime, and it came to be associated, in the discourse of we-ness and 
political love, with outside (usually Soviet) financing and marginal domestic support 
International terrorism', as employed by Michael Ledeen, and later, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, 
President Ronald Reagan, Israeli leader Benjamin Netenyahu and others, was more accurately referring to 
'trans-national' terrorism, that is, a situation in which terrorists based in one country, affect citizens in 
another. This is different than the current understanding of the term 'Intemational terrorism' of the al- 
Qaida ilk, a globally networked system of semi-independent nodes without a single state base, source of 
funding or even formal linkages, but sharing a similar, overarching doctrine of global re-ordering based on 
the Sunni idea of the caliphate. 'Intemational terrorism' as employed in the '80s, therefore, can be 
understood to have been used more as a basket term to describe a motley collection of unrelated groups 
\\ ith different ideologies operating in various interriational theatres, usually for local goals. The,. included 
Iranian-inspired Shi'a militancy and its export to Lebanon in the form of Hezbollah. as ý\ell as the secular 
PLO, Tamil Tigers, and various cells operating in South America (Claire Sterling [198 1] The Tei-ror 
Vctit, oi*k: The sect-et war ofinternational tei-i-orism [Ne,. \! York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston]). Although 
Sterling argues these were linked and funded through a Soviet project she labeled a network, it differed 
substantially from the distributed al-Qaida system associated with the term today (ibid; see also Walter 
Lacquer [19991 'Why the Shah Fell', Coinmentaýv Vol. 67, March. pp. 47-55). 
6 James Bill attacked Debacle as ill-researched and biased , see James 
Bill ( 1988) The Eagle and the Lioýi. 
op cit. but it \ý as important as one of the first books published on the revolution and was %ýell receiý ed bý 
members of the Reagan administration. 
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(Butler and Lavasseur,, White Paper, 1976). When those same opposition figures rose to 
lead the masses, terror was already embedded as a discursive signifier. TheNew York 
Times, for example, referred to 'Khomeini guerrillas' and 'Khomeini gunmen' (Februar', 
1979 passim). As information on Khomeini and other religious and opposition leaders 
remained scanty in the Western intelligence rosters, linkage with other *terrorist' activists 
was easily imputed within an emotionally fraught discursive economy which produced 
similar imagery for Islamic forces, oil saboteurs, and regional militancy such as that of 
the PLO (Dobson and Payne 1986: chapter 1; Vilanilam 1989: 117: Wolf 198 1: passim). 
Chaining 'terror' to 'hatred' and 'evil' was a natural sequence in the shame-anger spiral 
that was corroding the social bonds. 
With the Shah's departure and Khomeini's arrival in Tehran, 'the loss of Iran' 
became the construction most commonly used in the Anglo-American discourse to sum 
up the situation. 'Loss', indicated that a rupture of the bonds between Iran and the US 
necessitated implanting new emotional practices and meanings, and yet 'loss' kindled 
emotionalized associations of a positive past, suggesting diminishment in the bonds that 
remained. Further, Iran was produced not as a *gain' for a popular, emancipating 
movement, but as its opposite, a loss for the Anglo-American 'strategic pivot of a 
protected tier shielding the crucial oil-rich region of the Persian Gulf from possible 
Soviet intrusion' (Brzezinski 1983: 356). Anglo-American policy support was thrown 
behind Bazargan's sitting 'moderate' government, its members labeled as the true 
'inheritors of the revolution', their Islamic commitment for the moment dimmed within 
this heuristic (quote in Bill 1988: 145; Sick 1985: 55). Linking up with the moderates 
enabled the US and British to discipline their identities in two important ways. First, it 
made possible a smooth switch from the old regime to the new by representing them as 
the voices of reason that favoured Western universalist ideals -a move that was 
normatively consistent. Second, Washington and London could at the same time re- 
affirm their identities as loyal supporters of the Shah, even after he'd left Iran -a move 
that was emotionally consistent. 
From engulfment to isolation 
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The fact that a revolution had taken place, the speed and relative non-v, iolence of the 
tumover, and, significantly, its theocratic aspect, combined to leave the Anglo-American 
discourse un-moored from its previous referents, and London and Washington incapable 
of putting together a coherent Iran policy (Hoogland 1989). This ýý as exacerbated b,. 
Balkanization in the different arms of the US gover-nment as competing discourses ýý ere 
advanced, represented most prominently by Brzezinski and Vance, whose approaches to 
the period before the Shah's departure had varied considerably (Brzezinski 1983: chapter 
10; Vance 1983: chapter 14). 
In the face of a complex re-alignment in the social bonds between the United 
States and Iran, fear, anger, and exasperation combined to mobilize action. Intelligence 
for going forward, however, was minimal. In addition, the pressure to support the Shah, 
which permeated the State Department, NSC and Pentagon, rendered deviance or doubt 
concerning his continued rule tantamount to 'heresy' (Carter 1982: 449-50, Sick 
1985: 77,153); this left those in positions of responsibility fearful of creative diplomatic 
plans once the Shah left, suspicious of the information coming in from Tehran (especially 
as Sullivan became discredited), and lacking a functioning discursive economy within 
which to situate the US relationship with the new Iran (Sick 1985: 91). The disarray in the 
Carter administration's discourses scrambled the prioritization of such themes as national 
honour, credibility towards allies (particularly regional), support for democracy, and, 
perhaps most important at the time, US security and the USSR. The result was plays of 
positioning that contributed to decision-making hampered by affiliative constraint and 
which prioritized normative imperatives (Billig 1999). The intensity of the discursive 
struggle to establish a dominant narrative and legitimate US poiicy, reflected the degree 
to which the passions of loyalty, betrayal, affection, distrust and fear ýýere attendant. 
Indeed, the conflicts within the Carter cabinet, and the policy drift this enabled. 
reflected several larger debates in which plays of passion affected plaý s of meaning. The 
First related to which factors the US understood as having actually caused ýýhat e,., ents 
(e.,,. NN hat role had Carter's human rights policy played. NN hat role the speed of the Shah's 
modernization programme) and NNhat had realk gone wrong in *the loss of Iran'. There 
\\as little consensus on what actually constituted a re,, olution. since the Iranian version 
did not fit previously defined categories. The fact that the Khomeini regime did not 
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adopt an outright communist orientation was considered less threatening than if it had. 
though the suspicion that it might eventually lead in that direction contributed to distorted 
expectations in false analogies with Mossadeqs weakness (Brzezinski 19833: 470). 7 yet. 
the lack of a communist-directed ideology made conceptualizing Iran's upheaval 
problematic. A theocratic turn was understood, within the play of possibilities, as 
unlikely to contain either democratic or modem components. The Iranian anger 
unleashed by the revolution, and its apparent rejection of Western norms, were ill 
understood and in many instances, 'unthinkable', and in turn responded to in ýýays that 
'were easily interpreted [by the Iranians] as downright hostile' (quote in Bill 1988: 283, 
Shah 1992: 42; Sick 185: 167; Vance 1983: 347).. 
Sick, in his recounting of this period, quotes Arendt's observation in On 
Revolution, 'that what we call revolution is precisely that transitory phase ýNhich brings 
about the birth of a new, secular realm' (Arendt 1963: 36, quote in Sick 1985: 164). This, 
he observes, summed up the Western view (and experience) of modem revolutions. 
JT]he notion of a popular revolution leading to the establishment of a theocratic state 
seemed so unlikely as to be absurd', he writes. In fact, 'it was so unexpected, so alien to 
existing political traditions that it was ... an embarrassment' (ibid). Sick's use of 
ýembarrassment' is revealing, as embarrassment, a euphemism for 'shame'. implies 
ongoing we-ness 8. Embarrassment suggests that what Iran did. and how that was 
perceived by others, remained to decision-makers in the US a reflection of their own 
actions. In contrast to 'embarrassment', 'absurd' projects derision as a form of attack. 
Neither word acts as a negation of social bonds but rather, act to distress them. Indeed, as 
realization dawned that the Iranian movement did not fit the Marxist paradigm. the 
meanings attached to it represented Iran's radical religious orientation as being as 
distortive of Western norms and interpretations of democracy and modernity as 
7 This type of cognitive distortion, that is, insensitivity to, and denial of cues that challenge an already 
established image to which a policy is committed, has been analyzed by Lebow 1981: 112, 
for strategic 
scripts that accompany that imagery, see Hermann 2003: 298. What these analyses don't include is the 
emotional dimension, although they refer to it obliquely, particularly Hermann. 
S Scheff argues that the link between shame and embarrassment appears earl,, in ancient 
literature. as in the 
ts I story of Genesis. in Nk hich Adam and E, e are expelled from Paradise, E-% e co,. ering 
her breas n 
embarrassment Linder God's gaze, and Adam his eý es in shame, see Thomas J. 
Scheff (2000) Bloodi, 
Revenge: Emotions. nationalism and war (Lincoln, N E: i Unk erse. com. Inc. ), pp. 42.43 - 
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communism had been, and therefore similarly threatening (ibid: 165). As such. the US 
understood Iran's increasingly powerful theocratically based discourse as constitutl", e of 
another 'other', its very existence an insult, and thus a clear danger. What is more. for the 
US, the violence implicated in the articulated intent to impress Islamic laýý upon a Iree' 
society constituted a threat that outside any specific practice, attached a meaning of fear' 
to Islamic political revival. 
A State Department post-mortem on the revolution in July 1979, revealed the 
depth of confusion, almost despair, which Iran represented in terms of policy: 'The State 
Department has never understood Iran, culturally, religiously, or economicailý,. It has 
only meager clues to the depth of the Iranian dissatisfaction ..... . (quote in Taheri 
1988: 110). This statement is a complete about-face from State Department briefs 
composed just a few months prior during the Shah's reign, in which Iran ýN as not only 
represented as a culture, economy and society that the US understood, but as a nation the 
US discourse constructed as worthy of identifying with. 
The second debate regarded Islamic political resurgence and its meaning for 
modernity. The perception that prior to the revolution the US had 'understood' Iran and 
Iranians included the idea that the conditions for emergent democratic norms ý\ere ýýell 
established. Thus, political passion enabled the projection of Iran as a nation that had not 
only taken a radically unexpected, and 'embarrassing' turn, but that it did so having 
already achieved a level of development and education (that is, Westernization) which 
had made it comprehensible, and hence, a beloved friend (unlike Saudi Arabia, for 
example, understood as a friend, but never a comprehensible and thus beloved one). The 
heritage of political love amplified the perception that Iran's 'knowing' - and thence 
rejecting - Western democratic and modernist principles (not to mention the 
Western 
embrace) made it ýNiorse than a backward state that had never experienced Western 
progress. Its attempt to adopt an alternative. Islamic system that it expected to integrate 
into the larger global community was understood not as a discursive mediation to ý% 
iden 
the norms and acculturation of modernity, but as an act of profanit" against the rational 
achievernents of liberal Western modernism. Betraýal signified disorder and 
dishonestý. 
instantiating Shia Iran, and Islamic resurgence. as blights that needed to be contained. and 
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purified so as to ensure the security of the - free %\ orld'. In this ýý ay. percei,, ed norm 
betrayal unleashed emotional responses to mobilize action for their protection. 
Accordingly, this 'was a moment of intertextuality in which traditional modes of 
representation struggle to make sense of contemporary observations' (Campbell 
1998: 87). The moral image of 'them' as fanatic/violent was contrasted to 'us' as 
ration al/peacefu 1. Since power was understood to be contingent on promulgating states of 
reason, the discursive economy of the political could be infused with a conception of the 
Shia Islamic 'other' as threatening the progress of reason. This meant that its claim to be 
a universalist doctrine and model of law, with the decreed purpose of spreading the 
Islamic ummah or globalized community, could be perceived as contributing to a 'ýNar 
against all', and as a destabilizing force on the path toward anarchy (Alford 1997: 
Huntington 1996: passim). 
A final debate concerned the representation of the Iranian 'people'. To allay fears 
that despite well-intentioned US patronage. and the *naturalness' of its universalist 
principles, its ideals could be rejected through subversion, distinctions were constructed 
between what was represented as the extremist absolutism of the clerics and the 
universalist aspirations of the people. Thus was articulated, in various ýýays, a boundary 
which, within the generalized US discourse, divided Islamic radicalism from the Iranian 
populous, the latter being represented as still wedded to the precepts expounded through 
Western (as opposed to Islamic) democratic idealism. Although the boundary ýý as 
accepted as flexible, the idea remained robust, softening the rejection, while serving as a 
discursive framework to enable policies of accommodation toward an Iran It still did not 
accept as entirely 'lost'. 
The brassy condemnations from Tehran. by contrast, projected an 
image of a t-I S 
which disdained those suffering from policies that failed to conform with its 
lofty ideals. 
l, ike\N ise, the intractability of the I IS (and generallv Western) discourse \\as 
denounced. 
and contrasted \\ ith its un-fai ling efforts to change the discourse of others. 
The effect vvas 
to redraw the US likeness in a \\a\ reminiscent of Lasch's image of the 
American '70s. 
the prostitute \\, -ho *craves admiration but scorns those who provide 
it... [\\hoj attempts to 
move others \Nhile remaining unmo\ ed herself. She remains a 
lo\ er, dependent on others 
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only as a hawk dependent on chickens' (Lasch 1978: 124-125). This ýýas a likeness the 
I jS discourse of self could not emotionally grasp, for it contained no grammar to do so. 
As the months passed, an increasingly harsh dialogical interaction developed, 
constituted by the 'quality of being directed to' the other. (Guillaume 2002: 6). The 
performance of this self-representation was conducted as a process of identity defence. 
The disconcerting mirroring in the respective use of destructive, intensely negative terms 
and symbols to define the other, and the easy inversion of the same Derridian binaries of 
power, such as democratic/tyrannical, rational/irrational, and honourable/dishonourable. 
suggest continuing practices of political bond-creation, but implicated the passion as 
painful and brutalizing, a pattem of exchange to assuage self-hurt and retaliate, rather 
than acknowledge and ratify -a process of political love molting into political strife. 
Each rejected the other as 'immoral' and 'illegitimate', a parallel animus that constituted 
recognition in the self of those elements most feared within the other (Campbell 1998: 
235). The exaggerated assumption by each of the moral high-ground, towards ý01ich 
resistance constituted crime, reflected the repression of shame, its disguise externalized 
as superiority, a common narcissistic response (Lasch 1978: 29. Scheff and Retzinger 
1991: 12). The narrative of the world as dangerous (inhabited by the Satan ic/Extrem i st 
other and its expanding influence). to use Otto Kernberg's reasoning, 'turns the other into 
a threat object, against which the 'good' self-images are used defensively, and 
megalomanic ideal self images are built up' (quote in Lasch 1978: 39). 
Through the confusion and mixed signals of those first months, the relationship 
stumbled on as mutually exploitable, though in place of a discourse of shared visions, 
each separately reflected what progressively was understood as the other's betra" al. %Oile 
seeing themselves as innocent victims. In the process of (re)articulating their identities to 
protect against that betrayal. and its shame-anger variants of pain, frustration. distrust and 
anger, the relationship precipitously changed from one of summum bonum to sumnlion 
inullum, and at last. to horror alieni (see Hurd 2005: 25). 
This process was revealed in several steps. First, each side's attempt to use %N 
hat 
Bially-Mattern terms *representational force': rhetorical expressions of po%ver intended to 
impose stability on an identity relationship faced %%ith crisis (2001: 350). 
1-his tactic i,,, 
coherent \\ ithin the confines of a relationship in \ý hich social bonds 
have been 
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temporarily ruptured, but where common understandings and interests promote respect 
toward the other, and the desire to remain positively linked. In this case it failed because 
Khomeini interpreted past Anglo-American actions as sufficiently demeaning that he ýýas 
uninterested in repairing the social bonds without clear US acknowledgement of its own 
abuses. Hence he encouraged, rather than feared their further damage, and 
representational force, served only to increase polarization. 
The next step was the adoption of a rhetoric of entrenchment, in ýý hich each side 
attempted to define the borders around their own identities as un-negotiable. but %Oich 
revealed themselves still vulnerable to the provocations of political love. The last such 
move was the meeting and handshake between Brzezinski and Bazargan in Alglers in 
November 1979, ten days after the Shah arrived in the US (Bakhash 1985: 70). The 
ultimate fallout of political love occurred when each side made an irrevocable move to 
secure its own identity in opposition to the other. Inviting the Shah to come to the I IS 
without discussing it with the Iranian government can be understood in this light-, so too 
can Iran's taking of American embassy personnel hostage on grounds of pre-empti,, e 
self-defense. The US refusal to accede to Iranian requests to countenance an investigation 
into the Shah's alleged 'crimes' by a third party such as the UN. and the Iranian refusal to 
release the hostages for over a year, accomplished for each side a confirmation of their 
respective moral positions. 9 At the same time, it provided an important period for each to 
implant new meanings and practices that became reified as 'emotionally appropriate' 
policy behaviour toward the other. 
An important result was that US (and generally Western) perceptions of many of 
the major questions that emerged with the revolution were often considered only 
superficially in the midst of the passionate responses evoked bý events in Iran. The CIA 
coup that toppled Mossadeq and which today is widelý believed to 'have shaped all of 
Iran's subsequent history'. for example, xNas dismissed in \Vashington as irrelevant 
(quote in Kinzer 2003: 2 12, Houghton 2001: 14.60). Carter \\rote it off as ancient 
history' (Carter 1982: 454), an expression of historical denial on maný fronts, not least in 
regards the unsavoury image it brought up of the US as an imperialist power. Equall\ 
9 
.\ sirni 
I ar request bl, Ch IIe \\as honoured h\ British judges man\ years 
I at er in t tie case ot-Chi lean dictator 
Alfonso Pinochet. See Marc Weller ( 1999) . On the Hazards of Foreign Travel for Dictators and Other 
International Criminals'. InternationalAftt'ni-s. Vol. 75 (3). 599-617. 
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telling, the idea of US intervention in the internal affairs of another state for purely 
political reasons was perceived within the Carter administration's post-Viet Nam 
discourse of human rights, as 'irrational', which meant the Iranian fear that such a move 
could be repeated was viewed as more typical of the Iranian propensity for 'conspiracy 
theories', than anything else (Houghton 2001: 57; Rubin 1981: 298). 
Yet, these issues remained important, since how significant Iran's fear was 
represented to be, and how American perceptions of its ability to influence and stay 
engaged with Iran, defined the tension around which legitimating discourses contested for 
dominance within the sphere of policy-making. At stake was American self-perception as 
a leader, and critically, its representation of how power was to be exercised not only in 
Iran but in the region. Differing interpretations of whether the narrative should privilege 
honour within a geo-strategic security context (the pro-Shah Brzezinski perspective) or 
promulgate democracy as an ideal of American leadership (the pragmatist Vance 
perspective), emerged from different emotionalized motivations and competed in the 
production of American policy. Yet in both cases, primary norm protection was the goal. 
Honour versus Democracy: Competing policy motivations 
Me pragmatists discourse, which interpreted the shame of Iran's loss as a frustrating and 
embarrassing setback for American democratic leadership, was motivated by the desire to 
protect American honour by projecting democracy as a universalist value. Promoted by 
Vance, Precht of the State Department's Iran Desk, UN Ambassador Andrew Young, 
academics such as Cottarn and Bill, and many of the diplomats in the American embassy 
in Tehran, including Stempel and Naas, it privileged the need to find accommodation 
\%rith the new Iranian regime; not to do so was represented as positioning the US as 
contributing to instability and anarchy both in Iran and regionally. Credibility was 
understood as linked to US flexibility in being able to develop new conditions for 
democratic development in the face of change. 10 
The pro-Shah discourse, a continuation of meanings and practices from the pre- 
revolution period, interpreted the shame of losing Iran as affecting American - and 
10 This discourse roughlN coincides N%ith the 'balancing' theory of international relations, see S. Walt 
(1987) The Origins qfAlhances (London: Cornell UniN. Press), p. 4. and chapter I passim. 
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Western - credibility by unfairly tamishing their image as guarantors of allied security 
(Brzezinski 1983: 354-5). This discourse gave primacy to honour and loyalty toward allies 
and emphasized force use to ensure geo-strategic legitimacy. Promoted by Brzezinski. as 
well as many influential Iranians who had moved to the US after the revolution, Ronald 
Reagan on the campaign trail, and in Britain, Margaret Thatcher, fear that events in Iran 
would prompt allies to distrust the US and Westem alliance leant credence to using 
military responses - to support the Shah, and later, to save the hostages, and to bolster 
Iraq against Iran. ' 1 In Brzezinski's words: 
"[F]rom the international standpoint, American interests dictated supporting the 
Shah strongly. Other rulers in the region, friendly to the United States, were 
watching us closely. How we responded to the crisis was a guide to them how we 
mi ght react if they were threatened' ( 1983: 3 94). 
Understood within this discourse was the knowledge that the Soviet leadership was 
watching. Yet, though Brzezinski's focus is on America's friends, his distrust of the 
bonds tying those rulers to the US indicates repressed humiliation that American strength 
had failed the Shah (and therefore might lose them as well). It likewise revealed 
disinclination to risk developing new bonds with Iran that might have had diplomatic 
rewards, and, in Laingen's words, 'help reduce some of the chip on the shoulder, "damn 
you for our gas lines", American attitudes toward Iran' (quote in Bill 1988: 282). 
Brzezinski argued passionately for military support and if necessary, a coup to sustain 
American control and contain the Soviets, and spurned all initiatives at contact with 
Khomeini, viewing him in the darkest light, and seeing engagement with him as 
implying American softness - an emotionally untenable position. Elaborating an image 
of real fear, Brzezinski penned a memo to Carter two days after the Shah's departure, 
warning that Iran under Khomeini would 
'likely shift piecemeal to an orientation similar to that of Libya, or into anarchy, 
\vith the result our position in the Gulf would be undermined. that our standing 
throughout the Arab world would decline, that the Israelis would become more 
iI Walt, describes this phenomenon as 'bandwagoning ' and notes, 'Because U. S. statesmen have believed 
that allies are attracted by displays of strength and ýý ill, they have sought to preserve an image of credibility 
and military superiority despite the obvious costs', Walt, ibid p. 4. See also: F. B. Weinstein (1969) 'The 
Concept of Commitment in International Relations', Journal qf Conflict Resolution, Vol. 13 (1). For a 
discussion ofcosts. see M. Beeson (2007) 'The Declining Theoretical and Practical Utilit\ of 
-Bandwagon in g": American Hegemon\,,, in the Ai-,, e of Terror', British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, Vol. 9 (4). No\ ember, p 622. 
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security-oriented and hence less willing to compromise. that the Soviet influence 
in southwestern Asia would grow, that our allies would see us as impotent. that the 
price of oil would increase.... ' (1983: 385-386). 
Brzezinski's exaggerated idioms, his sexual reference, and tone of excitability in 
describing this devastating scenario, shows him using every emotionalized tack at his 
disposal to exert affiliative constraint and sway the decision-making his way. This 
discourse perpetuated on-going political love toward the Shah, as it perceived the nature 
of that relationship, despite the Shah's fall, as still carrying political punch, its 
implications still powerful for what it could say about US constancy toward allied 
statesmen. Loyalty to the relationship with the Shah was represented as needing no 
apology, and as having equal, if not greater, meaning for American international 
credibility than building a new relationship with the 'fanatic' Khomeini. Despite the 
increasingly wide-spread rejection of the Shah's pleas for quarter by other allies, this 
discourse passionately represented his welcome as necessary for US credibility, and in 
keeping with an American tradition of offering asylum to those in need. 
In fact, admitting fallen dictators was not an American tradition and a false 
analogy despite its frequent use in the pro-Shah discourse to justify the Shah's 
acceptance. As noted at the time by international lawyer Francis R. Boyle of Duke 
University: 'The United States has no conceivable national security interest in granting 
political asylum to or becoming a "safe haven" for deposed dictators who have allegedly 
committed "grave breaches" of the Fourth Geneva Convention 12 or have engaged in a 
consistent pattern of gross violations of the fundamental human rights of their own 
citizens. A rudimentary knowledge of intemational human rights law,... would have 
clearly indicated that the Carter administration not admit the Shah into this country for 
any reason except to prosecute him or return him to Iran' (1985: 190). The discourse of 
honour that passionately insisted asylum offers were a tradition and a duty, is revealing 
for what it savs about the necessity at that moment for securing American identity. The 
12 Fourth Geneva Convention (Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War). 1949, article 146 and 147. Boyle argues that by analogy to Article 146, 'the US government would 
hm e an affirmaw, e obligation to bring the Shah before its own courts or else hand him over for trial to 
another High Contracting Party for the commission of "grave breaches" (e. g. willful killing, torture or 
inhuman treatment, or NNfllfullN causing great suffering or serious injury to bodIIN health) as defined b" 
Article 147 during the course of an article 3 non-international armed conflict', see Boyle, page 189. 
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emotional vesting that re-historicized the American asylum record as embracing fallen 
dictators, was productive of American power as not only good but as unfettered. 
Khomeini's insistence that evil had come with this unfettered exercise of poýýer had 
rendered precarious the moral boundary of US identity that demarcated good from evil. 
necessitating an even greater exercise of power to protect that identity as good. This 
authorized it to ignore a narrative more in keeping with the US past as a caring but 
careful refugee haven. 
The rejection of Western norms, including the rule of law, by the radical clerical 
and lay cadres, exemplified by the summary trials taking place in Iran, was condemned 
by both US discourses as barbarous and contributing to anarchy within, and regional 
weakness without (The Iranian 27/6/1979: 10; Newsweek 12/2/1979: 47). Iran's bad 
child' posture, according to the pro-Shah discourse, required a policy that rejected all 
contact with the sordid, bloodthirsty Khomeini and his adherents, while castigating Iran 
for its abrogation of human rights (which in the last months of the Shah's reign had been 
downplayed). 
The pragmatists constructed the Iranian public as wanting a more legitimate 
democracy than the Shah had delivered, with 'Western-style' guarantees of civil liberty 
and the rule of law. This desire was perceived as needing encouragement and support in 
the face of the growing control of the clerics. Avoiding contact with Khomeini was seen 
as hampering the promotion of human rights, while accommodating the Shah's hope for 
asylum in the US was inscribed as endangering American security (particularly embassy 
personnel), as well as its standing and relationship with those elements represented as 
positive inside Iran. Constructing a strong relationship with the moderate forces in Iran 
was further understood to send a message to the Soviets that American interests were 
being, secured through a mechanism that could transfer association from the Shah to neýý 
leadership in keeping with American goals of building strong, loyal democracies in the 
region. To the pragmatists, it was reasonable to adopt a posture of 'parental' tolerance 
to\k, ard the 'inflamed' emotions in Iran' (Vance 1983: 342). 
The period folloN\, Ing the Shah's departure and over the folloNýing nine months, 
the contest between the pragmatist and pro-Shah discourses ýýas complicated by Carter. 
Variously adopting or entertaining aspects of both discourses in projecting his o%\n It, - 
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subjectivities, he contributed to the inability of either Vance or Brzezinski to fix a 
hegemony of meanings, and thereby instantiate power to a particular construction of 
knowledge. *In his frustration and anger, President Carter at times lost his cool and 
berated a number of his own officials, ' Bill writes. 'He constantly received conflicting 
advice and therefore wavered back and forth in his policy decisions' (1988: 260. Carter 
1982: 449-50). The result was to muddy American representations of its own position. and 
reduce its ability to understand the Iranian 'other'. Affiliative and egocentric constraints 
emotionalized both the delivery and the bargaining among Cabinet members. In 
Brzezinski's estimation of the situation in early 1979: 
'[1] focused on the central importance of Iran to the safeguarding of the American 
and more generally Western interest in the oil region of the Persian Gulf. 
Secretary Vance or Deputy Secretary Christopher ... while certainly not inclined to 
reject that view, were much more preoccupied with the goal of promoting the 
democratization of Iran and feared actions-US or Iranian-that might have the 
opposite effect ... The President was thus clearly pulled in opposite directions by his advisers and perhaps even by a conflict between his reason and his emotions 
(1983: 354-356). 
While Brzezinski remains purposefully vague as to which view appealed to Carter's 
reason and which his emotions, the text makes clear there was little middle ground in the 
atmosphere of finger-pointing and self-justification that took place once the Shah had 
fallen (Bill 1988: 276; Sick 1985: 187). Anger at 'losing' the contest to keep him in place 
(and outrage that Iran had 'won), meant a scramble for positioning inside the Cabinet to 
determine how to respond to the confusing signs emanating from Iran (Bill ibid). This 
resulted in less attention than might have been paid in less competitive and emotionalized 
circumstances to the discourses accompanying those signs, suggesting that 'oversight is 
rarely innocent' (Coole 2005: 423). 
Where the discourses did overlap, was in the attempt to achieve the 'modernist 
requirement of order and stability' (Campbell 1998: 87). Shared goals included: 1) Strong 
support of the moderates as the most pro-Western and rational faction in Iran. however 
disagreement remained on how to accommodate Khomeini and the radical Islamic 11 
populism he espoused. 22) Maintaining official representation in 
Iran to ensure America's 
position of influence, though sharp differences of opinion continued regarding the risk of 
hostage-taking (Laingen intervieNk,. The First War on Terror. Release Pictures, 2006). 
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For both discourses, however, the most important driver of policy ýý as the 
American discursive legacy of political love for the Shah, which was perceived offilciallý 
as much more real than any realist paradigm of compelling interests: 
'in a world of total Realpolitik, where nations have no friends but onlN interests. 
and where alliances are made and broken according to an iron law of tactical 
advantage, a case can be made that the United States should have leaped aboard 
the revolutionary juggernaut in a frantic effort to preserve some measure of 
influence with the new regime. But in the real world, where the United States 
carried with it the heavy weight of more than three decades of historical 
association, there was never any practical possibility that such a cý nical reversal 
of roles would or could have been sustained by a US president (Sick 1985: 185). 
By using the word 'cynical', Sick acknowledges that US policy orientations were 
informed by deep emotional entanglement with the Shah, and that adopting a realpolitik 
approach would be angrily construed not as a rational act of statecraft but as political 
disloyalty, even betrayal, of America's basic values. His report of a meeting between 
Vance and moderate Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi at the UN in October, 'the 
first high level discussion between the two countries since the departure of the Shah' in 
January, characterizes the atmosphere as marked by 'deep animosities on both sides', 
wording that indicates the social bonds for each, even at the level of encounter between 
-moderate' and 'Pragmatist' were damaged and insecure. (1985: 188) 
Writing off democracy 
Relinquishing the project of promoting democracy in Iran was not a point rhetorically 
conceded prior to the hostage crisis, as to do so would have been an obvious mark of 
shame to the American self-image. Yet, a close look at how the constitutional process in 
Iran was discursively strategized reveals that even within the pragmatist construction, it 
had, by early spring of 1979, already become secondary to the perceived necessity to 
secure the safety of the embassy diplomats as the symbol of American honour. Despite 
the Carter administration's commitment to promoting human rights as a pillar of 
American identity and policy, the complete lack of involvement and interest in the 
constitutional process taking place in Iran suggests that the -bad child' had alreadý been 
xNritten off. Although the US International Cooperation Administration did conduct some 
small-scale programmes enCOLiragingy cultural exchanges. and. at the request of the It, 
Chapter 4 Page H5 
Constitutional Assembly. provided copies of the American Constitution translated into 
Persian, there was no official or agreed upon blue-print by ýkhich the US govemment 
communicated its democratic experience or praxis to those devising a new constitution 
for the post-Shah Iran (Graves, Confidential Report to Curran. Asnad 1-6: 299). 
Most tellingly, this was reflected by the senior proponent of the pragmatist 
discourse, Secretary of State Vance, whose memoirs do not mention even once the 
constitutional process that dominated the Iranian scene for eight months (Bakhash 
1985: 71-9 1 ). This is an oversight that cannot be deemed 'innocent'. as putting in place 
human-rights guarantees (through democratic nation-building and the establishment and 
codification of the rule of law ) was a primary, if not the primary foreign policy goal of 
the Carter administration-and historically, 'the burden' of US foreign policy generally. 
Other memoirs are equally barren, or mention it only in passing - including Brzezinski's. 
Carter's, Jordan's, Turner's, Powell's, and even Sick's. The same gap is apparent in early 
analyses of US-Iranian relations at the time, including Ledeen and Lewis', Rubin's and 
even Bill's. None indicate that American efforts were expended to offer input or meet 
with drafters or advisors to encourage, support or influence the codification of the laws 
that would protect social justice, civic freedoms, elections, or other democratic practices. 
Scrutiny of the archives reveals no American or British statesman (or woman) publicly 
acknowledged that a constitutional process was taking place in Iran and that the Iranian 
people were attempting to obtain the democracy they deserved. The media, which did 
focus on it, chose to emphasize the inconsistencies and conflicts with which the elections 
to the constitutional Congress were fraught, as well as its lopsided character. there being 
only one woman who was elected, clothed in a chador (The Iranian 7/11/1979). In those 
examples of Anglo-American discourse in which it was included. the constitutional 
process was disgraced as theatre, not politics. Sick is unrelentingly negative, seeing it as a 
product of Khomeini having 'systematically set about silencing the opposition' (Sick 
1985: 262). 
The conclusion therefore, must be that the constitutional process, its intricacies, 
sources, compromises. and debates were not something the US in fact could allo%A ltý; elf 
to become involved ýN ith. Regarding Iran as would ajilted lover or despairing parent. the 
US turned its back on \\ hat it construed as a faithless and defiant ward and ignored the 
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critical process that could have given it the patina of involving itself in others' democratic 
efforts, or even, introduced aspects of its own 'universalist' norms and sensitivities into 
the discussion. The choice to ignore, as stark within the pragmatist as the pro-Shah 
discourse. wrote off Iran and the 'anti -democratic' doctrines of Islam as irretrievabl,,,,, 
irrational - an act of alienation that was a far cry from the solidarity offered the prodigal 
son a short year before. 
The United States' own passionate vesting in those elements of democracy that 
defined what it was to be American, therefore, rendered it an all or nothing project. 
Comparison with its own history, through deferral and forgetting, a process Derrida terms 
'diffl6rance', opened an unbridgeable divide between the US and Iranian aspirations for 
representative governance (Doty 1996: 6; Huntington 1993; B. Lewis 200 1: passim, 
Mirsepassi 2000: 40-47). The sedimented idealization of America's own democracy, made 
it unthinkable for the US to meet Iran at the frontier of a new democratic inscription. The 
laic discursive economy, which symbolized as inferior any ritualizing of religious social 
power within the political, secured US pride by figuring the 'loss of Iran' as having 
happened not because American universalist values weren't appropriate or natural. but 
because of what was sentimentalized as a culturally impoverished society to be pitied, but 
which was simply unable to respond to the attractions of democracy (Hurd 2005: 23; 
Rosenfeld, The Washington Post 5/1/1979). 
In June, an important shift in perspective took place in the embassy, ohen the 
Charg6, Charles Naas, was replaced by Bruce Laingen, who reflected a more pro-Shah 
narrative than his fellow diplomats who had witnessed the revolution. Laingen saw 
American legitimacy and security as the primary determinants of policy, a monologic 
approach that drew its power from domestic perspectives on foreign policy practice, 
rather than dialogic engagement with foreign, in this case Iranian, sensibilities 
(Guillaume 2002: 4-5). 
Specifically, Laingen. finding himself surrounded by Iranians suspicious of 
embassy actions and angry at America, de, ý eloped an emotionalized ý-iexN of Iranians as 
irrational and untrusmorthy. As revealed in his reports to the State Department. his 
gro%\ ing tear and horror of a people who had rejected US ideals provided the pro-'. ')'hah 
discourse the necessary ammunition to inscribe US identitý as more credible outside aný 
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accommodation with Iran, since its people, and the religion of Islam made it unfit for an. N 
viable alliance. His assessment of the Persian character sounded the death knell on the 
pragmatists' accommodation ist argument. Rather, it furthered the argument for the US to 
be patronizing and belittling toward a population that had so shamefully rejected it. This 
helped to remove Iran as a player in regional security practices. leading the way for direct 
American covert action in Afghanistan, and for putting in place the Carter Doctrine 
(Brzezinski 1983: 443,454). A cable Laingen wrote to Vance in August 1979, and NOich t-- 
was made public on February 3,1981 reveals barbed anger, the production of superiority 
and a compulsion to scorn and mock: 
'Perhaps the single dominant aspect of the Persian psyche is an overriding egoism. 
The practical effect of it is an almost total Persian preoccupation v, ith self and 
leaves little room for understanding points of view other than one's oxýn .... This approach underlies the so-called 'bazaar mentality' so common among, 
Persians, a mind-set that often ignores longer term interests in favor of 
immediately obtainable advantages and countenances practices that are re'-'arded 
as unethical by other norms. 
Coupled with these psychological limitations is a general incomprehension of 
causality. Islam, with its emphasis on the omnipotence of God, appears to account 
at least in major part for this phenomenon .... This same quality also 
helps explain 
Persian aversion to accepting responsibility for one's own actions.... 
Given the Persian negotiator's cultural and psychological limitations, he is going 
to resist the very concept of a rational (from the Western point of view) 
negotiating process. ('Message from Iran: Aug. 13,1979', IHT, 2/3/198 1 
The telegram outlines six lessons for those 'who would negotiate with Persians', several 
times underscoring that 'forcefulness' and 'insistence' were the only means to achieve 
success, a discourse more akin to that of imperialist mentalities than a state espousing the 
promotion of human rights and universal freedoms. The text's own resistances highlight a 
radical turnaround in official US sensibility since the Shah's time concerning the nature 
ol'the Iranian character and in fact, what was tolerated as acceptable diplomatic language 
in regard to Iran. In its character assassination of Iranians and Islam alike, and in its 
exaggerated rendering of them as exhibiting childlike qualities. Laingen's discourse 
embeds a US disdain in which is implicated a need to avenge American 
honour by being 
tough toward Iranians, a move to exert pressure on bonds that far from being severed. 
were active and vulnerable. As McDermott observes. 'high levels of perceked threat 
represent emotional responses, rather than logical or rational ones' (2004: 
18-5-6). 
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Laingen's presupposition that all Iranians were alike - and Islam had the same effect on 
all - and by extension, anyone else who might believe in it, granted primacy to 
conviction, rather than reason. In this way, Laingen's cable fulfills several tests of 
identity discipline for establishing alienation in a relationship of isolation: it classifies 
Iranians as subjects that are 'unethical' and 'egotistic' and hence *psychological ly 
limited'; it positions them as incapable of comprehending causality. and hence less 
civilized than those who can understand 'points of view other than one's oýýn', and it re- 
naturalises these 'resistances' within recognized formulae of Orientalist irrational ity". 
When this telegram was leaked to the press to coincide with the release of the hostages. it 
was heralded as a brilliant and prescient work of diplomatic insight, and was seen as 
anticipating - rather than contributing to - the breakdown in relations. 
Denying trust made possible American practices of exclusion in which the failure 
of democracy in 'the other' confirmed the democratic and idealized democracy of the 
self. Further, this disciplining of identity confirmed the US as a power able to bring, as 
wel I as hold back, democratization, justifying the mothballing of the project in Iran 
without any loss of face for the US. By this example, it is possible to see how 
emotionalized constructions become reified and institutionalized into passionate systems 
of policy. It is not insignificant that Laingen's text anticipates the texture of the language 
used consistently in Anglo-American discourse toward Iran after the hostage crisis and 
which it has featured ever since. 
Admitting the Shah: Shame as arrogance 
From the moment the Shah left Iran, his admission into the US, and the safety of US 
diplomats in Iran, x;, ere understood to be connected. How this was perceived delineated 
the pragmatist and pro-Shah discourses from each other, while at the same time, it posed 
for Carter the greatest area of risk . Being wedded to neither 
discourse, it proved to be a 
region in which discursive discipline failed him. and passion became policý. 
Much ink 
has been spilled analyzing his decision. McDermott argues xýithin prospect theorý. 
for 
example. that Carter sav, ' advantages to allowing in the Shah, seeing 
it as an act of Good 
Samaritan ism (of a certain sort) that wou Id play ýN el I NN ith in a campaign that %\ as not 
doing \ýell ( 1998: 104). How the L'S constructed its ldentitý so that 
Good Samaritanism. 
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and honour toward fallen allies were emotionally privileged and became productive of 
decisions that were taken regardless of perceived risk is the subject of this section. 
Within the pragmatist discourse, the critical issue had become the protection of 
US citizen safety in a climate of rising anti-American ism in Iran. Two previous incidents 
of hostage taking, one at the embassy and the other at the Kapkan Surveillance site on the 
Russian border, both in February 1979, though brief, had raised the specter of future 
hostage taking (Stempel 1981: 186). Both times this had rekindled a sense of moral 
transgression and alienation, and although in both cases the Bazargan government had 
responded with solidarity, the experience was a humiliating one for the US (Stempel 
1981: 185-8). 
The pro-Shah discourse by contrast was motivated by the desire to show the US 
as credible and powerful despite the wounds inflicted on it by Iran, ý, Výhich in this case 
meant acting honourably by offering a haven to one of its friends if it chose to do so, 
regardless of how others (that is, the new Iranian leadership, or the pragmatists) might 
perceive the situation. In March 1978, when the Shah requested entry into the US, 
Brzezinski derisively noted in his memoirs that officials in the State Department 
(including Vance, and Under-Secretaries of State Christopher and Newsom) regarded it 
negatively because 'it could pose a threat to Americans in Iran' (1983: 472). In the pro- 
Shah discourse, any constraint on US policy out of fear or deference to the Iranians ýý as 
figured in freighted language as 'blackmail', and a threat to the exercise of US 
sovereignty. On April 9, during a meeting with Carter to lobby for the Shah's admission, 
David Rockefeller implied that threats to the American embassy in Tehran \ý ere putting 
US honour at stake. 'I said it seemed to me that a great power such as ours should not 
submit to blackmail, ' he later reported to The Neiv I ork Times (Smith 1981: 158). 
Brzezinski supported this sentiment on principles that ýN ere -integral to our political 
tradition': 
To compromise those principles would be to pay an extraordinarily 
high price not 
onIN' in terms of self-esteem but in our standing among allies, and 
for very 
uncertain benefits .... Moreover. 
I felt that, tactically. we could not be blackmailed 
if we made it clear that ý\hat \ý, -e \, ýere doing \\as central to our sNstem of,, alues' 
(1983: 472). 
Chapter 4 Page 120 
Brzezinski acknowledges that self-esteem was imbricated in the choice to offer a haven 
to the Shah, and that not to do so would betray American values; this reveals the ongoing 
political love that operated in relation to the Shah, and how, in this discourse. it ýý as 
perceived as appropriate, and offering more certain benefits than denying him asylum. 
Likewise, Brzezinski makes clear that to him, the moral imperative of American alues 
would be so convincing that even the Iranians would back down from 'blackmail'. 
By July, during one of the many reviews of the Shah's status. Carter commented 
he 'did not wish to see the Shah to be here playing tennis while Americans ý, k, ere being 
kidnapped or even killed' in Iran (Brzezinski 1983: 282). Nonetheless, the discourse 
privileging admission of the Shah gained momentum throughout the summer, and in so 
doing, undercut whatever feeble efforts the Administration was makin(., to establish a 
rapport with Tehran. The discourse was framed in moral terms, xýhich turned the debate 
into a test of American character, and ultimately, the capacity for compassion on the part 
of the president. Yet the concept of compassion was not generalized. It was not directed 
at the embassy personnel in need of protection, nor, by this point, was it conceivable that 
it would be directed toward the Iranian people for the human rights abuses they claimed 
to have suffered under the Shah. Compassion as an expression of American ident1tv 
security had only the one target: the Shah. 
In an emotional address at Harvard Business School, for example, Kissinger 
declared that 'a man that for 37 years was a friend of the United States should not be 
treated like a Flying Dutchman looking for a port of call' (often quoted. but most fully in 
Bill 1988: 335). Ten days later, conservative columnist George Will praised the Shah as 
a great friend and then lashed out at Carter saving, 'It is sad that an administration that 
knoNvs so much about morality has so little dignity' (The [Vashington Post 19/4/1979). 
What is significant is the discursive representation of the Shah as a 'friend'. and 
the denial of the faults he'd been labeled ý, Nith in the US Congress and the media 
in the 
Near prior to his fall. What is more, the entrenchment of his image as a friend Nýas placed 
in ever starker opposition to the Iranian, particularly clerical, discourse. %Oich 
represented him as a criminal, fuelling among both decision-makers and 
in the population 
a self-righteous anger against Iran for its bloodthirstý pursuit of a 
fallen so\ ereign. In 
reducing the situation to one of good versus evil. friend versus 
foe. the narrative dreýý out 
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the last vestiges of political love still associated with the Shah. Brzezinski e,,, en told 
Carter 'we must show our strength and loyalty to an old friend, even if it means personal 
danger to a group of very vulnerable Americans'! (Carter 1982: 452-45-33) As Lasch 
observes, 'men have never perceived their interests with perfect clarity, and have 
therefore tended throughout history to project irrational aspects of themsel". es into the 
political realm' (1978: 29). Meanwhile, Khomeini's calls for the Shah's return for trial as 
early as April were discounted in both discourses as empty signaling -talk that \\as 
understood to carry weight domestically but without value interriationally (Jervis 1976). 
Nevertheless, because American identity was implicated in those calls, ignoring 
them served to strengthen the boundary that defined the civilized US, in opposition to the 
barbarianism of Iran. To have done otherwise would have implied the validity of the 
clerical accusations, and the shameful recognition of a less-than-virtuous American self. 
This was effectively avoided through the monologism of using the 'intellect in the serN ice 
of evasion rather than self-discovery' (quote in Lasch 1978: 40; Lebow 198 1: 119). 
Meanwhile, on the presidential campaign trail, Carter and his entourage ýýere 
acutely concerried over negative press about Washington's handling of the Shah. and (as 
his illness progressed), the prospects of his death - factors that eventually tipped the scale 
toward 'compassion'. Hamilton Jordan in his role as campaign manager gave the 
following advice: 'I mentioned the political consequences [of not admitting the Shah]. ' 
Then, he said: 'Mr. President, if the Shah dies in Mexico, can you imagine the field day 
Kissinger will have with that? He'll say that first you caused the Shah's downfall, and 
now you've killed him' (1982: 3 1). Terence Smith of the Neu, York Times, in -Why Carter 
Admitted the Shah', notes, 'Certainly Ronald Reagan ... would 
have pounced. Carter 
conceded that the possibility of such a reaction N\as on his mind. -I can't 
deny that that 
may have been a factor, " he said. -It probabl-y was. "'(Smith 198 1: 160). 
Carter. a president 
already complicit in allowing decision-making to be subjecti""ely constructed. \ýas 
particularly vulnerable to two emotional pressures, fear that a miss-step a propos the 
Shah could finish Carter's chances for re-election (and the shame that \'V-ould implý 
for a 
sitting president), and self-righteousness that doing the 
Christian thing and acting the 
Good Samaritan NWUld not only be a source of personal pride, 
but play Nýell to the Noter. 
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The combination of domestic exigency and the unwillingness to ackno%ý ledge the 
negative aspects of the Shah's performance furthered to extremis commitment to the 
Shah's welfare. In this way, 'vital US interests' (containing the Soviet flank. controlling 
oil prices through friendship with Iran) can be seen as having been less important than 
protecting US identity security by assuaging unacknowledged guilt at America's less than 
democratic behaviour in Iran, and ensuring Iran would not succeed in pointing this out on 
the international stage. The result: the discourse of 'compassion' toward the shah came to 
dominate at the expense of policies of engagement with Iran, or even effecti,,, -e policies to 
protect the US embassy there (loannides 1984: 8 1). 
A telegram penned by State Department Iran Desk Director Daniel Precht to 
Laingen, entitled 'Planning for the Shah to come to the United States, offers a ,, ood 
example. (This was apprehended by a mole, code-named Hafez, in the US embassý and 
passed onto the clerically dominated Revolutionary Council, copy in author's 
possession). 13 The cable establishes the US government's commitment to admit the Shah 
as 'an inevitable step ... by January 1980'. However, Precht suggests it \ýould be 
advisable first 'if the Shah were to renounce his family's claim to the throne. Should the 
Shah refuse... [w]e should make it quite clear publicly that we consider any claim to the 
throne by his family rendered invalid by the Iranian constitutional process'. Even so, he 
states: '[T]he danger of hostages being taken in Iran Ný ill persist'. Precht suggests several 
waýls to protect the premises as a precaution. Save for strengthening the doors , none of 
the recommendations were heeded. 
To withhold sanctuary until the Shah had publiclý abdicated the throne ýý as not 
interpreted as consonant with 'compassion". In the face of the Shah's illness. it ýýas 
deemed indelicate and shaming if the US insisted - an act of false pride tovýard 'a used- 
up Middle Eastern potentate and dictator \\ ho was - and is - one of"ours- (It ashington 
Pow 9/11/1979). 
In July 1979. First Secretary John Stempel wrote a cable in %Oich he noted that. 
turn for the worse in US-Iran relations' NN as resulting from 'continuing charges that 
'3 Fhat these clocurnents might have been faked was ne\ er at issue. The language, coding, paper and cals 
\\ere consistent, and implied they \% ere genuine and not the \%ork of a good 
forger. The collection of 
documents released by the 'Students Following the Imam's Line included the selection ofdocuments 
allqzedlN copied b\ 'Hafez', it must be noted that the IS has ne\er officiallý acknowledeed thc,, c 
documents, although it has I lke\ý ise ne\ er denied them, and they lia\ e 
been \% idelý used for , cholarship. 
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US and CIA are meddling in Iran' WSED 5925.7/6/1979. in author's possession"). 
Stempel, despite his ability to speak Persian and the length of his posting. did not 
recognize the seriousness of the CIA charge. and certainly. neither did Washing-ton. For 
Khomeini, and many of the other leaders of the revolution, including Aý, atollahs 
Montazeri (Tehran's Friday Prayer leader), Mahdavi Kani (Secretary General of the 
Fedayeen Islam -a clerical political party dating from the time of the Shah). Dr. Bohonar 
(later to be Prime Minister), Rafsanjani (later to be President). Khamenei (later to be 
president, and eventually, faghi), Khoenia (leader of the SFIL). and Beheshti (founder of 
the Islamic Republican Party), SAVAK was indistinguishable from the CIA. the latter 
having conducted the training and equipping of the former Shah's lntelli, ýence force (Bill 
1988: 210-11). All had spent time in prison and been tortured by SAVAK, their percei", ed 
'martyrdom' at its hands carrying deep psychological and emotional implications for 
their understanding of the CIA, and the shame of its role in Iran (Saikal 2003). 
Discovering what they interpreted as further covert actions to bring the Shah to the US, 
and perhaps, back to the throne, was rendered doubly shaming by what they felt ý% as the 
hollow public discourse of American democracy and liberty, and, more specificall\, the 
embassy's denial in the face of the hard evidence being passed on bý Hafez 
(loann ides 1984: 48-50). 
Within the American discourse, accepting the Shah into the US had no covert 
overtones. Because of the US disinclination to approach Khomeini or his clerical advisors 
directly, however, there was no viable communication between the US and Iran at this 
point, and this critical contingency was not shared ýý ith anx one beyond the moderates. By 
then, however, the moderates had been sidelined, something Washington had missed, and 
if anything, contributed to through what Bill calls *its crushing embrace' ( 1988: 288). 13ý 
the same token, ý\, hat was ill-understood in Washington because of its own political love 
for the Shah, was that any association ý\ ith the him implied to the Khomeinists that a 
relationship of strategic support continued-and therefore. so did the threat of re- 
imposing him or his son on the throne (Milani 1994: 163). As the Shah never 1'ý, ýLled a 
formal abdication. nor a statement severing his famiIN's claim to the throne. and as the 
"This and seýera I other embassy documents ýk ere acquired 
bN the author In Tehran during the hostage 
enerallý aýajlable to the public prior to crisis as the SFIL published them in loose-leaf and made them I_ 
their collation and publication as the . -Isnad series. 
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US never officially stated that it no longer recognized the Pahlavis. nor even that it 
explicitly recognized the Islamic Republic, fear and suspicion infused the clerical 
discourse when the two were seen to be closing ranks. 
Although Carter states in his memoirs that the lobbying to admit the Shah irritated 
him as he considered the question closed, the number of references to the issue in his 
own, and others' recollections (including Vance, Jordan, Brzezinski. and numerous 
cables in the USED archive) belies that claim, and discussion continued throughout 1979. 
a reflection of the stress and fervor the subject elicited. It was information obtained on 
October 18 that the Shah was suffering from acute cancer that finally convinced Carter 
(Smith 1981: 6). The news was couched in emergency terms, and the decision was made 
almost impetuously, without consulting with the Iranian government. The manner in 
which this decision was made and later communicated to Tehran, the timing, as well as 
the expectations that went with the decision, provide a key example of how emotionality 
(mis)informed the government's choices, and how subsequent relations unraveled as a 
consequence. 
First, in the blush of triumph and pride at finally 'winning', the pro-Shah 
discourse capitalized on its success to reaffirm the US as the 'parent' state - an act of 
hyper-excitability that led Washington to adopt bullying rather than diplomatic 
behaviour. Justifying itself as a Good Samaritan made it possible to ignore a variety of 
Iranian requests regarding the Shah, including having him assessed by an Iranian doctor 
and arranging for a formal renouncement of politics by his family. At the same time, 
Iranian warnings that such a move implied to them an ulterior motive were dismissed. In 
the pro-Shah discourse, great power was produced as being free from restraint. Thus, 
Brzezinski suggested, and Carter agreed, that 'it was inappropriate for the US to ask the 
Iranians for approval' and therefore, the Iranian government not be solicited for its 
opinion, but 'simply informed' of the Shah's entry by Precht and Laingen. These latter 
would also 'demand' guarantees for the embassy's protection (Brzezinski 1983: 475: 
quote in Carter 1982: 454). These several actions clearly communicated lack of respect 
for Iranian fears and needs. In failing to acknowledge its requests and 
its sensibilities. the 
US fueled a sense of dishonour and disgrace within the Iranian 
leadership. which elicited 
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further shame, alienation and a need to 'save face*. perpetuating the cý cle of isolation 
and political strife. 
Second. the patronizing brusqueness with which the Carter administration dictated 
the terms to the Bazargan government can be interpreted as an act of representational 
force. Instrumental ized through the pro-Shah discourse, it was meant to quell the 
Iranians (the love object) into submission within the relational framework that the US. as 
parent, still imagined was operational. 15 In fact, until the hostage-taking, Washington 
harboured the hope that Khomeini might withdraw into a 'Ghandi'-Ilke position. and *the 
loss of Iran' could be rescued through the shreds of its previous inscription of shared 
obligations and interests (Halliday 1989: 249, Saunders, "The Situation in Iran and its 
Implications', Statement to the Committee on Europe and the Middle East, House 
Committee on International Relations 1/17/1979, in Alexander and Nanes 1980: 47 1). To 
this end, the United States still entertained the self-image of being able to exert 
representational force to re-fasten the identities of the US and Iran together (Bially- 
Mattern 2002: 360; Vance 1983: 343,362). 
Third, despite all that had occurred, Washington had not fundamentally reassessed 
the relationship, but simply downgraded its importance, particularly within the pro-Shah 
discourse, which apprehended Iran as *third-rate regime' too disordered to be capable of 
real threat to the US (Brzezinski 1983: 474). At the same time. as Doty points out, 'US 
policies themselves could not be defined as a source of instability' (1996: 91). Thus, 
although it was anticipated that hostage-taking could follow acceptance of the Shah, the 
US discounted the impact of its actions through wishful thinking that Iran could not 
seriously hurt it. This enabled the warnings by Yazdi and Bazargan, as well as Precht, to 
be ignored. Carter, with whom the final decision ultimately rested. was also pressured by 
the consensus that at last characterized his entire Cabinet (including Vance, vv-ho had 
come on-side in response to the Shah's illness), on the basis of shared principles. Yet. as 
15 DotN art-mes that the parent will at times overlook indiscretions of the 'problem ch I Id' for the purpose of 
maintaining that child within the fold, as harsh measures could encourage the child to form alliances 
clscýý here. Howe% er, she points out that \ arious acts, that can be understood as disciplinary, and which 
ofien take the shape of inter-\ ention N% ithin the interrial affairs of the child, can and do mark the 
development of such a relationship. These disciplinary moments can be understood to fit Bially-Mattern's 
concept of representational force. See Roxanne Doty ( 1996) Impetial Encounters (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Prcss), p. 89, Janice Bially-Matterri (200 1) 'The Po\% er Pol itics of Identio. ', European Journal 
ol'Internationtil Rekitions, Vol. 7 (3), pp. 349-397. 
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Elster says, 'norms are sustained by emotions'. and this was unquestionably a highly 
emotionalized situation, which at last, forced Carter to make his choice on grounds of 
-appropriateness' under affiliative constraint (ibid; Crawford 2000: 140, quote on 154: 
McDermott 1988: 104). 
Thus, not only was a critical decision taken on the basis of motivated bias, but 
equally importantly, how that decision was carried out - by 'simply informing' the 
Iranian government, 'demanding' protection, and taking no steps to de-politicize the 
image of the Shah - implicates passion as a driver in the decision-making and assertion of 
American identity security defining this key event. As Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi 
said in complete frustration when he closed the meeting with US envoys Laingen and 
Precht, 'You are opening a Pandora's Box with this' (quote in Smith 1981: 163). 
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The Hostage Crisis: Victimization and Innocence as Figurations of Political Strife 
"This American blunder has left and will have a deep impact and effect on US foreign 
policy for a long time. Such an impact can only be compared with one or two events in 
the past, among them the Vietnam War. But the effect and impact of the current one is far 
more important and powerful than the other ones. ' -Ibrahim Yazdi, Foreign Minister, 
Islamic Republic' 
'Although Khomeini was acting insanely, we always behaved as though we were dealing 
with a rational person. ' - Jimmy Carter, US President2 
The hostage crisis which began on November 4,1979 and dragged on for over a year was 
a landmark in the construction of US identity as it approached the end of the Cold War. 
To American eyes, an anachronistic third world revolution was suddenly transformed into 
a serious security threat materially endangering US citizens as well as Western 
conceptions of diplomacy and world order. This had multiple effects. 
First, it enabled a passionate construction of the US as the victim of uncivilized 
and unwarranted aggression (Altheide 1981: 134; Houghton 2001: 53). This elicited deep 
shame at being caught unawares by a state it already perceived as unethical, and toward 
which it denied its own responsibility for the rift that was proving so damaging. The 
narrative of American innocence de-historicized its previous policies toward Iran (and the 
Shah) as immaterial to the current grievance. In projecting wrong-doing solely on Iran, 
the government and media in the US focused on the private suffering of the hostage 
families, \Oich became the metaphor for the whole nation's sense of social violation. The 
figuration of Iran as the malevolent source of this pain and humiliation deepened and 
perpetuated the shared shame-anger sequence, retaining both Iran and the US in a 
relationship of political strife. 
Speech delix ered in Tabriz, December 3,1979, quote in C. loannides ( 1984), op. cit., p. 1 39. 
Jimmy Carter (1982) Ket, ping Faith. Memoirs (? f a President (London: Col I ins), p. 459 
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Second, the mutualized anger crystallized the Islamic other in opposition to 
American conceptions of self and democracy, imbuing it with mythologies of social 
violence. 
Third, it privileged a 'tough conservative' post-Shah discourse, which constituted 
credible American power and leadership as grounded in the willingness to use force 
against perceived and actual threats. Within this post-Shah discourse, another Iran was to 
be avoided at all costs. The way the United States perceived itself in relation to the crisis 
contributed to a growing American militancy in its construction of self and other in the 
practice of international relations. The structuring of this identity is examined through the 
prism of political passion, which, in the course of the hostage crisis, settled firmly into 
political anguish, a process that produced a monologic sequence deaf to representations 
by the 'other', and reliant on its own representations of the 'other' (Guillaume 2002: 6). 
Rage, a protective mechanism employed to insulate against shame, motivated American 
policy responses both during and after the crisis, and justified vengeance against Iran as 
normatively appropriate (Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 66). 
The liberal New Republic asserted the need for a visceral component in future US 
dealings with Tehran in an editorial January 3,198 1: 'Any appropriate policy toward Iran 
must begin with this feeling of revulsion' (p. 7), it declared. The link with Islam was 
clearly stated in an April 3 Oth 1980 editorial in the Christian Science Monitor: 'The 
Iranians bear a heavy responsibility for the image the world will hold of the Islamic faith 
and its capacity to effect righteousness and noble behavior' (p. 24). The continuing 
justification for this emotionally contingent American foreign policy, states Pollack, rests 
with the hazard of domestic political blow-back. 'Indeed. one reason subsequent 
American administrations have been reticent to pursue a rapprochement with Tehran, ' he 
observes, 'is that this latent anger is so volatile and can be so easily brought back to the 
surface by a political opponent that few have been willing to take the risk' (Pollack 
2004: 173). Pollack's use of the emotive terms 'anger', and 'volatile' pinpoints the 
salience of passion in political constructions of both the US and Iran, and the constraints 
on rapprochement this has exerted over time. 
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Framing the Crisis 
The hostage crisis began much like the US embassy seizure the previous February. \ýhich 
was resolved in a matter of hours through the intervention of then Foreign Minister 
Ibrahim Yazdi. Yet this one soon differed in several important ways. First, the hostage- 
takers immediately broadcast demands for the Shah's extradition: second, the seizure 
gained the official backing of the clerically dominated Revolutionary Council and of 
Khomeini himself, third, Charg6 d'Affaires Bruce Laingen and two other US embassy 
officers who were at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that day, were also taken hostage. 
The captors, calling themselves the Students Following the Imam's Line (SFIL) 
immediately engaged with the international press through their spokesperson, 
Massoumeh Ebtekar (who came to be dubbed 'Mary' and, having lived several years in 
the US, spoke American -accented English). The SFIL rapidly established a position 
independent of the Bazargan government, which finding itself powerless within the 
circumstances, fell 48 hours later. By the end of November, the SFIL released a group of 
black and women hostages 'not suspected of espionage' (Sick 1985: 264). It likewise 
began to release documents from the embassy, many of which had been shredded and 
which the students pieced together for publication. The American response was swift, and 
over the ensuing month it froze American-based Iranian assets, cut-off oil imports 
(accounting for 700,000 barrels a day), and imposed sanctions (Christopher and 
Kreisberg, eds. 1985: passim). 
For the SFIL, seizing the hostages was a security move to protect against a reprise 
of 1953, when Kermit Roosevelt and other agents operating in the US embassy basement 
had worked to re-instate the Shah, who had fled from Mossadeq to Rome (Ebtekar 200 1, 
Kinzer 2003). Honour was to be maintained by refusing to back down on their demands 
for the Shah's extradition. For the US, honour necessitated the release of the hostages 
before any Iranian grievances could be acknowledged. This led to a stalemate in 
negotiations. The US brought the case to the Security Council and the World Court, ýNhile 
several different groups and individuals. including UN Secretary General Kurt 
Waldheim, attempted mediation. None succeeded. In April, the US mounted a secret 
reSCLIC mission, Nýhich ended in disaster. By the end of 1980. the Islamic Republic's 
constitution had been ratified and a neýý parliament (majles) seated. That same ý ear the 
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Shah died and Ronald Reagan was elected US president. Although the Shah's demise did 
not immediately resolve the impasse, negotiations being mediated at the time by the 
Algerian government at last gained traction. The hostages were released 444 daýs after 
their seizure, the very morning Ronald Reagan took the oath of presidential office. 
For the United States, the hostage crisis became a symbol of the vulnerability of 
democracy to newly perceived forces of evil beyond the communist threat, and revealed 
the precariousness of US identity poised between the commitment to universalist values, 
and the actions required to protect its vision of those values (Weisman 1981: 247, for 
previous incarnations of this tension in the Philippines, see Doty 1996: 82-86). The 
evolution from the hostage crisis to the first War on Terrorism is critical to understanding 
the discourse that emerged and how this impacted American concepts of hegemon-y, 
modernity and security. 
The fallout of political love, it will be argued, narrowed the scope of possible 
policy choices, disinclining the American administration to consider a range of actions 
'honourable' that under other circumstances, could have been tried, and in other cases 
have been - as in the case of Pinochet (Boyle 1985: 195). The fact that in other situations, 
alternative interpretations were exercised, suggests other possibilities were open within 
America's own discursive traditions. Taking its cue from the interpretation of political 
Islam as a rising threat rather than from practices of past Iran-American policy, decision- 
making necessitated a framing of the issue so as to preserve American righteousness in 
the face of 'illegitimate' acts by its errant ward (Altheide 1981: 138). This led to 
motivated behaviours to preserve identity security but risked important national interests. 
such as oil access and US relations with its European allies (Weisman 1981: 229) The cost 
of ignoring these interests was elided through the passionate representation of American 
prestige as paramount (Bowden 2006, McDermott 1998; Pollack 2004). The process 
protected what Slaughter describes as the -empire of norms' by re-instantiating a fear of 
others' democracy into Western discourse 3 (2004: Chapt. I passim). In effect, the hostage 
crisis Ný, as structured around normative infringements, but responded to in emotionalized 
;A similar play of practice took place in the US approach to Nicaragua, see J. Dumbrell (199"). -Imerican 
Foreign Policj,. - Cartei- to Clinton (Basingstoke: Macmillan). pp. 158-160, IT-1-173. 
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terms of 'delusional self-righteousness'. marking the next stage in the destructive course 
of political passion (Boyle 1985: 194). 
The crisis wound down as both parties emerged from the bruising 14-month 
ordeal claiming to be victorious. The negotiated terms assured that neither had to 
apologize to the other, admit to committing crimes, or pay damages (Christopher 1985: 
Pollack 2004 for the American view; Bani-Sadr 1982: 150 for the Iranian viexý). In this 
way, each was able to secure its identity in opposition to what was domestically 
construed as the failure and perfidy of the other. Yet, the settlement itself was 'a peace to 
end all peace' in that it allowed the silence of shame to infuse all future dealings between 
the two states, as it forced neither to acknowledge the legitimacy of the other's 
grievances, nor to take responsibility for their own damaging roles in the affair. As there 
was no catharsis, the US and Iran remained linked through deeply wounded emotional 
bonds. Several hostages, after their release, felt troubled by the evasion and superficiality 
that marked the Congressional post-crisis hearings. 'No one spoke to any of the Persian- 
speaking political officers among the hostages to find out what happened... ' reported ex- 
hostage John Limbert (quote in Bill 1986: 300, emphasis in original). The collective effort 
to forget and repress, however, accomplished only the opposite, so that as Cottam 
observed nine years later, Iran remained for the State Department 'a, if not the, 
preeminent negative target of the US' (1990: 285, emphasis in original). 
An Emotionalized Literature 
The hostage crisis, like other moments of intensive international adjustment, has been the 
subject of a plethora of analysis. The confusion that surrounded the events, motives and 
responses (official and personal) spawned accounts by scholars and commentators such 
as Bakhash 1985, Heikal 198 1, Hiro 1985, and most recently Bowden 2006, members of 
the media including loannides 1984, Rouleau 1980; Salinger 1981 and a special 
publication by TheNeit, York Times edited by McFadden, Treaster and Carroll (198 1); 
US government actors such as Jordan 1982 and Powell 1984: and Iranian actors such as 
Bani-Sadr 1982; Hojat-oleslam Bahonar (interviex\ed at length in loannides 1985). and 
SFIL spokes\\oman Ebtekar 2000. Many of these are primary sources intended to 
rationalize their o\\n actions as well as contribute to the semi-official record. 
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Assistant Secretary of State Warren Christopher's volume edited ýý ith Paul 
Kreisberg (1985), containing contributions by Saunders, Sick, and Ribicoff among other 
Washington insiders, sets out to fix the hegemony of the US discourse on various sticky 
issues that arose during and after the crisis, including why were there such 'a number of 
embassy documents that ultimately fell into Iranian hands', and *Why did výe let the Shah 
comeT (Saunders 1985: 85). 
With rare exceptions, the assumptions prevailing across the majority of the 
literature on American policy positioning adopts the received wisdom that the legacy of 
relations with the Shah had little bearing on the choices faced by the US in the new 
revolutionary Islamic setting and that it was Islam's radical recidivism that %ýas the root 
of the crisis (Brzezinski 1983; Carter 1982. Christopher 1985-, Hiro 1985: Pollack 2004: 
Rubin 1981; Sick 1985b; Taheri 1988; Vance 1983, Zabih 1982). Unexamined in these 
accounts. ) are the facts as presented. These include condemning Iran as having acted 
without legitimate claims against the US (Schachter 1985: 325-373): that the taking of 
hostages was only tenuously linked to the Shah's arrival in the US (Saunders 1985: 59), 
and the 'kidnapping' of embassy personnel was a criminal 'terrorist' act of such 
egregious proportions that any culpability of the United States was rendered irrelevant. a 
discourse represented as having been shared by the world community (Sick 1985b: 168, 
Turner 1991 ). This literature reflects normalized perceptions of danger that promoted 
comparisons between restrained, democratic and civilized American behaviour. and the 
'irrational', violent and terrorist character of a people 'shackled by religion" and 
incapable of democratic aspirations (Dorman and Farhang 1987: 180). 
The passionate language in these accounts suggests a seeming imperviousness to 
understanding the reasons for or historical motivations of Iranian actions or their Islamic 
underpinnings, and adopts stereotypes and heuristics for the US and 'the other' that 
reprise configurations used in previous moments of crisis and articulations of danger 
(Campbell 1998: 157; Doty 1986: 82-86; Scott 2000). Scott, for examples, observes that 
the experience of the hostage crisis played out in a recreation of the captlvitý narrative 
(the plight of the Puritans at the hands of the American Indians) ýOich historicall", 
situates Arnerican collective memory of personalized threat in an emotional pairing ýýith 
the idealism of pursuing its unique historical mission (p. 177). This mood, taken up in 
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myriad subsequent articles and books on Iran, from Pipes (1983). to Little (200)) and 
Bernard Lewis' What Went Wrong? (2002), describes the American self grappling ýý Ith 
the angst of anticipating and defining an Islamic threat that is growing outside any US 
contribution save for the latter's propensity to be too benevolent towards Middle Eastern 
backwardness. 
Perhaps the most unexpected, within a literature otherwise notable for its 
consistency, is Boyle's (1985) legal analysis (for less elaborate, but similar arguments. 
see R. Falk 1980; Wallis 1980). Referring to international legal norms, regimes and 
conventions, he offers an alternative interpretation of the hostage seizure as being 
consistent with the international rule of pre-emptive self-defense. He reproaches the US 
decision-making elite for its hostile reception toward complaints made by the Iranians 
prior to and after the hostage taking, and condemns Washington for acting irrational]y in 
a situation that proved not only disastrous for American national interests, but which he 
states revealed a 'self-induced delusion' that 'doomed any prospects for a negotiated 
settlement of the crisis from the start' (p. 193). 
Likewise, standing in contrast to the bulk of the political analyses, are the media 
analyses, which largely describe the reporting of the crisis as a-historicist. biased. 
narrowly focused, agenda-based, and politically driven (Adams 1981 : Altheide 198 1, 
Dorman and Farhang 1987; Larson 1988; Mowlana 1984.1995. Vilanilam 1987). This 
starkly contrary perspective, added to by Said's Covering Islam (1997). suggests the 
hostage story was packaged as a fundamental quarrel between Islam and the Judeo- 
Christian West, a drama that was backed by little expository coverage of Islam or of 
()oings on beyond the embassy perimeter. This category of analysis provides insight on 
the emotionalized menu of political information being transmitted to the public, and the 
rise in domestic commitment to a dynamic American patriotism and Christian moralltv to 
combat the evils of Iran and Islam. Without this popular component, the conditions of 
possibility for political passion to so thoroughly permeate elite decision-making, Nýould 
have been lessened. 
A number of analyses use the hostage crisis and the rescue mission as case studies 
to illustrate aspects of theoretical modeling (Ganji -1006, Houghton -1001, 
Hollis and 
Smith 1986. Hurd 22005, McDermott 1998. Nfirsepassi 2000. Scott 2000. Smith 1984-5). 
Chapter 5 Page 134 
Houghton's adept utilization of the rescue mission to illustrate analogical reasoning in 
decision-making, establishes that policy-makers drew on precedent ýOile ignoring keý 
facts that distinguished this hostage crisis from previous ones. His study reý, eals ho\ý 
passion over rationality ultimately informed the political decisions that were made. 
Avoiding the pitfalls of reflecting "accepted' American event framing. even \\hen 
using a selection of primary materials, is not a given in these studies hoýýever. 
McDermott, using the same case study, explores prospect theory to explain decision- 
making motivations. However, her inability to comprehend the normative resistances in 
which the truths established by the US discourse made certain constructions thinkable 
and actionable, corrupts her analysis of this particular case. By accepting 
unquestioningly the dominant construction of meanings and practices, McDermott buys 
into the passionate contingency of US innocence, and thus fails to accurately assess the 
domain of losses, and the nature of the risk that Carter was willing to take. In effect, 
McDermott, rather than ensuring she was 'no longer a consumer but a producer of the 
text', as Barthes so neatly describes it, became a captive to the discourse, providing an 
interesting example by default of how motivated bias plays a key role in risk-taking and 
decision-making (1974: quote on 5). 
Linking diverse perspectives on Iranian practice is a generally shared position that 
the hostage crisis was paralleled internally by a 'Second Revolution". in which the clergy 
centralized power while simultaneously crushing the presence of the United States, and 
the threat it represented (Bakhash 1985, Daniel 2001; Ehteshami 1995). Unfortunately, 
there is little theory offered on how different identity groups contributed to the play of 
power between those 'in' and those 'out', save for several analyses of the Mojaheddin 
(Irfani 1983, Pedde 2005). By contrast, analyses of Iran's intentions for revolutionary 
export (Abrahamian 1993; Adib- Moghaddam 2005, Cole and Keddie 1986: 
Hallidaý 
1986, Mirsepassi 2000, Ramazani 1986) reveal an effort to discover a paradigm for 
understanding the severity of this third world reaction to the imposition of 
Westernization 
and its normative interpretation of progress. 
This chapter builds on several of these ýNorks to propose that the 
hostage crisis. in 
\\hich \\as paralleled the centralization of control bý the Khomeini camp. constituted a 
critical juncture in \Oich American identity security became so threatened that all other 
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interests in relation to Iran had to be sacrificed. In so doing, the en(-Julfin-(-)r relationship of 
political love shifted into an isolating politics of strife. The complete rejection of the 
-other' by each party established the conditions of possibility for the United States to 
adapt its ideological language of democracy in terms of ethnocentric superiority. 
inculcating emotionalized practices and meanings that made acceptable the idea that 
4another people do not have the capacity for 'civilized' or modern political 
accomplishment' (Dorman and Farhang 1987: 180, emphasis in original). 
The Hostage Discourse, the Media and Political Passion 
To understand how the hostage crisis contributed to the writing of American identity. it is 
worth re-iterating the premise of the enquiry: whatever the reality, it is how the c',, 'ent ý\ as 
perceived, presented and represented that provides insight on why it was understood to 
be the identity danger it was, and how responses to it emerged. This is not to claim that 
there was not a diversity of views expressed in regard to the crisis, nor that the embassy 
seizure was not an event of import. It is to claim that the threat of the hostage taking, and 
its implications for the perceived danger of political Islam, cannot be purely explained 
'by reference to the objective threat said to reside' in Iran (Campbell 1998: 157). In fact, 
the legerdemain with which many facts of the hostage taking were interpreted reflects the 
particular manner in which emotions were channeled into mediating the threat and 
normalizing its narrative. 'Common sense simply withdrew when 'Islam' ýNas discussed. ' 
Said observes, and he could well have said the same thing of Iran (1987: 85). 
Of particular importance to the process of image-creation and response for each 
state, was the mediation of a large portion of the exchange between the two countries bý 
television. Larson argues that 'The hostage seizure on Nov. 4,1979 thrust US teleý sion 
into uncharted territory by greatly expanding its role as participant and potential catalý st 
in the foreign policy process' (1987: 123). In fact, television's expanded post-Vietnam 
capacity to transmit imagery in real-time. put perpetual strain on both governments to 
control the manner in xNhich the story was presented. As the goals and purpose of 
tele,. ision reporters (and companies) differed from those of goN ernment. the construction 
of the storN as they presented it - theatric, domestically grounded. and rigidly time-tabled 
- served to influence the images and emotions evoked, the 
key texts exchanged. the 
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dangers perceived by the public, and the dramatic mantra that it perpetuated in mediatin-ia 
the painful social bonding that linked them in a relationship of televised and rhetorical 
violence for over a year (Altheide 198 1: Larson 1986; Serfaty. 1990)-. 
Media as both the messenger and the message constructed the stor,, as one of 
heroes and villains, bringing into every household a configuration of American identitý in 
which US victimization and the articulation of danger was personified in the faces of the 
hostage takers, the blindfolded hostages themselves, and the ranting of Khomeini and his 
demonstrating supporters outside the US embassy. As Saunders relates. 'Nowhere ýN as 
the gulf between the Iranian and American worlds more angrily felt than in the American 
living room, with fanatical Iranian faces daily screaming hatred from TV screens. 
Immediately Americans were torn between two feelings-the normal humane concern for 
the hostages, and a natural desire to "show these people they can't do this to the United 
States. "' ( 1985: 47) Thus, shame, anger, frustration and fear were constructed and 
reconstructed on a daily basis (and nightly with Walter Cronkite's famous count-down on 
CBS) in a mediated humiliation the likes of which no country had ever experienced so 
publicly. 
The perceived egregiousness of the move welded for a brief moment the pro-Shah 
and pragmatist discourses together, and despite differences in how this should play out in 
policy, formed a bedrock of common perceptions concerning the identity security of the 
US. 'The Carter administration never recognized the validity of the Iranian position to 
any extent' explains Boyle. 'Instead, it engaged in manipulation of domestic and 
international opinion to show that the US was completely in the right, and Iran 
completely in the wrong' (1985: 191). In Pollack's analysis, which exemplifies both 
early and later official commentary (Houghton 2001: 53; cf. Zabih 1982: 44). the 
Khomeini regime would have found a reason to take such action regardless of any 
,, \merican move linked to the Shah, and thus had no right to 
have its grievances aired. His 
lew is that its actual motivations were to avenge the coup of 1953. centralize poýýer and 
(yet the attention of the American people, 'a key motive of the students' (Pollack 
2004: 55-165. quote 160; cf Christopher 1985). 
British media N%as equally influential and likewise emotionalised, and although The Times ý%as on st n ke 
for a good portion of the hostaize crisis, The Telegi-aph, BBC Radio, and The Financial Times %%ere critical 
to establishing similar % le,. %s not onlý in London, but in contributing to the US media outlook from Tehran. 
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The sensitivity of the United States media and administration to Iran's act of 
hostage-taking was considerably greater than in previous incidents of similar kind, such 
as the Pueblo Affair during the Johnson administration, or the Ward incident in 19495 
(Houghton 2001: 92-8). 1 argue that the reason this case differed so substantial 1ý from the 
others, and became such an emotionalized trauma for the US. was that the real subject of 
the discourse was the relationship of political passion between the US and an Iran that 
had ousted its Shah and rejected American ideals (Zonis 1996). It was not, as in previous 
cases, one in which a resolution could be reached based on the exercise of diplomatic 
options between states with sparse formal relations. At play in every negotiation between 
the two was, on the one hand, the unrequited anger of Iran that the human rights 
violations it had endured under the Shah were never acknowledged, and on the other. the 
unspoken but strongly felt hurt and subjugated shame with which the US viewed its status 
as spurned parent and its role as regional security provider. Both likewise suffered from 
the profound disrespect with which they felt treated by the other. 
This is not to say that important voices were not being raised in Iran that accepted 
the Shah's actions were not all US directed, or in the US, that accepted the Shah %ý as 
much worse a dictator than had been previously acknowledged (Weisman 1985). As 
Wallis complained, 'The Carter administration has repeatedly said that now is not the 
time to discuss the demerits of the Shah's regime. Yet now is preclseýl, the time to talk 
about the Shah's crimes against the people of Iran, and American complicity in them' 
1980: 153). But, these were not voices that carried veight among the policy-makers in 
either Washington or Tehran. 
Instead, the US Administration was concerned with damage control. The tý 
responses chosen suggest the motivations of the love-sick: a rapid rewriting of the fallout 
to create guilt only on the part of the 'other'; mobilization to bring allies on-side; 
exaggerated and intense rhetoric to rally public focus on present and personal sutTering 
5 In the Pueblo affair, 86 US hostages were seized from an -\rnerican spý ship hý \orth Korea in 1967and 
held for II months b,, the goverriment. In the Ward incident, Mr. Angus ýk ard. L'S Consul in Mukden. 
Manchuria, NNas taken hostage, along with his %% ife and entire staff in 1949, on charges of conducting 
espionage actl\ itles. they were held bý government authorities for almost exactlý a ýear during a political 
upheaval in some \Na\s similar to the Iranian revolution., see also CNrus Vance ( 1983) Har(i Choices 
i-Ifical vetim in, 4inet-l'c-a's. foreignpolic. i- (Ne\\ York: Simon and Schuster), pp 408-9. 
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while denying the importance of past state practices: and engagement ýý ith Iran that 
projected American superiority and power. 
Crisis and Passion 
In her analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Weldes notes that crises are instrumental i zed 
by goverriment decision-makers who are authorized to recognize and respond to 
emergencies in appropriate ways (Weldes 1999: 6 fn. 7). JA] crisis is a creation of 
language used to depict it ... a political act, not a recognition of a fact or of a rare 
situation' (Edelman 1988: 3 1). As with the lead-up to the revolution, the US management 
of the hostage situation was understood through two competing, often hostile discourses 
(the pragmatist and pro-Shah), yet both viewed the seizure in similar terms: as a crisis. a 
barbaric kidnapping, and a humiliation. In the rhetoric that both developed, victimization 
and innocence came to constitute primary signifiers of passion. The meanings drew from 
constructions of strength and leadership around which American identity had previously 
been produced, while incorporating an emotionalized discourse of self in response to 
perceived norm endangerment (Doty 1996: 30, Scott 2001, Weldes 1999: 42). 
Victimization and innocence did not imply vulnerability and naivet6. Rather, they 
enframed the mythology of America as heroic, privileging tough morality, the maturit", of 
patience, the willingness to suffer for its principles. This was the side of the American 
self encrypted in the captivity narrative played out first in the Puritan period, in ýýhich the 
promotion of American idealism required at times the forbearance of pain (Scott 2001). 
In so representing itself, the US cloaked itself in the persona of the civilized nation - 
injured by uncivilized practices - and willing to bejudged and redeemed by 
its cl,.,, ilized 
peers in the court of international law ('Exit Bazargan, JHT, 7/11/1979). 
This signification, solidly located in Carter's human rights discourse and 
promoted by the pragmatists, interpreted the honour of the US to be vested in negotiation 
t'or the sake of preserving the lives of the hostages. and therebN combined strength and 
restraint as moral imperatives (Dumbrell 1993: 171). 'We must continue to exhibit such 
constraint despite the intensity of our emotions. ' Carter stated in his \Vhite 
House 
announcement on November 12. acknoNN ledging from the outset that this was a crisis that 
\wuld be a plaý of emotions against principles. 'The liNes of our people in 
Iran are at 
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stake.... Our response will measure our character and our courage" (Vew York Times. 
-Transcript of Carter's Statement' 13/11/1979). However, this discourse carried certain 
risks, most obviously, that the White House would be seen as ýýeak, indecisive. and 
insufficiently muscular to command the respect that the US deserved. 
The alternative, 'tough conservative' discourse, interpreted strength and 
credibility as resting on the presumption that the US would never shirk from exercising 
its will, and that it was against just this type of threat that America, in fighting for libert,, 
and freedom for all, had to make a show of force. 'Restraint need not be paralý, sis' 
William Safire warned in the International Herald Tribune a few days after the hostage- 
taking. 'The job of creative diplomacy is neither to admire our own restraint nor to get 
ready to thump our chests; instead, we should be planning to react to this act of ýýar...., 
('Re-Stabilizing Iran', IHT, 16/11/1979). The 'tough conservative' viex\,, an outgromh of 
the pro-Shah discourse, saw waiting for negotiations to work as a humiliation, 'an 
institutional denial of nerve' (ibid). This led to a rising clamour for the use of force and, 
as Safire wrote, for 'a soldier who has the judgment to tell the President that the national 
honor (sic) cannot always be defended without casualties' ('The Calling Card' IHT 
15/4/1980). The proposition that the hostage taking was an act of war or a crime ýý-as of 
importance within this discourse, as both required strong measures of retaliation and 
containment. 
Until the rescue mission, victimization and innocence were representations 
(signifieds) shared by both discourses. The division between the pragmatists and the 
tough conservatives came to a head over the choice to adopt a change in tactics from 
negotiation to the use of military means to engineer a rescue. The decision to go ahead 
prompted Vance's resignation, and in effect, sealed the fate of Carter's bid for re- 
election. Despite the failure of that mission, the perception that Carter had betrayed his 
very public commitment to use only peaceful means for the sake of preserving tile 
hostages lives, eroded the public trust he'd heretofore enjoyed. and contributed to the 
hegemony of the tough conservative discourse. xN hich \N as perceived as more consistent. 
and better positioned to protect American credibility (Dumbrell 1993: 171. Sick 
1985: 171 ). This included a national swing to the political right. and support for the use of 
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force, both of which reflected the exasperation and impatience of the public and policy 
makers alike with the emotional guardedness that had come with the exercise of restraint. 
Victimization 
Although retaliation by the Iranian 'mob' had been expected upon the Shah's admission, 
when none came for almost a week, there was growing relief in Washington that there 
might not, after all, be a price to pay, corroborating projections that the plan would not 
endanger the US and instead, would turn out a success. In the face of the apparent calm. 
the administration even gave the go-ahead to Charg6 d'Affaires Bruce Laingen to hold a 
Halloween party on November 3 at the embassy, as long as the music was kept low and 
the curtains drawn. 6 
When news reached Washington on November 4 that hostages had been seized, 
the administration moved rapidly to establish information dominance. Carter and other 
members of the government repeatedly stated that the Bazargan government had given 
assurances that it would protect the embassy, an assurance the US had demanded for the 
very reason that take-overs had over the past year been frequent, and. as Carter said in a 
news conference on November 28, 'No embassy on Earth is a fortress that can ýk ithstand 
constant attacks by a mob unless a host government comes to the rescue of the people 
within the Embassy' (in Alexander and Nanes 1980: 483). This mobilization of US public 
sentiment was largely successful, as was the way the government presented the diplomats 
as being just ordinary American civilians that had done nothing to deserve such treatment 
(McAlistair 2005: 206,209). From the beginning, therefore, the US appropriated the 
hostage story as a drama that started not with the acceptance of the Shah into the US, and 
therefore, linked to American action, but with an un-provoked and spontaneous act of 
fanatical Muslim militants in a pattern of mob violence (Boyle 1985: Jordan 1982: 38: 
Taheri 1988; among others). Whatever hint of surprise there might have been ýý as 
incorporated into a larger story of America as the object of an ongoing, incomprehensible 
and undeserved Iranian rage (Hurd 2005). This innocence of responsibility was not just a 
cold calculation but the articulation by the leadership of the emotional experience of 
national trauma (Fierke 2004: 484). Carter's Nvords gave public meaning to emotions 
Author intervioý %% ith Bruce Laingen, Noý. 2.1979. 
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bome of a situation that appeared unimaginable, enabling him to mobilize and V-i% e them 
agency. This immediately established the hostages in a news storyboard that reflected a 
national identification with their plight, divesting them of their individual character and 
reinvesting them as American symbols, and thus, symbolically of America itself e 
pluribus unum (McAlister 2005: 207; Weisman 1981: 230). 
Passionately constructed, American victimization was experienced in three 
different guises: first, as being at the hands of an incompetent clerical leadership ýý ith 
which it had to negotiate for the hostages' release; second in terms of the hostages oýý n 
experience; and third, domestically as a nation besieged by 'an enemy within' - the 
Iranian immigrant community who were represented as supporting Khomeini and 
infusing American society with danger. 
Ignored in the construction of victimization were the hostages' own warnings 
prior to the crisis that American policy had been ill-conceived and humiliating and that 
consequences would ensue. As ex-hostage Barry Rosen explained his view of the ý, k'aý, 
Washington shamed Iran: 
'Having failed so often to recognize the power of symbols to the Iranians - and 
the significance in particular of the Shah as the symbol of evil - to do so again 
would announce that we understood nothing about the revolution. Those who 
bruited the possibility probably didn't understand that admission would be a 
seemingly calculated insult to almost an entire nation. ' (1982: 101-2) 
The Clerical Leadership The initial description of the embassy takeover as a sit-in (that 
turned into a siege), worked to showcase the US as having survived honourably such 
violations in the past through adequate site protection and by working with the Iranian 
oovernment to obtain resolution (Pollack 2004). The sit-in image stuck for several weeks 
(and in fact, was the title of the New York Times _Vlagazine article that appeared 
three 
months after the hostages were released (Kifner: 17/5/1981: 54-73). As a result. a 
lingering ambiguity continued in official and unofficial analyses as to whether the 
takeover had been pre-planned, the inconclusiveness within the discussion enabling the 
issue of whether US policies had contributed to it to remain blurred through actoe 
forgetting (see McDermott 1998: 46, reports at the time that suggested otherwise include 
, %lather, 'Holy War against the 
Great Satan'. The Observer. 11/11/1979: loannides 1984). 
This ensured that the LIS position as victim \\ould become part of the historical record as 
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institutional memory-and that emergence from the hostage nightmare could be framed 
as redemption. (Laffey and Weldes 2004: 355: Scott 2001: 182) 
Although specific demands were broadcast over Tehran radio výithin the first hour 
of the embassy compound being seized, a theme that runs through most of the memoirs. 
including Carter's, Brzezinski's and Vance's, was that there was no agenda, and that the 
event would resolve itself within the day, or a few days at most (Carter 1982: 458, 
McManus 1981: 18). 'It was not at all clear what the militants wanted' Carter states in 
Keeping Faith (p. 457). 'My impression was that originally they had not intended to hold 
the Americans captive beyond a few hours' (p. 458). This statement seems extraordinar\ 
in light of the students' having issued 'Communiqu6 Number I' through a loudspeaker 
strung from the embassy gates, in which they stated they were responding to Khomeini's 
'heavenly anger' against the United States, and 'The American diplomats are hostage and 
will be released only if the criminal and deposed Shah is extradited' to Iran to face 
punishment (quotes in Mather, The Observer, I I/ I 1/ 1979; and in loannides 1984: 127). 
This message was relayed from Tehran Radio several times that first day, and monitored 
by US intelligence in Turkey and Cyprus. Additionally, the Revolutionary Council 
confirmed its support that same day (also broadcast by radio), in which it too stated the 
hostages' release would be secured only if the Shah 'was handed over to the 
Revolutionary Court' (quote in loannides 1984: 128). 
The lack of comprehension, verging on deafness, on the part of US decision- 
makers stemmed from two emotionalized effects. First, the immediate danger and sense 
ofdeja vu galvanized those officially responsible into a state of hyper-excitability. itself a 
disrupter of equilibrium and contributor to increased feelings of threat (Houghton 2001: 
McDermott 2004: 173). This activated existing strategies of response, such as demanding 
that the moderate sitting government obtain immediate resolution. The Carter 
administration's various public statements that pointed to the Bazargan government as 
Washington's partner, was however, a posture that was itself confused and 
sentimentalized (Carter 1982: 457-8). The disregard Washington 
had shown that same 
government by refusing to consult with it on the Shah's admittance 
into the US or to 
recognize Yazdi's and Bazargan's repeated warnings that they could not promise 
full 
security because their own po\\er \\as constrained. reflected a 
lack of understand i n, -, - 
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perhaps more accurately. a 'remarkable absence' of interest-concerning hoýý Iranians 
would receive the imperiousness with which Washington delivered the neý\ s to accept the 
Shah (Boyle 1986). This 'absence of interest' extended to the timing of the Shah's 
admission, which coincided with the holiest Shia ritual of Moharram, the mourning of the 
fourth Shia Imam Hossein's martyrdom, a fact ignored by the Cabinet (Fischer 1981 ). but 
which had seriously compromised Bazargan's position. Washington \\as likeý\ 1se 
oblivious to the fact it occurred on the same date as the anniversary of Bloody Frldaý. 
which drew large crowds to commemorate the death of dozens of students at the hands of 
the Shah's army the year before. Carter simply described Khomeini's speech on that day. 
which called on seminary students to take action against the partnership of the Shah and 
the US, as 'unhelpful' ('News conference on Iran' 28/11/1979 in Alexander and Nanes 
1980: 483). In this way, presumptive superiority was projected in discourses surrounding 
American discretionary power in opposition to the inferiority of Islamic practices. 
In fact, the pro-Shah discourse that rejected contact with Khomeini, contributed to 
the tenaciousness with which the political clout of the radical religious ýking ýýas ignored 
at this critical juncture, suggesting the narcissistic phenomenon in which , intemal 
representations of the outside world are fractionated into partial representations as a 
reaction either to tenuous or threatening experiences with external objects' (Johnson 
1977: 13 1 ). Splitting the 'other' into partial representations enabled the administration to 
figure America as victimized by the clergy, while remaining engaged ýk, ith Bazargan. 
Second, when the situation did not resolve itself in the first few hours, or days, 
and the Bazargan government unexpectedly fell, the sense of threat rose. The 
'unprecedented' support offered the 'kidnappers' by Khomeini and the Revolutionary 
Council. led Washington to perceive it was being victimized by a state of 'crazy people' 
(Carter, quote in Jordan 1982: 39) and that w, hen Bazargan fell, Iran ýýas percel,. ed as 
rudderless. As a White House Briefing made clear: 'The most difficult part of the Iranian 
question is that there's (sic) no goverriment entity ý, ý ith whom ", \ e can communicate or 
negotiate or register a complaint or a request' ('"'hite House Briefing for Members of 
Coneress', in 2\1exander and Nanes 1980: 495). This reflected an emotionalized heuristic 
that framed able political leadership in laic terms. and \\hich therefore contributed to the 
widely held suspicion that Khomeini. despite having dominated the re\oiution. not to 
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mention the other clerical figures composing the Revolutionary Council. ýýas incapable of 
representing a viable govemment entity, and incompetent to deal k', 'ith the complex 
negotiations demanded by the crisis at hand (Taheri 1988: 115). The formal import of 
religion into the public sphere, which occurred with Bazargan's resignation, 
problematized the nature of democratic power in that it showed up the contingency of the 
laic presumption within the American settlement (Hurd 2005: 19). The claims of the 
students and their clerical supporters to be representatives of the people, and acting for 
the public good, constructed the state and its purpose in a way that threýý into question 
the sustainability of the secular impress on governance. The actions of the SFIL. and its 
official support, undeniably represented Iranian popular will, even though it %ýas 
shocking to US sensibilities. As 'Mary' described it: 
'The response was overwhelming. Day after day, the people poured through the 
streets in waves. The students made a habit of coming down to the main gate to 
greet them and spend some time talking to them, completely astounded at ýOat 
they had released' (Ebtekar 2001: 75) 
Rendering previously stable understandings of the political uncomfortably 
perplexing, this activated anxiety and disbelief in Washington. 'How could ýýe deal with 
people like thisT asked Saunders (1985: 47). Yet not until Bazargan resigned did the US 
administration have to face the fact that the only ones left to negotiate with were the 
clerics (Ibid: 32), and that the promises of protection, however weak. had been made hy a 
government now out of power. This elicited panic. As Jordan stated, 'We had no embassy 
left, and now there was no government. Who in the hell are we going to deal ivith? jibid: 
25, emphasis in original). 
Victimization was seen, therefore, as being exacerbated by the loss of anyone to 
communicate with in clerically dominated Iran, which situated the crisis in an opposition 
between the disorder and vengeance of the Iranian nation and the ordered and reasoned 
conduct of the US. This enabled assistant secretary of state Warren Christopher to state: 
'The hostage crisis, in short was not in Iranian eyes an episode in Iran, s international 
relations' (Christopher 1985: 6). By insisting that the US ý\ as the object and not the 
instigator of the grievance, shame . \, -as bý passed and silenced, not onlý 
by ignoring the 
other's plaints but in policy choices that served to aggravate the standoff. 
At this stage. 
emotional stress. according to Scheff and Retzinger, typically leads to a 
loss of moral 
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direction, and the urgent need to act and show power (1991: 29). CIA Director Stansfield 
Turner's wording is instructive: 
,I... felt this instance of hostage taking was so heinous that it had to be solýed 
before we could discuss Iran's perceived grievances. Because \ýe ýýere both the 
aggrieved party and a very powerful nation, we assumed we could find a ýýa,, to 
apply the necessary amount of pressure to the Iranians. 'We did not %ýant to ýý,, alt 
for them to come to their senses; we wanted to act. ' (1991: 59. emphasis mine). 
Tumer's insistence that the US was 'the' aggrieved party. while in the same sentence 
allowing that Iran wished to discuss its 'perceived' grievances. suggests impaired 
information processing through denial of the other's right to have a point of, ýIe\ý. Scheff 
and Retzinger observe: 'Although behaviour is fluent, it [is] slightly off-key. ... A[though 
behaviour caused by bypassed shame is goal -oriented... it is obsessive and compulsk, 'e, 
(p. 29). Indeed, Turner speaks of the compulsion to act. because the Iranians, in his view. 
were out of their senses. Earlier in his recollections, he admits that 'the team was not 
working well together', suggesting considerable cognitive constraints: -At our SCC 
meetings the discussion often could not stay on track... Stress accounted for some of this, 
but overactive egos played a bigger part than they should have' (ibid). 
This emotionalized context of hyper-excitability at the hostage seizure on the one 
hand and panic in the face of a rudderless government on the other accounted for the 
Administration's failure to recognize the SFIL's demands. This was compounded by the 
fact that in the discursive economy of US identity, the image of the Shah as 'criminal' 
had already been dismissed within the play of political love. What is more, to return the 
Shah was understood as condemning him to the same treatment his ministers had 
received in Iran's revolutionary tribunals, which Congress had already derided as being 
,, how trials and contrary to all 
human rights practices. Fear and an er impaired cognition, 
reducing the creative ability to find alternative solutions, ýOich meant that 
from the 
beoinning, there was no dialogic interaction, no recognition of meaning in the 
Ianguage 
used by the other, and therefore, no basis for negotiation (Bo,,, le 1986). 
Says 1, VIcDermott, 
'the more threatened people feel. the more likely their polic\ choices \-V-ill intensit'V the 
conflict' (2004: 17' )-4). Thus. as in a rhetorical duel, State Department 
Spokesman 
Hodding Carter rebutted Khomeini's accusations against the Shah. b\ accusing 
him of 
incitement: 
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'The flagrant and conscientious lies of the Ayatollah Khomeini contribute to 
creating an atmosphere in which such incidents become possible. ' (M. Tatu. 
L'imam Khomeiniy, ennemi num6ro un', le Monde. 2' 11/1979. 
trans. Interriational News Service). 
Jody Powell, White House spokesperson, likewise went on the offensive: 
'These scandalous allegations are totally false and, without a doubt. were made in 
full realization that they were so' (lbid). 
In turn, Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr stated that 'the hostages liberation depends on the 
United States', warning that 'no Iranian will unilaterally be able to take such a rneasure" 
(quote in J. Randal, 'United Hate' Washington Post, 12/11/1979). This was monologism 
at its most extreme: pain on both sides that required the other's recognition in order to 
achieve relief, and the narcissist's inability to accommodate an 'other' beyond the self. 
Both experienced victimization, though the sense of injustice stemmed as much (if not 
more) from the other's intractability in acknowledging the pain at the source. as from the 
actual hostage taking, which in effect, was symptomatic of the humiliation. It is revealing 
that Bani-Sadr, later in that long year, described Iran 'as having become hostage to 
America', suggesting that acknowledgement instead of denial on either part, could have 
lifted what had become an albatross around both countries' necks (1982: 146) 
For the US, forced to deal with religious leaders ýNho operated on a 
normative/emotionalized basis outside of American understanding or power, the hostage 
crisis represented a destabilizing rupture, but also an opportunity for re-inscribing US 
identity. The sense of superiority laced with frustration is palpable in State Department 
spokesman Hodding Carter's famous outburst: 'How could a little country of. "Juslims 
and people who ran around in robes and looked funny ... 
do all this to us and %\ee couldn't 
do anything about it? ' (quote in Dumbrell 1993: 169). But Adorno captures in theoretical 
terms the process in which the self-doubt and pain expressed by Carter regarding the 
whole country's suffering. translated into institutionalized amnesia through the 
domestication of the images and symbols of victimization. so that restoration and 
redemption could occur. and identitý be maintained: 
'From the vie\\point of social psycholo(-, y, ' he \\rites. *it \\ould also be expected 
that this damaged group-narcissism is lying in N\ait to be repaired and grasps at 
ever\thing in consciousness that might immediately bring the past into harmon\ 
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with narcissistic wishes-but then, it also, if possible. remolds realit', - as if this 
injury could be made not to have happened (in Hartmann 1987: 12121). 
The hostages The symbolism of the 'the US as hostage* played ýýell as a media and 
campaign emblem. This enabled the president to adopt a *Presidential' image in the face 
of the inhumane actions of the Iranian horde, and to focus on each and every hostage life. 
, Thus, the discursive acts of dimming the White House Christmas Tree lights. of the 
President visiting the hostage families, of praying with them publicly in the National 
Cathedral, and of Americans across the nation wearing yellow armbands, constructed L'S 
identity as one of controlled strength, and were productive of an image of undeserved 
suffering (McAlister 2005: 209; Smith 1981: 197). 
Represented as regular citizens doing their job, the diplomats became the s-vmbols 
of victimized American courage. American embassy actions in Iran were represented as a 
source of pride, having been conducted consistently and without blemish, that is, through 
internationally accepted practices of diplomacy that were good (and certainly. good 
intentioned) despite and within the atmosphere of violence and upheaval. 
The hostages' captivity was from the outset a political issue put to the service of 
US honour. Having been seized, they would not be traded easily, as their pain would not 
be squandered on easy gains for their captors. Their release would have to be, for them 
and their families-as symbols of America-a moment of pride. As Christopher later 
explained: 
*The objective of President Carter and his advisers was to cause the leaders of 
Iran's revolution to decide that releasing the hostages was in their interest, but to 
do it in a way Americans would see as honourable' (1985: 47). 
Here the US reveals a view of itself as still positioned to manage the crisis on its terms, 
\\, hile remaining stalwart and patient until that time arrived. The Iranians are 
depicted as 
not really knowing what their interests are, and needing the guidance and 
discipline of the 
parent to discover them. The x,, 'ord *cause' carries an ominous overtone, suggesting that 
disciplining this delinquent child could be required as a step in the prosecution of 
America's mission (Doov, 1996: 90). Victimization. therefore. packs into 
it the concept of 
the powerful being patient (as opposed to helpless). and the parent's vollingness 
to 
accommodate and Quide inheres in it the meaning of limit. and the necessity 
for 
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surveillance. That limit is reflected in the part of the phrase referring to honour. implying 
that any act that negatively affected American honour would not be in Iran's interest. At 
the same time, Christopher's statement makes clear that the hostages' freedom is 
contingent on how policy-makers determined what was honourable, the hostages 
themselves being but pawns in the larger game of American credibility. 
Carter, after visiting with the hostage families five da-ys after the seizure. imputed 
to them the nobility of victimization: 'They don't expect miracles and ýýant their loved 
ones home, but they want them to come home only on honorable terms' (quote in Jordan 
1986: 54, emphasis mine). Could this be true? Or was this the passionate politics of the 
President, but not the families? Equally telling was Brzezinski's refusal to meet the 
hostage families so as to be free of emotional linkages 'should the time come when the 
country's honour is pitted against the safety of the hostages' (ibid). 
Alternative views on honour, though never entertained by the decision-making 
elite, were, however, in circulation. An editorial entitled 'Lost Chance? ' in TheVutlon 
(26/1/1980: 67-68), for example, calls an initiative proposed by Tehran before the UN 
Security vote on sanctions, as having been 'peremptorily dismissed'. Advanced bý the 
Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Mansur Farhang, it called for a UN delegation to 
investigate whether evidence was 'available to justify extradition of the Shah under the 
11 common law" interpretation of international extradition' (p. 67- 68). The editorial 
observes that while 'lip service [is paid] to the ultimate safe return of the hostages, f6ý 
bother to distinguish between that worthy goal and the need to save an iI I-defined 
national honor. ' As the Administration, ' it asked at the end, 'unwilling to risk any 
solution that would allow Iran to salvage its own national honor? ' (ibid). Thus The 
. Vation points to acknowledgement of the other as necessary in finding resolution of ýý hat 
was mutualized shame. Boyle shows equal insight: 'The primary obstacle to a speedý, 
negotiated solution to the crisis proved to be the Carter administration's insistence that 
the "honor" of the United States precluded any American apology to Iran as demanded hý 
the latter. ' But, he adds, 'The "honor" of a superpoý\er is never at stake unti Ia president 
purposely decides to put it at stake, and thus, to risk its loss* ( 1985: 197). 
In these counter discourses. identity is elaborated in a more communitarian 
fashion than that adopted by American decision-makers. NOo. hý contrast. constructed 
Chapter 5 Page 149 
Iran as not deserving such recognition. This stemmed from the ambiguity of the US 
position as narrated by the Iranians, which was designed to shame the US for meddling 
in its intemal affairs and threatening its sovereignty. This in tum necessitated the 
construction of the US captives as innocent victims so as to banish any suspicion that 
they were acting outside their diplomatic mandate. As with earlier captivity mNtholo(-,,,. 
the narrative of victimization reversed the chief protagonists, highlighting the temporal 
issue of the captivity, not the reasons behind it (Scott 2000). When American efforts to 
pass a Security Council Resolution imposing sanctions on Iran were rebuffed by the 
Soviet Union, Ambassador McHenry, indignant and incredulous at not being, recognized 
by those outside Iran as the obvious victims, stated: 
'Written by Lewis Carrol as pages out of Alice in Wonderland. the light becomes 
darkness. The victim becomes the criminal. Commitment to international law 
becomes a defense of anarchy. ' (, Statement to the UN Security Council' 
13/1/1980 in Alexander and Nanes 1980: 50 1). 
Prior to the hostage crisis, Carter's emphasis on human rights as a pillar of his foreign- 
policy had garnered considerable criticism from within the pro-Shah tough conservative 
discourse, which interpreted it as a naYve and dangerous form of pressure on vulnerable 
allies, such as Somoza and the Shah (Dumbrell 1993: 172, Ledeen and Lewis 1981). Its 
articulation as a primary policy goal had turned the social purpose of the US human 
rights mission, which until then had been so naturalized as to need no justification, into a 
site of contestation (Doty 1996: 83). The hostage crisis refixed the signifiers of human 
rights, re-constituting it as something proponents of both discourses could share. The 
characterization of the diplomats as civilians, rather than as military or government 
employees, was a critical element in reconnecting American political identity to the 
citizen-driven image of Carter's human rights agenda. This made it a home-based 
example of the perpetual suffering experienced by individuals and their families in non- 
democratic parts of the globe, and which the US moral commitment to social justice ýý as 
designed to alleviate (Brzezinski 1983: 564). A united front on human rights and its role 
ýýithin American policy therefore served as a common platform by Ný, hich to oppose the 
hostage-takers, and particularly. their discomfiting labeling of the embassy as 'a den of 
Spies' and a 'US corruption centre' (Mather. Observer 4111/1979) 
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The prompt focus by the media and the government on the hostages as 'ordinary 
people' whose work as government agents had no bearing on their rights as human beings 
was an expression of this accomplishment. Their role as state representatives ýý hose 
activities at the time of the seizure could have been against the interests of the host 
government or its people, was discursively disciplined to reduce such ambiguity. The 
administration always denied that there were 'spiesý ( intelligence officers) among the 
captives, even though there were at least two, the documents of their assignment and 
details of their activities being among the records found and published by the SFLI earl', 
on (Boyle 1985: 188-9; Mottahedeh 1980: 19. USED, Tehran, Secret Document 0408072. 
, 4snad). The insistence on the use of 'civilians' to describe the diplomats re-naturalized 
the self-evident social purpose of the US as a power committed to promoting democracy 
and human rights through emissaries who were ordinary 'Joes. Their very ordinariness 
confirmed the goodness and honesty of American values. In this, the public embrace of 
the diplomats as 'just like us' served to emotionally reconfirm the norm of human rights 
promotion as something all Americans could identify with, and, despite whatever the 
Iranians said, could feel was a continuing part of the miracle of Manifest Destin,,,,. 
As several European states viewed it, and many Americans, too, had the Carter 
administration ignored the hostages, their value to the Iranians would have diminished, 
and their release might have occurred earlier (Sick 1985a: 22 1, Weisman 1981: 23 1-2; for 
a contrary view, see Pollack 2004: 165,175 ). 7 Yet the production of the crisis as a private 
odyssey played out on the public stage, in which the President's anger paralleled the 
anger of the families, neighbours, and communities, was understood to be emotionally 
appropriate, and ensured it would remain a factor in all subsequent decision-making on 
the issue. Carter's focus on them as civilians meant that their feelini2s. rather than what 
they had been doing in Tehran, became the highlight of a tragic. highly dramatic, but in 
the end, uplifting morality tale. The horror. outrage and eventually, obsession, on the part 
of the US public, media and administration at being victimized greý\ from the percelýcd 
danger of ordinary American citizens being taken across the boundary from the inside 
(.. \i-nerican territory) to the outside (Iranian territor) ). and thus their torment and their 
7 Th is\ leý% coloured European support for the US in the Securit-, Counc IL affect Ing the wtes In 
favourof 
economic sanctions against Iran. (N. Temko, 'Both Iran, US feel pushed to take tougher stand'. 
Cht-istian 
, ý; cicniv lfonitoi% 29 411980, p. 
1. Maurice Delarue, 'Le Silence des \cuf. LeAfomie, 1711 1979) 
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insecurity were imputed to be all America's. Observed . %eiv York Times columnist Steven 
Weisman, 'Their captivity offered the American people an unaccustomed opportunit\ to 
unite and play the role of aggrieved party in an otherwise ambiguous situation' (198 1: 
230). 
- Fhe media loyally backed the Administration as victimized by a third world 
nation gripped by religious madness, and dedicated for the first six months an average of 
one third of every nightly newscast to the story. Further, *it overwhelmingly presumed 
the self-righteousness of the American position' (Adams and Heyl 1981: 26, quote on 
32), being 'filled with the conviction of being morally superior, and therefore defied aný 
acknowledgement of the *others' view, reason, or morality (quote in Neit, It Orld 
Dictionary ofAmerican Language 1986: definition of 'self-righteousness'). As framed hN 
the media, the story did not lie in Iran, where alternative perspectives on the crisis had 
already been dismissed as illegitimate. As reporters were unable to reach the hostages 
personally, or the majority of the clerical leadership (most of which in any event did not 
speak English), the story focused almost by default on the hostages' families in the [-; S, 
making it immaterial whether the hostages were official functionaries or not. 
Additionally, depicting the families as victims made for rousing drama, infusing the 
public and their leaders with constant reminders of the fear and pain that Iran was 
inflicting on them. 
How US decision-makers denied the troves of embassy documents found and 
made public by the SFIL and which proved so shaming, is revealing for it says 
about the way 'objective facts' were placed in a discourse that drew on emotion to silence 
the damning evidence of American actions and intentions. The denial took place on two 
fronts. First, the government convinced US and Western media that they should ignore 
the documents to protect the hostages lives. The government thus engaged the media in a 
collaborati,., -e effort to fix signifiers of danger on the implications of exposure. Aii\ 
acknowledgement that there were actually intelligence operatives in the group Xýas 
constructed to be morally irresponsible, and a betrayal of the hostage families. As Senator 
Ribicoff stated, 
With respect to indi,. idual hostages and their fate, the State Department %N as 
hiorh1v concerned about publication of any stories that might suggest intelligence 
backgrounds of aný of the hostages. Such information (which Nýas developed 
bý 
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some journalists but might not otherwise have been known to the Iranian captors) 
could have been fatal in the event espionage trials had ever commenced. Hostage 
families were concerned about the release of this kind of information. ( 1985: ) 39 1 
The buy-in by the media was almost universal. In typical blustery form. Safire contended. 
'The CIA - already blamed for non-existent conspiracies - should start conspiring now" 
(-Restabilizing Iran' JHT, 16/11/1979). Yet Ribicoff s dig at thosejournalists who 
refused to be cowed by the government's clampdown, on the false premise that it 
informed the Iranian captors of information they might not other-ýý ise have discovered. is 
specious, in that it was the captors who were providing the evidence, both in the original, 
and in translation. This inability (or refusal) to recognize the hostage-takers as students 
capable of such understanding, suggests significant flaws in information processing 
taking place in Washington, or outright lying to discipline an otherwise pliant press - an 
extreme form of self-shaming (Sick 1985: 354). 
Second, the documents' importance was belittled, their authenticity never 
acknowledged, and their utility cast purely in terms of Iran's political callowness (and 
hence, inferiority). The discourse made light of Iranian fears concer-ning American 
activities in the embassy (Bani-Sadr 1982: 160: Bill 1988: 298). In his Paved With Good 
1nientions, The 4 merican Experience and Iran, vv h ich appeared on Iy xN ee ks after the 
hostages were released, Rubin adopts the sardonic tone of the superior parent who sees 
through the infantile simplicity of Khomeini's, and the students', designs. 
'The only explanation that Khomeini could accept was that CIA agents and 
people trained by them were working to create chaos, prevent employees from 
working, ruin harvests and sabotage factories. ... 
When his student supporters took 
over the American embassy on November 4, the first thing they did was to look 
for proof of these accusations. What they found was generally unimpressive: 
documents showing that the embassy had, for example, ýýritten reports on the 
situation in Kurdistan, in the army, and in various government ministries. 
Despite 
the lack of evidence, however, most Iranians firmly believed all these 
accusations'. (1982: 293) 
B\ making Khomeini's fears sound slightly ridiculous. Rubin deflects the question as to 
\01at the *CIA agents and those trained by them' \\ere actuall,, expected to 
be doing in 
Iran - avoiding and denying any shame at I'S 
behaviour. The imagery comes from Cold 
War So\ iet-style narratrves-*ruin harvests'. 'sabotage factories' - symbolic markers that 
hearken to a continuing emotional linkage ýýith communist forces 
for lack of alternative 
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analogies, but which carry little relation to the situation in Iran. A rude innocence in 
regards to the political in Iran is projected on the *student supporters' ýkho, childlike. set 
out 'first thing' to engage in the game of undercover agents. Rubin generalizes to 'most 
Iranians' the same paranoia and gullibility he imputes to Khomeini, impl-ving that the 
evidence showed that the US had no CIA agents in its embassy. the documents' 
blandness being the proof (a point Saunders likewise makes, 1985: 58). Hinted at ýýas the 
idea that the Iranians were on a different level than a sophisticated, 'ývorldly, power such 
as the US and that their clerical leader was politically paranoid, Rubin thereby adding his 
voice to the chorus that the clergy were incapable of modem leadership (see also Taheri 
1988: 115; Mather, The Observer, 4/11/1979). This construction, and the emotional 
register of deprecation, retained staying power beyond the final negotiations and the 
hostages' release. As Pollack looked back on that period, the tone and the same 
passionate constructions persist: 
'[T]he US govemment was forced to try to persuade a group of people ýýhose 
ideas about America and the world were immature, ignorant, and fantastic, to gain 
the release of fifty-two American hostages who the Iranians truly believed were 
spies sent to enslave their country. ' (2004: 162) 
The enemy within The position of the US-based, multifaceted Iranian communitv came 
to function as a third site of victimization. The ambiguity of the expatriate Iranians' 
individual opinions, actions and immigration status served to emotionalize difference into 
a 'defiling otherness', categorizing them all as 'the enemy ý, ýithin' (Campbell 1998: quote 
on 8; Dotv 1996: 6; Pipes 2002; Sherry 2005). 
A proposed demonstration by pro-Khomeini students on the first day after the 
hostage-taking introduced the contingency of their position right away. The difficultý "as 
perceived in terms that placed the demonstrators' constitutional ly protected right to 
freedom of expression, in opposition to the security of the hostages at the hands of 
*religious fanatics' that 'obviously ... don't understand our sý stem of go,. ernment' 
(Jordan 1982: 39). The fear was that there would be a misinterpretation of the facts by the 
ayatollahs should things go wrong. 'if there \%ere pictures of fistfights and bloodshed in 
f. ront of the White House, they would conclude that whatever happened to the 
demonstrators \\as sponsored h\ the President and the government'. Carter stated in a 
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Cabinet meeting (ibid). This passionate construction v"as countered by White House 
Counsel Lloyd Cutler. as v,, ell as Washington, D. C. %la. vor Marion Barrý. ýOo 
maintained the more sanguine view that freedom of assembly ýý as a cornerstone of 
American democracy, and that to disallow the demonstration was onIN to pro,. e to 
Khomeini and his ilk that the US did not have the courage to stand by its principles. 
Nonetheless. anxiety, fear and anger suppressed the shame of going against such 
fundamental principles. and Carter revoked the permit. In his memoirs he explains his 
motivation: 'With our hostages in captivity, American citizens - including the President - 
were in no mood to watch Iranian 'students' denouncing our country in front of the W111te 
House" (Carter 1982: 460). This established a signifier of danger to t'S-based Iranians 
that was sufficiently threatening to require the compromise of democratic rights 
enshrined in law. 
Thus, the precariousness of America's democratic identity was engaged at the 
very beginning of the crisis, and in terms that pitted Iranians in the [JS, against the 
security of the hostages, and the honour of the US nation. For Carter, emotional intensity 
, galvanized his thinking and motivated the policy that ensued: 'I am not going to ha", e 
those bastards humiliating our country in front of the White House.... [I]f I ýýasn't 
President, I'd be out on the streets myself and would probably take a sýý ing at anv 
Khomeini demonstrator I could get my hands on' (Jordan 1982: 40). 
Distinctions in the vlexýýs of American-based Iranians concernin., ý issues such as 
the Khomeini government. hatred of the Shah and Islamic belief ý\ ere blurred in the 
media's pairing of their images with those of demonstrators in Iran (Altheide 1981: 143). 
This contributed to the belief that the American homeland ýNas endangered. and that 
American society had become the victim of its oNNn liberal immigration IaNýs and open- 
door policies. The discourse of othering, in this way constructed US-based Iranians as 
indistiniluishable from Tehran-based Iranians in a narrative of violence that eý oked a 
Crightening image of them 'as a unified quasi army" (ibid: 147). Over the year, broadcast 
footage included Iranian demonstrators at the Statue of Liberty and clashes ý\ ith 
.. kmerican ci,. -iiians and securo forces in cities across the 
United States. highli-ghting, the 
iiisccuritý represented hý the 'foreign other' on US soil. American sanctions prohibiting 
the entrance of Iranians into the US confirmed in the popular imagination that all Iranians 
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were Islamic fanatics, reducing the conditions of possibility for alternati,. 'e interpretations 
and introducing the idea that the US was at war with Iran and Islamic fundamentalism' 
(ibid: 134; Sick 1985: 230). 
The proximity of a combative Iranian community benefitting from the 
benevolence of American hospitality established tensions within American societý that 
were played out in myriad personal experiences of strife. A story used by. Vew York 
Times reporter Tom Wicker, highlights the confusion and anger that was inspired by the 
duality of having Iranian students free to live in the US while American hostages ýýere 
held captive in Iran: 
'A Cleveland sportscaster destroyed an Iranian flag on camera at the close of his 
report the other night. His superiors told him not to do it again, but said they 
understood his frustration. So would many other Americans, judging from the 
counter-demonstrations that have been staged against Iranian students in many 
cities, and from a White House switchboard that is said to be jammed ýý 1th protest 
calls. ' ('US-Iran: A time to reason'. NYT 12/11/1979) 
This anger toward an incongruous 'domestic danger' perpetually reinvented the 
play of personal insecurity in an international drama, and was crucial in enabling 
motivated bias, constructed as articulating and carrying out popular vV ill, to take place at 
top decision-making levels, particularly in the context of the presidential campaign 
(Saunders 1985: 47). Emotionality was in these circumstances interpreted as a positive 
motivator for decision-making, its instrumental ization rationalized as patriotism, inner 
coherence, and strength of character. As veteran New York Times reporter Weisman put 
it, 'It was good politics' (ibid). Looking back years later, Pollack argues for the 
appropriateness of this emotionalized policy motivation: 
*These constant images of Iranians blaming America for everything wrong in the 
world, the sense of anger that a country would commit such an offense against us, 
8 
r\t the time, Islamic fundamentalism was understood as primarly Shia radicalism that ýN as 
being practiced 
in Iran and later, Lebanon. The PLO, and other Palestinian militants. were purelý secular at the time. and 
in the West noticed the extremism developing in Sunni Islam until well after the coordination 
betýkeen 
its proponents and the ['S in the So,, let ouster from Afghanistan. The use of 'Islamic terrorism' or 
jihadism' did not include connotations now prevalent in the post-9 II tenn, in which 
Salafi 
fundamentalism and N lolence ha-, e became sýnonymous %% ith the international terrorist network ot'al- 
Qaida. 
. -\ Ithough 
in the Anglo-American discourse the distinction between the týý o Is often ý ague, and the 
cumulative \ iew has become normalized in that \\hat began as Iranian Islamic terrorism is perceived 
simpl\ to ha\ e got worse o\ er time until it begot the al-Qaida variant, the two, though sharing common 
inspirations (including the Qoran), %ý ere, and remain. distinct, see for example 
Graham Fuller (2003) The 
Fufw-e ol'Politii-al 1slam (\e\% York: Palgra\ e Macmillan). 
Chapter 5 Page 156 
and the demand to do something about it, became driving emotions for the 
American public - and their elected officials knew they had to do something to 
address these passions' (2004: 161). 
The fragile positioning of American identity between the principled and the 
emotive established conditions of possibility for perpetuating an anger that ýN ould sur,,, ive 
the actual hostage crisis. The yo-yo affect of this self-righteous identity structuring and 
the danger that it represented, was recognized early on by Jordan. 'I was glad that the 
people cared, but bothered that they cared so much. ' he noted in his diary on November 
7,1979, adding, 'An ugly mood will develop in this country if the hostages aren't out 
soon. ' Richard Sennet, sociologist at New York University argued that the extreme 
national identification with the hostages and the accompanying fear of the enemy XN ithin, 
was counterproductive. 'The crisis became a symbolic confrontation in which a realistic 
judgment of the stakes gave way to an exercise in mass hysteria, in v"hich we pursued the 
thing that yielded the greatest psychic and emotional benefits' (quote in Weisman 
1981: 23 1). Hysteria so entwined the public and private that the rational could no longer 
be identified, prompting political heavyweight George Ball to complain: -Television 
played it like a soap opera, and made it the greatest soap opera of the year .... In 1968, 
when the Pueblo hostages were taken, it was not made into one of the great events of our 
time .... Television has played this situation up so that 
it has become the central issue of 
American policy, which I think is absurd. ' (quote in ibid: Dumbrell 1993: 168). 
The requirement to find some way to respond to the popular torment, which 
vacillated between stoic endurance and belligerent confrontation. raised the tension 
between the pragmatist and touch conservative discourses. In the Oval Office, the need to 
counter the months of humiliation and falling support in the polls, gradually shifted 
hegemony away from the former and toward the latter (Sick 1985: 330). Carter's 
'rational' rhetoric of restraint. seen as complacency, had failed. An domestic politics'. 
Sick observed presciently, 'continued passivity not only condemned the President to self- 
immolation in the polls, but it risked generating a popular backlash in favour of forces 
who opposed everything Vance and Carter represented' (ibid: 347). 
Brzezinski's viexx, -s appeared increasingly persuasive over time: *Yes it is 
important ýýe oet our people back. But \our greater responsibility [%Ir. 
President] is to 
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protect the honor (sic) and dignity of our country and its foreign polic,, - interests' (Jordan 
1982: 44). 
As Jordan ruefully admitted, 'Cy's calm approach sounded good, but Zbi(-, 's 
tough approach felt good' (p. 53). 
Innocence 
In securing American identity through the signifier of innocence, the meanin(us attached 
to the hostage-taking were played out by emotionally denying the past (Admas and Heý 1 
198 1, McAlister 2005: 110; Sick 1985: 218). Innocence thus instrumental ized the image 
of the US as a nation wronged despite-or more tellingly. perhaps because of-its 
democratic and benevolent character. 
Failure to engage with the historicist aspect of US-Iran relations contributed to the 
play of difference in two ways: a) it enabled American identity to be secured as a rational 
and legally grounded entity within the framework of international laý'ý'. This located it in 
diametric opposition to what was constructed as the irrational, and illegal nature of the 
Iranian other, and the false memory that the US had never tolerated such an act by 
another state; b) it shifted, through impaired information processing, the understanding of 
Iranian motives from a desire to protect and isolate itself from American interference to 
a desire to aggress against American democracy and directly influence the American 
public. Unproblematized innocence enabled the US self to be constituted in terms of self- 
righteousness using symbols of good and evil, which in turn suggested that universalist 
, ý, 'alues without force to back them up could not always be assumed to triumph. 
Legality, memory and passion In a news conference on November 28,1979, Carter 
called the hostage-taking 'an unprecedented and unique occurrence. Down through 
history. ' he said, 
'\Ne have had times when some of our people NNere captured by terrorists or Nýho 
ýNere abused. and there have obviously been instances of international 
kidnapping 
ýN hich occurred for the discomfiture of a people or um, ernment. So 
far as I kno%N. 
this is the first time that such an actiý, -ity has been encouraged bý and supported bý 
the government itself. ' (quote in Houghton 2001: 80). 
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Similar views were expressed by Under Secretary of State Christopher and others in the 
administration 0 985: 1; Jordan 1982: 19), despite their knowing that there had been mo 
cases in the recent past in which American diplomats and other representatives had been 
held by foreign governments for up to a year, one in a very similar post-reýolution 
situation (Houghton 2000: 92-100). How could educated and moral state actors knovV inuYIN 
elide such information? The only explanation can be that the submerged spiral of 
alienation and shame in the Iranian case released such strong emotions of anger and 
outrage that it appeared fundamentally different than those other. less emotionalized 
cases. In interpreting it as a novel occurrence, any rationale by the Iranian regime for 
taking such a step was viewed as simply ratcheting up a process that already had caused 
severe separation anxiety, and thus its 'reasons' were viewed as immaterial and immoral. 
I he Iranian discourse that imputed danger to specific factors such as the ongoing 
relationship between the US and the Shah, or the history of US foreign intervention to 
overthrow sitting governments (including one of its own), was not recognized as "'alid - 
and hence, as a pointer to a solution. Instead, it was dismissed as paranoia, and used as a 
factor in laying blame (loannides 1986; Boyle 1985: 96). Little credence was given to any 
possible Iranian process of political assessment or consensus-building concerning the 
necessity to bring into tandem Islamic and international rules; instead, the Iranian 
leadership was labeled as unaccountable. As Boyle assessed it, 'the Carter administration 
adopt[ed] an essentially rectificatory and positivistic approach to the Iranian hostage 
crisis whereby it acted as if it were a plaintiff vindicated on all counts of its petition' 
(ibid: 194). 
This is not to say that compelling, if subjugated, discourses did not flourish, or in 
l'act, reach the public (Falk 1980; Said 1997: 99-100). 10 Boyle argued that the hostage 
taking Could be justified as an act of pre-emptive self-defence under article 51 of the UN 
Charter based on the Iranians' perceptions of, -Nmerican threats to their revolution, and 
Q Vance drew on these analogies frequently, and brought them to Carter's attention. Brzezinski. -Oo did not 
consider honour to have been %ý el I served in either previous case, where negotiation took months, ne,. er 
ackiim% ledged the applicability of these analogies (Houghton 2001, op cit: 92-3, Vance 1983, op cit: 408-9). 
10 Among the most extraorditiarN was I. F. Stone's article, *. A Shah's Lobby Next"' in theNew YOrk Review 
ql'Books on February 22,1979, \\ ritten J ks after the revolution, and \\ filch uncann, IN just two \ý ee 
anticipated much that subsequentlN occurred, including demands by Iran to return the Shah for trial, but 
\\ hich he argued from the perspective of American oý er-meddling, in Iran's affairs \ý ithout learning the 
lessons that might cause it to retaliate. 
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which, 'under these imminent circumstances, took precedence over Iran's obligations 
under Charter articles 2(3), 2(4) and 33 (Boyle 1985: 189). Seeim! the crisis in these 
terms suggested there were alternative ways to perceive it. and therefore. avenues never 
pursued that could have resolved it quite differently. Without excusing the Iranian seizure 
of the embassy, Boyle found 'a plausible legal argument on the Iranian side that should 
have been taken into account by the Carter administration ... as part of the definitional 
context of the crisis' (ibid: 191). By failing to entertain any discourse that publiclý 
acknowledged that the dispute warranted inquiry within a mutually acceptable 
international tribunal, as the Iranians frequently requested, and without pre-conditions, 
the Carter administration made it clear that American identity security relied first on its 
honour being secured as unblemished and innocent, rendering a solution without 
preconditions unimaginable (NYT 14/11/1979, Washington Post 15/11/1979: Bani-Sadr 
1982: 49). It therefore frequently would claim it had 'exhausted all diplomatic channels', 
a quote McDermott, for example, uses (and accepts) as a given (1998: 45). 
Doty describes this as 'reversal of visibility', an extension of what Foucault 
attributes to practices of disciplinary power (Doty 1996: 143). 'Inherently moral subjects 
did not need to account for their practices, ' she argues. Since American standards of 
human rights and democratic practices were the guide-post around ýkllich international 
norms were understood to gain their meaning, the US was able to ignore its own 
violations, orjustify them within the context of international imperative. Pollack's easy 
dismissal of any guilt might seem disingenuous v, ithout this insight: 'For so maný 
Americans, a key point, ' he writes, is that we were innocent of the charges that the 
Iranians leveled against us, and that they claim motivated them to launch the attack' 
(2004: 174). Drawing on Foucault's concept of 'useful delinquency' as a mechanism of 
. controlled illegality', Doty explains this ability of the US to practice inconsistency 
abroad xNhile still viewing itself as innocent of culpabilitý. -The implicit hlerarchý of 
countries and the s,,, -stem of surveillance made it possible for the US to profit b,. the 
iolation of hurnan rights (in the sense of keeping order and prevent leftists from coming 
to po\\ cr in '*third world" countries) and still condemn those practices' she statcs (p. 
141). 
,o to an international 
bodý. it When Washington did decide the crisis should u 
brought the issue on its o\ý n terms. \\ ith the intent to obtain condemnation ofiran. not to 
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support an international investigation into any human rights abuses that maN have 
occurred. The UNSC resolution and the International Court of Justice rulings, ýN hich 
narrowly confined themselves to Iran's obligation to release the hostages, and did not 
call for any punitive measures, were nonetheless construed by Washington as being 
'exactly as the United States had wanted'(Pollack 2004: 164). 
When the US turned to its allies to enact sanctions against Iran in January 1980. 
and they refused, the US interpreted it as weakness in that they offered but 'paltry 
excuses for inaction', the implication being that their need for Iranian oil and trade had 
overshadowed their principles (ibid). The European view. by contrast. was that the US 
had made too much of the crisis, compromising the financial and oil markets. and 
therefore compromising its own interests as well as theirs through its rig-id standoff. 
Negotiation, they contended, would help the hostages more than sanctions (Harsch. 'The 
Bear Made Them Do It', Christian Science Monitor 25/04/1980: 23) To the White 
House, this smacked of disloyalty, a particularly galling development in light of 
Washington's self-perceived effort to take the civilized path of working through 
international institutions to resolve the crisis, temporarily straining the social bonds ýý ith 
Europe. 
Nonetheless, in sharing US 'we-ness'. the allies' moral cooperation was seen as a 
necessity within the emotional structuring of its own sense of honour, for their 
ýkithholding it would further the shame. Thus, US officials and the media repeatedly 
claimed that world opinion was solidly behind the US as a 'nation of laws' (Sick 
1985b: 168) and that it was Iran that had made a huge diplomatic sacrifice, becoming, 
isolated and spurned by the world community. Nonetheless, despite the attempt to fix the 
hegemony of its discourse. US confidence was shaken by the fickleness of its allies and 
their failure to acknowledge its pain through right action. This prompted Senator Ribicoff 
to sound a warnino, later instrumental ized in Ronald Reagan's War on Terrorism. in tý 
hich US credibility became contingent not on the restraint it could sho\N, ýý ithin 
ii-iternational fora, but through its willingness to protect its own self-interests ýýhen its 
identiVy, securitv NN as endangered. 
*\\'e must face the reality that \ýe cannot count on support or e\en on 
frieiidlý 
agreement \\ ithin the established \\ orld institutions on moral or peace-threatening 
issues affectinu, our basic national interests no matter ho\\ rigorously ý\e pla\ 
b\ 
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the rules for the submission of disputes for peaceful institutional resolution. We 
must always stand prepared to act alone ... Thus we maintain our credibiliv, as a 
world power' (1985: 379). 
Playing to America Through its ongoing privileging of the relationship ýý, ith the Shah, 
and its own discursive disciplining of innocence, the US government and media, as noted 
earlier, remained unengaged, and uninvolved in the debates of democracy- build ing and 
the role of religion and tradition within the process of rethinking social relations in Iran. 
The months-long debates over the construction of the constitution, the unique role of 
Khomeini as leader, the elections-these subjects were barely acknowledged and little 
interested an administration which constructed the politics of Iran purely through the 
passionate opposition of US-Iran relations (Bakhash 1985. Christopher and Kreisberg, 
eds. 1985; Keddie 1980: 532; Sick 1985: 201). 
The construction of US identity throughout this period, therefore, represented the 
hostage crisis as the dominant theme of Iranian politics just as it had become in American 
politics. Implicated in this representation was the claim that the US (and the Shah) ýýere 
being painted as culpable of carrying out crimes against the Iranian people purely as a 
ruse to help secure the clerical dictatorship, even if--or in fact. especially if-such 
crimes had not occurred (Jordan 1982: 116). Thus, Iranian practices were implicated as 
flawed, and unworthy to be recognized as anything vaguely resembling modern liberal 
democracy. This view was of course abetted by the post-revolution confusion and 
undemocratic tactics that sheared away Khomeini's opponents and allowed his version of 
the constitution to triumph. The lack of interest and the paucity of detail provided on that 
process, however, made it secondary ý, N, 'ithin the American discourse. 
rhe view that the elections were a sham, and that there ýN as no democratic 
principle involved, remains a theme in analysis of this period. as the discourse adopted b" 
Pollack reflects: 'At the end of January, ' he writes, 'Iran held its first presidential 
elections, and Khomeini's candidate naturally won with 75 percent of the vote' (Pollack 
2004: quote on 166, Sick 1985: 235-237). Pollack's use of -naturally' underscores the 
presumption that the elections ý\ ere not - and never could be - genuine. as 
does his 
failure to mention that several clerical candidates ran for the job. that Khomeini ne,,, er 
endorsed aný candidate or party, and that it Nýas a layman that ultimately %%on. 
In his 
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voluminous study. there is only this single line that describes the election of the first 
president to be voted into office in Iran's history. 
At the same time, the rejection by Iran of the American model ýý as too 
discomfiting - and too shaming - to accept. Khomeini spoke of buildin(I vV-alls around 
Iran in order to keep out the plunderers brought in by the Shah; he questioned ýý hether the 
West even had a civilization - let alone one to be copied - and pointed to Islam as the 
source of Iranian salvation (Khomeini in Algar 1982). This rhetoric was so contrar", to 
American conceptions of self that it was literally indigestible. there being no narrati,. e 
heuristics, constructions or signifiers to make knowable. let alone acceptable. such a 
stance (Houghton 2001; Pollack 2004: 179). Instead, since the American media ýý as at 
the embassy, and the American focus was on the hostage story, the complexities of the 
post-revolutionary year were reduced to terms that fit the hostai, e storyboard. and Iranian 
actions were seen only in terms of American reaction. Each Iranian mo,,, e ýk as interpreted 
as designed to influence the United States, and eventually. to justitý, itself to the 
American people (Sick 1985: 204). Khomeini's celebration of the West's alienation from 
Iran was ignored. Instead, in the estimation of Sick and others at the time - and of 
Pollack twenty five years later - Iran had the opposite goal. to engage the Americans. 
This was a gambit Pollack contends failed - an extraordinary statement that erases the 
memory of a United States passionately submerged in the hostage story for o"er a Car 
(p. 180). Rejection, too horrible to contemplate for the narcissist, or parent or lover, is 
here reversed, so that, according to Pollack, the US never -cared ajot for Iran' and it ýýas 
the US that rejected 'the psychic gratification the [Iranians] so craved'. not the other ýýay 
around (ibid). 
In sum, the loss of political love, and groNN-th of political strife significantly 
impacted the rupture, as well as the settlement of the identities that folloýýed. Political 
emotion pla-, ved a much larger role in this case than xNould be expected in a relationship 
that Nus not so tied to both American and Iranian ideals of self. The loss of Iran as a 
validator of American self-esteem. and of its illusions of omnipotence expressed through 
an idealized self-image of bene-volence. left the L'nited States shocked, humiliated and 
exposed. Television's maturing during this period only contributed to the drarnatic 
rendition in \\hich it \\as *\\e' \Nho suffered at 'their' hands. and for no (Tood reason. 
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At this point, it is already possible to see the developing pattern of dý sfunctional 
communication in which American-Iranian discourses that inculcated shame in dealing's 
with the Shah, became embedded and institutionalized into a mutualized policY stance of 
alienation. The endless sharne-anger-disrespect loop, which has contributed to the US 
finding it elusive to construct a coherent ' Iran policy, grew out of collective responses 
of outrage and despair that repeatedly compounded the unhealed hurt. fear of 
powerlessness, and commitment at all costs never again to experience such perceived 
humiliation and injustice-reactions that constitute the maturing of a love-sick 
relationship. In advocating the need for reprisals to protect and promote American 
honour, Secretary of State George Shultz warned against the United States becoming 
'the Hamlet of nations', a spectre that evinced the horror not only of ýNeakness but of 
madness (speech April 3, reprinted in US Neivs and World Report Dec. 24,1984). 
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Political Passion and the First War on Terror 
'We should no less remind ourselves of what ýýe tell the Iranians, that passion is not 
policy'. -Ramazani, quote in Sacred Rage (1985): 250. 
Within a week of the hostages being taken, Carter was publicly calling it an act of 
terrorism, and labeling the Students Following the Imam's Line (SFIL), alon, -, ýý ith the 
government, as terrorist. This was a refrain he used regularly. As he stated in a speech 
after meeting with the hostage families: 'It's vital to the United States and to every other 
nation that the lives of diplomatic personnel and other citizens abroad be protected and 
that we refuse to permit the use of terrorism and the seizure and the holding of hostages 
to impose political demands' ('Transcript of Carter's Statement', TheXell, York Times, 
13/11/1979). The importance of this claim was made clear in Carter's 'Executive Order 
12170: Freezing Iranian Government Assets in America', November 14. in which he 
attested: 
1, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States, find that the situation in Iran 
constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a national 
emergency to deal with that threat' (Alexander and Nanes 1980: 48 1). 
Choosing to categorize this incident from the outset as a national security threat, and 
national emergency, terms that constitute the danger as pertaining to the American 
citizenry as a whole, Carter elevated the scale of the incident by putting it on a par vVith 
\\ar, natural disasters and the ideological threat of communism. By so doing, Carter 
sanctified 'terrorism' as a present and 'extraordinary threat', and the actions of Iran as 
unique in human history. Since the students, and the clerical leadership spoke in terms of 
Islam as the purpose and God as the guide for their actions, Islam ý\as notionall-,, - I 
ii-nbricated \\ ithin this signification, its role left vague, but its propensity for violence 
clear. 
The hostage crisis constituted a nodal point in the discourse ofAmerican identitN 
in that it created the conditions of possibiliv, for a change in discourse. Once Ronald 
Reagan ý\ as instated as President on January 1981. and the hostages vvere released in 
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Tehran, containing, punishing and pre-empting terrorism became a primarý foreign 
policy focus. In his first statement as Secretary of State, Alexander Haig announced: 
'International terrorism will take the place of human rights' because 'the greatest problem 
... in the 
human rights area today is the area of rampant international terrorism' 
(McAlister 2005: 199; quote in Wills 2003: 3). 1 
The hostage crisis thus launched the Age of Terrorism. Of course, \ýell-publicized 
terrorist/criminal acts had punctuated the previous two decades (Ledeen 1986: 90, Sterling 
1986: 103-05); yet it was not until the hostage crisis that terrorism was understood by 
Americans to have struck home. 2 
The narrative practices constituting terrorism dehumanized and indo, iduated the 
danger to US identity security, imbuing terrorism as beyond any moral order. and 
therefore, requiring pre-emptive containment as much as punitive measures. This shift in 
the discourse of danger, which elaborated a broader use of force in defense of American 
identity, could not have taken place without the predicate of vulnerability and 
emotionalized disarray made possible by the loss of political love and Iran's pointed 
repulse of American norms and international modeling. Yet, at the same time, the 
temporal and locational contexts affected the shift in discourse and were critical to its 
hegemonic progression. The hostage crisis, paired very quickly vith the invasion of 
Afghanistan by the USSR, took place in a geostrategic location and historical moment in 
Miich conflicts pitting east against west were expanding. Further. it was one in which 
relations of danger made possible practices and approaches to understanding a *rising 
threat' of (Shi'a-inspired) Islamic terrorism as the hegemony of communist tN'ranriv was 
dwindling (Cottam 1990: 176). In sum, the socially constructed threats instrumental ized 
through the hostage crisis impacted with enormous power discourses that ýý ere being 
elaborated as the terrains of danger shifted. Critically, this nodal point enabled an 
emotionalized discourse in which tyranny could be joined to terrorism, and eventual ly. 
for terrorism to stand alone as the primary threat to US identity security. 
I ional See chapter 4, footnote 4, for discussion of the meanings understood at the time in the term 'intemati 
terrorism'. 
similar response took place %ý ith the eN ents of 9'11, in that the American perceptions of previous 
activities hý the al-Qaida terrorist net%wrk \ý ere not framed as 'global' until its attacks struck the homeland, 
and prompted the launch of the (second) \k ar on Terror. 
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This change incorporated the fear of victimization, and the commitment nex er 
again to be so vulnerable to the engulfment of political love. The construction of 
American honour shifted during the experience of the hostage crisis to inculcate 
immunity (through force, if necessary) from such pain and incursion: 'no more Irans'. no 
more humiliation at the hands of others. Honour therefore, became entwined %\ Ith the 
idea of willing to protect American identity security at all costs. In contrast to the post- 
Vietnam experience, the US adopted a radical stance: If it was to be seen as credible, it 
had to be willing to use force to protect its honour. Deterrence, as well as retaliation and 
reprisal against terrorism, were understood, post-hostage crisis, as fundamental to 
America's self-defense and self-image as able to withstand xkhatever evils surrounded it. 
Innocence as a moral play of practice likewise contributed in a keý xNay to the 
shift in discourse. Carter's uncompromising unwillingness to countenance any discussion 
of US actions in Iran prior to resolving the crisis represented American values and the 
actions they enabled as morally inalienable. In this way, the US reproduced itself as 
innocent of any wrong-doing in promoting these values, and in fighting back against the 
a-morality of terrorists. Reagan's brash optimism in America Is greatness, and 
specifically, in US principles as inherently moral, added varnish to the play of innocence 
in America's mission. McCrisken argues that 'any aspect of US foreign policy could 
therefore be justified simply by declaring it as morally furthering the cause of freedom 
and democracy' (2003: 93). 
This had several ramifications which have influenced and made possible 
American policy formation through both Democratic and Republican administrations 
since. The moral rectitude of America's universalist mission. which powered the US 
fight against communist totalitarianism, was now combined with moral -innocence' in the 
f, ice of terrorism, elaborating, the 'good' self. in opposition to the evil 'other'. This 
enabled a passionate self-righteousness toward NN hat were perceived as the follies of 
international consensus in the face of inflictions on American interests. Here a space výas 
opened to 'ustify the use of force a ainst those indulging in what the US defined as 19 
international .,, iolations through terrorism or tyranný. 
The hostage crisis in effect 
contributed to the ability of the US to stake out the geographN of its identity through a 
refinement of its Nulnerabilities. and the means (and meanings) by which to overcome 
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them. The scope of these meanings and practices-vv here American identity began and 
ended within its larger mission of projecting its values to others-was appropriated as 
acceptable democracy. Outside the borders of this identity-in the geography of 
otherness, where shame and violence was perceived as directed against the democracy 
espoused by the US-lay the domain of terrorism and totalitarianism. It ýkas this domain 
against which American honour and credibility, as produced post-hostage crisis, had 
actively to defend. The shift in discourse enabled the hostage crisis to launch the Age of 
Terrorism, as well as a War on Terrorism, which was as much a mission for establishing 
a hegemonic narrative of what constituted terrorism, as it was a means for using force 
against those carrying it out. 
This chapter analyses terrorism as a signifier in American discourse and hoýý it 
linked the hostage crisis with the First War on Terrorism under the auspices of Ronald 
Reagan and his Secretary of State George Shultz. The crisis constituted a juncture in 
which the need for self-discipline and self-protection took on a new horizon. enabling the 
establishment of the Shultz Doctrine, which codified the US right of pre-emptive strikes 
against suspected terrorist operations, even though. as Shultz admitted, 'we may never 
have the kind of evidence that can stand up in an American court of law' (Shultz speech 
Dec. 9, reprinted in US News and World Report. Dec. 24,1984; Wright 1985: 248). What 
is more, it was continuation of the Shah's discourse which had defined the mutual *threat 
of the Red and the Black' as a new variation on the old danger of communism, a 
discourse he projected in interviews even from his hospital bed in New, York (Jordon 
1982: 90) 
In securing US identity as a power in opposition to terror, Washington developed 
an array ofpolicy structures to define and contain it. It was in this period that a rising 
level of terrorism (both Islamic and secular) was being directed against the US and 
Israel, much of which Washington and Tel A,., ýiv attributed to Iranian management (or 
meddling) even when evidence was lacking to support it (Halliday 1990: 256. \Veinberger 
1990: 250) For the moment, Islamic terrorism N\ as secondar,, to the Cold \A'ar threat, and 
et. it began to impact the representations and meanings associated ýý ith totalitarianism, 
beginning the shift that would ultimatel\ produce the former as the greater danger. 1-he 
discourse de, ý, 'eloped \\ ithin the context of the hostage crisis was easilý transmuted to a 
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rhetoric of diabolism, most visibly. for example. in Reagan's use of 'The Evil Empire' to 
describe the Soviet Union, a takeoff of Iran's 'Great Satan' (Cottam 1990: 274). There 
was also the growing perception that the Arab-Soviet partnership \ýas promoting terrorist 
tactics (a point passionately made by Israeli politician Benjamin Netanyahu in statements 
I Inking Soviet support to PLO violence), prompting portrayal of a *League of Terror' 
emanating from the left and the right, which catapulted Claire Sterling's The Teri-or 
Network to prominence (McAlister 2005: 217-19, Netanyahu 1986: 12, quote in Shultz 
1992: 16; Sterling 1981). 
The necessity of 'avoiding another Iran' offered a means to reconstitute American 
identity as a protector and promoter of a specific form of democracy, \ý'hich, in alliance 
with other Western states sharing similar values, in particular Britain and Israel. ýýas 
perceived as uniquely able to secure a world order able to combat terrorism (Netanyahu, 
ed. 1986: passim). The use of terrorism to describe those responsible for the hostage 
crisis had several implications, which, elucidated in the language of political passion, 
enabled the construction of Iran as beyond any possible relationship. First, motivated bias 
was revealed in the Carter administration's inability to acknowledge the clerical 
leadership as anything but irrational and vengeful, seeing its abuses of power as so 
corrupting and contrary to international law and human rights that it deemed Iran to have 
forfeited its position as a member of the intemational family of states, and therefore, 
classified it a rogue, the ultimate act of shaming. Such a reading of the Islamic Republic 
in effect dehumanized Iran, placing it outside any moral cartography. The rogue 
discourse enabled the United States to attempt to fix a narrative around Iran that would 
limit contact with it by other states, and internationalize the figuration of us and them 
around American conceptions of freedom and democratic values (White House Press 
Secretar--y', 'Statement and Fact Sheet on President's Anti-terrorism Legislation'. 
'6/4/1984, in Simpson 1995: 405-411). To a large degree. this discursi,,, -e strateo-, of 
flencing off Iran \vorked. at least until the Khatami presidency. Iran's oýýn actions 
reglularlý abetting this disposition among US allies. Containing radical Islam (First the 
, Slli'a, and then the Sunni Salafi ,,, ariants), 
hoýýever, proved more difficult. 
Second, the external threat of terrorism and the domestic threat o crime \ýcrc 
iers conjugated in similar narrative terms (Sherry 21005). 
This connected them as signifi 
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that transgressed and merged the private and public domains, necessitating and justifying 
the use of state-sponsored force for punishment, retribution and pre-emption. In 
approaching the two as common blights, the shame of having such high levels of crime in 
a -good' democratic society was elided, and projected outward as the need to eliminate 
criminal and terrorist evils abroad (Sherry 2005: 252, Altheide 1980: 143). This enabled 
counter-terrorism and military force to 'be undertaken for the sake of something 
identified as private - love, the family, revenge, ' rendering ambiguous the constraints on 
such actions by international legal rules that had been designed specifically to address the 
contingencies of war - not crime (McAlister 2005: 233). 
Third, the inscription of Islam as an enabler and promoter of violence. such as the 
taking of hostages, offered an opposition to Christianity, which entered the play of 
practice as a signifier of American values and morals. McAlister describes this as 
'mobilization of religion as nation'. She chronicles the widespread use of the exodus 
narrative, and the oft-repeated broadcasting of the Black spiritual. *Let my people go'. to 
back up her assertion that 'as Islam emerged as the category for understanding Iran, 
Christianity became remarkably prominent in media accounts' in the US (2005: 211 
The emotionality implicated in religious legitimation has often been used to 
instrumentalize political authority and inhere apostasy to a foreign "other' (Campbell 
1998: 47; Connolly 1989: 325). In merging domestic and intemational discourses of 
danger around religious we-ness, the conceptual framework of exclusion contributed to a 
monological expression of difference in religious terms (Guillaume 2002). For Carter. the 
claim to be the victim of uncivilized and a-moral behaviour was emotionally 
cornmunicated by drawing on analogies with other recognized faiths: 
'The actions of Iran have shocked the civilized world. For a government to 
applaud mob violence and terrorism. for a govemment actually to support and in 
effect participate in the taking and the holding of hostages, is unprecedented 
in 
human history .... There 
is no recognized religious faith on Earth ýýhich condones 
kidnapping. There is no recognized religious faith on Earth which condones 
blackmail. There is certainly no religious faith on Earth ýOich condones the 
sustained abuse of innocent people. ' (*Presidential NeNýs Conference*. Alexander 
and Nanes 1980: 482) 
Literatures of violence 
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Literature that addresses the implications of Iran's new leadership role in the Islamic 
world, and its assumption of this mantle through the terror/crime nexus of the hostage 
crisis, for a long time was dominated by Orientalist argument (Said 1979: 1997). In these 
treatments, Iran's ideological posture in exporting its revolution in the wake of the 
hostage crisis, and the security threat this implied for govemments around the Persian 
Gulf, and Western interests within the region. are couched in the flamboyant and 
passionate language of 'rage', 'wrath', 'militancy' and 'danger', what Scheff and 
Retzinger categorize as 'code words' for shame, and its projection outward. Robin 
Wright's Sacred Rage, The Crusade of Modern Islam (1985), Bernard Lewis's 'The 
Roots of Muslim Rage' in The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990) and Samuel 
I luntington's 'The Clash of Civilizations? ' (Foreign Affairs, May/June 1993, published 
as a book 1996) are three prominent studies in a cottage industry that developed the 
concept of terrorism and a 'crescent of crisis' that was seen to be emerging as a result of 
the ideological export of Khomeini-ism. This literature is not confined to Westem 
writers, as, for example, Taheri's highly ideological Holy Terror (1987). Elevating the 
movement to the forefront of 'evil' as the Soviet 'Evil Empire' crumbled, this literature 
spawned the term 'Islamist', even as the plethora of arguments concerning its roots, 
purpose and containment by the West revealed that terrorism was a subject that 
fascinated not only the public, but the Westem Academe. Books on terrorism abounded 
and are too numerous to list, though many reflect the emotional (if not ideational) bias 
of, for example, Barry Rubin, previous editor of 11iddle East Review of International 
and his co-author Judith Colp Rubin (2002). Their compilation of a selection of 
incendiary Muslim documents and speeches attempts to link the diverse agenda and 
histories of modern Islamic political radicalism into a single stream, by showing how 
'Khomeini's thought ... created a sort of Leninism for the Islamist movement' (p. 8) and is 
'foundational in the thoughts of Usama Bin Laden' (p. 13). Wills' The First War on 
Terrori. vin (2003), offers a narrower documentary history of terrorism using Reagan 
administration materials in more narrative form, and is useful for how it reprises 
unvarnished the fear, panic and passion involved in the discourse that led to the First "Far 
on Terrorism. 
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This theme is taken up on a theoretical plain by McAlister (2005). ýkho argues 
that -media terrorism' turned Iran into *the paradigmatic signifier of America as a nation 
imperiled by terrorism' (pp. 199-20 1). Hurd (2005). in focusing on the implications of 
religion as a factor within politics, unpicks the laic dimension, seeing the US rejection of 
any engagement with the clerical Iranian leadership as based on a Judeo-Christian bias 
against other religious doctrines' ability to encompass democracy, and the laic conception 
of 'neutral public space' that rendered a theocracy both 'irrational' and against *common 
sense and public good' (p. 27). Another category of studies locate the Islamic (and 
Islamic terrorist) 'turn' within a larger po I itico-soc io logical context (for example, Burgat 
2003, Esposito 1992; Ramazani 1986; Roy 2007; and Sayyid 1997). 
'Terrorism' as Political Passion 
"Ferrorism' was a useful and effective rhetorical device within a discourse that pollticallý 
denied its object expressivity (Guillaume 2002: 6). The terrorist image evoked memories 
of the kidnappings by the Symbionese Liberation Army, Red Brigade and Bader- 
Meinhoff - acts of criminality as much as of politics (Boyle 1885: 192). It was a natural 
step to discursively extend what had been already constructed as the madness of the 
tyrannical Khomeini and the barbarity of the fanatical Iranian mob into the moral 
depravity of terrorism. Further, it recalled in (white) America's imaginary the spectre of 
the race riots of the '70s, led by Muslim Black Panthers, as well as the anti-Vietnam 
demonstrations of the '60s, incidents which had done their part in (re)naturalizing the use 
of force for the establishment of order, and of the role of the police (men in uniform) in 
sorting out people of colour (Weldes and Laffey 2004). Terrorism merged the 
signification of actions carried out by individuals with that of the state. In representing, 
those in power in Iran as terrorists, whether they had taken over the American Embassy 
or were holding posts in government, the US inscribed the Iranian clerical regime as evil. 
This constructed the politics of Islam as essentially antipathetic to the spiritual and moral 
rectitude of Christian America (and the Christian West) - and thereby. an existential 
threat. 
Terrorism offered Carter's administration an evocative vocabulary to address 
domestic public shock and outrage. It shut down the narrative of 'the other' and I 
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maintained a discourse that conformed with Bakhtin's conception of monologue, which 
-... manages without the other, and therefore, to some degree, materializes all realit".. 
Monologue pretends to be the ultimate word. It closes down the represented ýýorld and 
represented persons' ( 1984: 292-293). Classifying events in Iran as terrorist meant the 
Iranian accusations against the United States and the Shah were figured as coming from 
terrorists - and US policy-makers could therefore adopt the standard official response 
always taken toward terrorists, namely, that the US did not negotiate with them (Sick 
1985b: 219). Iran's unacknowledged accusations, paralleling as they did many of the 
accusations that the US was making against Iran, energized the need for the US to starkly 
demarcate the moral boundary between self and other to ensure the *other' was 
understood in different terms and clearly estranged while the self was naturalized 
through its moral concerns. This relationship between identit""Alfference is described b. N 
Guillaume in his study of the politics of alterity: 'a national community is continuously 
ready to protect, to perform and/or propagate this self-representation, either in order to 
actualize it or in order to defend it against competing representations (internal/external, 
concrete/imagined). A national self-understanding... is in essence an answer to the 
utterances of other national identities' (2002: 13). In this case, the utterances of the other 
perpetuated a spiral of denial, the need to defend against the disrespectful representations 
of the other, communicated through a politics of strife. 
In repeatedly using a freighted term such as terrorism in its representational 
practices, the US can be understood to have felt compelled to re-inscribe its identity as 
oood and incapable of the actions that Iran accused it of, while Iran was inscribed and re- 
inscribed as wicked and capable of anything - including the victimization of 'innocents' 
(Saikal 2003: 79). The United States thus amplified itself as rightly becoming emotional, 
because it had been betrayed, but also, despite its great power, because it too could *feel 
the pain' of being a victim. Thus, stature and pride accrued to it because of its humaniv,. 
\01ch situated it in opposition to Iran's inhumanity. Like the Irish, or more importantlý, 
the Israelis, it had been ill-used, but now would ensure it xýould never sufter that pain 
, igain (Campbell 1998: 10-5.107, McAlister 2005: 199). In this vvay, insult and hubris 
increasinoi\ characterized representation of the -other' through a process ot'narrati,. e 
. self-defense. The painting of the 'other' as *fundamentalist' and terrorist can 
be 
Chapter 6 Page 173 
understood as a politics of strife, in ýkhich Washington's framing of 'Islamic* terrorism. 
and Tehran's framing of 'American' terrorism, so emotionalized the discourses of 
danger that facts and specifics were subsumed in narrow heuristics and inflamed 
sentiment. 'To make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general necessarý' 
observed Edmund Burke. 'When we know the full extent of any danger, NN hen ýý e can 
accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes' (1990: 54). 
The framing of the hostage issue as an act of international terrorism that could 
brook no negotiation was generally considered a diplomatic success by Democrats and 
Republicans alike (Reagan, 'Carter-Reagan Presidential Debate', 28/10/1980). In fact, 
although Reagan criticized the Carter administration as too soft, he adopted the Carter 
terminology of terrorism wholesale to describe the hostage crisis and the threat of radical 
Islam (Wills 2003: 19). Couched within a rhetoric of responsibility to bring 'truth to li(Yht 
in a world groping in the darkness of repression and lies' (Reagan, Voice of, America 
Remarks, 24/2/1982), Reagan expanded on Carter's rhetoric to justify emplacing 
legislation to combat Islamic terrorism as an evil. This Islamic evil was exemplified by. 
but not confined to, the clerical regime in Iran, for the anti-terrorist legislation to protect 
democracy (NSDD 30, NSDD 138, NSDD 179) referred to 'radical Islamic guerilla 
groups in the Middle East and Northern Africa" not simply terrorists (quote in Simpson 
1995: 366), and tasked Vice President George Bush to develop tactics for 'pre-emptive or 
retaliatory actions to combat terrorism' (Shultz 1985, Dept. of State Bulletin, September, 
P. )6, quote in ibid: 454). (NSDD 138,179 reprinted in Simpson 1995: 404-411,576- 
577, Schultz 1986: 648-650; Weinberger 1990). 3 
Emotionalized discourses for political retribution 
Linguist George Lakoff argues there is a tradition in American foreign policy to 
personify other nations with labels that constitute them as particular types of characters. 
In his N ic\\, 'The nation as a person is pervasive, powerful. and part of an elaborate 
The implications of protecting democracy abroad for the sake of democracy at home 
increasinglý 
imbricated questions of so,. erei gnit%, as in the case of the in\ asion of Grenada, and later, the arrest and trial 
on LIS territory of Panamanian President Noriega. Although international la-, % addresses the rights of state', 
in protecting their own so% ereignty against outside aggression, questions of 
human rights and sovereign 
right,, in the context of democrac\ promotion assumed ne%k relevance. See for example, 
C% nthia Weher 
(1995), ýimulating Intet-vention, thesicite. andsYmbolic exchange (Cambridue: Cambrid, -, e 
Unl\ersit\ Press). 
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metaphor system. It is part of an international community metaphor. in ýýhich there are 
friendly nations, hostile nations, rogue states, and so on. ' (Beeman 2005: 41: quote in 
Lakoff 2004: 69). Lakoff describes this US propensity as a *metaphoric' sýstem: ýet. his 
arguments suggest that it goes beyond metonymy and in fact. is a representational 
practice that reflects US political emotionality, despite its claim to be a realist pomer. 
Sheikh approaches the perceptions of the US toward other states in a larger context of 
hierarchy: 'American political cosmology [is] a cosmology that stratifies states in a 
hierarchy, the horizontal rubrics of which range from the demons (revisionist states) to 
the divines (I i beral -democratic allies and clients), as per their ideological proximity vis-A- 
vis the American ideal' (Sheikh 2001: 4). 
In characterizing Iran as terrorist and a rogue, the US employed a term of 
rejection and disdain to describe what was previously a love object. As in the case of 
love, in which narcissism sees the desired object as an extension of self by obliterating 
the other's identity, so in the case of love's destruction, in which the contours of the other 
are erased by the narcissist's inability to see the object as an extension of self. Thus, in 
perceiving no validation of its own self, but instead, only painful reminders of its own 
deficiencies and fears, the US apprehended Iran as a menace, reflecting back onto the US 
self its own shame. Sick describes the intensity of the remorse (like guilt, a code word for 
internalized shame) of those in govemment who faulted themselves for allowing fellow 
countrymen to become enmeshed in the maw of such peril: 
[V]irtually everyone in the policy circle experienced some measure of personal 
ouilt for having permitted this predicament to occur, and that sense of culpability 
contributed to an exceptionally high level of emotionalism... it was almost like 
taking religious vows... (Sick 1985a: 221). 
Pollack, speaking as a member of the American intellectual elite, as ýýell as 'for 
i-nost Americans', admits that 'emotional obstacles play aver-y significant role in our 
differences' NN ith Iran, but goes on to dismiss American responsibilit" for that 
emotionality (2004: 171 -21). Denying the shame inculcated 
in those differences is a 
critical ethical issue. according to Scheff and Retzinger, in that *shame becomes part of 
one's character. [and] xN ould seem to interfere \\ ith the functioning of conscience* 
(1991: 187). As shame is experienced in response to immoral actions. ignoring it 
impedes 
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understanding the consequences of those actions. Pollack makes this .,, ividl\, clear as he 
captures the emotions of anger, blame. and buried pain that have contributed to 1-'S 
policies toward Iran, but he misses the critical component of shame: 
The hostage crisis has left a terrible scar on the American psyche. It is an episode 
so frustrating that most Americans have simply preferred to forget about it. ignore 
it, and minimize it as much as they can. However. few Americans have ever 
forgiven Iranians for it. It is America's great underlying grievance against Iran 
and as such it has been the *elephant in the living room' of US policý tox,, -ard Iran 
ever since. We never discuss it openly, but the residual anger that so many 
Americans feel toward Iran for those 444 days has colored (sic) ever" decision 
made about Iran ever since. (2004: 172) 
Nis performatively bears out Kernberg's contention that narcissism is often 
characterized by the ability to use sophisticated analytic interpretation in relation to the 
self, and yet, the process is less an act of self-awareness than emptying the expressed 
concepts of meaning. This he contends provides the narcissist the means to feel a sense of 
possession and superiority without engaging with the insight offered by the analysis 
(Kernberg 1975: Lasch 1967: 40). Pollack talks of the terrible scar left by the hostage 
crisis as the 'elephant in the living room', but his arguments, sophisticated though they 
are, do not reflect on the complexities of the grievance, or the consequences of its denial. 
From the outset, the interpretation of Iran's act as illegal and terrorist suggested to 
commentators and decision-makers alike that the ire of the US would not easily be 
assuaged, and that full retribution would follow once the freedom of the hostages had 
been accomplished. According to this view, no acknowledgement by Iran, even if it ýýere 
to be forthcoming, would be sufficient to re-secure diplomatic normalcy, implicating the 
shame-anger-revenge spiral to have done its work in so damaging the social bonds that 
tlieN would be comprehensible only in terms of strife. This rationalized the rh_), ht of 
revenge, the right to publicly punish. regardless of the terms the US agreed to in order to 
bring the hostages home. The need for revenge, however, implied on-going social 
bonding - an inability to let go. In fact, Americans saw it as a moral 
duty to bring justice 
to those practicino terrorism once Washington's hands \ý ere no longer tied b" the need to 
protect the hostages lives (ýVicker 1979: IHT 13/11). Negotiation ý, vas not seen as a sion 1. Z74 
of acquiescence concernino the perpetrators' right to practice such violations. As Sick 
explained: 
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When President Carter stated publicly in late November that the release of the 
hostages would not -vvipe the slate clean". he was expressing not onl% his 
personal view but also the view of many of his closest advisers and probabl" most 
of the American public at the time. that America had suffered a grievance that 
could not be rectified merely by a return to the status quo ante. The deep anger 
was a constant and inescapable element of policy-making at the time, and it Xýas 
fueled by endless hours of television coverage from Iran. (I 985b: 150). 
I lere Sick reveals that from the very beginning of the crisis, anger \ý as a 
significant contributor to policy that objectified Iran as a regime to be rejected. raged 
against and allowed no forgiveness. Safire often expressed frustration at the inabilitý of 
the US to bring appropriate action against Iran and anticipated with some relish the time 
when it could: 
'What does the US do when the impasse is resolved? [D]o \\e turn the other 
cheek, forgive and forget? On the contrary - we should treat this kidnapping with 
great seriousness and turn th is provocation to US advantage' (IHT I I/ I 1/ 1979). 
This passionate need to exact retribution and regain the advantage, NOich had no outlet as 
long as the administration favoured restraint to protect the hostages' lives, led to se',, 'Cre 
disappointment and self-doubt, even by many doves in the ranks of the media and the 
government. As Anthony Lewis commented in The Neu, York Times five months into the 
waiting game, the 'American posture is passive, even verging on the submissive', ýýhlle 
at the same time, 'it is inconsistent, unpredictable and undignified' (*The Vieý\ý from 
Fntebbe', 27/4/1980). The upshot was the sense that Iran had succeeded in its gambit. 
x0ile the US had allowed itself to be shamed (ibid). 
Writin, (.,, 25 years later, Pollack's language parallels uncannily. that of memoirists 
andjournalists writing much closer to the time, implicating his representational practices 
as bounded by the same disciplining of difference. and revealing that the emotional 
contingencies, having become institutionalized over time, have enabled little change in 
the discourse in the intervening years (p. 173). 
In effect, Iran, 'the insurgent'. had committed the unforgivable b", 'call[ingy] 
into 
Z7 
question the self-evidence of the existing order' (Dotý 1996: 85). B,. def"ing, the 
US. not 
. Just 
in the takim! of hostages, but in appearing not to care that Washington planned to 
i,, olate it. and condenin it \\ ithin the international familý of nations. Iran suggested 'the 
rossibility of alternatives-alternative political identities. altematke social arramements 
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and political orders-at both the domestic and the intemational level' (ibid). The 
unexpectedness of Iran's responses, the ambiguity and yet stabilitN of its positioning. 
dismayed Washington. As Sick observed: 'There was a tendency '. kithin the US 
government, especially among those engaged in managing this massiýe exercise in 
international public relations, to overestimate Iran's vulnerability to exterrial pressure' 
(I 985b: 218). One reason was that, to the US, insurgency was a phenomenon 
characterized by disaffected group activity, not the stance of a whole nation. A January 
1980 Congressional briefing by the White House, for instance, stated, 'the most powerful 
single political entity in Iran consists of the international terrorists or kidnappers, who are 
holding our hostages' (reprinted in Alexander and Nanes 1980: 495). This was a faulty 
heuristic that distilled the new Iranian state into the single structure upon which the US 
was focused, while ignoring the political machinery at work in the constitutional project, 
the reconstruction jihads being launched, and all the other activities conducted by other 
political entities. Further, by constructing the SFIL as 'international terrorists', the White 
[louse maintained the fiction that they were part of a network operating outside Iran. 
even if they were also working with Iranian clerical support. Dismay that the precarious 
'domestic ordering' in Iran did not crumble, or even provide expected openings for US 
and other international pressure, heightened the tension and confusion in the making of 
policy. 
Iran thus problematized the concept of insurgency in a wider context. in that 
re - Jection of 
the existing order was the product of a national, and to a large extent, popular 
stance. Symbolically, the hostage taking irretrievably confirmed that Iran had not only 
rejected the US as an object of its affection but that it had adopted an alternative 
teleology of world order, namely, the divine inspiration (and protection) of Islam. This 
re. lection \ý, as interpreted in the subjectivity of American identitý, production as an act of 
political violence that could threaten the entire fabric of the international order. The 
ambiguity of this peril, and the perception of arbitrary and unfounded hatred associated 
\\ ith it. \\as productive of a fear and anger that could only be understood in terrorist 
terms. fixing the boundary between the US self and the Iranian other as the border 
bet\\ een inside the \\ orld order and outside. as , it' alone and 'us' together. In its 
percei\ ed role as the leader of the free \vorld, however. the US as the ever-caring parent - 
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not just of the obstreperous and hurtful child. but of all the nations in its communitý - 
could not allow such 'bad' behaviour to go unchallenged. Sovereiptý and freedom ýýere 
signifiers that from Washington's perspective remained in flux when attached to Iran. 
Further, it allowed for the idea of retribution as a corrective measure not onlý to re-secure 
US honour, but to secure Iran's real freedom (as well as international order). Iran's 
rejection of America was ignored as ridiculous, while America's rejection of Iran's 
clerical leadership was privileged as rational. 
Since the hostage taking was represented in the US discourse as a signifier of 
Iranian and Islamic identity, rather than as an aberration (a unique act, for example, of 
mob violence, see Boyle 1985: 195), the release of the hostages inspired a promise hy the 
newly elected President Reagan to institutionalize American security such that acts of 
hostage-taking and terrorism would suffer punishing consequences (Simpson 1985: 3 1. 
NSDD 30, reprinted in ibid: 112-115, Reagan 'To the Congress of the US' in ibid: 408- 
411 ). Further, Iran's rhetoric of revolutionary export was interpreted as an overt 
expression of terrorist mobilization, and virtually every act of Islamic terrorism during 
the ensuing decade was attributed directly to Iranian influence and cooperation (K. 
Fatemi, *3000 Days of Ayatollah Khomeini', Wall Street Journal 30/4/1987: Weinberger 
1990: 250; Wright 1985: 139-40). This need to blame Iran as the puppet-master of all 
Middle East terrorist activity, such as the shut-down of Mecca in 1980, the TWA 
hijacking in 1985, the Beirut bombing (of 'Fortress America'), and the Kuwait Airlines 
jacking in 1988, instrumental ized the ongoing outrage felt by the American population hi -1 
at large and US government actors toward Iran (Wright 1985: 109). Suspicion of its 
motives, actions and reach were contextualized in an unfulfilled need to exact vengeance. 
The ongoing but disguised US hurt was thereby translated into a pattern of policies that 
continuously enflamed the wounded social bonds, implicating the US as no more able to 
separate itself from Iran than Iran in fact was able to separate from the US. 
As the US adopted the increasingly forceful position of representing itself (and 
I'Lirope) as the moral utopla(s) of democracy, that is, as terrorism's opposite. the 
narcissistic apprehension of meanings associated with democracy fractionated off the 
conditions of possibility that Islam and democracy could be compatible. 
This re-figuring 
of the ideoloov of universalism (\\liich previousk maintained that all peoples 
desired and 
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could achieve democracy), Hurd identifies as drawing on Judeo-Christian 
representational practices in which democracy is understood as incompatible ýý Ith other 
religions' tenets, a discourse that had been overshadoxýed ýý, hile the site of fear focused 
on Godless communism (Hurd 2005: 17)4. In the shifting of endangerment to re-include a 
site understood as religiously inspired, namely, Islamic terrorism, tyranný and terrorism 
were represented as twinned in their blasphemy against democracy. Arendt suggests that 
the construction of reality in such ideological terms creates *a coherent ýýorld, albeit an 
entirely fictitious one' (Arendt 1973: 475). This false analogy, vhich linked terrorism to 
tyranny in an ideologically freighted heuristic. necessitated mobilization ýýithin the 
Fiction of complete good versus complete evil, superior versus inferior. To Robin, 
'ideology' in this way becomes 'a moral narcotic altering its adherents' sense of ethical 
reality' (Robin 2002: 119; Sheikh 2001: 4-, for contending discussion, see Howarth 
2000: 92). 
Under Carter's watch, both the 'tough conservative' and the 'pragmatist' 
discursive strands represented Iran as having rejected democracy outright, first by ousting 
the Shah and second, by spurning the moderates after the revolution. As such, Iran was 
apprehended as not only led by a violently tyrannical regime, but as representing a 
people-and a religion--incapable of choosing and practicing democracy. What failed to 
be examined was how a popularly supported government, elected by its constituents, but 
representing views and values and actions that did not parallel Western ones, differed 
from a democracy-and what that meant for American understandings? The US could 
not publicly examine this question because of the fear and anger with which the US now 
apprehended its previous love object, and the vulnerability of its universalist idealism to 
the shame of rejection. 
The danger was heightened because Iran was a state the US understood onk,, 
obscurely, butvhich, because of Iran's own claim to universalio" and moral utopianism. 
x\as constructed in the American discourse as impervious to democracy and dangerouslý 
expanding the barbaric terrain of terrorism. It was in this terrain, affirmed British 
Orientalist Elie Kedouri. that Iran \\as most comfortable. 'The fact that political 
Hurd makes no claims to a historical Judeo-Christian linkage. but simplý that both inhered in their 
traditions negative % le%%s to%%ard other religions' democratic practices and capabilities. 
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terrorism originating in the Muslim and Arab world is constantly in the headlines must 
not obscure the perhaps more significant fact that this terrorism has an old historv. ' he 
stated (Kedourie 1987: 12). Thus, in his genealogy of Islamic terrorists. which starts off 
with the 'first political assassination' of Ali and concludes with 'Khomeini's Iran 
exemplifying a "terrorist state"', the incoherence of linking such diverse and historically 
spread-out acts is obscured in the fabric of historical trompe-l'oeuil, which fills the 
historical content of Islam with representations of violence and terror. those fruits of its 
failure to respond to Westernization. This veiled emotionality was equally practiced bN 
Bernard Lewis, who in several works, including 'The Roots of Muslim Rage' (ýýritten ten 
years after the hostage crisis), represents 2 Oth -century Islam as so corrupted with hatred 
at the power of the infidel that it is in fact beyond rehabilitation. 'Clearly. something 
deeper is involved than these specific grievances numerous and important as they may 
be-something deeper that turns every disagreement into a problem and makes every 
problem insoluble' (1990: 24). Relations with Iran epitomized this insolubility, and the 
fear such fundamental incompatibility between self and other implied. 
Reagan, like his successors, developed no detailed policy toward Iran because, 
once the hostages had been released, the US perceived no benefit in acknowledging it, 
only harm - an attempt at establishing status by officially ignoring it, despite the political 
strife that continued to reveal an ongoing relationship between the two (Pollack 2004: 
182). Iran represented 'abnormal values' and 'emotional imbalance'-, to avoid hurt was 
understood, therefore, as a rational policy choice (ibid: 177). In Weinberger's memoirs, he 
remembers the feeling clearly: 'I ý, vas always completely convinced as I am to this day 
that it is impossible, unwise and very undesirable to try to secure any kind of relationship 
or have any kind of negotiations with a county led. as Iran is. by fanatical terrorists ýý hose 
principal platform is vitriolic and unreasoning hostility to America and to all the values 
\\e honour' (Weinberger 1990: 250) 5. Here Weinberger echoes a view propounded b,,,, 
5 Weinberger disapproved of the plan to provide 'arms for hostages' to Iran, killing a draft covert action 
finding to that effect in the fall of 1985. Uninformed about Iran-Contra until it broke, he considered it a 
confirmation of his % lew of Iran, and wasjoined by most of Reagan's administration in his perception that 
the US had once more been % ictimized and shamed by Iran. See 'Draft NSDD US strateg-, for Iran' in 
Christopher Simpson (1995) National Security Directives ofthe Reagan and BushAdministrations. - The 
declassýfied history ol'U. S. political and military polic , v, 
1981-1991 (Oxford: \Vest,, ie%ý Press). pp. 452-3. 
Casper Weinberger (1990) Fighting. for Peace. Seven Critical Years at the Pentagon (London: Michael 
Joseph), chapter 12. 
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Carter and increasingly employed as a refrain in foreign policy construction: that hostilitN 
to the US was not only a danger, but a form of -unreasoned' deviance. In this ý\a\. 
sentiment was projected outward in a perpetuation of polic\ that enframed the US both as 
victimized by others and as ready always to fight for its principles. 
Vice President George H. Bush. in the course of the presidential campaign in 
October 1984 stated: 
'Let me assure you of one thing: the United States under this administration II 
never, never, never let terrorism or fear of terrorism shape or determine the 
foreign policy of the United States of America. We are not going to move out 
because terrorists move in. We are too great. We are too strong. We are too proud. 
And we are too principled to let terrorism shape our foreign policy' (, Velv York 
Times 28/10/1984). 
In these ringing words, meaning can be seen to be the exact opposite of what Bush 
actually states: a denial of the shame and anger the US was experiencing in a projection 
of muscular superiority through exaggerated communications symbols of status. 
Secretary of State George Shultz had officially launched the First War on Terrorism that 
spring, and legislation suggested by Reagan had successfully been passed by Congress 
(Simpson 1995: 454) 
'The hostage crisis reawakened the United States to an old reality: that its good 
intentions are not enough' Weisman states in No Hiding Place (1980: 228). Reagan, who 
offered heroic leadership, and a rhetoric of gunboat diplomacy, appealed to the battered 
., \merican self, which understood itself to have been the innocent object of terrorism 
despite its best of intentions. 'Iran provided Americans a look into the abyss of hatred for 
, i\rnerica abroad that is going to make it more difficult, especially on an emotional level, 
to do future business ýkith the Third World', Weisman warned (ibid: 228) 
Shifting Endangerment from the Cold War to the First War on Terror 
'Fhe discursive economy of terrorism enabled the hostage crisis. and by extension. Islamic 
politics, to be internationalized. Moral equivalence ýýas discursively disciplined in the 
conflUence of common significations for the communist (totalitarian) and the Islamic 
terrorist evils. Meanings and fears domesticated in the signifiers of innocence and 
ictirnization simpl\ drew from established codes vvithin the totalitarian discourse to 
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imbue the terrorism narrative with an already familiar internationalized otherness that 
imperiled the West, both at its individual and societal levels. Use of the false analouý to 
link them heightened emotionalized discourses around both. since the perception that 
they worked in parallel ways to destroy democracy increased the sense of identit\ 
insecurity being experienced in the democratic world. As it can be argued that 
Washington maintained a separate relationship of political strife ýýith both Moscoýý and 
Tehran, discourses of alienation and hostility in regards to the one now informed the 
6 
other. The two coexisted for over a decade, aspects of the discursive construction of the 
one bleeding into the other and visa versa as the fresher danger of Islamic terrorism 
developed in importance within the Reagan administration. No longerjust as an isolated 
incident that took place during Carter's tenure, Shi'a-Islamic hostage-taking. no\ý in its 
second permutation in Lebanon, was increasingly understood as a more generalized 
Western problem. 
What remained ambiguous was how to define terrorism, what level of proof ýý as 
required before retaliation could be carried out, and whether pre-emptive strikes were a 
moral necessity or morally wrong. Even the tough Reagan administration rhetoric %\as 
unable to discipline a hegemonic discourse that effectively inscribed the border between 
the US self, in the exercise of legitimate use of force (including pre-emptive self- 
defense), and the 'terrorist' other, which served to weaken American representative 
practices in responding to its violence (Simpson 1985: 454). A Khomeini statement such 
as '\ý, e are not worried about invasion, we are worried about American ideas', for 
emimple. contributed as seriously to US representations of Iran as terrorist, as any threat 
or use of force by Iran, legitimate or otherwise. Such a statement, in other words. as part 
of a politics of strife, was construed as an attack. Likevýise, an ally of the US. discursi,, elý 
represented as an upstanding member of the community of nations, such as Iraq at the 
time, or Israel, can be understood to have been given ýN ide discretion in the use of self- 
defence (or pre-emptive self-defence) NN ithout concern that it \wuld be produced as a 
terrorist act (Cottarn 1989. Zunes 200' 3: 33). 
mthough it is he\ ond the scope of this stud\ to deta, I anal ysis of the relationship 
bet \ýeen Moscow and 
Washington, based on the theoretical anal,, sis presented in chapter two. It can 
be seen to have been a 
Isolating. but ongoing relationship of political stri fe. 
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From the outset, a strong narrative connection was made bemeen Marxism and 
Iran's Islamic revolution. Conditioned to see subversion as communist inspired, there 
appeared from the very beginning to be a determination to see the hostage takers as 
somehow operating under Soviet direction or otherwise linked to the left. In particular. 
the student-clerical axis seemed to elude the administration, which. according to John 
Kifner of the New York Times, 'tended to view the militants in standard "red menace" 
terms'. Fie quotes White House Press Secretary Jody Powell as telling reporters a good 
two months after the seizure that they followed 'a rather radical and certainl-y a Marxist 
line' (quotes in Kifner 1981: 182). Influential scholars such as the Hudson Institute's 
Constantine Menges, and senior journalists such as CBS's Marvin Kalb, stated, NkIthout 
reference to specific sources, their presumption that the fundamentalist Muslim hostage 
takers were working in conjunction with the Soviets (communists) and the PLO, because 
they shared a 'coincidence of interests' (NBC Today Show 10/12/1979, CBS 12/12/1979, 
Menges: The New Republic 15/12/ 1979-, Said 1997: 87). Said notes that no more 
evidence was necessary than the 'diabolism' of communism 'in natural alliance ýN ith the 
devilish PLO and satanic Muslims' (ibid). 
For Reagan, riding to the White House on polls in which 71 percent of the US 
electorate agreed that 'the US has been at the mercy of the Ayatollah, ý\, ho has made us 
look weak and helpless' (IHT. 15/4/1980), and who repeatedly asserted that US security 
\ýas at risk because Carter was a vacillator and peacemaker and had allowed the military 
to so degenerate that 'it was incapable of defending the country (-War and Politics'. The 
Yation 26/4/80: 48 1), it was time for Americans 'to dream heroic dreams' again, and to 
embark on 'a crusade for freedom" (First Inaugural Address. 20/1/198 1; Address to 
i-nembers of the British Parliament 8/6/1982). Further, the spectre of seeing Moscow 
sweep into a weak Iran in a repeat performance of Afghanistan, served to link. ho\ý cý er 
tenuously, the idea of Soviet-sponsorship of anti-American terrorism under the auspices 
of Islamic terrorism in the Middle East (Taheri 1988: 141). Read,,, to redress the tarnished 
image of the US in the wake of both Vietnam and Iran. Reagan's administration 
perceived American credibility to ride on American military capability. With the 
liosta, ges' release, the perceived need for restraint \ý as rendered moot. and replaced 
by an 
,,,, to ensure against further self-sacrifice at the hands of Islamist eNil. offenske strateL 
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This gave the use of force greater signification in the passionate construction of 'post- 
hostage-crisis America' (Pollack 2004: 173) A discourse of vengeance noýý could enjoy 
free play as a way to assuage American hurt and shame. Yet even here, the backbone of 
principle that was constituted as primary within the American self acted to . ustify that J 
violence in terms of innocence, figuring revenge as ultimately serving the good of 
mankind (McCrisken 2003: in the discourse of Carter's administration. see 61, of 
Reagan's, see 94). 
The construction of the Iran hostage situation as a product of terrorism enacted hý 
ideologically driven individuals supported by the state, energized the US discourse on 
Soviet-sponsored terrorism, particularly as it affected the Arab states and Israel. This ýýas, 
provoked by a perceived ambiguity in how aligned or even dependent the Iranian Muslim 
tactics were, or what was defined as terrorist activity encouraged by the Soviet Union 
elsewhere in the Middle East. This included the PLO, the serial plane hijackerAbu- 
Mussa, and Soviet-backed Syria, which harboured The Jackal, the Venezuelan who held 
the members of OPEC hostage in 1975 in Vienna. The figuration of terrorism as a hand- 
maiden or twin of totalitarianism became a topic of serious debate by an intellectual 
circle within the Reagan administration (which included, among others. neoconservatives 
as ý\iell as members of the Christian right) (Halper and Clark 2004: 70: McAlister 2005: 
220; Wills 2003: chapter 1). In dialogue with counterparts in the Israeli political elite, 
several US officials, among them CIA-director William Casey. accused the Soviets of 
inserting indoctrination into terrorist camps in places such as Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and 
Libya (Wills 2003: 33). At the same time. reports of Iran's inspiration of Islamic militants 
in such places as Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain. Kuwait and Qatar, were perceived as 
threatening both Israeli and US national interests and shared security (Wright 1985). 
The overlap of American and Israeli discourses of terrorism served to 
internationalize the concept of terrorism in such a way that the citizens of democracies 
\\ere interpreted to be the primary victims because they served to bring international 
rnedia attention to the terrorists. something that purehy, local terrorism did not 
do 
(NetanNahu, ed. 1986). This privileged certain types of terrorism over others, specificallý 
hostage-taking (of Western victims). hijackings (In"oh. ng Western tra"elieres). and 
suicide-bombings (of Western targets). The specific Israeli contribution to the discourse 
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privileged the act of rescuing hostages rather than negotiating for them-an approach that 
fit well within the shifted American discourse that perceived US honour as countenancing 
no further humiliation. At the Second Conference on International Terrorism in 
Washington, Shultz noted that like the threat of international communism which 
imperiled the free world through its disdain for the rights of the private citizen. and by 
association, the values at the core of America's universalism, so terrorism. * %ý herever it 
takes place, is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies, against our 
most basic values' ( 1986: 18). Like tyranny, terrorism victimized the private citizen for 
the sake of public purpose-and that purpose was understood to be Western public 
opinion. Thus, local terrorism was no longer understood to be on a par with international 
terrorism, since the latter, like international communism, transgressed borders ýý ith the 
purpose of invading not only domestic security but intemational order (McAlister 
2005: 221). 
Another contributor to the Conference was US Ambassador to the UN. Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, a first generation neoconservative who, like Caspar Weinberger, Irving 
Kristol, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, was committed to the global credibility strand of the 
I conservative' discourse and containment of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Kirkpatrick 
neatly sets out how American conceptions of victimization and innocence enabled a 
reading of terrorism that was deeply entangled in the narrative of totalitarianism, while at 
the same time, enframing aspects of the latter discourse in terrorism's re-inscription of 
., \merican identity. 
The affinities between terrorism and totalitarianism are multiple. Both politicize 
society. The totalitarian makes society, culture and even personality the objects of 
his plans and actions; the terrorist sees the whole of society as the object of his 
violence, his war. Both regard violence as an appropriate means to their political 
ends and both use violence as the instrument of first resort. Both reject the basic 
moral principles of Judeo-Christian civilization. Both terrorists and totalitarians 
act and see themselves as acting in the name of a new morality.... 
I see two important links between totalitarianism and terrorism. First. the most 
powerful totalitarian state of our time is also the principal supporter and sponsor 
of international terrorism. Second, those who pursue poNýer hý using terrorism 
generalIN aspire to form totalitarian societies.... (Harpers 1984: 44-46). 11 - 
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In the terse first two sentences, Kirkpatrick draws on the familiar and already understood 
discourse surrounding totalitarianism to situate her vie\ý of terrorism. 'Both politicize 
society' is thus presumed to be understood by the reader as a condemnation, implý ing 
that society is not naturally political, but instead, the realm of ordinary people conducting 
their private lives far from the institutions of politics. Totalitarianism and terrorism both 
are interpreted as rending asunder the safe haven which is 'the whole of societ\, ' and 
turning it into an illegitimate battlefield. The only difference between the two is their 
place in 'the hierarchy of institutional politics' (Fortin 1989: 198). In coldly bureaucratic 
and 'rational' language, Kirkpatrick isolates and fences off the terrorist from an\. 
legitimate social purpose (thus distinguishing him from a freedom fighter), and sees him 
instead as utilizing violence solely to subvert the public. Kirkpatrick denies an\, Just 
cause to the motives of those she describes, seeing them as a-moral. and bý so doin-(-,,. 
renders them faceless -a deeply shaming act in relation to another human being. 
Kirkpatrick's erasure suggests a fear and hatred that cannot countenance the individual. 
In assuming the superiority of the 'moral principles of Judeo-Christian civilization'. she 
denies those principles historicity and ethics and situates the confrontation as 
civilizational-that is between the Judeo-Christian world (itself a post-World War 11 
construct that denies the violence that previously characterized their relations) and the 
Muslim world. 
Kirkpatrick's pattem of thinking employs signifiers interchangeably for both 
totalitarianism and terrorism, and by so doing, privileges the innocence of the Western 
private sphere as the object of their violence. In the revitalization of the war against 
communism that was taking place in the personalized war of the terrorist, the language 
implies that the attack, the first salvo, is coming from the *other' side, and hence, 
containment or counter-force are rationalized as necessary, and linked. 
7 
7 US support for the Sunnijihadists in Afghanistan fighting against the aggression of the 
Soý let Union %k as 
not constructed in terms of Islamic terrorism, which at the time was confined to specific groups such as 
Iran's s (see footnote 8, chapter 5), the Islamic Brotherhood in Egypt which had 
killed President Sadat. and 
extremists in Saudi Arabia x% hich had taken over the Great Mosque in Mecca. 
To Kirkpatrick and others, 
, 
han 'guerrillas' were fighting tN, rann,,, not abetting it, and therefore ne,, er referred to as 
Islamic the . -\ 
fa 
militants. but instead, constructed in the positive light of counter-terrorism. It was, in 
fact, because the% 
\\ere framed so ýer\ differentIN in the discourse that their turn against the 
US \Nas so shocking - an 
OPpOrtUT11t\ for the analý sis of an engulfing relationship of political lo\ e gone 
bad that exceeds the 
dimensions of this study. 
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The US attempt to turn this post-hostage discourse into a hegemonic 
representation ot I terrorism and totalitarianism, had a powerful advocate in Kirkpatrick. 
who, as Halper and Clarke note, 'used her position at the UN to its full capacity in 
convincing the other member states that they were fully accountable for their behaviour 
toward America' (2004: 75). The perception that terrorism had the same reach as 
totalitarianism in what CIA Director Casey was already calling *a perpetual war v'Ithout 
borders'l emotionalized a discourse in which failure to preempt such primal violence %%as 
constructed as the ultimate shame (McAlister 2005: 218, quote in Wills 2003: 3-3)). 
Iranian Revolutionary Export as Terrorism 
In Reagan's perception, the superior 'moral power' of the United States implicitly made 
its actions good for mankind, and hence, there was no need for post-Carter discussions of 
redemption (since America had in fact never 'fallen'). Nor was there need for soul- 
searching as to why terrorism targeted Americans, beyond its obvious rejection of 
American values and commitment to democracy (McCrisken 2003: 93-34). However, the 
social and political impact of the hostage crisis lingered in Washington, affecting for 
example, the policy decisions concerning the on-going Iran-Iraq War. *Our official policy 
was to remain neutral in this conflict', Wienberger stated, 'but the Iranian outrages 
against our people, beginning in 1979, made it difficult for me to remain neutral in any 
conflict in which Iran was a party. ' (1990: 25 1). Weinberger's claim to neutrality (and his 
begrudging acknowledgement that it was difficult) points to the reification of the shame- 
anger spiral in the construction of policy. 
The increasing incidence of terrorist activity in the Gulf region, including 
bombings, hijackings, foiled coup attempts (such as in Bahrain in 1981 by 'militants') 
and finally, the Beirut Marine bombing in 1983. embedded the contingency of Iran's 
revolutionary export as the culprit behind it all, even vvhen its involvement ývas 
untraceable (Wright 1985: 19,14 1). Commented Weinberger. I also felt, with some 
support from the intelligence community, that most of our citizens ýNho had been seized 
and held as hostages in the Middle East over the ý ears since 1984 had been kidnapped 
either by direct Iranian action or by the actions of people ý\orking for and under the 
direction of' Iran' (ibid: 25-2). This heuristic. borne of moti-vated bias is here rationalized 
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by relying on ', vome support from the intelligence community'. Thus, for example. 
though the Beirut bombing was directed at Marines. that is, soldiers in the serx ice of the 
American military quartered in Lebanon to act as not altogether neutral peace-keepers in 
a civil war, the bombing was constituted as an act of state-sponsored terrorism rather than 
an act of institutionally recognized warfare. Not only was it represented as victimizing 
unwary innocents on a par with the hostages taken in Tehran (only in Beirut. they had 
died), but to ensure against the shame of such an interpretation, the definition of terrorism 
8 
was made to include the targeting of off-duty personnel. The act was interpreted as 
Funded and manipulated from Iran for the purpose of exporting its violence not only into 
Israel's near abroad, but back into American living rooms, once again, to gain American 
attention. 
As Iranian handiwork was perceived to be expanding the realm of terrorism, 
while the Soviet danger was observed by some in the Reagan administration to be 
lessening (as both its rhetoric and the belligerency of its behaviour began to wane), a 
reassessment began. In place of the fear of Soviet communism, the greater diabolical 
enemy gradually became Islamism led by Iran, with its export of Islamic revolution, and 
its shadowy networks of terrorists (Cottam 1990: 28 1, Halliday 1990: 256; Hoogland 
1990). 
8 Fhe US State Department -Definition of Terrorism', Title 22 US Code, Section 2656(d). states in 
Footnote I (its sole footnote, NNhich significantly elaborates on the definition of 'non-combatant'), that it 
inc I udes: 'ciNi I ians, and mi I itar-N personnel N%ho are unarmed and not on duty. In addition, attacks on 
nillitarN installations or armed militar,, personnel %N hen a state of militar,, hostilities 
does not exist are also 
considered to be terrorist acts. ' This definition, it states separately, has been 'employed since 11)83'-, ýee 
%% \% \%. state. go%. 
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British Democracy and Competing Freedoms: The Satanic Verses, thefatwa and the 
enemy wit in 
'Salman Rushdie is in hiding, but in the Muslim world, he is everv,,, ýhere. ' 
--Mahnaz Ispahani. The New Republic -3 Y 711989 
jThe British] government has taken the lead in making this matter purely political. The 
more they take this line, it will have a disastrous effect for the whole world'. 
--Akhundzadeh Basti. Iranian Char& D'Affaires, London 1/3/1989 
The call by British Muslims to ban the Satanic Verses, followed by Ayatollah 
Khomeini'sfatwa on February 14,1989, condemning its author, Salman Rushdie, to 
death, unleashed passions in response to perceived threats to British identity security that 
were to have long-term consequences. Indeed, the Affair was a nodal point in the British 
discourse of self, in which the need to secure fundamental norms constituting 
Englishness2 emotionalized signifiers of freedom, democracy and secularism as referents 
of identity. The publication of The Satanic Verses enabled a modem discursive conflict to 
be fought over the role of religious practice in both domestic politics and international 
relations. In effect, the Rushdie Affair inspired two significant shifts in the hegemonic 
British discourse: a) it implicated the threat of anti-democratic Islamic violence 
(terrorism) as both a national and international danger; b) it represented protection of 
religion \\ ithin state practices as less compelling than the promotion of liberal notions of 
freedom 3. 
' Quoted in Lisa Appingnanesi and Sarah Maitland (1989) The Rushdie File (London: Fourth Estate), p. 
1.16 
2 Gamble inverts the usage of 'English' and 'British' as labels for the purpose of generalizing ident, tN, 
stating, for example, 'The Enidish, which included all the British'. This usage of 'English' and 
'I'tiglishness' as describing the 'self that all Britons understood themselýes to be within the Union is 
adopted here in this chapter. Andrew Gamble (2003) Betvveen Europe and America, The. 11iture ol British 
Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), p. 63: see also Talal Asad (1993) Geiiealogies ql'Religion: 
ýiscipline and Reasons qf'Power in Chrl'Stianitýý and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press), p. 244. 
It is interesting in light of the conflict betN% een state protections to freedom Of expression and sensibilities 
ofbelief (%Nhich had their follow-up in the Danish cartoon affair), that the protection of religious dress in 
the performance of state duties %ý as \ iewed as acceptable and became, in the first decade of the 21" century. 
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Fhe rhetoric and behaviours elicited by the Rushdie Affair invol% ed passionate 
political exchange, not only with Iran, but internally. In the former case. this ruptured 
what had been over the previous year (1988) a gradually neutralizing policy bemeen the 
UK and Iran (Joffe 1991: 80). In the latter, official representations of muiticulturalism 
became emotionalized and increasingly exclusive, and mobilized the population to adopt 
-core British values' as a requirement of inclusion (Patten 1989). In both instances. it 
prompted an increasingly monological discourse in relation to both the international and 
domestic objects of threat, following the pattern in which the 'other' is objectified. in 
essence, becoming 'a subject of one's own conscience, ýkhich can be interpreted and 
modified at will as a function of the self s own needs as an identity' (Guillaume 2002: 9). 
At the heart of the Rushdie Affair was the concept of freedom of expression and 
how it related to British commitments to democracy. Freedom, by virtue of its location at 
the centre of British identity, inspired strong passions in defending it against competing 
representations by Muslim forces inside and outside Britain. Hoý\ever, the very act of 
protecting this freedom narrowed it as a code of social representation in contravention to 
both historical and current practice. In this way, it seeded a politics of strife not only 
between the British government and its primarily Sunni Muslim communities at home, 
but with Muslims elsewhere, particularly in relations with Iran. As the outrage of 
Britain's Muslims wasjoined not only by Sunni Muslims across the globe, but Shias as 
ýkel I, the Affair did important work in discursively casting the vast Islamic communW, as 
a single, undifferentiated Muslim threat. The Affair thus served to naturalize emotional 
expressions associated with a generalized Islamophobia. (Poole 2000: 158). 
The passions that marked the debate around freedom of expression and freedom 
ofbelief, as well as around the degree of protection accorded to either by society and the 
state, suggests that the crisis unleashed by the Rushdie Affair cannot be explained b., 
reference alone to an objective threat said to reside in the actions of Iran or the calls for 
censorship by the Asian communities in Britain. Instead, it reflects hoýý responses ýýere 
instrurnentalized based on conviction. suggesting an economý of passion that mobilized 
action rather than restraint (in contravention to the classic British. 'stiff upper lip'. ýOich 
offiiciallý protected in regards Muslim practices. following alreadý established Sikh practice,, in 
Britain, 
this stood in contrast to practices established In the same period in France. 
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seeks to control the environment by controlling the feelings [Coils 2007: 47]). In fact. the 
Rushdie Affair can be seen to have been a reaction to a deep seated sense of betra.... -al, as 
it spotlighted the tenuous social bonds linking resident minorit'v luslim communities to 
British society in a relationship of engulfing pseudo-assimilation. The revealed 
alienation. which until then had been suppressed, elicited shock and denial on both sides, 
the failure to effect solidarity within British society experienced as a source of un- 
acknowledged shame. The perception that its ex-colonial, 'black", Muslim minorities did 
not 'de-seW (or efface) themselves sufficiently, and instead, exhibited disrespect for 
British mores, underlay the anger that infused popular responses. In the self-righteous 
narcissistic imaginary that constructed Britain as having it in its power to bestow its 
universalist values on a perpetually willing community of others, the breakdoýýn in these 
social bonds was deeply disillusioning, and provoked a raft of self-protective discursi"e 
reflexes on the part of both the liberal public and the political elite to insulate the British 
self from further harm. 
The simmering disconnect between official discourses of assimilation and the lack 
of it by the Muslim communities erupted during the Rushdie Affair into a national crisis 
of public anger at what was perceived as a moral siege, and of private fears regarding the 
enemy' within. This re-ignited in the English collective memory the 'alien-ness of the 
colonial 'other' with their distinct religious and ethnic traditions. It also re-naturalized the 
emotionally structured Orientalist dialectic of a superior/inferior hierarchy, ýýhich dreýý, 
on the legacy of Empire as it became politicized into racism, and from ethnic racism to 
religious racism (Gamble 2003: 64) 
This chapter examines this passionate discursive crisis. Attention is dra,, %n to the 
groýN, ing parity in representational practices between the UK and the US not in order to 
insist that a grand clash of civilizations is inevitable, but to illustrate that rhetorical 
strategies of superiority and exclusion are common mechanisms in the 
imperial/exceptionalist encounter - that is, the meanings and presumptions associated 
\\ith the \\ay dominance and po\\er emotionalize and negate altemative interpretations of 
reality are global in nature 4. In the case of Britain and the United States. the added 
Similar practices can be seen in the Athenian case as laid out in Thuc,, dides, see 
R. N. Leboýk (2001) 
,, rhucN, dides the Constructi\ ist' American Political Science Review. Vol. 95, (3), pp. 547-560, and 
in 
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dimension of their own special relationship. and their shared language and literature. 
contributed to the conditions of possibility for a gradual merging at key points to 
establish a common Anglo-American discourse in respect to democracý promotion. the 
threat of Iran, and Islamic radicalism. 
The trajectory of the British discourse in various ways mirrored the American 
response to the hostage crisis, and is of interest, since at the time of that crisis, Britain's 
stance had reflected more closely the European rather than American discourse. In short, 
it perceived the hostage crisis as an unnecessarily 'public' conflict in which innocence 
was not clearly demarcated, and viewed American handling of the crisis as over- 
internationalized, over-politicized and over-emotionalized. 
Yet, once confronted with a politicized Islamic crisis of its own, in which 
religious ethics were seen to clash with secular ones, and, fundamental norms 
underpinning identity security were perceived to be at stake, British politicians and public 
alike adopted a position in many ways analogous to the American. Terrorism, particularl,, 
as regards the actions of Iran (but not exclusively so), was adopted as a signifier to 
describe the barbaric moral activism underpinning all variants of radical Islam, 
particularly regarding what was construed as the transgression of private space through 
the public sphere. Although the hostage-taking and the_)ýýtlva were quite different in 
nature, the question as to whether Khomeini's actions were acts of war haunted both, and 
characterized debate in the media and political spheres in both cases. Like the Iranian 
community inside the US, which was perceived to be an extension of Tehran during the 
hostage crisis, the Muslim community inside Britain came quickly to be linked in the 
course of the Affair to the Muslim community abroad. As in the US at that time, it was no 
, er vleNved as an integral part of 
British society, but as a Fifth column for outside long 
N, Iuslim forces and therefore a potent threat to the harmony of British society. In this 
context, no opportunity of self-conception allowed for a British understanding of the 
Iranian declaration as other than a claim upon its Muslim community, and an incitement 
to infuse that community with its o%, ý n dangerous norms and practices. T hese meanings 
rnade thinkable the British construction of the /, ýrwa as an act of cultural intervention 
imperial Japan, see Xaý jer Guillaume (2002) 'Foreign Policý and the Politics of Alterity A 
dialogical 
understanding of intemational relations', AII'llenhim. - Jow-nal ol 1wernational Studies, Vol. 31 (1 ), pp 
1-26. 
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equivalent to state terrorism, a position that helped cement British and American polic', 
toward Iran, as well as aligning them in regards to Islamic militancy. 
The passions evoked by the Rushdie Affair. notjust in Britain. but in the US as 
well as other parts of Europe (especially Germany) and many parts of the "Ouslim world 
(particularly Pakistan and India), loosed previously fixed meanings associated with 
hegemonic discourses relating to Christianity and Islam and their relation to democracy. 
This took place not only within the communities in these states. but in relations between 
states, affecting modern discourses that however uncomfortably, had momentarily 
diffused and suppressed binaries such as inferior/superior, state religion/democracy, 
Muslim/ Christian, post-colonial/modem, religious freedom/secular freedom, bigoted 
/enlightened. For Britain, the shock of the Iranian fiw-vva, as well as the reprise of colonial 
tensions this time expressed internally, evoked condemnations of 'inappropriate' 
behaviour by the other, and a rapid sequencing of shame (humiliation) and anger. 
The next section briefly reviews the literature, and is followed by an analysis of 
* Fngl ishness' as a contributor to concepts of self, and the way interpretations and 
responses to the Affair were conceived within the public domain. The body of the chapter 
focuses on the discourse as expressed in the signifiers of innocence and victimization. 
Since domestic discursive strategies informed and were informed by the elaboration of 
identity internationally, the political passions released during the Bradford book burning 
are considered for purposes of elucidating the discursive structures operationalized in 
response to theftinva. By making visible the motivated bias that informed the political 
decision-making process, a politics of passion is revealed to have infused the discourse, 
contributing to a politics of strife both inside Britain and in its policies toward Iran. The 
implications for the Anglo-American discursive construction of exclusive democracy, 
and the positioning of British international relations. concludes the chapter. 
A Politicized Literature 
Fhe Rushdie Affair broke almost quiethy, Nvith the banning, of the, ýatanic Verses in India 
Just ten daN s after its publication by Viking on September 25,1988. The outrage then 
rose oradually. until it reached a double crescendo. first v, -ith the Bradford book buming) 
on JanuarN 14.1989, and then, exactIN a month later in February v, ith the Khomeini 
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fatwa. Over the following months, its intensity subsided. although as Poole points out. 
media references to Rushdie as an iconic signifier of Muslim violence and religious 
rigidity continue (2000: 164-5). It was throughout, like the hostage crisis, a media 
phenomenon, although in contradistinction to that event. it engendered a di" isi'. e and at 
times viciously passionate debate between pro- and anti-Rushdie campaigners that raged 
not just inside England, but throughout both the Muslim and Western worlds. This 
debate, in which the nature of freedom of speech became a fiercely contested signifier of 
democracy-pitting the oppression of individual rights against the oppression of reliLHOUS 
discrimination-was subsequently taken up in the literature, and therefore can be seen to 
occupy two separate, highly politicized poles. 
There is little Western scholarly work (and no full treatment. as far as this author 
could find) dedicated to analysis of Iran's position in the Affair, Iranian perceptions of 
theftit-wa, and little on its implications for East/West relations or Iran's relations ý, klth its 
near abroad. Almost universally condemned as the desperate gesture of a dying man 
attempting to unite conflicting forces in a compromising domestic situation (Halliday 
1998: 136), thefiatwa's long duration (extended no doubt because of Khomeini's death), 
v, hich contributed to a decade's-long diplomatic break between Iran and the UK, has 
been investigated only in chapters here and there (for example Fischer and Abedi 1990: 
Joffe 1991 -, Pargeter 2008). Its pivotal role within the construction of Anglo-American 
discourses toward Islamic terrorism in general, and Iran's characterization as a state 
sponsorim, Y terrorism in particular, also remains under-examined. These issues are 
addressed in this chapter, but the treatment here too is necessarily brief. One further 
Under-analyzed aspect is the inconsistency within the anti-Rushdie (usually. proAluslim) 
discourse of support for thefiatwa - which by having been issued by Iran, evoked 
conflicting responses, not only in reference to Sunni-Shia differences. but in Muslim 
N le\\s of Iran's political practices in general. The legal ambiguity ýýith výhich it ýýas 
regarded contributed to a body of literature dedicated to discussions of different strands 
of Shari'a interpretation (B. Leý\, is 1991; Yapp 1989). 
It is in the literature that attempts to dominate the discourse of the Rushdie affair. 
\vh1le denying the rationality of the attempt in the contending literature. that the political 
econoi-n\ of identity creation and the politicized passion of democracN is \\rit 
large. On 
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one side was the 'liberal' literature, which interpreted unrestricted freedom of speech as 
foundational to democracy. and the introduction of religious concerns as a *%, lolation of 
the neutrality of public space' (Hurd 2005: 19). The standout ýý, as novelist Faý Weldon's 
Sacred Cows (1989) in which she assumed a position of superiority over. and denial of 
the 'other' in her condemnation of the Qoran and its God of 'terror and vengeance'. Its 
sensational imagery of a monolithic, expanding Islam was adopted by maný, amongst the 
literati, including Norman Stone (The Sunday Telegraph, 19/2/1989). As Poole observes 
in her analysis of British Muslim representation in the media, 'By linking Muslims to 
conflict and ignoring their victimization around the world, this distorted picture is 
suggested to people who have few alternative images' (2000: 157). In this literature. 
outrage, ignorance, fury, offence, contempt, vengeance, and other similar code words 
reflect a complex shame in which alienation between the British liberal and British 
Muslim world (internal and external) threatened and damaged social bonds that ýýere 
undergoing a painful readjustment. 
For Ruthven (1990), as for Pargeter (2008), British identity is understood as 
unassailably cosmopolitan, and the Rushdie Affair as a venal sectarian game fought by 
the Iranians and the Saudis to dominate political Islam in Europe. Pargeter argues that the 
Affair was but one step in the networked growth of Islamism, and thefiatwa an act of 
opportunism in a political agenda outside the control of the UK or its Muslim 
communities. In her view, Rushdie was an unwitting if informed catalyst of darker 
identity constructions within the Islamic world, and a deeply unsettling symbol of the 
havoc that Islamist politics wreaks both at home and abroad. 
Ruthven views the Affair as more about minority British Muslims and their 
affinity for 'a triumphalist faith of uncompromising masculine supremacy', than about 
social constructs Nkithin Britain itself (1990: 6.161). Like much of the literature on both 
sides of the pro- and anti-Rushdie divide (in the former case, see 
for instance Pipes 1990. 
in the latter, see Sardar and Davies 1990), Ruthven uses textual analysis to argue that 
Rushdie is a masterful post-modernist whose abusers ý\ere inferior and bigoted, pointing 
to the failure of fundamentalist Muslims to accept (or even be aNk are of) the 
greeinent' that pertains to novel \Nriting. 
Chapter 7 Page 196 
Oxford geographer S. J. D. Green (1990) occupies a middle ground, taking on the 
issue from the perspective of British social order. Offering a lucid analý sis of social 
structure as a product of religious geography in Britain, he addresses the inter- 
relationships between religious peripheries and the liberal core. Using the Rushdie Affair 
as well as antecedents such as the Swann Report, he describes a bleak trajectorY for 
liberalism, seeing it becoming so politicized that its inflexibility and dogmatism in the 
face of religious political pressures makes it, in his view, sadly inadequate to sustain the 
legitimacy of British ethics or the quality of British life. 
Anthropologist Talal Asad (1993) analyzes forces of domination and delineation 
in race relations to draw dark lessons from the Rushdie Affair for the structure of British 
multiculturalism (an alternative anthropological treatment in support of Rushdie appears 
in Fischer and Abedi 1990). In tracing previous situations in which urban riots, racist 
murders, IRA bombs and questions of censorship were at issue. he observes that the 
British government's response in the Rushdie Affair was materially different, and IaNs 
the blame on a 'British post-imperial identity in crisis' (p. 241 ). Yet, he ignores the 
question of why the introduction of religious concerns into the public sphere caused such 
passionate outpouring when secular society had become accustomed to tread lightly 
between the demands of blasphemy and freedom of speech (for further discussions of 
pamphlet burnings and book bannings, see Appignanesi and Maitland, eds. 1990, Ahsan 
and Kidwai, eds. 199 1: passim). 
A third category in the literature attempts to include both sides. Sacrilege versus 
CiOU4, (Ahsan and Kidwai, eds. 1991) and The Rushdie File (Appignanesi and Maitland. 
eds. 1990), the former pro-Muslim, the latter pro-Rushdie, combine excerpts and 
previously published articles into single compendia to offer not only an accessible 
chronicle, but the hope 'that somehow we learn to live Nvith our differences in a spirit of 
toleration' (Appignanesi and Maitland eds. 1989: vii). Scholarly anak ses attempting to 
balance the *liberal' and 'extremist Muslim' arguments include LaTorte 1998, Kuortti 
1997. Piscatori 1990, and Halliday 1995. Kuortti investigates the notion of the sacred in 
tile practices of both the secular and religious responses to the Affair. Broader analNýCs 
adopt aspects of the Rushdie Affair to examine, among other topics, cultural dialogue 
(Fischer and Abedi 1990), media representations (Cottle 199 1. Hafez -1000. 
Poole 2000. 
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2002), Islamophobia and Islamism (Hippler and Lueg 1995); and Iranian foreign pohcý 
(Ehteshami and Varesteh, eds. 1994). 
My analysis builds on the above, focusing on the emotional component as 
understood through stress on internal and external social bonds, and how that ýý as 
expressed in discursive strategies and the structuring of policy. 
The passion of 'Englishness' 
- Identities never die, )' Coils reminds us, 'they only enfold into the landscape' (Coils 2007: 
50). Although by the time of the Rushdie Affair. the empire had been officially dead for 
over 20 years, its legacies in British social relations were still part of the inner landscape 
(Gamble 2003: 62). 
The concept of Englishness, the normative 'us'. was tightly interwoven ýk ith the 
concept of freedom: 'free subjects, free speech, free ideas, free religion, free enterprise, 
free trade - [these] were the historic Liberal inducements of an ideal Englishness' (Coils 
1986: 3 1, emphasis in original). What is more, this liberalism was represented as an ideal 
force, 'deep within the national character, and capable of universal dissemination as 
England's special gift to the world' (ibid: 30). 
Ingrained in this myth of the liberal self was its perceived importance to the 
security of the state, and thus, British military might 'projected external defense [as] 
extending to the protection of the British way of life and preservation of order, authority 
and moral health throughout society' (Gamble 2003: 77). This fed into the iconic qualitN 
of Britain's self-perceived gift, as Seeley put it, 'to have conquered and peopled half the 
world in a fit of absence of mind' (1914: 10). The construction of a superior and 
qUintessentially English universalism instantiated a narcissistic discourse that implicated 
F'nglish exceptionalism as so compelling that its dissemination was seen to be almost off- 
handed. 
This applied as much to the ý, N, ay the liberal elites conceived their relations ýN ith 
the lower classes and other disenfranchised ýN ithin the English populations at home. as it 
did to the foreign immigrants and ex-colonial peoples. Thus. the imagined community of 
larger Britain was never a communitý of equals, but a community blessed bý the 
engulfment of Englishness (Dodd 1986: 35). A key factor necessary to make tills a reality 
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was to effectively incorporate what Matthew Arnold termed 'pro'. "incial nationalisms* 
into English culture. In Arnold's view, 'Englishness is not so much a category but a 
relationship', ready to absorb minorities at the political level (even if this meant denying 
them political identity) by engaging (and recognizing) their contribution at the cultural 
level (quotes in Dodd 1986: 12). Though Arnold delivered these ideas at Oxford in the 
1860s, his concepts stand out in the discourses and practices of multiculturalism a 
hundred years later (Green 1990). In the latter. the values of the peripheries (the 
immigrant minorities) were felt (again) to be foundational to Englishness and its liberal 
capacity for renewal, the defining bonds of inclusivity, however. constrained prlmarilý to 
that of culture rather than politics. 
In the second half of the 20 th century, as waves of immigrants arrived from the 
British Orient to fill Britain's labour gap the myth of inclusivity was put to the test. 
Motivated by a sense of private transgression, ethnically naming various minoritY (, Yroups 
as 'blacks', 'Pakis', etc., discursively defined their identity as separate from the rest of 
society, rendering their social bonds perpetually contingent. Patterns of labour relations 
and the representational practices that had accompanied these groups in the colonies 
mirrored relations of dominance within Britain as the new immigrants were discursively 
and physically fenced off as separate communities (Asad 1993: 243; Green 1990). The 
process was represented through the guise of altruism, which conceived of the social 
bonds in terms of Britain's willingness to include them and nurture these -others' inside 
its ovvn democratic society. 
Altruism, however, in the liberal context masked and sentimental ized, through 
containment and discipline, those perceived as 'inferior'. Since assimilation was 
contingent on commonality, tension between master and mastered was a natural 
consequence. The result xvas what Benjamin describes as -splitting', \ýhere -one side is 
devalued and the other idealized' 'so they are available to the subject onlý as altemati,. es' 
(1988: 63). The upshot is that Nvhen commonality is dismissed so that dominance can be 
extended. insular practices and emotional responses are ele"'-ated. and the realm of 
mutual, or negotiated, alternatives is marginalized. The strain this placed on the social 
bonds can be seen, for example in the Sx\ ann Report. the basis of the much vaunted 
Polic\ of multiculturalism. but \\hich in fact limited the degree of acceptable pluralism in 
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Britain's secular society. In that Report, religion ký, as defined as a branch of knox%, Iedge. 
and expressions of pluralism accepted only insofar as they conformed to -rationall. \ held 
values' (Green 1989: 17). Assimilation as a practice was thereby strictly bounded b" the 
inability of the liberal outlook to acknowledge the identity of others that failed to 
resemble it, and instead, empowered only those that did. On the one hand. the narcissistic 
production of dominance over difference enabled the ex-colonial immigrant *other' to 
remain so completely 'alien' that actual assimilation was permanently delayed. On the 
other, it enabled a complacency in which assimilation was imagined as ine', itable as a 
result of exposure to Englishness, even when actual exposure was minimal. Group 
exclusion, therefore, deferred acknowledging how the immigrants Xýere actuall', engaging 
with Englishness, and resulted in 'multicultural' practices that reflected core English 
values. 
It took the Rushdie Affair to expose how the social interactions between the 
British core and its immigrant communities were constructed in relations of continuous 
chafing. Unacknowledged shame on both sides had been communicated through 
condescension, a sense of moral transgression, disrespect, the repression of ideas, and 
other expressions of disconnection (Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 67). The Affair projected 
the private passions associated with race and religion into the public sphere, triggering an 
escalation in the process of separation, as the two sides were unable to negotiate or 
communicate respect for the identity of the other. The Rushdie Affair spotlighted a 
conundrum: not all freedoms were equal. The freedom of artistic (personal) expression 
and the freedom of protection against blasphemy were in fact socially constructed in a 
hierarchical framework that reflected a moral ordering elaborating English (Westem) 
liberal identity. This ordering was understood as natural by those defininor themselves as 
British, and, in revealing its fragility in the face of the 'onslaught' of altemative. Islamic 
interpretations, inspired rage and shock. This ordering was not understood the same ýýaý 
hN those \\ith Islamic sensibilities, hence the shock on their part. 
Campbell points out that 'security and subjectivity are intrinsically linked. even 
in 
conventional understand in gs', since -Foreign Pol ic', Ný orks to constitute the 1 entity in 
\\ hose name it operates, [and] security functions to instantiate the subject 
iý itý it purports 
to ser\e' (1998: 25 1). The attack on foundational concepts of Ent-, I ishness \ýithin the 
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confines of its territorial core was conceived as a private invasion. and an act of ý lolence. 
Perceived threats to fundamental norms prompted passionate protection to discursi-'ek 
demarcate the frontier between us and them. The re-secured boundaries contained 
exclusively those who conformed to core English values. and if they didn*t, then as 
Michael Jones, political editor of the Sunday Times wrote in *Ground Rules for the 
British Way of Life', 'it is sad, but too bad' (19/07/1989). 
Innocence: The betrayal of the embrace of 'Englishness' 
The immediate and angry response of diverse Muslim communities both inside and 
outside Britain to publication of the The Satanic Verses caught the publishers. agents and 
close literary circles around Rushdie by surprise. The concept that a post-modern book 
should elicit such an emotionalized community outcry seemed initiallý absurd, as did 
calls to ban the work (Weatherby 1990). Pre-publication wamin(-, s by Khushwýant Singh, 
a Penguin editorial advisor, that the book could be viewed as incendiary b" a ýý ide ranoc 
of Muslim readers, had been dismissed, and it was only later that questions were raised 
about Rushdie's own awareness (and intentions) in regards to the outrage the book might 
cause (see e. g. M. H. Faruki, reprinted in Ahsan and Kidwai, eds. 1991: 147). This lack of 
awareness on the part of the publishers or early reviewers points to the presumption of 
political de-selving within the construction of an otherwise embracing -Englishriess' that 
\ýas conceived as incorporating the cultural diversity of its plural constituents. 
Muslim anger against the book, and calls for censoring it, ývere interpreted as 
abrogating a code of behaviours and meanings that implicated assimilation, and thereby, 
as putting unacceptable pressure on the democratic system. The British Muslim 
corrimunitý's dismay at x\, hat it declared was intolerable abuse of religious sensiti" itN 
i-nasquerading as freedom of expression struck at the heart of the tenets of the British 
liberal ideal self. \Oich considered itself innocent of ill-intent or wrong-doing. The 
shame at failing to acknowledge these sensitivities, and what that implied about British 
assimilation, \\as externalized as outrage at the 'inappropriateness' of %Iusllm responses 
both at home and abroad. An immediate spiral of injured surprise, and sense of betra\al 
ensued. Britain's \\ iII in tolerance of its manv ethnic communities \\ as perccl \ ed to 
define modernit\ and democracy. and therefore as directed to all. no matter ho\\ alien. 
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how 'un-English' they were. This. however. was contingent on the understanding that 
there had to be a give-and-take: acceptance b,,,,, the immigrant communities of core British 
values, in exchange for British acceptance of husbanding foreigners resident on its soil 
(Gamble 2003: 66). Indeed, it seemed perfectly natural to presume, as did a leader in The 
Times on July 25,1989, that 'British Muslim children should know their Koran: of 
course. but they should also know their Shakespeare'. For most of British societ),. 
therefore, the Muslim plaint failed to acknowledge the altruism of the British settlement. 
and therefore, threatened the social bonds between them. 
As the Rushdie Affair unfolded, the significations of 'tolerance' (the abilitý to 
accept and embrace 'others'), and 'freedom of expression' (including religious 
defamation), became unhinged. Emotional izat ion infused the refixing of these referents. 
leading to the fractioning off of those perceived to lie outside the British scif. Thus, 
within the discourse of the Affair, a duality rapidly placed in opposition Friglish 1iberals' 
or 'secularists', and those named, and fenced off, as 'Muslims', 'fundamentalists'. or 
'extremists' (Green 1990: 14, Howarth et al 2002: 11). 
The common usage of the 'Muslim' label, which gained currency durino the 
Affair, was new. It homogenized along religious lines what had previouslý been 
differentiated as Asian, South Asian, African and West Indian. The label discursi"'Clý 
erased not only the distinctive Muslim traditions and sects that defined the members of 
these communities, but the diversity of views within these radically separate groups that 
until then had seen little similarity among themselves. By distilling out the Muslim 
component in the public mind. differences in beliefs, practices and places of origin all 
became unimportant (Asad 19931: Fischer and Abedi 1990: 394-5-, Sardar and Daý is 
1990). 
The social disciplining effected by the -British Muslim' label had two 
implications that became fixtures in the liberal discourse. First. it linked British Muslims 
to their home populations (whoever and whereN er they Ný ere) in a heuristic that 
drem, 
from the collective memory of empire and its linkages. The groNý ing, concerti at the 
political and religious association betx\een British Muslims and their 
foreign Islamist 
brethren fed into an emotionalized cycle of increasing hostilitý. \\hIch imputed a sense of 
endangerment to the British core from local Muslims. As the Affair progressed. these I- 
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latter were perceived as having more in common with Muslims abroad than ý% ith Britons. 
and worse, importing radical views into Fortress Britain -a ke. -,, factor %ý hen subsequentl. -, 
the. futwa was issued 
Second, it served to demarcate the identity of British Muslims to themsek es. As 
[ýisher and Abedi observe, being slurred as Takis' or *Asian' did not carrv the same 
level of imputed abuse as being taunted and shamed as a *Muslim'. which provoked the 
need to defend the faith and the honour of God, in addition the honour of ethnic ori(-Iin. 
The Muslim naming thus acted as a more acute antagonizer than ethnic labeling and 
served to discipline, through the defense of faith, the various Muslim communities into 
perceiving themselves as a 'group', where previously none had existed (Fisher and 
Abedi 1990: 395). 
The 'fundamentalist' label, which the US discourse had internationalized at the 
time of the hostage crisis as a precursor to the almost synonymous terms 'Islamist' and 
jihadist', was adopted in the context of the Affair as claiming in its grip all those \0o 
believed in banning the Satanic Verses. Fven before Khomeini'sfiat-lt, a, and especiallý 
thereafter, it re-ignited associations of religious fanaticism and uncivilized beha"', iour, 
terms also used to describe those in Lebanon holding British and American hostages at 
that very moment (and presented in the British, as much as the American media, as 
master-minded by Iran) (Taheri 1988: 168). Critically, fundamentalism instantiated an 
ii-nage of Muslim incitement to violence against innocents, a humiliating representation 
for the various Muslim communities and one causing consternation ý\ ithin the public 
political sphere. Few present this inversely linked duality as clearly as HampsherAlonk 
in speaking of anti-Rushdie Muslims: 
'Fundamentalist belief is ýNell armed to sustain bloody opposition through 
parables of trial, salvation through suffering, and personal election. These 
devices make fundamental religious belief incompatible A ith tolerant politics' 
(1991: 165). 
I lanipsher-Monk's claim that such 'devices' make Islamic fundamentalism 
irreconcilable \\ ith democrac\ echoes Kirkpatrick's rhetoric that placed Judeo-Christian 
ciN ilization in opposition to Islam. Like hers, his . ieNN allows for no parallel 'deN ice,, 
* in 
hi s own national parables. even\\ ithout the overl a\ of faith. II is understand 
in g ofthe 
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stories of British history and tradition. for example. are sufficienth, naturalized (and 
sentimental ized) around chivalry and honour as to make it possi m to ignore their ible for hi 
similarities to the mythologies of Islamic history. What of the parables of trial in tile Clý, 11 
War. for example, or of T. E. Lawrence, whose tale is par excellence that of personal 
election? By failing to problematize the parables in his own tradition. Hampsher-Monk 
apprehended the situation the way many other liberals did too. that is. bN enuaging in a 
process of identity production understood to be bounded bý different norms and 
motivations than those involved in 'fundamentalist' practices. Embedded in this 
discourse is the emotionalized presumption that Islam, armed to sustain bloodý 
opposition, is inferior to Christian-Judaic tradition in relation to 'tolerant politics'. an 
expression of false pride, and an approach Guillaume describes as unethically gi-ounded 
(2002: 9). 
By drawing the limits of tolerance through the rhetorical device of excluding, 
behaviours and beliefs associated with fundamentalism, identitý production 
emotionalized the re-inscription of the British self as democratic and innocent of 
I. ntolerance. Thus, the representation made by the Muslim communities that the 
public(ation) of The Satanic Verses placed what it considered sacrilegious content into 
, ument the public sphere, thereby making it a political book, ý\ as elided by the liberal arg 
that it was the expression of a private individual ýýith inalienable rights to pub I ish ýN hat 
he wished in the free world. Argued Oxford's Green: 'Secularism's undefined nature 
does not allow for discipline on freedom of speech-unless it refers to treason or material 
darnage' (1990: 17). 
When Muslim thinkers such as Mazrui. Parekh and others argued that freedom of 
speech was always contingent and that literary works \\ere regularlý banned 
in the I's. 
UK and Canada (including The Last Temptation of Christ), theý ýý ere ignored (LaTorte 
1989: 138). So was Atam Vetta's plaint that had the novel been directed at the 
Jewish 
t'aith, the response \\ould have been different (Ahsan and Kid\\ai, eds. 
1991 : 111 ). Anti- 
/ionist literature, it %\as pointed out, occupied the largest number of entrie" on the 
Anglo- 
Saxon \\orld's list of banned books. lists \\hich the Muslim communit\ presented 
to the 
rnedia to support its claims, as x\ell as a list of -Western countries' officiallý-, ýponsored 
\iolence on foreign soil against selected targets' (LaTorte 1989: 
138-9. Ahsan and 
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Kidwai, eds., ibid: 266; Appignanesi and Maitland. eds. N90: Appendix). This. it \\as 
argued, revealed tolerance to be a political choice. The inconsistenc\ in the banning ol 
certain works and not others within democratic practice was shaming for both side"- tor 
liberals, justification necessitated denial and externalization of superiorit\ . I'or Muslims. 
it imputed to their sensitivities less worth than ýýas a\ýarded to others. ý0ich led to 
humiliation. On both sides, therefore, defensive mechanisms vere relied upon to elide 
shame, which perpetuated the cycle. 
The signification of tolerance, according to Lasch. is ent%,, ined Ný Ith perceptions ot 
race and racism. Though his analysis relates to the uneas\ relation-ship bemeen ý\hites 
and blacks in I 970s US, his observations remain apt for the situation pertaining bem cen 
Muslims and whites in the UK in the '80s. * De facto racism continues to flourish \N Ithout 
a racial ideology. Indeed, it is the collapse of dejure racism in the south and the 
discovery of de facto racism in the north, under the ideolog\ of tolerance. that 
distinguishes the most recent phase of race problems' he \ý rites ( 1978: 25). The Rushdie 
affair located racism within the politically acceptable rubric of secular ideolou".. ýOich. 
by having privatized religion, countenanced no further infringement upon the public 
sphere. In this manner, British politics was constructed as innocent oraný possible 
imputed sacrilege upon its constituents. as in this sense, all its constituents \ýere deemed 
equal, and the question of racism could be ignored. Yet. den\ ing the Muslim - ie\\ 
ýalidity eroded the concept of tolerance, privileging instead the narrower. less generous 
meaning of 'sufferance'. 
Home Secretary John Patten, whose position included responsibilitý for race 
relations, addressed these issues in a letter on July 4 th directed to Aluslim leaders in 
Britain' (reprinted in Ahsan and Kidwai. eds. 199 1: 1-325). This ýý as folloýýecl mo 
\\eeks later by a Home Office release entitled, *On Being British'. Patten's 
focus %ýas 
integration and the necessitý for minorities to acquire British culture. on the presumption 
that British culture NNas innocent of intolerance and therefore *, oood'. and ready to 
be 
illclusl\e to\\ard those behaving rationallý. His moralistic stance reflected the 
fear ofho\ý 
alternatke values \\ould affect British societý. an expression ofan emotionalized 
decision to den\ the \alidit\- of those \alues. and in so 
doing. promote a politics of, ýtrit'e- 
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Patten is remote, at times patronizing. at others didactic. but he alxýa,, s addresses 
the Muslim community as a singular. undifferentiated 'other', distanced and different 
from the English self. He never assumes the position of an official representing the 
Muslim constituency as one group among man,,,, ýkithin the British electorate responsible 
for empowering his government. Nor does he offer to mediate. Instead, he addresses 
-British Muslims' as a subject of British rule and occupying a position not dissimilar to a 
colonial entity inside Britain. His purpose is to encourage this group to conform to the 
rest of British society, an attempt to ensure the relationship remain one of engulfment. 
Patten speaks with the political authority of secularism, that realm of rational democracy. 
public good and common sense, in which religion had been expelled from the public 
space (Hurd 2005: 19). 
'The Government understands how much hurt and anxiety that book has 
caused, and we also understand that insults, particularly to a deeply held faith, 
are not easily forgotten or forgiven. But we now have an opportunity to take 
stock. The single most important guiding principle as we move forvýard must 
be the aim of full participation in our society by Muslim and other ethnic 
minority groups. 
Patten personalizes the Government as -we', but avoids the direct reference of 'you", 
disembodying his addressees and therefore the ratification of their particular grievance. In 
this way, he establishes his position to define the subject as well as to judge it from a 
position of power -a point made in his last sentence in Ný hich moving forward is defined 
hy full participation in 'our' society.. In employing the word *understand', he extends 
paternal empathy-, yet, by generalizing the 'hurt' across all religious belief, he fails to 
acknowledge the actual 'insult' while absolving the government of any further need for 
engagement. Patten sidesteps any language of solidarity that might suggest a willingness 
to negotiate or otherwise recognize the essence of the 'other's view. This denial of the 
specific trauma is itself a political act (Fierke 2004: 481). Despite the official language he 
uses, the go-,, ernment's entrenchment is implicated in an emotionalized perspective. 
Patten's intent is not to assuage ý,, Muslim concerns, but English ones; he therefore moves 
on to 'take stock' and confirm that the 'sin, (,, Ie most important guiding principle' is to 
confirm the inNih of Britain's abi I itN to absorb the d iN ersity of others. Yet they are now, 
specifi ic others. in particular, those \0o ha,,, e: 
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to Britain's wealth of culture and tradition. Many have come ýýith 
values that can only be admired, such as firm faith; a commitment to farrilly 
life; a belief in hard work and enterprise; respect for law and a ýý ill to succeed. 
To their credit, they have kept those values as the core of their life in Britain. 
too. , 
Here Patten echoes Amold, highlighting cultural inclusion while fencing off the political 
(Dodd 1986: 12-13). He goes on to elucidate how Muslims must behave if 'they are to 
make the most of their lives and opportunities as British citizens'. In this. there is the 
veiled accusation that if they do not conform, they are not 'real' British citizens (and 
thus, excluded), a point he makes in a different guise by extolling, toward the end of the 
letter, those Muslims who apologized for unacceptable Muslim conduct in response to the 
Rushdie Affair. The letter ends by briefly stating that The Satanic Verses cannot be 
banned, 'nor would we seek or want such power', as that would not be 'British' - or 
moral. His discourse instantiates British Muslims as dependent on British culture for their 
identity, and unable to exercise influence on either its basic tenets, such as freedom of 
expression, or the fate of its cultural artifacts, which in this case, included The Satanic 
1'erves. 
Two weeks later, 'On Being British' (Patten, Home Office 1989) revealed that the 
Government was unconvinced that the dislocation of identity had been sufficiently 
'sutured by Patten's previous statement. Further motivation to action around 'core' British 
values was necessary to decontaminate the environment of its threatening qualities (Post 
1986: 677-9). In this diminutive manifesto, there is no mention of The Satanic Verses. 
Instead, the leadership focuses on strengthening national identity as a security measure 
ýigainst anti-Rushdie Muslims' affront to British credibility. Attempting again to re- 
establish 'order', the directives underscore appropriate behaviour: 
... [Participation] includes playing one's part 
in the economy. plaving one's 
part as a neighbour, making a contribution which goes beyond one's own 
family or indeed community. 
In effect, Patten was acting consistently with the tradition articulated by Gamble of 
conceiN ing security as extending beyond extemal defense to include the British ýýay of 
life and 'the preservation of moral health throughout society' (2003: 7). In presenting 
British society in these terms, he articulated the meaning of a society whose tolerance and 
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embrace of diversity justified its shock and innocent suffering at the Muslim imputation 
of intolerance, while exonerating it of intent to harm. 
Victimization 
The naming of Muslims as fundamentalist inscribed the behaviours of those ýý ithin the 
Islamic community as militant, since, 'it is precisely militancy which characterizes 
Western media coverage of fundamentalism' (Kuortti 1997: 37). This enabled the 
representation of Muslim responses as violent and dangerous, and British society as the 
victim (Asad 1993: 239). Perceptions of innocence and victimization, however. are 
discursive mechanisms of social discipline, and 'prepare the way forjustifying any act of 
retaliation' (Morrow 2003: 29). Victimization was perceived in terms of betrayal, 
Britain's welcome of other peoples to its shores being constructed as having been taken 
advantage of. Thus Roy Jenkins, the main architect of the Race Relations Act of 1976 
wrote in The Independent on March 4,1989, 'We might have been more cautious about 
allowing the creation in the 1950s of a substantial Muslim community here. ' The guilt 
(internalized shame) this implies contributed to the discourse of blame surrounding 
Muslim rhetoric and actions throughout the Affair, the latter promoted as productive of 
violence, and necessitating further fencing off of the Muslim community as a periphery 
of the British centre. 
The discursive economy of privileging violence to enflame the emotional 
landscape is highlighted in Cottle's analysis of a television news report on an anti- 
Rushdie demonstration,, in which a flag burning, and a tussle among two men in the 
crowd were highlighted (in Cottle's view, unfairly) without noting that they were single 
incidents in an otherwise peaceful rally. 'The close-up on the faces and shoulders of the 
disputants conveys the impression that the wider crowd was itself similarly locked in 
dispute, despite the fact that this was an isolated, and highly insignificant, incident at the 
fringe of the loosely assembled demonstrators' ( 1991: 5 1). In this, by no means isolated 
instance, British tolerance was contrasted with Muslim violence, enabling emotionalized 
representations that figured the Affair as a conflict in \ýhich Muslims were engaging in 
a(ti, gression, intimidation, and lavvlessness against the British social body. Not 
surprisingly, this passionate discourse fed off itself in that it contributed to a closing of 
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ranks among British Muslims themselves, creating perceptions among their separate 
communities of a need for solidarity in the face of their own sense of endan, -, erment. This 
in turn contributed to the vicious circle of political strife within the media and among the 
chattering classes regarding the various Muslim groupings as constituting one 
undifferentiated and increasingly endangering community. 
Constructions of victimization became most clearly evident in reactions to the 
Bradford book burning, and to the Khomeinifatwa. The discourses surrounding these 
two events linked British Muslim communities to worldwide political Islam, confirming 
their 'otherness' in the way both were articulated, and in the threat they ýýere mutually 
perceived to represent to the British self. 
The Braqford Book Burning 
Demonstrations by Muslim groups calling for the withdrawal and banning of the Satanic 
Verses had failed to gain the attention of the media or the government. or in any 
substantial way to further the cause. Buming the book was designed to change that 
position. The Bradford incident in effect, pitted *Freedorn of expression' against 'the 
freedom to blaspheme' in a ritual that came to represent the iconic quality for each camp 
of the sacredness of the word-the artist's text on the one hand, the Qoranic text on the 
other. In essence, the Bradford book burning implicated freedom of expression and 
blasphemy as the same thing, passionately produced in opposite ways by opposing sides. 
The antagonism and mutual efforts to shame the other revealed how to each, their text 
was sacred, and represented a symbol of identity that was being victimized as a political 
act (Kuortti 1997: 90). 
The attempts by the Muslim community to have the courts ban The Satanic 
Ferses on the basis of blasphemy, and thereafter, to have the blasphemy la'w' in Britain 
broadened to include Islam, were both unsuccessful attempts to incorporate an expansion 
of religious tolerance, and its definition of the sacred, and thereby to obtain 
ackno\Oedgement of the shame felt by Muslims within Britain at the 1erses' publication 
(Ahsan and Kidwai. eds. 1991: 56). The construction of Rushdie's blasphemy as not 
against God (for God could never be damaged). but against the muslim community. 
implicated that community's sense of public transgression as being ignored. This 
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paralleled the feelings expressed within the liberal discourse at the Muslim response. Yet. 
instead of uniting them, the similarities divided them, and the texts of both go, ý ernment 
and media were dominated by emotionally driven rhetoric that appeared to pri,,, -Ilege 
inclusion within the construction of democracy while in fact affecting practices of 
exclusion, and thereby furthered the injury to the social bonds. As The New Republic in 
the United States put it, echoing liberal British sentiments, 'Blasphemy is nothing to be 
ashamed about. It is a birth pang of democracy' (quote in Kuorrti 1997: 1 -15). 
This position not withstanding, when the Bradford book burning took place, 
attacking objects of literary value was not discursively portrayed by the liberals as a 
'birth-pang of democracy', but instead, emotionally apprehended as a violation of 
democracy's freedoms. Producing widespread outrage, it was perceived to anticipate Ray 
Bradbury's story 'Fahrenheit 451' in which book burning symbolized the end of 
civilization. Protecting 'civilization' - through democratic privilege on the one side, 
religious dignity on the other - was thus played out in the discourses of both sides in a 
politics of strife. 
The Khomeini fatwa 
Into the cauldron of this already emotionalized politics came Ayatollah Khomeini's 
Ailiva. Indelibly linking representational practices toward the British Muslim to Muslims 
abroad, it internationalized the Affair. Author Bikhu Parekh, revealing his own complex 
view of the matter, describes thefatwa's cascading discursive effect: 
'it was depressing to note how the legitimate anger against the Ayatollah's 
murderous interpretation and outrageous Muslim support for it escalated step 
by even sillier step to a wholly mindless anger against all Bradford Muslims. 
then against all British Muslims, then against all Muslims. and ultimately. 
against Islam itself' (1990: 79, emphasis in original). 
Thefiativa was issued against Rushdie and his publishers on the basis of their 
liaving published The Satanic Ferses 'in opposition to Islam'. 
A call on all zealous Muslims to execute them quickly. N, ýherever thev, find 
them, so that no one N-vill dare to insult the Islamic sanctions. ' 
'in addition, anvone who has access to the author of the book, but does not 
possess the poNNer to execute him. should refer him to the people so that he 
may be punished for his actions. ' (Khomeini, Iran State Radio) 
Chapter 7 Page 210 
Thefutwa was issued at the end of a year and a half in which a climate of recriminations 
and death had characterized relations between Iran, the US and the UK. On Jul. \ 1988. an 
Iran Air flight carrying 270 pilgrims to Mecca had been shot down by an American na", 
ship, the USS Vincennes, over the Persian Gulf. The US claimed the flight ý\ as 
mistakenly identified as an attack plane, and President Reagan promised to pay 
compensation. But compensation was never paid, prompting Khomeini to issue afiltiva 
promising the skies would 'rain blood' and offering $10 million to anyone \ý ho could 
bring 'justice to Iran'. Five months later on 21 December 1988, the Lockerbie disaster 
occurred, and at the time of the publication of the 5atanic 1erses, the Scottish police 
considered the prime suspect to be a Palestinian group backed by Iran (Miles 2007: 8). 
Thefiatwa against Rushdie can therefore be seen to have taken place v6thin a context of 
Jýtwas, the first carrying a significant bounty, and which reflected Iran's perception that 
the West was attacking it, and the larger Muslim ummah both militarily and culturally. 
This message was repeated in speeches by various other Iranian leaders. including 
Speaker of the House Hashemi Rafsanjani and President Ali Khamenei, the latter stating, 
at Friday Prayer the day after the Rushdiefatwa, 
'We Muslims should be as wary of the enemy's cultural front as we are of the 
enemy's military front. As the enemy's attack on our frontiers brings us into 
action, the enemy's attack on our cultural frontiers should evoke a reaction from 
us at least to do the same' (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20/2/1989, from 
Tehran Home Service, 17/2/1989. ). 
Khomeini'sfatwa evoked an immediate response from the British government. 
\01ch imputed it, like much of the media and other liberal commentary, as demanding 
Rushdie's assassination, no matter ývhere he was located. On February 20, Whitehall 
ithdrew its diplomatic personnel from Tehran and demanded the ýk ithdrawal of Iranian 
representatives from London. Many Muslim intellectuals. such as Parekh considered the 
Jýnva as bloodthirsty and inappropriate, and as a setback to reasonable attempts to attain 
redress for valid grievances. Although, in rejecting thefatwa. this group appeared 
ideationally similar to British liberals, the distinction in their perceptions was nonetheless 
critical. For tile latter. represented by Harold Pinter and other \\ riters in a letter to Prime 
\, Iinister Margaret Thatcher. thefiatwa was interpreted as one more example of a 
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barbarous regime acting in the name of a religion whose tenets too easil%, accommodated 
violent behaviour (The Guardian, 16/2/1989). Further. in a manner similar to that in 
which the American public had taken the plight of the hostages as their oýýn private 
suffering, political and intellectual society took Rushdie's martyrdom as its oýýn - and all 
of Britain's. Anthony Burgess, in an article entitled 'Islam's Gangster Tactics' %A rote: 'To 
order outraged sons of the prophet to kill him and the directors of Penguin Books on 
British soil is tantamount to ajihad It is a declaration of war on citizens of a free countrN 
and as such, it is a political act. ' (The Independent, 16/2/1989). Burgess' representation 
of Iran's political involvement as ajihad to be carried out on British soi I and as a 
declaration of war on British citizens, was contingent on already emotionalized public 
perceptions. 
The representation that the edict applied to British citizenry in general rather than 
to a single author, and that it was to be carried out inside Britain was fanned by Foreigm 
Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe: 
'[N]obody has the right to incite people to violence on British soil or against 
British citizens ... Ayatollah Khomeini's statement 
is totally unacceptable. ' 
(The Independent 17/2/1989). 
Howe represented Khomeini as impinging on British laws, and intervening in the law and 
order of another country. This reflected a two-prong debate that continues until today. It 
is critical for our purposes to understand how thefatwa was interpreted since the 
representational practices, and the emotionalized meanings and presuppositions upon 
\khich they were based, reveal a discursive economy of political passion, which 
homogenized and hegemonized the multiplicity of voices engaged in the Affair as the 
international and domestic threats merged. The emotionality of the discourse dominated 
decision-making and policy construction by excluding alternative identities. Thus, the 
internal Muslim community was linked to the external, and seen as supporting or even 
carrying out Khomeini's project, rather than seen as integral to British society, and, 
despite its , arious vieýý s on The Satanic Verses, as a bulwark against thefat-vtw. 
What 
ý\, as ignored. in \N hat \\ ere already becoming institutionalized practices, ý\ as the 
immediate response of the British Muslim community. Dr. Mughram Ali AI-Ghamdi, 
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chairman of the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs. for example. publicly stated 
within the week that 
t 'We do not know what the Ayatollah has actually said. But ýýe are a minority in this country and we intend to fully abide by the la, ýý. We are not above the law. We do not condone violence of any kind by anybody under an', pretext' (quote in New Life, 17 /2/1989). 
This was paralleled by many others, who argued forcibly against the fatwa. ýNlllle arguing 
16r the banning of the Satanic Verses. Rushdie was rushed into hiding on the premise that 
his life was endangered by Iran, a pragmatic act in response to what was deemed the 
unpredictability of Iran's regime; but equally, an act of political passion to securitize the 
Affair for the sake of securitizing Britain's own identity. To accomplish this took a 
reading of Khomeini's text at its most dangerous, denying its contingency and thus 
turning the Rushdie Affair into an issue of national security. 
The two questions that continue to bedevil and are contingent in the issue of the 
futwa are first, whether it pertained outside the ummah, that is, in the Dar-al Harb, since 
traditionally Islamic law is recognized to apply only up to the borders of official Shari'a 
legal rule (for discussions see Fischer and Abedi 1990: 398-9; B. Lewis 199 1 )-, and 
second, whether Khomeini abrogated Shari'a law by declaring a death sentence without 
first having a trial. In regards to the first, Pargeter has (re)presented in scholarly terms 
support for Howe's view, arguing it was an attempt by Khomeini to incorporate the 
Muslim enclaves of Britain into the Dar-al Islam, as much for political gain against 
similar attempts by Saudi Arabia, as for cultural hegemony. She quotes Islamic scholar 
Giles Kepel to back up her thesis: 'Khomeini was demonstrating that, for him, the 
universal mission of Islam did not stop at national frontiers, but included populations ýkho 
had emigrated to Europe and who were seen as Islamic enclaves. the bridgeheads of the 
Muslim nation' (Kepel 1994: 33,39, quote in Pargeter 2008: 10). 
This reading suggests that Khomeini's imagined community included the Islamic 
enclaves of Britain, yet offers no discussion concerning the crucial fact that Shari'a laýý 
\\, as not practiced in those enclaves, and therefore, that there was le(yal ambiguity (in tý 
Islamic practice) of their being constituted as any different than the rest of Britain. 
Further, the message \\as directed not to British Muslims specifically. but to all \Iuslims, 
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implicating the carrying out of the sentence as contingent on various options presented in 
thefatwa. 
Khomeini calls on 'all zealous Muslims to execute them [Rushdie and the 
publishers] wherever they find them... ' which constituted the primarý focus of 
interpretation by those in the West. However, Khomeini adds a second crucial option: 'In 
addition, anyone who has access to the author of the book, but does not possess the power 
to execute him, should refer him to the people' (Tehran Radio, emphasis mine). In this 
sentence, Khomeini implies that there are those who do not have the option to carrý' out 
thefarwa, because they live outside the ummah. These he directs to hand Rushdie oxer to 
'the people', that is, the Muslim community, to be punished. One option, certainlý. Nýas 
that he was suggesting Rushdie be kidnapped and brought to the Dar-al Islam. Another, 
however, was that the Muslim community inside Britain would have to decide on his fate 
- the banning of his book and a public apology being within the realm of possibilitý for 
resolution (Fischer and Abedi 1990: 398). These considerations were never clarified nor 
even made thinkable; neither were they entertained by a government having alreadý' 
embarked on a discourse that through a politics of passion separated rather than united 
the communities of Muslims from other Britons. Yet, these possibilities suggest an 
alternative set of responses equally resonant within the British liberal tradition, but which 
were sidelined, even at a moment when a reassigning of ambassadors was being 
discussed for the first time in 10 years (a project thefatwa brought to a summary halt) 
(Joffe 199 1: 100). Producing Khomeini as threatening to aggress British territory and 
more generally, its citizenry, in language more commonly utilized toward an enemy in 
ýýar, reflected how Britain had produced its own identity as endangered (Kepel 1994: 39). 
A range of policy options failed to be considered because they were not suggestible - the 
emotionality involved making them 'bad politics'. 
The representation by scholars almost 20 years after thefatwa that Khomeini's 
intention was to reach out to British Muslims and incite them to assassination or 
kidnapping, or try Rushdie inside Britain on 'Muslim' territory, points to the ongoing pull 
of political passion. The necessity of adopting and perpetrating this most threatening of I-- 
readings suggests the fragility of British identity security. It effectivel,, implicated the 
enemý outside so\, ý ing and inciting evil inside , -ia a Trojan Horse effect, ýý 
hich rendered 
Chapter 7 Page 214 
any frontier porous and unsafe. and which risked both the core and the periphery. 
Ensuring that Rushdie remained in hiding under guard served the govemment as a ýýaý to 
publicly remind that the borders in this case had already been confined to theirvery 
lowest possible denominator: his liberty-and that of Britain-could be maintained onlý 
through imprisonment. Thus, *Rushdie is a modern martyr of secular libertý and 
tolerance' Hugo Young wrote in The Guardian (27/2/1989). In this. their own trial Ný ith 
Khomeini, Britons could viscerally understand the public/private pain of the Americans 
in the course of the hostage crisis, the only difference being that in Britain. the hostage 
remained at home. 
The second point, whether Khomeini was insisting on assassination outside the 
Islamic legal requirement of a trial, was more heavily discussed within the Islamic 
community (worldwide) than in the West. In Shar'ia law, the term 'sentence' does not 
easily translate, and is as commonly used to refer to an accusation as a sentencing (Yapp, 
The Independent 22 /2/1989) . Thus, the ambiguity of 
Khomeini's term sparked debate 
among Muslim jurists, and contributed to the fact that no countering. /aht, a ýýas issued by 
anotherjurist even among those communities (including Saudi Arabia), %ý, hich publicly, 
disclaimed the death penalty for Rushdie (The Guardian, 17/3/1989). A close reading of 
thefiuwa does not reveal any proscription against a trial, and there is no reason to believe 
that thefiatwa would purport to circumvent Islamic law, although these points ý% ere I ittle 
discussed in the media frenzy that took place after thefiitwa was issued (for an exception, 
see Yapp, The Independent 15/3/1989). More common was the presumption that 
Khomeini had transgressed Islamic law as much as British law, a position that ý%as 
rapidly naturalized within the representational practices of seeing Khomeini and his 
regime as bloodthirsty and irresponsibly mixing religion with politics, and %, ýhich enabled 
him to be apprehended as equally willing to break his own law, as any other-Or 
alternatively, as too ignorant of the law, or too brazen, to know or care about its 
restrictions (Fischer and Abedi 1990: 399). Harvey Morris in The Independent of 
February 16,1989 implicates, through the use of sarcasm. the inferiority of such 
leadership by describing Khomeini not as a man of laws. but a master of artifice: 
*,, \\-atollah Khomeini's sentence of death of Salman Rushdie \esterda% emeril-, ed as ýet 
another re\ OlUtionary coup de theatre b,, the 86-year-old founder of the Islamic 
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Republic'. In this same vein. the common misrepresentation that Khomeini himself had 
offered a bribe for Rushdie's death imputed to him the image of a crazed dictator: 
11,500,000 TO KILL HIM-by order of that Mad Mullah', for example, ýýas the 
headline of the Duily Mirror on the same day. 
This alternative analysis of thefatwa's wording is offered here not \\ ith the intent 
to suggest that thefatwa should be perceived in one way or another, but to underscore 
that its interpretations are contingent and it remains a site of contestation. 'Theatre', 
'madness', and 'sentence of death' served (as did many other tropes used at the time) to 
implicate Iran's Islamic regime as medieval and clownish, an interventionist danger to be 
contained and a potential contaminant of Western society that cannot escape such 
victimization even on home territory. Presuppositions about Khomeini and Iran's Islamic 
approach to law, combined with the politics of strife that characterized the domestic 
relationship with British Muslims wanting to ban the Satanic Ver. Ves, can be seen to have 
made thinkable a radical reading of thefatwa. Further. this positioned Britain as being 
Iran's opposite, the exemplary of the laic, modem and reasonable world. 
Yet, Pipes (and others) angrily observed it was Iran, not Britain, that first severed 
relations on March 7,1989. Though Foreign Secretary Howe described Iran as 'a 
deplorable regime', clearly distinguishing between Britain's system and Iran's, the 
precariousness of that distinction was confounded by the fears that there were dangerous 
linkages between Britain's Muslim community and the wider world, bringing into 
question the purity of the British enclosure, and its national imaginary as a culture able to 
absorb others without endangering itself One result of the Affair was the use of a politics 
of strife to divide and isolate the two parts of society, rather than a politics of love to 
affirm and recognize domestic Muslim sentiment against thefatwa for the purpose of 
cernenting the two. This naturalized practices of Isiamophobia in both the media and the 
public. and once launched as appropriate, Islamophobia ensured the spiral of damage to 
the social bonds ýwuld continue (Poole 2000: 158) 
The re-affirmation of Britain as a democratic society on the intemational stage 
\ý'as invoked a ainst Iran as a rogue, despite Britain's inability to address or resolýe its 9 
oN\n Muslim communio, "s concerris over fundamental aspects of democratic meaning and 
practice at home. In this process, Britain's foreign policý discourse reprised colonial 
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rhetoric, mixing it with elements of the American muscular narrative toýýard Muslim 
fundamentalism. This disguised the shame of its domestic conflict by demonizinv- Iran. 
Hegemonizing the Anglo-American discourse 
The Satanic Verses Affair was a decisive moment for Britain. The need to re-present and 
re-instantiate its identity in the face of a linked domestic and international threat from 
political Muslim activism, served to re-internationalize its social purpose at the \erý 
juncture at which the Cold War was ending and its position between America and Europe 
was being re-evaluated. The response of Europe to the Rushdie Affair ý\ as supporti, ý e- 
the EU nations had withdrawn their diplomatic representatives from Iran ýý hen Britain 
did, and emotionalized statements from their respective governments and media helped 
mobilize public reaction, reifing the historical Muslim/European experience and 
condemning the blindness of current Muslim politics (Hafez 2002). Yet, it \ýas the UIS', 
which had most personally suffered socio-political trauma at the hands of Iran, that výas 
perceived as most in tune with British sentiments. What's more, the activism on both 
sides of the Rushdie Affair in the US had been high, and at times more " iolent than even 
in the UK. Official US response exceeded that of most EU states. vv-ith condemnation bý, 
the Senate and statements by the president and members of Congress (Pipes 1990: 156). 
Drawing on similar constructions of public suffering and private pain, both Washington 
and London supported and promoted a discursive parallelism that arose out of 
commonalities in their representations of self, and the victimization they felt from a 
common enemy. Both constituted the post-Cold War geography as the breaching of 
Western security by the Muslim adversary that now combined both Shia and Sunni 
N ariants. 
By the time of the Rushdie Affair, Britain's position in the world ýýas being 
discursively re-oriented, and though no longer able to represent itself as the pivot of an 
empire, the special civilizational role of 'Englishness' was inscribed through its 
partnership and military support of the US (Dumbrell 2006, Gamble 2003: 80,84-45). 
Thatcher's Ma) 1989 speech to the 1922 Committee. delivered a fortnight after Patten's 
note 'On Englishness', is explicit: 'A strong economic base has let Britain stand tall in 
the \\orld again and \\e became an important part of the unfolding future of east-\\est 
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relations. It used to be said Britain had lost an Empire-and not found a role. We have 
now. ' (emphasis in original). A decade later, her expansion on Churchill's concept of 
English-speaking supremacy, reflected the ongoing discourse of democracý and freedom 
as specifically an Anglo-Saxon project: 
Moreover, Britain enjoys another advantage, namelý, that ý, Ne're not Just 
European. We are part of the Anglo-Saxon world, whose language alone is 
global, whose democratic institutions alone have proved enduring, and %ý hose 
leader, America, alone can claim to be a superpower. 
The freedom we take for granted today was created and upheld bý' the English 
speaking peoples. (Thatcher 1999: *Speech to International Free Enterprise 
Dinner', 20 April) 
As the domestic and international discourses of the Rushdie Affair unfurled, the 
representation of Iran and political Islam as threats to British identit"', and the shared 
Anglo-American mission of promoting a superior world based on secular democrac, ý and 
the free exchange of goods and services, re-inscribed significations of endangerment. 
Until then, figurations of the rise of Islamic politics in the Middle East had lacked a deep 
emotional component for Britain, being instead, representations of upheaval in a sphere 
that Britain had handed over to the US in 1966 (and even earlier, in 1956, in Iran). The 
Rushdie Affair, combined with the simultaneous holding of British hostages in Lebanon 
by Iranian-backed Muslim terrorists, changed this. Now, in producing its society as 
victimized and yet innocent at the hands of a domestic Muslim community linked to 
foreign Islamic militancy, the British/Muslim relationship became troubled through 
political passion, imbuing a discourse of political strife with stridency. and licensing the 
need for retribution. Thus, the entailments of Britain's own identity re-instantiated the 
boundary between the good which was England and the evil of Islamic extremism, a 
representation of 'other' that enabled it on its own terms to share common cause %ý ith its 
greatest and closest ally, the US. 
The passion unleashed by the Affair generalized responses of affront. both in 
public opinion and policy prescription. This can be observed in the increasiný-' Usage. 
once the fiinva had been issued, of 'terrorism' as a British securit-, issue. a term 
pre% ious ly utilized primarily for the IRA in Northern Ireland (O'Suili'Van 1986: 122). 
1-lippler sees the ideology of Islamic threat having become the site of -culturally defined 
racism'. the images used producing ýthe psychological prerequisites to justifv militar"' 
Chapter 7 Page 218 
action if necessary' (2000: 158). 'Rogue states are more difficult to control- stated Mrs. 
Thatcher. 'Islamic militancy threatens terrorism and instabilitY. ' (Free Enterprise Dinner 
Speech 20/4/1999). 
When, within days of thefatwa, Rushdie issued a serni-apology for the pain he 
had caused Muslims (though refraining from withdrawing the book). Tile Observer 
summed up the shame many liberals feared: 'The very worst result ofN,, lr. Rushdie's 
statement... would be if it were to give the impression that the fundamentalists had 
somehow won this one., and brought the West and its artists to its knees' ( 19/22,1989: 14). 
Using terms such as 'wining' and 'losing' pit the 'West' against 'fundamentalists' 
(whether at home or abroad), suggesting there was no currency of exchange, negotiating 
with the victimizer had become the equivalent of negotiating ., ýith a terrorist, and the 
relationship one of complete isolation. 
The translation of this discourse into the international gained traction as relations 
between Tehran and London deteriorated and as policyrnakers and the media in the 
heightened the rhetorical stakes. Noted R. J. Hollingdale in The Guardiun: *there is really 
no such thing as state terrorism: a hostile act by a state is an act of war' ('Iran Steps 
Beyond Terrorism', 12/2/1989). Meanwhile, the Senate condemned Khomeini's threat as 
'state-sponsored terrorism' and President George Bush stated that the US would hold 
Tehran responsible for attacks 'against American interests' (quote in Pipes 1990: 155). In 
En,,,, Iand, the sense of terror at the invasion of fundamental British rights was much the 
same. When Labour MP Roy Hattersley, stated at the end of a speech that, 'A free 
society does not ban books. Nor does it allow writers and publishers to be blackmailed or 
intimidated, ' nonetheless added that, likewise, in a free society 'the Muslim communitN 
must be allowed to do what it likes to do as long as the choice it makes is not damaging 
to the community as a ý, Nhole, ' he was met by scathing denouncements. including one b" 
1'. Pearce: 'The Hattersley faction of the Labour party has taken up a position at once 
illiberal, repressive and abjectly deferential to a bunch of Islamic clergý firmIN planted in 
the 15 th century'(quotes in Kuortti 1997: 19). Repressed shame. translated into ýý ithering 
denial of the other. ensured monologism would preclude any mediation. Thatcher's 
statement delivered to the Common\Nealth Summit in October 1989, recasts this -6eý\ as a 
prescription against policy complacency: 
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'There is a tendency to assume ... that liberal democracý has comprehensiNeIN defeated Marxism-Leninism and there vill in future be no other ideological 
challenge to it. That would be a very rash assumption ýOen one considers the 
continuing power of nationalist, authoritarian and extreme reilUIOL1ý1 
fundamentalist ideas. ' (margaretthatcher. org/speeches) 
The rhetorical strategy here leaves open the possibi I ity of further con flict \ýith national I st. 
authoritarian and extreme religious fundamentalist ideas, identifN in(-, them-rather than 
familiar third-world dictatorships or Chinese-style totalitarianism as the most serious 
threats to liberal democracy. As Khomeini earlier pointed out, it \ýas *ideas' that had 
become the domain of identity endangerment, rendering the *other' an existential threat. 
This is not to suggest that the nature of British foreign policN made an abrupt shift tomard 
the securitization of Islamic fundamentalism, but that the representational practices that 
had evolved established the conditions of possibility for heightened sensibilitý toward the 
Islamic other, and a construction of identity that, by virtue of the antagonisms established 
by the Affair, could instantiate and discipline clear borderlines between the liberal us and 
the illiberal, fundamentalist Muslim them. As discourse theoreticians Laclau and Mouffe 
most simply define it, identity blockage occurs when 'the presence of [an] Other pre'. ents 
rne from being totally myself (quote in Howarth et al. 2002: 10). Radical political Islamic 
practices came to be represented both in American and British discourses as pre\ýenting 
either from being themselves, or to project themselves to others. Fundamentalist Islamic 
ý-alues and its universalist claim to law and right community, were passionatelý 
enframed as blocking Western, and more specifically. Anglo-Saxon identity. a derailment 
understood not just as hostility to democracy, but as tragically destructive to human 
aspirations everywhere and thus, morally evil. 
Conclusion 
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Iran's was one of the great revolutions of the 20'h century and inspired i important N\ork in 
reconceptualizing classic understandings not only of intemal political catacksm, but of 
relations between states (Foucault 1979; Ganji 2006, Mirsepassi 2000. Skocpo 994: II 
chapter 10; Selikar 2000). Existing explanations (whether realist. liberal or 
constructivist) remain unsatisfactory, however for understanding the prolon'_'ed animositN 
in the relationships that evolved out of the revolution, the impact on \Vestern democratic 
claims, and the clemonization of radical Islam. This study has attempted to better 
comprehend these issues by exploring through structured study the role of moti\ ated bias 
in state policy responses. Emotions became the site of investigation as a result of a 
process of deduction. Motivations, as understood by liberal theorists, are explained in 
terms of resources and restraints, be they material or moral (Moravcsik 1997). Yet, to 
explain the ongoing hostility characterizing the Anglo-American relationship ýkith Iran in 
terms of such restraints seems inadequate to account for the preferences adopted hý both 
sides. Realist descriptions of state behaviour based on power. self-help and material 
threat identification likewise offered but a partial picture, as the acrimoný between Iran 
and the West was not material but primarily existential. Geo-strategic and energy 
imperatives would seem sufficiently compelling to have relieved the strains between 
them; instead, the relationship has worsened over the course of 30 years, as Iran has 
successively been condemned as a pariah, enemy (of Saddam, who was then conceived of 
as a friend of the West), international state terrorist, and, finally, member of the Axis of 
F vii. 
ge Further, moves bN Iran, which internally, through elections, have brought a ran( 
of presidents into (and out of) power, and exterrially, re-integrated it regionalk and 
ithin the larger association of Islamic and Central Asian states. ha" e had little impact on I 
the discourses of successive British and American administrations (ý\ ith the exception of 
the brief tha\\ in tensions in 1999 under US President Bill Clinton), suggesting the threat 
Iran represents is not structural. 
Normative explanations likev, ise are unsatistN ing). The practices and meaninu-, of 
the iclentltý roles adopted by the US and Britain, in xýhich theý perceke themsekes at the 
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leading edge of the Westem democracy project. did not easilý accommodate the rejection 
of an oil-rich nation overthrowing a dictatorship. and institutinu N a s. stem of ci% ic 
governance (Wendt 1992). Surely, the Anglo-American tradition includes relationships 
and democracy promotion with states whose leaders and oppositions objectkely ý%ere at 
least the equal of Iran's in terms of human rights abuse and authoritarianism, but ýNhose 
resources and geo-political positioning mitigated such concems (as, for example. Saudi 
Arabia, and Algeria)? What then distinguished Iran, and made it so irretrieýablý 
Normative analysis, in fact, is too dispassionate to offer a full explanation. Iran's 
relationship with the West is a study of passion. It was fi I led ýý ith Anglo-American rage 
at Iran's spurning of what the West valued most - its universalist ideals, %\hich included 
the vaunted altruistic intent by Americans and Britons to share what they considered the 
civilizing principles of democracy, modernization, and liberal capitalism within a 
framework of Western security. It seethed with the self-righteousness of the condemned - 
and the condemning; it became electrified in the public mind by the media theatre of the 
hostage crisis and conflagrations of the Rushdie Affair, and it resonated %ý ith the 
colourful but biting language of mutual demonization. 
Examining passion as a contributory factor therefore appeared worthwhile. and 
normative modes of analysis offered useful tools to study emotionalism in policN, 
construction. These tools include: concepts of identity politics-, an anti-foundationafiýst 
perspective; the enabling of agency; and importantly. discourse as a means to highlight 
parts of language and meaning, while enabling the parts to be integrated into an 
understanding of the whole over time, and vice versa. 
Once focused on, it became clear that emotions contributed not just to Anglo- 
American relations w-ith Iran, but were present in all international relations, though 
certainly not alxN, -ays in passionate ways (Bleiker and Hutchison 2008, Mercer 2005). 13ý 
being both a motivator and partner of reason, emotions are, like norms. constants in the 
structuring of decision-making (Crawford 2000). Yet, they are more fluid than norms, 
more physical, and. unlike norms, historically represented as something to keep in check 
(Marcus -2003. Ross 2005). Thus, the challenge xxas 
hoxN, to track them in a NNa,, 
sufficientix rigorous to be useful" Taking my cue from work done bý Scheff and 
Retzinger (1991) in the sociological field. but \Norkin(-y in the anarchic territorN of xýorld 
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politics already staked out by Adler and Barnett (1998), Bialh, -)"lattern (2W). coole 
(2005,2007), Crawford (2000), Doty (1996), Fierke (2004), Guillaume (200-1). Jer" i.,, 
(1976,1985), Larson (1989), Lebow (1981) and others %ýho have pursued beha\Ioura I. 
psychological, cognitive. and corporeal aspects in the politics of International relations. I 
have used shame and pride as the most reflexive emotions in order to calibrate relation', 
between closely communicating states over time. How shame is acknoý% ledged or 
dismissed, and where on the cycle of 'shame begetting shame'. or 'solidarit\ begetting 
solidarity' any given relationship finds itself, provides crucial insight into the emotion', 
that inform the behaviour of states. Pride and shame reflect identit\. and its important 
underpinning of norms that compose a state's imaginary of self. The transgression of 
those norms through shame threatens identity, and it is identity insecuritý that moti\, Ite,, 
states to establish security communities and special relationships. 
In examining the behaviour of states in closely knit relationships in terms of 
shame or pride, it emerged, however, that unacknowledged shame or false pride \ý as 
more prevalent in 'happy' settings than might otherwise be expected. This \ýas 
as it raised the spectre of special relationships (and security communities) that are not 
purely felicitous, but instead, can be suffocating or alienating, regardless of whether the 
involved states regard them as such. This re-conceptualizes the loo-ic of special 
relationships. Political love -a close relationship of choice - may in fact be so engulfing 
as to be threatening, despite the patina of we-ness and mutual embrace. Additional 1ý. a 
new category of special relationship, political strife, reveals an insecure communlt\, in 
\\hich two (or more) states are bonded, not out of choice, but out of a reflexive response 
to the normative threat represented by the other, the need for constant vigilance and self- 
protection constituting a relationship of isolation (Scheff and Retzinger 1991: 15). 
This opens a range of possibilities for understanding preferences, bargaining and 
threat-perception between states engaged in relationships with each other that are more 
constraining than beneficent. This, it can be argued, still fits the liberal construct of 
iscourse reý eals that the restraint'. However, observing the shame spiral in pattems of di 
ernotional dimension - that partner of reason - is, in situations of 
identItN threat. 
heightened, and hence, more salient, more passionate. than in balanced relat, onships. and 
rnore likek, therefore. to play an influential role in the decision-making, proce,, scs. 
I-aken 
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cumulatively, this suggests the conditions of possibiliv, for a reification of emotionalized 
policies in state practices. Stable relationships (or, in fact, an\ relationships %%hcre 
identity security has a low threat threshold) have a lok% emotionalized reL-pster: "Insecure' 
relationships have high emotionalized registers. These latter de"elop, patterns ol' 
emotionalized decision-making toward the other state (or states) %%hich can become 
normalized, and though often narcissistic and monological. nonetheless. respond 
reflexively to the emotionalized content in the responses of the other (Bakhtin 198 1: 
Campbell 1998; Guillaume 2002). 
Applying this theory and method to the case of the Anglo-American encounter 
with Iran, several important findings emerged. First, the US and Britain both established 
a special relationship of political love with the Shah, which proved engulfin-g for all three. 
The Anglo-American discourse passionately constructed the Shah as a model son of the 
West, adopting, without independent intelligence corroboration, his narrati",, e ofiran a, a 
stable, modernizing, secularizing state, and of the opposition as minor, anti-West, and 
terrorist (Bill 1988; Sick 1985, Milani 1994). 'Pride' in the Shah, and their o\ýn roles in 
his development plans, blinded - through hubris - both Washington and London to the 
forces of oncoming revolution, its Islamic framework, and the deep hatred of the Iranian 
majority toward the Shah (Keddie 1981,1987, Zunes 2003a, 2003b). The US ýestlng in 
political love for the 'Shah-as-Iran' discursively closed off possibilities for Washington 
to consider alternatives to him as his position weakened. Additionally, the shame of 
Khomeini's rejection not only of the Shah. but of Anglo-American involvement in Iran, 
their Western constructions of democracy and the secularism of governance. \ý as 
projected as threatening. An emotionalized Anglo-American discourse, therefore. 
rejected the leaders and purposes of the revolution as benighted and treacherous. %ýhile 
denying ýý rongdoing by the Shah or their own contribution to his doýý nfal I- 
Second, ongoing constructions of political love toward the Shah. rationalized. for 
example, in terms of honourable behaviour towards America's friends, denied that his 
clerical adversaries \\ere attempting to construct a democratic system. and therefore. 
despite Iran's holding of a referendum. the clraýNing up of a constitution. and the "Cating 
ot'an elected parliament. the US failed to formally recognize the Islamic Republic. 
LlkeýN ise. emotionalized discourses ignored Iranian fears that contimllm, [ TS Support t'()r 
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the Shah could imply intervention along the same lines as had occurred in 1953 %ý ith the 
overthrow of Mohammad Mossadeq. Passionate constructions based on Impaired 
historical memory of that previous era. and on exaggerated and over-simplified heuristic" 
of the clerical leadership as incompetent and naive, enabled the US to admit the 'ýhah into 
its territory out of false pride that its power was such that it did not need to ackno%ý ledle 
the repeated concerns or warnings of the Iranian government. This x%as an expre"sion oi 
political strife that shamed Iran, and in turn, exposed the US to the next sequence In tile 
spiral of alienation, which took the form of hostage taking (Scheff and Retzinger 
1991: 68-69). 
Third, the passionate construction of the US as the innocent % Ictim in the hosta, --, c 
affair, outside any reference to past Iran-American relations, inspired an emotionalized 
narrative of public domestic suffering, in which all America ýýas perceived as field 
hostage, and Iran as barbarous and in the wrong. US failure to ackno\ý ledge Iran's oýýn 
perceptions of victimization at the hands of the Shah. or the effect of past Anglo- 
American practices, while Iran's own shame was projected as anger and condemnation 
ofthe US, perpetuated the recurring loop of mutualized disrespect and discursive attack. 
ý6ich reflected continuing social bonding in a relationship of isolation (ibid). 
Fourth, the release of the hostages in a deal that failed to necessitate aný 
acknowledgement of the others' grievances perpetuated the spiral of shaming in rcified 
policy orientations. Continuously threatened by Iran's adoption and aggressi,., c export of 
an alternative (Islamic) doctrine of universalist ideals, the new administration ofRonald 
Reagan adopted a reactive Iran policy based on a politics of strife (continuous suspicion. 
anger. fear, distrust) and constructed (Shia) Islamic terrorism as linked and on a par ý% ith 
totalitarian violence (Kirkpatrick 1984). This enabled the formulation of Iran as the 
greater danger in the Iran-Iraq war, and fuelled the mobilization of the 
First War on 
Terrorism as a mechanism of identity security. This passionate construction of Iran 
helped blind the administration to forces of Islamic radicalism in the Sunni communities. 
enabling alliances in Afghanistan, for example, that %%ould ha\ e serious consequence,, tor 
: \nierican interests. 
Fifth. the emotionalized grammar. ý\hich constructed Islamism as a threat to 
S ý'ta C Western norms and practices of human rights, and Iran as a rol-'Lle and in, tiuator of t- 
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sponsored terrorism against the West, was absorbed into the liberal British discourse in 
its own encounter with Iran and radical Islam during the Salman Rushdie 
. _\t, 1, air. 
Revealing the tensions that existed in the relationship of engulfirrient bemeen the \Iuslim 
communities and the British social body, the Affair prompted an emotionalized dkcour,, C 
contingent on re-securing the British imaginary of self as a tolerant societ\. In the courc 
of privileging 'core British values', the spiral of shame . Nas perpetuated as tile 'grieNance" 
ofthe anti-Rushdie factions were denied both domestically and inter-nationally, a process 
vvhich linked interrial Muslim communities to exterrial ones and produced an isolatin" 
relationship with Iran. In this way. passionate constructions of Iran and Islamic political 
radicalism were shared within a re-energized Anglo-American discourse, in %Nhich cach 
state had separately produced an encounter with the Islamic Republic as bruising and 
endangering. 
Sixth, this mutualized, if independently sourced discourse, served to rcif,, 
emotionalized policy prescriptions as appropriate and ýýarranted. Representations of bad 
I'aith and suspicious behaviour on the part of the 'other' contributed to an ongoing 
relationship of political strife, the war of words symptomatic of the threatened social 
bonds that still existed with Iran, and with proponents of radical Islam. The perpetuation 
ofpolicy that continuously privileged norm protection over material interests or Cýen 
moral ones, such as support of Saddarn Hossein against Iran (at the very least, a moral 
dilemma), suggests that the motivation to protect identity security in the face of' 
perceived threat, most especially existential threat, vill over-shadoýk policy based on 
material interest protection. Emotionalized decision-making is therefore *rationalized' on 
the basis of conviction, and 'rational' arguments used to explain normative 
inconsistencies and actions against a state's 'best interests' (Keddie 1987). 
In sum, the politics of passion provides a theoretical frame"ork for building an 
Linderstanding of hovv states enter spirals of vengeance. self-righteousness. and _, uilt. as 
\ýell as spirals of connectedness, and how, these spirals effect short-term as ýýell as Iong- 
term polic\ choices in certain relationships. Its ability to reveal ne\ý structural aspects Ot 
special relationships suggests that the application of this theor\ to other aspect', ot 
international relations anahy-sis could prove revealing. and that in an\ C\ent. 
it may 
of special relationships in other speci ic ca pro\ ide a more nuanced understandin, 
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such as between the US and Cuba or Israel, or. for example. beMeen China alld Tal%%an. 
It can be understood, in this case, to contribute to an understanding ot I the ongoing Zý 
politics of strife that perpetuates a relationship of isolation betmveen Iran and the 
American world, and how that politics has informed the discourse of democracN and 
radicalized Islam in the context of the first and second \Vars on Terror. 
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